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ABSTRACT 
 
 
What determines technology capabilities and catch-up of countries? Why do the patterns, 
speed and performance of innovation differ across countries? This thesis seeks to address 
these questions by linking institutional, organisational and sectoral features of innovation 
in Korea and Japan which are regarded as the most successful cases of technology catch-
up. Despite the widespread recognition that innovators are susceptible to institutional 
conditions and contextual influences, previous empirical studies have not used contextual 
factors as determinants of innovation. On the other hand, institutional analysis of 
innovation has addressed national diversity and historical patterns of change based on 
thick description and qualitative evidence. This thesis provides a new way of explaining 
the underlying of dynamics of innovation by empirically examining direct correlations 
between country-specific institutional characteristics and technology capabilities and by 
testing causal relationships between technology input and output. This thesis employs the 
national innovation system (NIS) and the late industrialiser perspectives to perform three 
sets of empirical analyses. The first indentifies key institutional and policy determinants 
of national technology capabilities based on five sets of cross-sectional data, consisting of 
37 high-income countries and 32 middle-income countries. The second examines specific 
institutional conditions for causal relationships between technology input and output 
based on time-series data of Korea and Japan. The third investigates technological catch-
up occurrence, speed and performance to indentify productivity and technology gaps as 
well as delaying and contributing factors. The findings of the thesis have significant 
relevance to innovation strategy and policy of other catching-up countries in the process 
of building indigenous technology capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivations 
What determines technology catch-up and capabilities of countries? Why do the patterns, 
speed and performance of innovation and sectoral specialisation differ across countries? 
Under what condition is rapid technological catch-up of countries undertaken? This thesis 
seeks to address these questions by linking institutional, organisational and sectoral 
features of Korea and Japan to their economic and technology catch-up performance. 
Given that an institution could be defined as the formal structure or mechanism for 
political rule-making and enforcement to govern cooperative human behaviour (Schotter, 
1981; North, 1990), this thesis examines the trajectory of institutional reform and its 
effects on technology capability of two most rapidly catching-up economies in East Asia, 
Korea and Japan. The analysis of institutional change in terms of National Innovation 
System (NIS), industrial structure, financial system and intellectual property (IP) regime 
show how the countries control and adjust the allocation and distribution of resources for 
economic and technological growth.   
Despite previous academic efforts to examine idiosyncratic features of innovation 
systems and activities at various levels, there is little satisfactory explanation for the 
dynamics of institutional reform and its effect on technology capabilities empirically in 
innovation literature. Existing studies on innovation, adopting the institutional perspective 
and NIS approach, address institutional and policy factors as important sources of 
economic growth, but do not attempt to examine their impacts on technology catch-up 
and innovation performance empirically. This thesis fills the gap by empirically analysing 
how county-specific institutional and policy frameworks contribute to the development of 
technology and innovation activities. The institutional and policy factors contributing to 
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technology capabilities and innovation performance, including economic policy, trade 
policy, finance system, organisational structure, national innovation system (NIS) and 
sectoral innovation system are introduced in the theoretical framework and empirical 
research design. They are operationalised to analyse their consequences of catch-up 
pattern, sectroal specialisation and innovation performance in the contexts of Korea and 
Japan.  
There are a number of studies based on an institutional perspective in social 
sciences that identify determinants of technology progress. Industrial organisation 
economics literature mainly stresses on market size, concentration, integration and 
diversification the underlying of industrial structure as important sources of the growth in 
terms of income, finance and technology (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; Bain, 1956; Kamien 
and Schwartz, 1975; 1982; Scherer, 1965, 1990; Sutton, 1998 Williamson, 1965). 
Strategic management literature emphasises on the development of firm specific 
capabilities and governance structure as the main determinant of innovation and 
competiveness (Barney, 1989; Rumelt, 1991). In this sense, these two streams of research 
do not provide a proper treatment of the role of government and public institutions in the 
process of technological innovation (Malerba, 2002), without a proper regard to different 
institutional and sectoral contexts. Therefore, the variations in technology catch-up 
patterns, sectoral specialisations and innovation capabilities across firms, industries and 
countries cannot be sufficiently explained (Freeman, 1995, 1997; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993; Edquist, 1997). Also, most of these studies are based on the context of advanced 
countries, while paying little attention to the context of emerging or developing countries.  
 The NIS literature examines the patterns of innovation and growth strategies 
across countries by looking at the country-specific institutional governance as an 
important source of innovation performance. A specific institutional configuration that 
shapes NIS leads to distinctive coordination mechanisms, learning processes and roles of 
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players (Kogut, 1991; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1998). It highlights a complex set of 
relationships among the key players in the country specific system of stock and flow of 
knowledge (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Archbugi and 
Lundvall, 2001). In this sense, the NIS approach provides an insightful framework to 
explain a dynamic relationship between institutional arrangements and technology 
development. However, the NIS approach shows some weaknesses in addressing my 
research questions. The NIS approach has limitations in analysing the contexts of the 
latecomers countries, since the principles and configurations of the NIS are modelled on 
the systems of advanced countries. It proposes universal formula which is developed by 
technologically advanced economies and hence emphasises strong institutional links and 
professional networks (State-University-Industry relationship) as logical premises for 
effective creation and diffusion of new knowledge. Therefore, this approach cannot 
capture the distinctive features of innovation systems of Korea and Japan in a satisfactory 
way (e.g., extensive government supports and close ties between government and 
business). Despite a weak State-University-Industry relationship due to the lack of 
university R&D capabilities, the countries have achieved a rapid economic growth and 
technological catch-up. Further, the NIS approach suggests that technological change is 
determined by inside factors of the system, but it is often influenced by outside factors of 
the system (Viotti, 2002). This implies that a great part of innovative products and 
services are generated not only by home-grown capabilities, but also by global activities, 
such as foreign direct investment (FDI), internationalisation of R&D, cross-border 
strategic alliance (Patel and Pavitt, 1998; Archibugi and Lundvall, 2001; Archibugi and 
Pietrobelli, 2003). Their global activities in turn blur the boundaries of NIS. 
Such weak points underlying the NIS approach could be complemented by the late 
industrialiser perspective. The late industrialiser perspective focuses on the significance 
of country-specific structural and institutional conditions for resource accumulation as 
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critical elements in spurring rapid industrial and economic growth in the contexts of 
latecomers or developing economics (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; E. Kim, 1997; 
Mathews and Cho, 1999). This perspective addresses not only the role of national 
endowment of science and technology (S&T), but also the role of institutional 
configurations and contextual factors in the processes of industrialisation and innovation. 
However, both the NIS and the late industrialiser perspectives provide static descriptions 
of national institutional devices and endogenous mechanisms for learning and 
coordination, without proper regard to the trajectory of institutional change and special 
regional and sectoral contexts. Therefore, this thesis extends these perspectives and tries 
to build a more dynamic account of country-level technological change.  
Largely based on the NIS and late industrialiser perspectives, this thesis provides 
three sets of empirical analyses to examine the determinants of technology capabilities 
across countries on the one hand, and the determinants of technology catch-up 
performance in Korea and Japan as case studies on the other. The first analysis indentifies 
key determinants of technology capabilities based on five sets of cross-sectional data, 
consisting of 37 high-income countries and 32 middle-income countries. Looking at the 
big picture using cross-sectional data is crucial for generalising the importance of 
institutional framework on innovation and assessing the relative significance of 
institutional factors before examining the details. This study examines the impact of 
institutional and policy factors related to economic freedom and liberal regulatory system 
on the national technology input and output. The findings of the negative effect of liberal 
economic system for domestic market entry and capital flow provide new explanation and 
theoretical implications since the statistical outcome derived from the cross-national 
research do not conform to many economic and management theories, including resource-
based view, transactions cost economics and varieties of capitalism  In addition, I found 
that the size of government acts as a moderator of regulation and foreign trade effects on 
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national technology capabilities, indicating that small government size in the combination 
with the liberalised domestic market and foreign trade systems facilitates technology 
investment and creation. However, most previous macro-empirical studies on innovation 
mainly examined its close correlation with the growth in terms of productivity, economy 
and competitiveness, even though catch-up process and innovation performance are 
seriously affected by socio-economic and institutional conditions. The possible reasons 
why they have not attempted to examine these relationships across countries are due to 
difficulties in moderating countries’ huge technology gaps, different levels of economic 
development, and various institutions. In this sense, this country-level analysis is a new 
attempt to empirically examine these linkages by controlling various institutional and 
organisational characteristics of countries.  
The second analysis examines specific institutional conditions for the technology 
input–technology output relationship based on time-series data by employing the triple-
helix indicators within NIS and  the contextual factors in Korea’s and Japan’s innovation 
systems. With the causality test, similar or different patterns of technological development 
in Korea and Japan are discussed. In both countries, the governments have played a 
pivotal role in coordinating and supporting innovation activities for rapid economic 
growth, while embracing the role of private sector R&D and foreign technology transfer 
over time. Compared with Japan’s innovation system, Korea’ innovation system shows 
more effective public R&D and dependent on foreign techniques in the creation of 
national technology. However, most previous studies on NIS looked at the country-
specific institutional setting in a historical approach, and descriptively analysed its role 
technology capabilities and innovation.  
Also, I could not find any empirical studies employing the causality test to 
examine the causal relations between innovation output variables, say patent production, 
and innovation input variables, say R&D expenditure. Most empirical studies on 
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innovation address technology investment as an important determinant of economic 
growth and innovation performance, looking at their relationship through correlation test. 
The greater part of this area examined the direction of causality between economic and 
financial variables. The representative studies are the causal relations between financial 
development (e.g., stock market volatility and capitalisation) and economic growth (e.g., 
GDP) (Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Calderón and Liu, 2003), between FDI and 
economic growth (Hansen and Rand, 2006; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006), between capital 
investment and economic growth (Vanhoudt, 1998; Elena and Gaetano, 2001) and 
between international trade (e.g., export and import ) and productivity (Awokuse, 2008; 
Harrison, 2007). Therefore, this empirical analysis provides a new way of explaining the 
underlying dynamics of rapid technology catch-up and innovation progress in Korea and 
Japan by testing the causal relationship of technology investment with respect to 
technology creation.  
The third analysis examines the level of technology capabilities and 
competitiveness of Korea and Japan by analysing in which industrial sectors Korea 
rapidly caught up with Japan through the estimation of the productivity gap between the 
two countries, given that technical progress and innovation are directly related and 
contributed to the growth of TFP.  By introducing institutional and policy factors, the key 
determinants of technology catch-up occurrence, speed and performance that influence on 
latecomer countries’ technology capabilities and innovation are identified to compare 
distinctive catch-up patterns between the two countries. The distinctive patterns and 
determinants of Korea’s catch-up also are analysed by comparing those with other catch-
up countries, particularly Taiwan. As a comparative bench mark of Japanese firms, this 
analysis highlights that industrial sectors required for explicitness of knowledge and 
embodied technology transfer, and in monopolistic market structure and export-oriented 
growth are more likely to occur catch-up at fast face. It implies that knowledge regime, 
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finance system and trade policy are important factors facilitating technology catch-up and 
competitiveness in the contexts of catch-up countries. Based on this empirical analysis, 
the two path-creating catch-up models of biotechnology and wireless telecommunications 
technology in Korea and Japan, implying that latecomer firms explore their own path of 
technological development and innovation, are selected as case studies. It attempts to find 
the delay factors (biotechnology) and the contributing factors (wireless 
telecommunications technology) affecting technological catch-up and innovation, as well 
as policy measures for improvement from the view point of NIS.  
Do the selected cases meet the criteria for case section and the condition for a 
comparative analysis? To choose the cases, this thesis adopts both a positivist approach 
(69 developed and developing economies) and a phenomenological approach (Korea and 
Japan). In a positivist approach that selects many cases as possible from similarity of case 
background, the cross sectional research using such large numbers of 69 countries can 
reduce the risk of case-biased findings and generalisability (Saunders et al., 2003), but 
tends to omit intrinsic importance of cases as well as their contextual background 
conditions (Yin, 1994). To complement the methodological shortcomings in the 
positivism, I choose Korea and Japan as representativeness in a phenomenological 
approach that provides in-depth understanding of the phenomenon with a detailed 
contextual analysis and an examination of the outlier characteristics (Stake, 1994; Gerring, 
2004). However, a phenomenological approach has the weakness in conceptualising and 
generalising the findings from a few cases (Stake, 1994), hence the clustering method is 
used for a rational choice of case countries. In high-income economies, Korea and Japan 
share similar backgrounds of technological development, institutional characteristics, and 
socio-economic contexts.  For systematic comparison, this thesis uses the method of 
agreement or positive comparison between the cases that are somehow similar in 
characteristics.  
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What similarities do Korea and Japan have in common?  First, Korea and Japan 
have similar background of economic and technological developments. Both Korea and 
Japan are most rapidly technology catch-up countries and now the world top scientific 
technology-oriented countries, breaking from subsistence agricultural society and war-
torn nation (OECD, 2004). Korea has followed the Japanese growth patterns in some 
ways for economic recovery and technological catch-up. The success story of these 
countries are attributable to high investment and accumulation of growth factors (Nadri, 
1994), effective government industrial technology policies, government intervention in 
domestic market and an export-led industrialisation strategy (Chang, 1993; World Bank, 
1993; Woo, 1999). The dynamic change of growth strategies in Japan according to the 
level of economic development (from labour-intensive industries to heavy and chemical 
industries and then R&D-intensive industries) reflected Korea’s economic and industrial 
policies to transform its industrial structure in the same way (Stern et al., 1995). It has 
enabled Korea to enter the same market as Japan as a competitor. Second, Korea and 
Japan share similar features of finance system, such as a strong government intervention 
in financial sectors, a strict regulation on the allocation of financial resources, and a 
significant government subsidisation of the cost of borrowing in the product and process 
of innovation. The governments act as a risk-sharing partner with industry and banks to 
facilitate R&D expenditures in high-yield industries in which income elasticity of demand 
has been high and technological progress has been rapid.  Third, there is a strong 
resemblance between Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems. Government and large 
industrial firms are key contributors to their innovation system, while universities and 
high-tech start-ups have relatively lower R&D capabilities compared with the 
technologically advanced countries. Fourth, Korea’s large business group (chaebol)-
centred system and their close ties with government are much more similar to Japan’s 
than any other business models within high-income countries and other East Asian Newly 
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Industrialised countries (e.g., Taiwan and Singapore). Korean chaebol is analogous to 
Japanese Zaibatsu (family-owned conglomerate), which is different from the current 
Japanese corporate ‘families’ centred on a bank, namely Keiretsu (Chang; 2003). 
Therefore, the selected cases in this thesis satisfy the criteria of case selection and the 
condition for a comparative analysis. The case studies of Korea and Japan allows us to 
test the usefulness of existing innovation studies and theories that have primarily been 
developed in Western advanced countries, while providing important implications for 
emerging or catch-up countries in relation to the question of in what ways they should 
manage their indigenous innovations. 
 
1.2 Research Purpose and Questions 
This thesis has four research questions in relation to determining factors for national 
technology capabilities. The first is to investigate the role of government regulation and 
policy in the development of technology capabilities, since innovative activities of actors 
within the NIS are very sensitive to the governance capability of the administration that 
changes market structure and trade policy and consequently the stock and flow of capital 
(Friedman, 1993; Lee and Yoo, 2007). Globalisation causes institutional transformation 
such as the change of ownership structure and regulatory policy (Goyer, 2003; Hoskisson 
et al., 2004), forcing countries to conform to market mechanisms and undertake legal 
reforms to attract more FDI (Kogut and Macpherson, 2003). To allocate and utilise 
resources such as R&D efficiently, the government reduces the tax burden for technology 
trade and investment abroad, while easing regulations in local credit, labour and business 
markets to facilitate cooperation among economic actors rather than dependence on the 
State (Hall and Soskice, 2001). This gives rise to a heated debate on neo-liberalism versus 
state coordination (Evans, 1997; McMichael, 1996).  
If it is so, does the liberalisation of trade and capital movement (labour, credit and 
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businesses) always make a positive contribution to the stock and flow of knowledge and 
technology? Does a heavy regulatory policy impede the dynamics of innovation 
activities?  What makes the state-led economies, such as Korea and Japan, rapidly catch 
up and develop technology capabilities then? Economic freedom and free capital flow in a 
more liberal regulatory system is expected to have positive effects on technological catch-
up and innovation performance since a lower regulatory burden on market entry and trade 
increases entrepreneurial opportunities and R&D cooperation (Goh, 2005; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Jameson and Soule, 1991). Therefore, this leads to question 1. 
 
Research Question 1: 
In what ways do government regulation and policies affect technology catch-up 
and technology capabilities of Korea and Japan? 
 
The second is to investigate institutional conditions for technology capabilities 
from the view point of NIS. Given that different NIS leads to differences in learning 
process, patterns of technology catch-up and innovation performance across countries, it 
is important to examine how key players within the NIS and contextual factors have 
contributed to rapid technology catch-up and in the contexts of Korea and Japan. Previous 
studies on innovation systems of Korea and Japan highlight that government, large firms 
and universities play a central role in shaping the NIS as driving the rapid catch-up in 
both Korea and Japan. The Korean government has stronger leadership in the process of 
technology catch-up as a financier and a performer of R&D compared to the Japanese 
government that plays the role of a mediator or a facilitator. Large industrial firms have 
been the dominant players while universities have still lower level of research capabilities 
and lower contribution to innovation systems in both countries compared with the frontier 
countries (Harayama, 2001; Rhee, 2004; Park, 2004; ISI et al., 2008).  
If it is so, how much of the current technology output (or technology input) can be 
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explained by past values of technology input (or technology output), whether adding 
lagged values of technology output (or technology input) can improve the explanation, 
and which researcher performers are more effective and innovative in technology 
investment and creation in the contexts of Korea and Japan. This leads to question 2.  
 
Research Question 2: 
In what ways do key actors within the NIS and contextual factors affect technology 
catch-up and technology capabilities of Korea and Japan?  
 
The third is to investigate the role of technology regime, sectoral innovation 
system and institutions related to S&T in the process of technology catch-up and the 
development of national technology capabilities. Technical innovation is stressed in 
various academic fields, because of the persistent disparity between the poor and the rich 
in the world, as well as the stunted growth of middle-income countries (Esterly, 2001; 
Jung and Lee, 2010). However, Korea and Japan have shown remarkable achievements of 
economic growth and technological catch-up. The rapid and sustained economic growth 
of these countries is attributable to their innovation-based growth strategy focusing on 
distinctive mechanisms of knowledge creation, learning process and technological 
innovation (Hobday, 1995; Rodrik, 1999; Kim and Nelson, 2000; UNCTAD, 2003). The 
institutional conditions conducive to the accumulation and diffusion of technological 
capabilities underpin the economic miracle of Korea and Japan. The countries have been 
often cited in various fields of academic literature as successful examples of the state-led 
capitalist model. Korea has followed the Japanese route to industrialisation, 
internationalisation and innovation processes with similar characteristics of political and 
institutional frameworks, while Japanese firms serve as a model to Korean firms in terms 
of corporate governance (e.g., ownership concentration), institutional arrangement (e.g., 
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business groups), overseas expansion, technological catch-up and innovation system.   
Given the similar patterns and mechanisms of catch-up, which industrial sectors of 
Korea have rapidly caught up with those of Japan?  What determines the occurrence, 
speed and performance of Korean firms’ catch-up in successful industries? What are the 
key institutional conditions for the catch-up success?  This leads to question 3.  
 
Research Question 3: 
What determines the occurrence and speed of technology catch-up and the level of 
technology capabilities in Korea and Japan? 
 
The fourth is to investigate the role of sectoral policy and institutional framework, 
and their contributions to the development of radically innovative capabilities, with 
particular reference to biotechnology and wireless telecommunication industries in Korea 
and Japan. Biotechnology and wireless telecommunication are radically-innovating 
sectors associated with entrepreneurial business model (i.e., Silicon Valley model), which 
have particular distinguishing features of ‘the management of high-risk finance’, ‘the 
development of human resources within a competency destroying environment’ and ‘the 
creation of sufficiently high-powered motivational incentives of personnel’ (Casper, 2009, 
p.365).  
A large comparative political economists that propose a direct theory linking 
institutions to firms’ innovative capabilities and sectroal specialisation analyses how 
differences in corporate governance, organisational types, labour market system, financial 
system and firm relations influence patterns of innovation, technology changes and 
sectoral specialisation across countries. National financial and business systems, in which 
firms develop innovative capabilities internally with long-term investments in the 
accumulation of a stock of organisation-specific knowledge, tend to promote incremental 
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and customer-focused innovations involved in a cumulative and path-dependent 
technology change within an established paradigm (Caspar, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Haake, 2002; Tylecote, 2007). Reliance on such a cumulative and collective 
knowledge in the development of innovative capabilities makes it difficult firms to 
reconfigure their organisational structures, while locking in current trajectories (Whitey, 
2002). Based on this, Korea’s and Japan’s financial and business systems (i.e., high levels 
of industry embeddedness, high dependence of inter-firm and in-house R&D, non 
cooperative with external organisations) are conductive to incrementally-innovating 
sectors, such as consumer electronics, machine tools and cars, while providing little 
incentives for firms to perform discontinues and radical innovations, such as 
biotechnology and ICT sectors (Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008; Casper, 
2009). Given that highly specialised entrepreneurs could rapidly acquire and use new 
knowledge in pursuing distinctive research agenda (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 
2002; Tylecote, 2007), the countries’ systems dominated by large firms can be a obstacle 
to developing innovative capabilities in fast-growing and newly-emerging industries, 
because of low degrees of labour mobility, the availability of venture capital and 
university-spin offs. The absence of the availability of expert finance for new firms limit 
the reconfiguration of their structures to rapidly use of new knowledge and acquiring 
radically new opportunities responding to the rapidly changing environment ─ a complete 
trajectory shift for a new technological paradigm (Caspar, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Lazonick; 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008).  
In the idealised types proposed by varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework, hence 
the two coordinated economies (state-coordinated system in Korea and business groups-
coordinated system in Japan) tend to adopt high-quality incremental innovation strategies, 
since their institutional frameworks are unfavourable for the industries involved in radical 
shifts direction in absence of market-based institutions and venture capital (Whitley, 
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2002; Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008). However, Korea and Japan get 
abreast of liberal-market economies as radical innovators in many high-tech sectors by 
successfully harmonising the contradictory forces of market-based restructuring 
(individualism) and relationship-based innovation (communitarianism) (Lee and Yoo, 
2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008). Such an inconsistency in this dichotomy in the 
application to the contexts of Korea and Japan suggests that variations in the rate and 
types of technical changes across countries should be explained by integrating variations 
in government S&T policies, NIS and sectoral innovation system. Differences in 
Government policies and innovation systems can reflect firms’ actions in the development 
of distinctive innovative competences and strategies.  
In this sense, it is critical to analyse how effectively government policy facilitate 
radical innovation by coordinating institutional complementarities operating within their 
financial and business systems and how sectoral-specific policies interact with economy-
wide institutional incentives and constraints in the countries. Whilst Korea and Japan 
have achieved rapid catch-up in the wireless telecommunications industry, they have not 
shown any significant success in biotechnology industry. Why have Korea and Japan 
experienced a pathetic return on a large scale of government funding and corporate R&D 
for biotechnology? How have Korea and Japan managed to catch up rapidly with wireless 
technologies of advanced countries at higher speed than biotechnology, even though the 
policy priority has been placed on attaining developments in both wireless technology and 
biotechnology? Why have ICT capabilities of Korea surpassed that of Japan in terms of 
new technology creation, despite smaller investments and funding? Is the Triple helix 
paradigm appropriate for explaining the development of the biotechnology and wireless 
telecommunications industries? This leads to question 4.  
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Research Question 4: 
What are the contributing and delaying factors affecting the catch-up success in 
biotechnology and wireless telecommunication industries in Korea and Japan?  
 
This thesis jointly uses quantitative and qualitative methods to operationalise the 
research questions and test the validity of the arguments. After indentifying the existence 
or absence of causations though the correlation tests between institutional factors and 
national technology capabilities in 69 countries, a comparative historical research through 
typological analysis and process analysis and Ganger causality test are employed to 
demonstrate the empirical validity in case studies. The statistical findings derived from 
the cross-country regression are appraised within the specified contexts by providing fine-
grained and convincing evidence within Korea and Japan.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
This PhD thesis is organised in eight chapters: introduction, review of innovation 
literature, theoretical framework, methodology and research design, institutional 
conditions for national technology capabilities (a cross-county study), institutions, 
government policies and technology capabilities (a case study on Korea and Japan), 
technology catch-up and sectoral innovation system (a case study on biotechnology and 
wireless telecommunication industry in Korea and Japan), and discussion and conclusion.  
The chapters of this thesis are outlined as follows. Chapter one (Introduction) 
provides the research background, motivations and questions, and the methodological 
approach and research contributions are stated.  
Chapter two (review of innovation literature) provides a critical review of 
theoretical and empirical literature on innovation focusing on determinants of technology 
catch-up and capabilities. After a discussion of the concept of innovation and technology 
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capabilities, the second section reviews previous theoretical studies on generations of 
innovation models and NIS. The previous empirical studies on determinants of 
technology capabilities and innovation performance are critically reviewed to assess their 
main contributions and limitations in the third section. The last section reviews the 
specific literature on innovation in the contexts of latecomer economies for the contextual 
understanding the characteristics of their technological catch-up, particularly attention to 
Korea and Japan. This chapter clarifies the theoretical and empirical gap in understanding 
institutional change in NIS, industrial structure, IPRs and finance system, and its 
influence on technology capabilities and innovation.  
Chapter three (Theoretical Framework) develops a theoretical framework for a 
systematic and empirical analysis of technological catch-up and innovation by 
incorporating NIS approach with the institutional theory and the late industrialiser 
perspective. The second section provides a broad theoretical background on a critical 
assessment of how government public policy and NIS influence national technology 
capabilities and innovation in Korea and Japan. The third section discusses the usefulness 
of institutional theory and NIS perspective in addressing the technological catch-up and 
dynamics of innovation of Korea and Japan. The last section concludes with discussion 
for empirical analyses based on the newly suggested theoretical framework and its 
strengths. In the theoretical framework, institutional effects of innovation are 
operationalised at the national level and sectoral level to capture the role of government 
regulation and policy, and finance system, industrial structure, IPR and NIS in the process 
of technology catch-up and development of technology capabilities. The empirical 
investigations are performed in chapters 5 and 6.  
Chapter four (Methodology and Research Design) discuses research design, 
method and data for the empirical study. The first section presents the basic research 
strategy of this thesis to develop an appropriate research design and appraise the worth of 
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my methodological framework. The second section justifies the rationale for the choice of 
case countries of Korea and Japan, and data reliability of this study. Then, I address the 
key issues of methodology that have been used in the existing innovation studies to 
decrease the risk of method effect. In the methodological framework, a cross-sectional 
analysis is performed to examine the role of institutions and policy in technology 
capabilities across countries. With the findings from a cross-sectional analysis, a 
comparative approach is taken to investigate the distinguishable institutional 
characteristics of Korea and Japan, and examine their effects on technology catch-up 
performances.  
Chapter five (Institutional Conditions for National Technology Capabilities:  A 
Cross-County Study) provides empirical analysis in relation to determinants of 
technology capabilities across countries to find answers to the research question 1. This 
empirical study investigates the effects of economic freedom and liberal regulatory 
system in the national technology input and output on the assumption that the stock and 
flow of knowledge, and R&D cooperation/competition are directly affected by 
institutional conditions for market entry, voluntary exchange of capital and foreign trade. 
After a discussion of estimation result, the methodological limitations and future research 
are followed by the end of this chapter. 
Chapter six (Institutions, Government Policies and Technology Capabilities: A 
Case Study on Korea and Japan) explores a historical background of technological 
development and innovation in Korea and Japan. It provides the contextual understanding 
the extent to which they have achieved the rapid economic and technological catch-up 
with the advanced countries. After the brief outline of historical characteristics of S&T 
policy in Korea and Japan, I evaluate the effectiveness of their S&T policy and 
institutional framework. Furthermore, this chapter provides the historical and contextual 
analysis of specific institutional arrangements and policy change in industrial structure, 
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NIS, finance system and IPRs in Korea and Japan. By introducing the triple indicators 
within NIS and the contextual factors, different institutional conditions for technology 
input–technology output relationships and the patterns of technological development in 
Korea and Japan are compared through the causality test. 
Chapter seven (Technology Catch-up and Sectoral Innovation system: A Case 
Study on Biotechnology and Wireless telecommunication Industry in Korea and Japan) 
discusses the level of technology capabilities and competitiveness by analysing in which 
industrial sectors Korea and Japan rapidly caught up. Also, different patterns of catch-up 
between the two countries are analysed by examining determinants of occurrence, speed 
and performance of catch-up. Furthermore, two cases studies, biotechnology and wireless 
technology, are performed to indentify key contributing (or delay) factors affecting 
technological catch-up performance and capabilities.  
Chapter eight (Conclusion) provides a summary of key arguments in the findings, 
contribution, limitation and further research directions of this thesis, along with 
managerial, policy and research implications.  
 
1.4 Research Contribution  
This thesis links a comparative institutional analysis at the country level and a sectoral 
level analysis based on the NIS and late industrialiser perspectives. To address a series of 
research questions in relation to technology capabilities and innovation, it examines the 
extent to which technological catch-up performance and innovation capabilities of 
industries and countries are influenced by institutional changes in government regulation, 
policy and finance system and innovation system. The new perspective developed here is 
shown to have relevance to and provide more evidence on an on-going debate on 
institutional and organisational conditions for innovation and technology capabilities. 
The theoretical framework of this research indentifies political, economic and 
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institutional characteristics of high-income and middle-income countries and their 
impacts on technology capabilities so as to find policy measures for improvement. This 
provides new theoretical and empirical insights that may be of interest to institutional 
theorists, strategic and technology management scholars and policy makers. Also, a series 
of empirical investigations on distinctive contexts of the East Asian latecomer countries 
(Korea and Japan) provides a new analytical model of determinants of technology 
capabilities and industrial catch-up performance. The case studies of Korea and Japan fill 
the gap of conventional theories. Since conventional economics and management theories 
are derived from the advanced Western countries’ experiences of industrialisation, 
internationalisation and innovation processes, there remains a question whether the 
theories are applicable to the contexts of emerging or latecomer economics, especially the 
East Asian State-led capitalist countries (Korea and Japan). There is no doubt that the 
governmental leadership and institutional embeddedness in Korea and Japan are directly 
related to their success in industrial reform, overseas expansions and innovation. However, 
the conventional theory insignificantly addressees political, institutional and sociological 
factors as the leading determinants to succeed (Boisot and Child, 1996; Peng, 2000; 
Warner et al., 2004), which may lead to the question whether the extant business theories 
are a pertinent indicator to the context of the East Asian State-led capitalist countries.  
The contribution of this thesis is as follows. First, it empirically views a direct 
correlation of the country-specific institutional characteristics with technology 
capabilities. The previous empirical studies on innovation did not address contextual 
factors as determinants of innovation in spite of the widespread recognition that 
innovators are susceptible to institutional conditions and contextual influences. Although 
there is no doubt that the success of the country’s technology capacity-building and 
innovation depend on its inherent administrative legislation and institutional framework, 
the majority of empirical studies addressed the institutional and policy factors as 
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determinants of economic variables, such as total factor productivity, national income and 
growth (e.g., La Porta, 1999; Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Calderón and Liu, 2003; 
Awokuse, 2008). Therefore, this study is a new attempt to empirically examine the effects 
of government regulation and policy on technology capabilities across countries. Since 
the mobility of capital and labour, venture business and FDI play the important role in 
innovation performance, countries’ liberal regulatory regime in credit market, labour 
market and businesses, as well as foreign trade are particularly focused in this study in 
order to examine their linkages with the national technology creation and investment. 
With the empirical testing, this thesis fills up the gap in the existing innovation studies. 
Second, it provides a new way of explaining the underlying of dynamics of innovation by 
testing the causal relationship between technology input and output in contrast to the 
previous studies that looked at their linkages through the correlation test. Third, it 
attempts to empirically analyse the specific institutional conditions of technology creation 
and investment relationships by using indicators in NIS and the contextual factors in 
contrast to the existing NIS literatures that analysed these linkages and the influence of 
each triple helix indicators on innovation, either historically or descriptively. Fourth, it 
provides a comprehensive evaluation of catch-up models which enable us to compare 
significant determinants and levels of technology capabilities with other caching-up 
countries or advanced countries. The findings of the thesis have significant relevance to 
innovation strategy and policy in other countries, particularly catching-up countries which 
are in the process of building indigenous technology capabilities. These contributions are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.   
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CHAPTER 2  
Review of Innovation Literature 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Technological innovation is regarded as an engine of national economic growth. Due to the 
persistent disparity between the poor and the rich throughout the world, innovation is a topic 
of interest in a wide range of disciplines, including economics, business, sociology and 
engineering. In business and economics, a number of studies have highlighted technological 
capabilities and innovation as key sources of economic development (e.g., Freeman, 1995; 
Kobrin, 1995) and competitiveness (e.g., Cantwell, 1989; Kogut, 1991; Porter, 1990). The 
increase of capital and labour, or the growth of multi-factor productivity, is the key source of 
economic development in the neoclassical economic growth model. Also, some studies based 
on an institutional perspective have focussed on different patterns of technological 
trajectories and sectoral specialisations of countries (or firms) in different institutional 
contexts (e.g., Dosi et al., 1990; Shan and Hamilton, 1991; Lundvall, 1992; Bartholomew, 
1997; Malerba, 2002). The institutional conditions conducive to the accumulation and 
diffusion of knowledge reflect the creation of new technical sources influencing the 
comparative advantages of a country (also see Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  
This chapter critically reviews the extant theoretical and empirical studies on 
innovation and determinants of technology capabilities at the national, sectoral and firm 
levels. The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 reviews earlier theoretical and 
empirical studies on innovation with an emphasis on the concepts of innovation and 
technology capabilities, the generation of innovation models and key determinants of 
innovation performance. In section 2.3, I bring together the body of innovation studies in the 
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context of latecomer economies with the specific literature on Korea and Japan to better 
articulate my research theme.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Studies on Innovation and Technology Capabilities  
Several definitions of innovation exist in various fields since it is difficult to conceptualise 
innovation with one standard definition because of the inherently complex nature of 
innovation activities, which are risky, time consuming, indirect and uncertain. Innovation 
refers to new concepts, products and inventions derived from individuals’ ideas, learning and 
scientific research used for invention, translation and commercialisation.  
The first notion of innovation appeared in Joseph Schumpeter’s book, The Theory of 
Economic Development (1912). Schumpeter was the first economist to draw attention to the 
significance of innovation in economic and industrial development. In the 1930s, he defined 
innovation as: “… (1) The introduction of a new good … or a new quality of good (2) The 
introduction of a new method of production … (3) The opening of a new market …(4) The 
conquest of a new source of supply of raw materials …  (5) The carrying out of the new 
organization of any industry …” (Schumpeter, 1934, p.66). In 1998, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) articulated the notion of innovation as the 
creation of new knowledge, and the application and diffusion of existing knowledge, 
categorised by a technological product innovation and a technological process innovation: “A 
technological product innovation can involve either a new or improved product whose 
characteristics differ significantly from previous products. The characteristics may differ due 
to use of new technologies, knowledge or materials. A technological process innovation is the 
adoption of new or significantly improved production methods, including methods of product 
delivery” (OECD, 1998, p.7).  Another explanation is that innovation is not considered until 
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it is implemented or commercialised to create added value, in contrast to invention which is 
not directly associated with the application or the commercialisation (Gibbons et al., 1994; 
Freeman and Soete, 1997). This highlights the importance of technology capability in the 
creation and commercialisation of new (or improved) products and processes. Technology 
capability conducive to the transformation of knowledge into new products, processes and 
services enables a firm and a country to strengthen their competitive advantage and attain 
sustainable growth economically, socially and intellectually (Porter and Stern, 1999, p.12). 
Technological capability is defined as the ability to generate new ideas, know-how 
and technologies with accumulated knowledge (Archibugi and Coco, 2005; Fagerberg and 
Srholec, 2008). It is built and developed using several heterogeneous ingredients; (i) visible 
knowledge (e.g., capital goods, infrastructures) and invisible knowledge (e.g., human skills 
and expertise); and (ii) explicit knowledge (e.g., patents, scientific articles) and tacit 
knowledge (e.g., know-how by learning) (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Evangelista, 1999; 
Archibugi and Coco, 2004, 2005).  
Explicit/visible knowledge is related to the ease of its translation into information 
using formulas, diagrams, numbers and words, implying an ease of codification and transfer 
among people (Archibugi and Coco, 2004; Jung and Lee, 2010). On the other hand, 
tacit/invisible knowledge cannot be easily codified and described, and consequently the 
transfer of tacit knowledge is costly and uncertain (Grant, 1996; González-Á lvarez and 
Nieto-Antolín, 2007). In this regard, the firm or organisation that depends on tacit knowledge 
is more likely to seek secrecy than a patent (González-Á lvarez and Nieto-Antolín, 2007). 
Therefore, consistent training and learning that require long-term research and development 
(R&D) investment and strategic alliances across borders are the major channels for technical 
innovation, especially in high-tech sectors where the involved knowledge is more tacit, such 
as biomedical, micro-machine and next-generation automobiles (Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 
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2003; Rycroft, 2002;  Jung and Lee, 2010). Table 2.1 shows that Korea is the most innovative 
country in the world and also has advanced national technology capabilities with the world’s 
largest technology input and output. As a component of national technology capabilities, 
technology input encompasses fiscal policy, education policy and other policies relating to 
innovation and science and technology (S&T) development, while patents, technology 
transfer and other R&D results are included as sub-components of technology input 
(INSEAD, 2009).  
 
Table 2.1 Top Ten Countries by Global Innovation Index, 2009 
Rank Country Overall Innovation Input Innovation Output 
     
1 Korea 2.26 1.75 2.55 
2 United States 1.80 1.28 2.16 
3 Japan 1.79 1.16 2.25 
4 Sweden 1.64 1.25 1.88 
5 Netherlands 1.55 1.40 1.55 
6 Canada 1.42 1.39 1.32 
7 United Kingdom 1.42 1.33 1.37 
8 Germnay 1.12 1.05 1.09 
9 France 1.12 1.17 0.96 
10 Australia 1.02 0.89 1.05 
 
Note: (i) Innovation input covers fiscal and education polices and the innovation environment (e.g., ICTs); (ii) 
innovation output includes patents, technology transfer and other R&D results (e.g., business performance, such 
as labor productivity and total shareholder returns); (iii) The indicators of innovation inputs and outputs are 
measured by GDP.  
Source: Compiled by the data from INSEAD of The Global Innovation Index 2011. 
http://www.globalinnovationindex.org/gii/GII%20COMPLETE_PRINTWEB.pdf 
 
Different mechanisms and channels for technology capabilities also exist in three 
technological development stages - immature, intermediate and mature. Immaturity is linked 
to low-income countries that possess basic manufacturing skills in underdeveloped 
technology infrastructures and feeble network-based innovation systems. The intermediate 
class involves many middle-income countries in the factor-driven and investment-driven 
phases. The mature class includes high-income countries in the innovation-driven growth 
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phase (Lall, 1999; Porter, 1998; UNCTD, 2003a). This suggests that foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and absorbing capacity are key drivers of national technology capabilities 
in the earlier stage of technology development, while R&D cooperation and 
internationalisation of R&D are key channels for progress in the mature stage (UNCTD, 
2003a). 
 
2.2.1 Generation of Innovation Models  
Five generations of innovation models exist: the technology push model, the need pull model, 
the coupling model, the integration and parallel lines model and the system integration and 
networking model. The models broadly divide into linear and non-linear approaches to 
innovation. The linear form of innovation comprises the technology push model and the need 
pull model. The former was generated in the 1950s. This model suggests that new technology 
brings opportunities to acquire, learn and transfer new knowledge, and the consequent pull 
innovative activities for creating new industries (Rothwell, 1994). The role of government 
laboratories and universities is emphasised so as to spur the development of new technologies 
that are pushed into the market (Rothwell, 1994). In contrast, the latter model highlights the 
importance of the demand side factors in promoting industrial innovation, suggesting that the 
market is the source of ideas for directing innovative activities (Rosenberg, 1974). In the 
need pull model, the need for innovation is determined by customers, and new technologies 
are created in response to customers’ need. This model evolved from the mid-1960s through 
the early 1970s (Rothwell, 1994; Tidd et al., 2005). Both innovation models address 
innovation as a simple linear sequence of functional activities, emphasising important 
sources of product innovation, but not the process of innovation. However, in practice, the 
inherent nature of innovation is associated with a complex, risky, uncertain and interactive 
process with various stakeholders. Likewise, innovation is affected by a threshold of 
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opportunity and external shocks (Tidd et al., 2005). Therefore, non-linear approaches to 
innovation emerged to compensate for the weak points in linear models.  
The third generation of coupling model appeared from the early 1970s to the mid-
1980s. This model outlines innovation as the combination of technology push and market 
demand, emphasising the research interaction between different sectors and the feedback 
loops between them in the process of innovation (Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985).  The fourth 
generation of the integration and parallel lines model (from the early 1980s to the early 1990s) 
focuses on integration within the firm, upstream with suppliers and downstream with 
demanding customers. As success factors of innovation, this model emphasises a close link 
between suppliers and customers and a cooperative relationship among various actors 
(Rothwell, 1994). The fifth generation of innovation model (integration and networking) 
emerged in the early 1990s through an extension of the fourth generation model. This model 
focuses on a strategic partnership with suppliers and customers, as well as integration at both 
intra- and inter-firm levels on the basis of information technology (IT)-based networking in 
the process of innovation (Tidd et al., 2005). To succeed in innovation, this model suggests (i) 
a flexible organisational structure and customised response; (ii) extensive networking for the 
speed of development and external data links; (iii) a policy quality control; and (iv) 
continuous innovation focusing on high quality and other non-price factors (Rothwell, 1994).  
As mentioned above, the models of innovation have evolved with different public 
policies and corporate practices in response to market conditions and technical changes since 
the 1950s, shifting from the linear model to the parallel and integrative innovation models. 
However, the linear models of innovation still trigger innovation in many industries. For 
example, the technology push model applies to newly emerging and highly basic scientific 
research-dependent industries, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (Rothwell, 1994, 
p.23). Meanwhile, the need pull model that focusses on new markets and active customers is 
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appropriate for innovating in the electronics and automobile industries (Pavitt, 1984).  
 
2.2.2 National Innovation System Models 
The concept of a national innovation system (NIS) was first introduced by Christopher 
Freeman and Bengt-A˙ke Lundvall in 1985 when a point in dispute in the European industrial 
growth strategy was raised (Sharif, 2006). Their idea has been taken up by several scholars in 
several areas of the literature. The various definitions of NIS are shown in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.2 Definition of NIS 
Freeman, 1987, p.1 “The network of institutions in the public and private sectors, whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new 
technology” 
Lundvall, 1992, p.2 “A set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance…of national firms” 
Nelson, 1993, p.4 “The elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion 
and use of new, and economically useful, knowledge…and are either 
located within or rooted inside the border of a nation state” 
Metcalfe, 1995, p.38 “The set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to 
the development and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the 
framework within which governments form and implement policies to 
influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of interconnected 
institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artefacts 
which define new technologies” 
Patel and Pavitt, 1994, 
p.78 
 “The national institutions, their incentive structures and their 
competencies, that determine the rate and direction of technological 
learning (or the volume and composition of change generating activities) in 
a country” 
 
In a nutshell, NIS is a set of institutions supporting the stock and flow of knowledge 
to develop national technology capabilities and overall national competiveness. The NIS 
leads distinctive coordination mechanisms, learning processes and roles of players, as well as 
contextual factors within the system, which significantly affects various patterns of 
innovation process and growth strategies across countries (Kogut, 1991; Nelson, 1993; 
Lundvall, 1998).  
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The contextual factors and actors in NIS as significant sources of technology 
capabilities are highlighted in much of the innovation literature. Freeman (1995) stressed the 
roles of innovation policy, corporate R&D, educational system and industrial structure in 
shaping NIS in economic and technological development of Japan. Lundvall (2002) focused 
on four factors that influence the technology capabilities of countries - government structure, 
finance system, R&D system and inter-firm linkage. From the institutional perspective, 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) emphasised the importance of institutions and organisational 
characteristics as the key factors contributing to technology capabilities and innovation - the 
national education system for schooling, training and retraining, the patterns of labour-
management bargaining and negotiation, the degree of mutual commitment of firms, workers 
and financial institutions and the structure of corporate governance.  
Also, several theoretical and empirical studies have focussed on cooperative activities 
between universities and industry as important contexts of technology transfer (Albino, 1998; 
Robinson, 1988; Stewart and Gibson, 1990; Mowery and Oxley, 1995), as well as the 
positive effect of interaction among endogenous and foreign firms on technological spillovers 
(Cantwell, 1989, 1995; Perez, 1997; Á lvarez and Molero, 2005). More recently, Chang and 
Shin (2004) addressed informal relations, networking capabilities of institutions and 
personnel as significant sources of innovation success in the context of transition economies, 
particularly China. 
NIS has evolved through three models: statist model, laissez-faire model and triple 
helix model, as shown in Figure 2.1. The statist model is characterised by top-down 
bureaucratic coordination, the dominant role of government in knowledge creation and 
primarily teaching-based universities (Benner and Sandstrom, 2000; Leydesdorff and Fritsch, 
2006). In the laissez-faire model (interface units across strong boundaries), government has 
limitations in addressing market failures, universities act as providers of human capital and 
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basic research and firms are strongly linked in the market (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; 
Inzelt, 2004). The role of the university becomes larger as inventor and R&D performer in 
the triple helix model, evolving from teaching university to research university and 
entrepreneurial university, which shifts from the secondary to the primary institutional sphere 
in a knowledge-based society (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff and Fritsch, 
2006; Marques et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 2.1 NIS Models 
                                    
 
 
→ 
 
 
 
 
Statist Model                                        Laissez-Faire Model                                   Triple Helix Model 
 
Source: Compiled by authors from Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (2000); Leydesdorff, and Fritsch 
(2006). 
 
In the triple helix paradigm, knowledge creation and innovation are stimulated at the 
focal point at which they (the triple indicators) affect each other or have links with each other 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1995; 2000). The role of the university is highlighted with the 
mission of (i) accumulating and creating knowledge through constant research; (ii) training 
through knowledge transfer from the teaching staff to students; and (iii) facilitating new 
products and innovation processes though the transfer of ideas or know-how to other 
organisations (e.g., government laboratories, research institutes, firms) and joint R&D. The 
Government 
 
Industry 
 
University 
Government 
 
Industry 
 
University 
Government 
 
Industry 
 
University 
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triple helix is an appropriate model for the biotechnology industry, which in contrast to other 
industrial technologies (e.g., electronics, automobile) is distinguished by heavy dependence 
on basic scientific research and close ties to market-induced applied research. Such scientific 
research-based technology is needed to build up the capacity of universities and their close 
ties to research institutes and industry (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993; Lehrer and Asakawa, 
2004; Casper and Kettler, 2001). 
The NIS has five major agents: administrative organisations, public/private research 
institutes, higher education institutes, industrial firms and intermediaries. Administrative 
organisations include government agencies and ministries related to science and technology. 
They act as S&T policy planners, performers and coordinators, as well as sponsors and 
facilitators for firms’ innovative activities (Senker, 1996; Chang and Shih, 2004). Higher 
education institutions (i.e., universities and public/private technical training centres) are 
engaged in knowledge diffusion and technology transfer, as well as fostering human capital 
(Park, 2004; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). Research institutes and industrial firms are major 
R&D and innovation performers for creating and utilising technologies (Chang and Shih, 
2004). Intermediaries promote the dynamics of R&D cooperation among public research 
institutes, universities and firms through the formation and implementation of joint R&D 
projects and programmes (OECD, 1997).  
 
2.2.3 Interplay between Corporate Governance System and National Innovation System 
Innovation success largely depends on the quality of national finance system and corporate 
governance system.  The importance of corporate governance as the key source of innovation 
is first recognised by Joseph Schumpeter. He suggested an advantage for corporate 
governance of large firm, allowing the reinvestment of profits into a routinised innovation, 
whereas a disadvantage for new entrepreneurs (based on external finance) in the development 
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of new equipment and the improvement of the exiting one (Schumpeter 1911; 1942), given 
that innovation is generally associated with “non-negligible time and outlay” (Schumpeter 
1939, p.68). After Joseph Schumpeter, there were a number of studies focusing on 
organisational characteristics as determinants of industrial competiveness and innovation: top 
management GEO’s age (Khan and Manopichetwttana, 1989); firm size (Bertschek and 
Entorf, 1996); foreign ownership in Scottish manufacturing industries (Love et al.; 1996); 
innovative established firms versus new firms in semiconductor and biotechnology industries 
(Sørensen and Stuart, 2000); international diversification  of large firms (Hitt et al., 1997). 
More recently, William Lazonick and Mary O’Sullivan focused on ‘social conditions 
of innovative enterprise’ that provided systematic analysis the role of finance and corporate 
governance systems in the learning process required for innovation. “A system of corporate 
governance supports innovation … provide the institutional support ... support 
organisational control in contrast to market control … Reflected in the operation of 
employment, financial, and legal institutions, social conditions constitute norms according to 
which business enterprises seek to make strategic decisions concerning the allocation of 
resources. (O’Sullivan, 2000b, p.59-67). They highlighted the significance of ‘financial 
commitment’ to overcome the nature of innovation (e.g., high uncertainty, time-consuming), 
and consequence need for ‘organisational integration’, allowing collective and cumulative 
learning (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000a; 2002). The organisational integration might arise 
in the established firms. Financial commitment that provides the conditions for recycling 
profit into investment in innovation depends on shareholder/financier engagement and 
management autonomy as a response to low visibility and slow pay-off innovation (Tylecote, 
2007).  
Given that firms are the main research performer and financier within national 
innovation system (NIS), corporate governance system that directly affects their strategic 
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actions for the allocation, investment and acquisition of resources, as well as the mechanism 
for the distribution of returns is interrelated to national technology capabilities in the product 
and process of innovation. The interplay between NIS and corporate governance system and 
its profound effect on innovation patterns, outcomes and sectroal specialisation across 
countries have been highlighted by many financial economists, mostly varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) scholars (Lazonick; 2004; 2010; Tidd et al., 2005; Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and 
Vistintin, 2008).  
The absolute and relative technological advantage and industry-specific 
competitiveness of nation largely rely on characterisation of the shareholder-manager 
relationship and the manager-manager relationship ─ who directly (or indirectly) controls 
firms, how promotes their value creations, and what mechanisms are used for the 
improvement. In radical differences in national business systems of corporate financing, 
equity ownership and corporate control, economies are broadly divided into the two types: 
stock exchange-based and bank-based financial systems (La Porta, et al., 1998; Allen and 
Gale, 2000; Levine, 2002); in other words, outsider-dominated and insider-dominated 
corporate governance systems (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Whitley, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Tylecote, 2007). Such different national systems of finance and corporate governance 
produce different preferences toward firms R&D and innovation activities (Hoskisson et al., 
2002).  
In categorisation from VoC perspective, stock exchange-based financial system (or 
outsider-dominated corporate governance system) is consistent with liberal market 
economies (LMEs), characterised by dispersed equity ownership, external equity financing, 
diversified portfolios and high liquid, as well as a dominant conflict of interest between all 
shareholders over management. The main shareholders include pension funds, mutual funds, 
insurance companies and households (Berglöf, 1997; Tylecote, 2007). Coordinated market 
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economies (CMEs) parallels bank-based financial system (or insider-dominated corporate 
governance system), which have distinctive features of more concentration of equity (or debt) 
ownership by large block-holders, higher share of control-oriented finance, less liquid of 
financial market and a conflict of interest between minority shareholders against controlling. 
The main shareholders include family owners, banks, government and cross-holding firms 
(Berglöf 1997; Dore et al., 1999; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008).  
Until at least 1990s, English-speaking countries were placed in the former category, 
and other non English-speaking countries were assigned in the latter category (Edwards and 
Fischer, 1994; Berglöf 1997; La Porta et al, 1999; Levine, 2002). Such the classification, 
grouping non English-speaking countries into insider-dominated corporate system economies 
(CMEs), hardly seems robust and plausible due to the heterogeneity of financing and 
governing innovation, embracing labour market condition, role of financial market, role of 
state, polarity control, inter-firm linkage, firm-bank linkage, and ownership concentration and 
others. This leads to an emergence of alternative taxonomy, which proposes the four types, 
distinguishing stakeholder-capitalist, state-led capitalist and family/state capitalist from non-
stock exchange-based economies (Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Visintin, 2007) 
First, shareholder capitalism is characterised by a high stock market capitalisation, 
large role in private equity (less reliance on bank loans), low employment protection, low 
inter-firm linkage, and the consequent the availability of expert finance for new firms (e.g., 
venture capital), in which there is pressure from expert owners for higher value added in the 
areas affected by radical innovation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Aguilera and Jackson, 
2003; Young and Scott, 2004). The USA and the UK are representatives of this model in 
which only shareholders play the role in management with little intervention from 
government and other stakeholders, as well as little use of bank finance (Tylecote and 
Visintin, 2008). However, part of the differences between the countries is the dominance of 
45 
 
family-controlled firms and widely held firms in the USA and the UK, respectively 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). The UK in which there is “indirect control 
through share price movements and the market for corporate control” (Tylecote and Vistintin, 
2008, p.87) seems to more perfectly fit as the stereotypical shareholder capitalism than the 
USA based on a large number of firms controlled by founding entrepreneurs and their 
families.  
Second, Germany, Japan and other countries in which employees and other related 
businesses can have share of control or influence over management decisions are categorised 
into stakeholder capitalism. The key distinctive features are “considerable non-market 
coordination directly and indirectly between countries, with the sate playing a framework-
setting role” (Soskice, 1999, p.103). Under the pressures and interests of stakeholders in 
management, bank finance, inter-firm cooperation, financier engagement and stakeholder 
spillovers play the central role in firm performance and innovation (mostly incremental 
innovation). Compared with Germany, Japan’s bank directorships in large firms are appeared 
only in crisis, and lending to industry is much higher to govern technological change 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008). Also, families play little role in 
Japan than in Germany, because of its relatively high-trust culture and institutions that allow 
Japan to successfully govern and manage organisational problems without family control 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Such different ownership structures could 
produce different cooperation mechanism ─ stronger inter-firm cooperation within sectors 
and stronger inter-sectoral cohesion among firms in Japan (Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and 
Vistintin, 2008).  
Third, state-led capitalist countries, namely Korea and France, rely on bank finance 
more than stock market finance, like the stakeholder model, but strong central government 
influence over the banking system exists. The unique features are larger government role in 
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coordination, stronger employee protection and inter-firm cooperation among large firms and 
close ties between the privileged firms and bank (poor access to bank finance for SMEs and 
start-ups). A small numbers of very large firms that fit into the aims and policies of the 
government could receive state-direct loans and cheap bank loans, while small firms rely on 
external finance (Lee and Yoo, 2007). Compared with France, Korean firms have higher level 
of family control and there is less state direct control and ownership in high-tech sectors in 
Korea (Edwards and Fisher, 1994; Goyer, 2001; Lee and Yoo, 2007). The Korea firms are 
better performance than the French firms in rapidly innovative areas involved in high 
opportunity and high risk, which can be attributable to a small number of family-controlled 
conglomerates, chaebol. “Grouping creates financial synergies which enable the chaebol to 
mobilise large-scale investment funds effectively … grouping also helps the chaebol firms 
invest more aggressively in new technologies by enabling them to share risk with their 
member firms” (Chang and Park, 2004, p.42). Tylecote and Vistintin (2008) pointed out that 
Korean firms have followed the style of American corporate governance system, whereas 
French firms are shifting toward the British shareholder model in the development of high-
tech sectors.  
Fourth, family/state capitalism is distinctive from the above three types due to high 
shareholder engagement, low financier engagement and lack of external finance, in which 
there is a huge direct state subsidy for few large firms and state-owned firms with relatively 
high degree of state ownership and control.  Italy and China belong to this category (Tylecote 
and Visintin 2002; Tylecote, 2007). The family capitalism can limit the dynamics of 
innovation since the countries’ legal systems, such as Italy, provide ineffective protection of 
minority investors (La Porta et al., 1998). Although government interference in management 
exists in both state-led and family/state capitalisms, its influence is much more positive to the 
state-led economies because of effective government intervention and close ties with family 
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capitalists (Tylecote, 2007). Table 2.3 summaries distinctive features of national financial and 
business systems governing innovation across countries.  
 
 
These types lead to different trajectories of innovation and sectoral specialisations. 
Table 2.3 Taxonomy of Financial and Corporate Governance system for Innovation 
 
  Outsider System Insider System 
Main 
Shareholders 
 Pension/mutual funds, 
insurance companies, 
households 
Families, banks, other firms, government 
    
Shareholder-
Management  
 Arms-length Control-based 
    
Share of Control-
oriented Finance 
 Relatively low Relatively High 
    
Ownership 
(Equity and Debt) 
 Dispersed Concentrated 
    
  Shareholder Stakeholder Sate-led Family-Sate 
Equity Market   Strong Weak Weak Weak 
      
State Role  Background Cooperation with 
business 
Close ties with 
large firms 
Larger sate-
sector  
      
      
Poles of Control 
& Directness  
 Uni-polar; Indirect 
control 
Muti-polar; Direct 
control 
Bi-polar; Indirect 
control) 
Uni-polar; Direct 
control) 
      
Employee 
Protection 
 Weak; no 
codetermination 
Moderate; 
codetermination ,  
Strong; no codetermination 
     
Dominant Types 
of Firms 
 Family holdings
(1)
; 
 
 
Dispersed holdings
(2)
  
Family holdings 
(3)
; 
Financial/Non-
financial holdings   
Family holdings; 
Non  non-
financial 
holdings;  
Dispersed 
holdings  
State holdings, 
Dispersed 
holdings 
(especially 
Taiwan); 
 
Countries 
  
Australia, Canada, UK, 
USA, Switzerland, etc. 
 
Netherland, 
Sweden, Germany, 
Japan, etc. 
 
France, Korea etc. 
 
Italy, Spain 
Taiwan, etc. 
 
Note: 
(1)
 and 
(2)
 type is dominant in the US and the UK, respectively. 
(3)
Germany has the highest share of family 
control in the stakeholder model.   
Sources: Compiled by the data from Berglöf (1997); Whitley (1999; 2003); Tylecote (2007); Tylecote and 
Vistintin (2008).  
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Corporate ownership structure decidedly affects investment behaviours toward industrial 
competiveness and innovation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory has provided 
many other theoretical frameworks to explain these relationships by suggesting effective 
monitoring mechanisms to control opportunistic of agents. From the agency theory, dispersed 
ownership structure generates the conflicts between principals (i.e., shareholders) and agents 
(i.e., managers) interests, and often produces the unbalanced structure (such as powerful 
managers and powerless owners), while leading to managers’ opportunistic behaviour for 
self-interest as well as the high monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhaedt, 
1989; Roe, 1994). However, dispersed ownership structure allows risk bearing, diversified 
portfolio and specialized management (Porter, 1992). Meanwhile, stewardship theory have 
highlighted that ownership structure controlled by large block-holders can lessen the 
principal-agent problems and prevent the agent’s opportunistic behaviours by efficiently 
monitoring managers (Aoki et al, 1994; Davis et al., 1997; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). The 
definition of stewardship theory is that “… situations in which managers are not motivated 
by individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of 
their principals” (Davis et al., 1997, p.21).  
From technological perspective, the dispersed ownership (normally the shareholder 
model) that allows risk-hedging in diversified portfolios and increasing venture capital 
should be beneficial to the sector where ‘competence-destroying change’ (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) needs for radical reconfiguration of its organisational structure in the 
development of radically new products. Rapid technological change leads a complete 
trajectory shift, moving to a new technological paradigm. “In rapidly changing environments, 
there is ... value in the ability to reconfigure the firm’s asset structure and to accomplish the 
necessary internal and external transformation” (Teece, 1998, p.201).  
Due to the limitation of external capital availability, on the other hand, concentration 
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of ownership (normally the stakeholder model) should be disadvantageous to the sector 
involved in radical shifts direction, but advantageous to the sector in which technological 
change is cumulative and path-dependent, implying that learning and knowledge 
environment is associated with ‘competence-enhancing change’ (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986; Malerba 2004). “Where technological change is progressing within an established 
paradigm ... established firms should be able to carry it forward, enhancing their 
competences, without much change in their organization” (Tylecote, 2007, p.1465). Lee and 
O’Neill (2003) and Carney (2005) proved a positive effect of ownership concentration on 
R&D investment in medium-high technology industries. Tylecote and Vistintin (2008) 
highlighted the significance of industry-wide-expertise in governing radically technological 
change, and the large role of management autonomy in the incremental shift direction.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) pointed out that shareholder capitalism are superior to the 
other capitalisms in radically innovative sectors, since the stock market and equity finance 
based structure can raise expert risk capital and more R&D under a high market uncertainty 
(Will does it work?) and a technological uncertainty (Will does it sell?) caused by the rapid 
technological change. Although the rest of capitalist countries involved in relatively low level 
of availability of external finance fail to effectively respond to the radical technological 
change, but their organisational structures in which there are cooperative relationship 
between stakeholders (firm-firm or firm-bank or firm-sate) are advantageous of 
incrementally innovative sectors (also see Franks and Mayer, 1997). However, Taylor (2004) 
critically examined VoC theory and extended Hall and Soskice’s approach by using both 
simple patent counts and citations-weighted in longitudinal time frame, and found that Japan 
and Korea are radical innovators, especially in hardware related to information and 
communication technology (ICT), next of the US.  
The countries’ innovative capabilities of ICT in which diverse technologies are partly 
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attributable to the inter-sectoral based cooperation among the large firms, although they have 
different characteristics of corporate governance systems ─ large family-controlled firms-
oriented (chaebols) and government-coordinated systems in Korea; network of cross-
shareholdings among large firms-based (horizontal industrial groups, keiretsue) and business-
coordinated systems in Japan (Soskice, 1999; Allen and Gale, 2000). In selected major areas 
of state interest, involving especially low visibility and slow pay-off, government encouraged 
firms to adopt new technologies by forming shareholder/financier engagement and 
interacting with other institutions of various kinds, which can improve the availability and 
acceptability of risk finance (Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008).  
 
2.3Empirical Studies on Innovation, Technology Capabilities and Catch-up  
This section provides a critical review of empirical innovation studies on determinants of 
technology capabilities and innovation performance. To articulate my research themes in 
better detail, I also introduce the extant research for latecomers’ technology and productivity 
catch-up, using specific literature on technological and economic development in Korea and 
Japan. Innovation studies on Korea and Japan provide the contextual understanding of 
distinctive sources and mechanisms of technology catch-up and capabilities. 
 
2.3.1 Literature on Determinants of Technological Capabilities and Innovation 
A large body of studies is devoted to identifying determinants of technology capabilities and 
innovation at various levels - firm, industry and country - in the social sciences. First, 
traditional innovation research derived from economic studies has argued that R&D 
expenditure and knowledge stock increase the probability of innovation (Scherer, 1965; 
Bound et al., 1984; Ettlie et al., 1984; Hausman et al., 1984; Pakes and Griliches, 1984; Hall 
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et al., 1986; Crépon et al., 1998; Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Licht and Zoz, 2000; Greve, 
2003; Beneito, 2006). Despite different contexts, measurements and issues, these studies 
have commonly regarded in-house R&D and indigenous capabilities as main determinants of 
technology capabilities and innovation.  
Second, management studies have highlighted the role of human capital (Rhyne et al., 
2002; Romijn and Albaladejo, 2002; Michie and Sheehan, 2003) and firms’ marketing 
capabilities and managerial skills (Hobday, 1995; Souitaris, 2001; Koschatzky et al., 2001) in 
innovation and firm performance. Other organisational studies have argued that innovation 
performance is influenced by firms’ internal elements, such as size, age and assets 
(Schumpeter, 1942; Galende and De la Fuente, 2003; Bertschek and Entorf, 1996; Sørensen 
and Stuart, 2000), corporate finance and ownership structure (Francis and Smith, 1995; 
Dixon and Seddighi, 1996; Love et al., 1996; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Wolfenzon; 
2002; Tylecote, 2007). Given those different shareholders’ interests and risk management, 
types of financial system and corporate ownership structure produce different strategic 
actions in the product and process of innovation (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008). As case studies, Love et al. (1996) 
discussed the positive impact of foreign ownership on firms’ value creation, performance and 
product innovation using a sample of Scottish firms and English firms, respectively. Francis 
and Smith (1995) empirically examined the relationship between firms’ ownership structure 
and innovation performance, and concluded that the firm with a highly concentrated 
management ownership than the diffusely held firm is more likely to undertake long-term 
oriented investment, considering firm stability and future prosperity. In many emerging 
economies, firms are controlled by founders and their families (Prowse, 1992; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000). However, excessive firm ownership concentration and 
insiders dominated system have a harmful effect on firms’ performance due to arbitrary 
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owner decisions, less liquidity in markets and fewer opportunities to negotiate the firm’s 
values (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Wolfenzon; 2002). A strong possibility exists for 
information asymmetry between owners and managers in diffusely held firms, implying that 
the separated management structure is likely to result in conflict of opinion among managers 
regarding innovation projects and allocating R&D resources (Francis and Smith, 1995). More 
recently, Lee and O’neill (2003) examined how distinctive characteristics of national culture 
affect the organizational ownership structure, with particularly attention to the US firms and 
Japan firms. They argue that the separated corporate ownership structure in the USA is 
associated with individualist culture, whereas the collectivist culture in Japan affects the 
concentrated ownership structure. The collectivist culture values trusts and long-term 
relationship, as well as attaches a great importance to groups’ interests relatively to individual 
ones (also see Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Lee (2005) also compared the different 
ownership structure between U.S and Japanese firms and its direct influence on R&D activity 
rested on the basis of agency and stewardship theoretic perspectives. 
Third, international business studies have stressed the crucial roles of external 
linkages and networks of knowledge involving multinational corporations (MNCs), as well 
as central and regional government policies promoting inward FDI investments in the 
products and processes of innovation (Vernon, 1977; Hunt, 1992; Cantwell, 1995; Meyer-
Krahmer and Reger, 1999). They have commonly pointed out that innovation performance 
depends on the ability to attract knowledge-intensive R&D investments from foreign MNCs 
and to connect to the global value chain of these firms. Vernon (1977, p.39) asserted that 
“multinational enterprises see special virtues in innovation partly because that activity tends 
to go hand in hand with a rapid increase in sales and profits.” Hunt (1992, p.192) argued 
that the “multinational firm is an extension of the multidivisional form. It is more complex 
because two common differentiators (function and product) are joined by a third-geography.” 
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Dunning (1993) informed us of two main contributions of economists to the understanding of 
foreign production and multinational enterprise (MNE) growth, this being identification and 
explanation of the ‘unique characteristics of the MNE qua’ and attempts to explain various 
“determinants of the foreign value-added activities of MNEs irrespective of whether they are 
due to their multinationality” (Dunning, 1993, p.36). Cantwell (1995) said that “in more 
recent times technology leaders have altered the nature of international technology creation 
by pioneering the international integration of MNC facilities into regional or global networks” 
(Cantwell, 1995, p.171).  
Meyer-Krahmer and Reger (1999) examined changes in innovation strategy in 
twenty-one multinational corporations with a focus on internationalisation. Their result 
showed that “triadization” still occurs in research and technology among European, Japanese 
and US corporations. Significantly, Meyer-Krahmer and Reger (1999, p.754-755) noted that 
R&D location decisions can be attributed to change and development in “the 
internationalisation of management and corporate culture, and the type of cross-border 
coordination and interaction” observed. In addition, Meyer-Krahmer and Reger (1999, p.758) 
signalled that “creation of technological knowledge in foreign countries has become an 
important part in the on-going trend towards internationalization”. They went on to argue 
that “an increasing need for international solutions is necessary in global problem fields”. 
This affects the emerging and appropriate division of labour in policy and strategy at the 
regional, national, European and international level (Meyer-Krahmer and Reger, 1999, p.758). 
In this respect, Ghoshal and Bartlett (1988) addressed the significance of norms 
interconnecting with socialisation in multinationals. Morgan (2003, p.1) confirmed the MNC 
to be a “social ‘construction’ that arises out of ‘specific national, institutional contexts’ that 
mould how it will ‘internationalize”. 
Fourth, institutional studies on innovation have underlined the importance of 
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institutional factors, such as industrial structure, finance system, sectoral and national 
innovation system and public policy as determinants of technology capabilities and 
innovation performance. Recently, political economists have pointed out that cross-industry 
and cross-country differences in catch-up patterns and sectoral specialisation result from 
distinctive institutional-setting and policy frameworks (Taylor, 2004; Tylecote and Vertova, 
2007; Lazonick, 2007; Breznitz, 2009; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 2002; Leydesdorff and 
Fritsch, 2006) and different technological regimes, such as technological opportunities, 
appropriateness of innovation, and cumulative technical advances (Pavitt, 1984; Archibugi et 
al., 1991; Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Breschi et al., 2000; Park and Lee, 2006). 
Fifth, a large body of innovation studies has highlighted the role of a 
collaborative/competitive innovation network and clustering process in the development of 
technological capabilities and improvement of innovation performance at sectoral, regional 
and national levels from various perspectives (Castells and Hall, 1994; Hsu et al., 2003; Koh 
et al., 2005; Roberts, 1998; Storey and Tether, 1998; Vedovello, 1997). Porter (1990) argued 
that interrelated industries in regional clusters are a localised source of customers, 
employment, exports, incomes and networks in which corporate innovation can be enabled 
with a regional competitive advantage (RCA). The RCA refers to the capacity of a region to 
succeed and provide strategically significant offerings that are cheaper or finer than those in 
other regions, not a country-specific advantage (CSA) or a firm-specific advantage (FSA).  
Porter’s (1990) 'Diamond of National Advantage' model comprises industry rivalry, strategy 
and structure (inadequate rivalry will undermine innovation and adequate rivalry will revive 
innovation); factor conditions of basic resources (climate, demographics, resources and size) 
and advanced resources (communications, infrastructure, specialists and technology); 
demand conditions (domestic catalysts can drive innovation); and related and supporting 
industries (collaborative or competitive in their offerings).  In addition, government policy 
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can affect innovation in various ways, including antitrust regulations, rousing early demand 
for advanced products and services and stringent standards for products and services. Porter 
(1998; 2000) analysed different determinants of innovation clusters and competitiveness 
across countries, including government policy, legal institutions and market potential, factor 
conditions (e.g., human resources, technology infrastructure) and others (e.g., firm strategy, 
demand conditions). Based on Porter’s model, Lai and Shyu (2005) examined distinctive 
sources of innovation performance in national industrial clusters located in China and Taiwan. 
Dodgson (2008) discussed different patterns of innovation in industrial and technology 
clusters by employing the two theories of varieties of capitalism and NIS in the context of 
Korea and Taiwan.  
The literature reviewed here suggests that technology capabilities and innovation 
performance are determined by not only the accumulation of internal and external sources 
around firms, but also by institutional, policy and contextual factors. The next section 
reviews specific literature focusing on idiosyncratic sources of technology catch-up and 
capabilities in the contexts of East Asian latecomers, with particular attention to Korea and 
Japan.  
 
2.3.2 Literature on Technology Catch-up  
The importance of technical innovation is stressed in various academic fields because of the 
persistent disparity between the poor and the rich throughout the world, as well as the stunted 
growth of middle-income countries (Esterly, 2001; Jung and Lee, 2010). Cameron (1998) 
highlighted the role of human capital based on creativity and originality in narrowing 
productivity and technology gaps because slowdowns are caused by the depletion of 
imitation or copy possibilities. The newly industrialised countries (NICs) in East Asia (i.e., 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) have shown remarkable achievements in economic growth and 
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technological progress. These countries are often of interest to researchers because their 
growth patterns have demonstrated the inadequacy of the Anglo-American model and 
because of changes in general economic theory. The rapid and sustained economic growth of 
East Asian economies is attributable to effective institutional reforms and policy changes 
regarding technology catch-up with countries advanced in high technology fields. The 
institutional conditions conducive to the accumulation and diffusion of technological 
capabilities underpin the economic miracle of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (Hobday, 1995; 
Rodrik, 1999; Kim and Nelson, 2000; UNCTAD, 2003).  
 “‘Catch-up’ relates to the ability of a single country to narrow the gap in 
productivity and income vis-à-vis a leader country, ‘convergence’ to a trend towards a 
reduction of the overall differences in productivity and income in the world as a whole” 
(Fagerberg and Godinho, 2005, p.514:2). The NICs refers to the latecomers and catch-up 
countries that are moving fast enough to attain the same technological progress and 
innovation performance as the leader (Park and Lee, 2006).  However, there are different 
catch-up patterns and mechanisms in the East Asian latecomer countries. The World Bank 
(1993) argued that distinctive institutional framework (e.g., political-commercial links), 
industrial structure (e.g., export-oriented) and fiscal policy (e.g., saving rate, investment in 
education) produce different evolutionary paths and strategies for technology catch-up in the 
NICs.  
The counties differences in catch-up strategies, patterns and performance are also 
caused by distinctive organisation structures; (i) the pursuit of a reverse product life cycle 
strategy in Korea’s large firm internalisation model; (ii) the pursuit of a reverse value chain 
strategy, process specialist strategy and product pioneering strategy in a Taiwanese small and 
medium-sized enterprise (SME)-centred innovation network model; and (iii) the pursuit of a 
process specialist strategy, reverse value chain strategy (smaller scale) and application 
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pioneering strategy that is strong among service firms in Singapore’s FDI-leveraging model 
(Wong, 1995).  The Korean chaebol-oriented structure parallels a Schumpeterian scale-based 
technological development, whereas the Taiwanese industrial structure based on SMEs 
associated with a neo-Marshallian network-based technological development (Wang, 2005). 
Among the East Asian latecomer countries, Korea has the background and institutional 
framework behind its rapid economic and technological catch-up most similar to Japan. The 
Korean political-commercial link and large firm-centred structure and innovation system (e.g., 
in-house R&D, home-grown talent) are much more similar to the Japanese model than any 
other business and innovation models within high-income countries and other East Asian 
NICs, such as Taiwan and Singapore (Forge and Bohlin, 2008).  
Regarding sectoral technology catch-up performance, a technology paradigm shift 
enables latecomers to easily leapfrog forerunners, specifically in newly emerging industries 
characterised by high income elasticity of demand, rapid technique change and short life 
cycle of product (Lee et al., 2005). The concept of leapfrogging was first developed by Perez 
and Soete (1988). They explained the phenomenon that a new techno-economic paradigm or 
the period of paradigm shift enables latecomers to capture new technological opportunities in 
emerging industries (also see Dosi, 1982). Lee and Lim (2001) suggested different catch-up 
models across industries; (i) path-following catch-up - the latecomer follows the forerunner’s 
path; (ii) skipping catch-up - the latecomer follows the path to an extent but leapfrogs some 
stages; and (iii) path-creating catch-up - the latecomer creates its own path of technological 
development and innovation. Sectoral technology catch-up performance depends on the 
technology regime, uncertainty regarding a technological trajectory and accessibility to 
external knowledge flows and initial stock of accumulated knowledge (Lee and Lim, 2006; 
Park and Lee, 2006; Catellacci, 2007). Park and Lee (2006) provided evidence for the 
argument that caching-up countries can attain higher technology capabilities and 
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competitiveness in industrial sectors involving shorter cycle time, easier access to knowledge 
and higher appropriability in case studies of Taiwan and Korea.  
To investigate distinctive technological accumulation processes and innovation 
patterns in the context of catch-up economies, the next section reviews more specific 
literature on determinants of technology catch-up and capabilities in Korea and Japan.  
 
2.3.3 Literature on Innovation in Korea and Japan  
Researchers have established that sustainable economic growth is attained by “a process of 
acquiring technological capabilities and translating them into product and process 
innovation in the course of continuous technological change” (Kim and Nelson, 2000, p.IX). 
Since Korea and Japan are the economies with the fastest technology catch-up in the world, a 
large body of studies on determinants of technology capabilities and innovation patterns in 
these countries has used various perspectives, methods and levels of analysis.  
At a country level, the role of government in setting up effective policy measures for 
national technology capabilities and institutional reform in response to technological change 
was highlighted in much of the previous innovation studies on Korea and Japan. They 
commonly demonstrated the causal relationship between government intervention and the 
pace of industrial and technological progress in the state-led capitalist model, such as Korea 
and Japan (Koo, 1987; Amsden, 1989; Haggard and Moon, 1990; Freeman, 1995; L. Kim, 
1997).  
Freeman (1987; 1995) identified the national education system, industrial relations, 
technical and scientific institutions, government policies and cultural traditions as key 
determinants of national technology capabilities in Japan. L. Kim (1997) argued that effective 
export-oriented policies and close ties between political institutions and big business groups 
in the build of national strategic industry are major contributors to the rapid economic growth 
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in Korea (also see Koo, 1987). Hobday (1996) and Carney (2000) formed a similar 
conclusion that successful technological catch-up in East Asian economies is a result of 
government leadership, technological leaning derived from activities in export market and 
arrangement between government and industrial firms.  However, Sakakibara and Cho (2002) 
pointed out the problems associated with low levels of knowledge sharing and cooperative 
R&D activities between universities and industry in Korea and Japan.  
At an industry level, Mowery and Nelson (1999) discussed key sources of industrial 
leadership and factors behind cross-national and cross-industry differences in innovation 
patterns in seven industries in the US, Japan and Western Europe. Cefis and Orsenigo (2001) 
empirically analysed the persistence of innovation activities and its role in knowledge stock 
and innovation performance using patent data of manufacturing firms in Japan, France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK and the US. Cohen et al. (2002) identified appropriability conditions 
and intra-industry R&D spill-overs as critical success factors for technical innovation in 
Japanese manufacturing sectors.  
Amsden (1989) suggested that government intervention, chaebol-centred industrial 
structure and shop-floor management explain why Korea has grown so much faster than 
other emerging economies. S. Kim (1998) argued that Korean semiconductor success is the 
result of political-institutional processes, the state-chaebol relationship based on reciprocal 
subsidy and chaebol governance. A good partnership between government-sponsored 
research institutes (GRIs) and firms with the government priority policy for intensively 
fostering ICTs enable Korea to be the most powerful ICT country in the world (Lee and Yoo, 
2007). Meanwhile, the rapid growth of biotechnology in France is attributable to a strong 
research capacity of university and its close linkage with public/corporate research 
institutions, as well as the priority policy for biotechnology sectors (Lee and Yoo, 2007). 
Furthermore, Bartholomew (1997) indentified several external sources around firms 
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as determinants of biotechnology and other basic scientific research-dependent industries: 
tradition of scientific education, patterns of basic research funding, linkages with foreign 
research organisations, degree of commercial orientation of academia, labour mobility; 
venture capital system, national technology policy, and technological accumulation 
(Bartholomew, 1997,  p.246). A number of researchers argued that low levels of labour 
mobility, availability of venture capital and international partnership, as well as a weak R&D 
capacity of universities negatively affected the progress of biotechnology in Korea and Japan 
(Rhee, 2003; Park, 2004; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). More recently, Lee and Jung (2010) 
examined productivity gaps between Korean firms and Japanese firms in the manufacturing 
sector, highlighting the role of knowledge regime, sectoral innovation systems and market 
structure as determinants of productivity catch-up.   
At the firm level, Damijan et al. (2003) investigated 8,000 firms in the top 10 
transition countries and stressed the important role of FDI in technology transfer and its 
direct effect on local firms’ productivity. Amsden and Hikino (1994) argued that the 
improvement of firms’ capacity to successfully master foreign techniques and transform them 
into organisational know-how is essential for the latecomer firms.  The role of organisational 
learning in productive and innovative activities was highlighted in much of the innovation 
literature on the latecomer firms (Hobday, 1995; Mathews and Cho, 1999; Cho et al., 1998; 
2001).  
Lee and O’Neill (2003) examined the effect of corporate ownership structure on R&D 
investment of US and Japanese firms. By employing agency theory and stewardship theory, 
they argued that the different owner-management relationships, such as ownership 
concentration, result in disparities in R&D investments between the US and Japan. Hobday 
(1995) discussed success cases of East Asian latecomer firms’ innovation strategies for 
electronic technologies. He pointed out Taiwan’s SME innovation cluster model, Singapore’s 
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leapfrogging strategy and Hong Kong’s laissez-faire technological development strategy. The 
inter-organisational relationships (e.g., business groups, strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
partnerships, research consortia) are the key drivers of catch-up success, since the 
arrangements empower the organisations to achieve economies of scale and scope, allot risk 
and share resources in the absence of financial, technical and managerial assets (Powell, 1990; 
Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Amsden and Hikino (1994) argued that business groups 
contribute to the progress of technology at both a firm and a country level because the 
diversified groups can efficiently transfer and diffuse know-how, ideas and skills into their 
affiliates in Korea and Japan. Furthermore, the formation of business groups may allow the 
flexibility of turnover capital for technology investment among their subsidiary companies, 
which serves technology capacity building and upgrading. However, particularly in the time 
of transition, a close relationship with government may be the necessary condition to grow 
firms and cope with the frequent fluctuation in public polices and institutions (see Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Peng and Heath, 1996). Korean and Japanese economies are the typical model of 
government-initiated industrialisation and innovation and large firm-centred countries.  
All innovation studies listed here have mentioned that an extensive intervention of 
government and government’s close ties with large industrial firms contribute to the current 
status of technology competitiveness in both Korea and Japan (also see Johnson, 1982; 1987; 
Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995). Government policies are a vital engine for changing from factor-
driven to innovation-driven growth through their facilitation of various institutional and 
financial supporting schemes and incentives for innovation (Kim and Dhalman, 1992; Kim 
and Nelson, 1999; Sakakibara and Cho, 2002). 
 
2.4 Conclusion  
This literature review on innovation, which mainly focuses on determinants of national 
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technology capabilities and sectoral catch-up performance, contributes to the development of 
theoretical and analytical frameworks in an appropriate research design for this thesis. 
Theoretical views on innovation clarify the concepts of innovation, technology capabilities 
and NIS, while offering a useful lens through which to view sources and processes of 
innovation. Recognising that innovation is a key source of competitiveness (Porter, 1994) and 
business success (Schumpeter, 1964), numerous studies have examined determinants of 
innovation from various angles, for example, corporate governance, NIS and finance market 
system. The previous empirical studies commonly concluded that firms’ internal factors are 
significant (e.g., R&D efforts, organisational and strategic factors), but de-emphasised 
external factors (e.g., institutional conditions, government policies, international factors) in 
the development of technology capabilities. In reality, political and economic instability, 
including government debts, inflation and external shocks (e.g., oil), hinders the dynamics of 
innovative activities (Allard et al., 2012). Likewise, institutional reform and policy change 
that shape NIS and R&D systems can produce cross-country, cross-industry and inter-firm 
differences in innovation and catch-up patterns. However, only a few case studies have 
examined the interface between institutional factors and technology capabilities, mostly 
offering a historical and descriptive analysis. The theoretical and empirical gaps are discussed 
in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Technology Capabilities 
and Technological Catch-up 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework to answer research questions concerning why 
innovation pattern, speed and performance, and sectoral specialisation differ across 
countries and in what way the latecomers have achieved rapid economic growth and 
technological catch-up. For the empirical analysis of the country-level and sector-level 
dynamics of innovation and its consequences on technological advancement and 
competitiveness, the framework is based on the institutional theory while drawing on national 
innovation system (NIS) and late industrialiser perspectives. As noted earlier, this thesis 
explores two major issues: (i) the determinants of technological catch-up and innovation 
performance, especially the effects of the country-specific institutional condition, policy 
framework and sectoral context on technology capabilities and (ii) the casual relationship of 
actors within NIS and the contextual factors with respect to technology capabilities. 
Therefore, this thesis attempts to create an integrated theoretical framework by addressing 
specific institutional, policy and contextual factors as significant sources of technological 
advantage. From a new angle on the link between institutional characteristics and technology 
capabilities, it analyses the emergence of new technological trajectories, as well as the 
variations in catch-up patterns, innovation performance and sectoral specialisation across 
countries, with particular reference to the most successful Asian countries, namely Korea and 
Japan. In this sense, the policy and institutional contextual effects are investigated to capture 
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the county-specific characteristics of the innovation environment and its link to technology 
capability by extending and operationalising an institutional approach to innovation in the 
NIS literature. 
This chapter is structured in the following way. Section 3.2 provides a broad 
theoretical background for a critical assessment of how institutional and policy factors 
influence national technology capabilities and innovation in Korea and Japan. The usefulness 
of institutional theory and the NIS perspective in addressing technological catch-up and the 
dynamics of innovation of Korea and Japan is also discussed. Section 3.3 develops the 
theoretical framework to propose how the country-specific institutional features determine 
technology capabilities and innovation performance by linking institutional, policy and 
contextual factors to innovation themes. Section 3.4 concludes with a discussion of the 
empirical analyses based on the newly suggested theoretical framework and an evaluation of 
the strengths of the framework. 
 
3.2 Background of Theoretical Framework: Perspectives on Institution, 
NIS and Late Industrialiser 
The remarkable economic growth of Korea and Japan has attracted academic and policy 
interest in the idiosyncratic features of policy and institutional frameworks, and their impacts 
on industrial science and technology (S&T) progress. The rapid technological catch-up of 
Korea and Japan is partly attributable to successful policy and institutional change, including 
NIS, sectoral innovation system (SIS), education system, fiscal policy, S&T policy and 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime in response to technological change. Aoki and Kim 
(1998) discussed the unique institutional and organisational arrangements behind the 
government-business relationship as a key contributor to the rapid economic growth in Korea 
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and Japan. The unique political and legal systems that make policy top priority might also 
contribute to different patterns of and innovation activities and sectoral specialisation across 
industries and countries. Looking at the development of information and communications 
technologies (ICTs), for example, the Japanese government placed top priority on developing 
its own mobile technology standards to deploy high-speed information technology (IT) 
networks in the local market, whereas Korean policy and institutional frameworks were of 
benefit to IT firms concentrating on exporting and internationalised research and 
development (R&D) (Breznitz, 2009). Although numerous researchers have demonstrated the 
policy and institutional factor effects on industrial expansion (e.g., production system, labour 
division, major industries), only a few studies have focused on the relationship from the 
innovation point of view. The distinctive institutional contexts might cause the cross-country 
variations in technology capabilities and S&T progress supported by the distinctive top 
priority.  
An institution refers to “the rules of game” (North, 1990, p.43:7), which include 
norms, routines, common habits, established practices, rules, laws and standards (Edquist, 
2005). The comparative institutional perspective highlights the role of institutions and 
political-economy structures in contrast to the conventional approach that focuses on the 
relative factor costs as crucial elements of comparative advantage (Aoki and Kim, 1998; 
Casper et al., 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The diversity of institutional arrangements that 
shape economic behaviour produces various styles of resource accumulation, firm growth 
strategy and corporate governance around the world. From this perspective, Casper et al. 
(1999) argued that the German institutional arrangement is hardly conducive to radically 
innovative industries, while it helps to continue process innovations and product innovations 
in mature, established technologies. The new institutional economics has attempted to 
analyse different patterns of growth across firms, industries and countries by focusing on the 
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role of the evolutionary process and the role of social norms and legal rules that govern 
individual behaviour and structure social interactions (North, 1997; Aoki and Masahiko, 2001; 
Easterly, 2001; Alston, 2008; Dixit, 2008). Although this perspective has contributed to the 
development of many other theoretical frameworks in addressing differences of socio-
economic and institutional environments and their linkages with economic and financial 
development across countries, it has resulted in little attention to policy change or the 
variance of technology capabilities and innovation performance in the country-specific 
institutional setting. 
The NIS approach emphasises the significance of NIS configurations and national 
institutional networks as key sources of the variety in patterns of the product and process of 
innovation at various levels (Kogut, 1991; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1998). It suggests that 
distinctive paths towards technology development and innovation are the result of a complex 
set of relationships among the key players in the country-specific system of the stock and 
flow of knowledge (Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Archbugi 
and Lundvall, 2001). The NIS has evolved through three models: statist model, laissez-faire 
model and triple helix model, as discussed in Chapter 2. Over time, it can directly reflect 
different growth policies according to economic development stages, from factor-driven 
growth (statist model) through investment-driven growth (laissez-faire model) to innovation-
led growth (triple helix model). The government is the key NIS player in factor-driven 
growth focused on the building of infrastructure and institutions related to science and 
technology. In the stage of investment-driven growth, S&T policy focuses on the construction 
of effective innovation systems for the private sector’s R&D and its linkage to government. 
The dynamics of R&D cooperation among government, academia and firms becomes the key 
factor contributing to the development of indigenous technology capabilities in the stage of 
innovation-led growth (Motohashi, 2005; Park and Leydesdorff, 2010). 
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However, the NIS approach has some theoretical shortcomings in explaining 
contextual issues, including socio-political contexts and business external/contextual 
environments, and their impacts on technological development and innovation in Korea and 
Japan. It is “… theoretically too modest … observations, much like a country fixed effect, that 
show that institutional environments in the form of nations matter: we do not have a theory 
that explains why or that seeks to group these effects into categories of national systems” 
(Kogut, 2003, p.158).  
The underlying limitations of the NIS approach are summarised below. First, the 
theory of NIS has the weakness of being pressed into the contexts of latecomer countries, 
particularly state-led capitalist economies where close ties between government and business 
play an important role in technology catch-up and innovation. The principles and 
configurations of NIS are modelled on the systems of advanced countries, but technological 
change of the latecomers is often determined outside the system (exogenous variables) (Viotti, 
2002). In other words, this perspective suggests a universal formula that is created in the 
strong professional networks and institutional links in technologically developed economies 
as the logical premise for the creation and effective diffusion of new knowledge. In this sense, 
it does not seem sufficient to explain the rapid economic and technological catch-up of Korea 
and Japan, where many weaknesses exist in innovation systems, such as a weak State-
University-Industry relationship. Second, the NIS approach provides static descriptions of 
national institutional devices and mechanisms for learning and coordination processes among 
the key players, without proper consideration of the special characteristics of regional and 
sectoral innovation systems, the distinctive paths and mechanisms of S&T development in 
unique regional and sectoral contexts or their interactions with NIS (Gu, 1997). Also, it 
considers neither an evolutionary process of NIS that changes and develops along with 
technological change nor tools for predictions (Archibugi et al., 1999). Third, the rapid 
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growth of foreign direct investment (FDI), internationalised R&D and cross-border strategic 
alliances produce blurred NIS boundaries (Patel and Pavitt, 1998; Archibugi and Lundvall, 
2001; Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003), since a great proportion of innovative products and 
services is generated not only by in-house R&D and home-grown capability, but also by 
improving imported technologies and joint R&D with foreign organisations (Johnson, 1987). 
To complement these limitations in applying the theory of NIS to the contexts of 
latecomers, this thesis employs the late industrialiser perspective, highlighting the importance 
of country-specific structural and institutional conditions for resource accumulation as 
critical elements in spurring rapid industrial and economic growth in the contexts of 
developing economies (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; E. Kim, 1997; Mathews and Cho, 1999). 
The famous Ace Amsden book, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, 
identified different patterns of industrial and technological growth in different policy and 
institutional frameworks by extending the insights of Alexander Gerschenkron’s economic 
backwardness (Gershenkeron, 1966). Amsden (1989) identified an invention-based structure 
in the UK (the first industrial revolution), an innovation-based structure in Germany and the 
US (the second) and the basis of learning by using borrowed technology in late industrialisers. 
Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, India, Mexico, Turkey and Japan were classified as late industrialisers 
and learners in her book of late industrialisation (Amsden, 1989). Also, a number of studies 
have argued that the route to technology progress in latecomers is not identical to that of 
advanced countries (or firms). A new techno-economic paradigm or the period of paradigm 
shift enables latecomers to quickly move into mature markets and provide new technological 
opportunities, particularly in newly emerging industries such as biotechnology and ICTs 
(Dosi, 1982; Freeman, 1994; Lee et al., 2005; Park and Lee, 2006).  In this sense, the late 
industrialiser perspective underscores not only the role of national endowment for S&T, but 
also the role of institutional and contextual environments in industrialisation and innovation.   
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However, both perspectives on the NIS and late industrialiser interpret institutional 
change as an evolutionary process, while merely descriptively analysing how distinctive 
policy, institutional and contextual factors affect the stock and flow of knowledge in the 
contexts of Korea and Japan. This thesis attempts to fill the gap of theoretical and empirical 
shortcomings in previous innovation studies by extending perspectives on the NIS and late 
industrialisation.  
 
3.3 Theoretical Framework: Determinants of Technology Capabilities and 
Innovation 
My theoretical framework builds on the idea that the rapid economic growth and S&T catch-
up of Korea and Japan are attributable to effective state intervention, the policy framework 
and institutional change responding to technological change.  By developing the institutional 
perspective on innovation, this thesis sheds new light on the discussion regarding the 
determinants of technology catch-up and the capabilities. It is associated with an institutional 
structure of a particular environment that provides players with advantages for engaging in 
innovative activities in that environment. Innovation research for technology catch-up and 
capabilities is integrated with existing studies based on new institutionalism, NIS and late 
industrialisation, while reflecting the peculiarities of the Korean and Japanese contexts.  
No definitive studies on determinants of innovation performance have provided a 
proper theoretical framework for understanding policy, institutional and contextual issues 
related to improving technology capabilities and competitiveness. In the resource-based view 
(RBV), many strategy and management studies have highlighted the strategic resources that 
defy imitation as determining factors in boosting innovativeness and performance, and 
thereby a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; Mahoney and 
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Pandian, 1992). The strategic resources embrace several heterogeneous ingredients that form 
technological capability building, such as visible/invisible knowledge and tacit/codified 
knowledge (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Archbugi and Pietrobelli, 2003). Although the RBV 
is still widely used as a tool in building theoretical frameworks in business management 
studies, it has been criticised for ignoring the process of resource development and the 
contextual factors (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
The dynamic capability view (DCV) attempts to compensate for a shortcoming of the 
RBV. Dynamic capability refers to “the firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure 
internal and external competence to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece et al., 
1997, p.516). In contrast to the RBV that stresses the capacity to select appropriate resources, 
the DCV focuses on the specific capacity for resource development and renewal in response 
to a changing business environment as a key determinant of competitive development.  This 
may imply that successful innovation is driven not only by the revolutionary radical 
innovation associated with the development of new products and technologies, but also by 
evolutionary incremental innovation based on the process of improving and renewing 
existing knowledge and resources. Incremental innovation seems to be more influential in 
catching-up countries. In this sense, dynamic capability is neither easily imitable nor 
completely substitutable without considerable investment of time and effort, and thus it is a 
key driver for developing technology capabilities. Since technical innovation is inherently 
uncertain and increasingly dynamic, dynamic capability is the driving force of technological 
growth and competitiveness in a knowledge-based economy.  
However, the DCV provides little help in understanding how political systems and 
government capacity that shape distinctive institutional frameworks and innovation 
environments affect national technology capabilities, despite the government being a major 
contributor to the NIS in the contexts of state-led capitalist countries, namely Korea and 
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Japan. Korea and Japan, along with Finland and Switzerland, are the world’s top performers 
in terms of government expenditures and grants in R&D (OECD Statistics). Strategic 
government intervention in Korea and Japan is a crucial driver of productive growth and 
rapid technology catch-up, particularly in precision manufacturing and newly emerging 
industries, such as ICTs. Therefore, the rapid catch-up and technology capacity-building in 
Korea and Japan are driven not only by the stock of capital (the RBV) with the mechanism 
for resource development and renewal (the DCV), but also by successful institutional reform 
and policy change that directly influence the flow of valuable resources and investments for 
future innovation. 
There is no doubt that the dynamics of innovative activities relies on not only internal 
sources, but also external sources around firms, such as political and economic stability, 
which  create sound monetary and taxation systems, trade policy, IPRs regime as well as 
favourable climates for R&D investment (Allard et al., 2012). In this sense, this thesis 
addresses institutional and policy factors that affect political, economic and innovation 
environments as important determinants of the national technology capabilities and the catch-
up success of Korea and Japan. Figure 3.1 presents the conceptual framework of this research. 
Based on an institutional perspective on NIS and late industrialiser, this analytical framework 
is structured to incorporate existing innovation research on institutional, organisational and 
sectoral features of Korea and Japan. Empirical investigations have been performed to 
examine the key determinants of technology capabilities across countries on the one hand, 
and determinants of technology catch-up performance in Korea and Japan as case studies on 
the other.  
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Figure 3.1 Analytical Framework  
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The first analytical framework was developed under the assumption that cross-
national diversity in political and economic environments is the key factor in explaining the 
heterogeneity of institutional-settings and policies that lead distinctive innovation patterns 
and sectoral specialisation, as well as different technology capabilities across countries. It 
assumes that national technology capabilities and innovation performance depend on a strong 
government capacity supporting economic freedom to the stock and flow of capital, a low 
regulatory burden on foreign trade and a sound monetary system and legal structure, 
including IPRs.  
The second analytical framework was developed under the assumption that specific 
institutional conditions for the technology input-technology output relationship cause the 
distinctive paths and channels for technology progress, with particular attention to Korea and 
Japan. It also attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of triple-helix indicators’ innovation 
activities by empirically analysing the time required for a return on technology investment 
for each indicator in the contexts of Korea and Japan. The use of an appropriate lag is an 
important issue in innovation research because of the inherently complex and risky nature of 
innovation activities (Tidd et al., 2005). Hence, this empirical investigation tested how much 
of the current technology output of each player within the NIS (e.g., the public sector, the 
private sector, foreign investor) can be explained by its past values of technology input, and 
the other way round.  
The third analytical framework was developed under the assumption that specific 
institutional and policy frameworks play an important part in reducing productivity and 
technology gaps between a latecomer and a forerunner (a leader). The unique characteristics 
of industrial structures, S&T polices, knowledge regimes, and sectoral innovation systems in 
Korea and Japan are employed to explain distinct catch-up patterns, speed and performance. 
It also attempts to identify key institutional and policy factors influencing productivity 
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growth and rapid technology catch-up at a sectoral level. With case studies on biotechnology 
and wireless telecommunication technology in Korea and Japan, the delay factors and the 
contributing factors affecting technological catch-up are investigated in distinct sectoral 
innovation systems. This helps in understanding why the catch-up performance and speed of 
the wireless telecommunication industry is better and faster than that of the biotechnology 
industry despite the same catch-up patterns (the path-creating catch-up model). A detailed 
discussion follows in the rest of this section. 
 
3.3.1 Government Policy and Technology Capabilities  
The dynamics of innovative activities are significantly dependent on both the national 
context (e.g., political and economic conditions) and the international context (e.g., 
globalisation) because the “creation of new knowledge and the innovations that transpire 
from such knowledge are influenced by many factors both within and beyond the boundaries 
of the nation” (Howells and Roberts, 2000, p.259).  
The importance of national conditions is underlined in Porter’s diamond model for the 
competitive advantage of nations. The diamond model is used to investigate the impact of 
national conditions on the global competitiveness of industries to explain why some countries 
(or industries within countries) are more competitive than others. In contrast to the classical 
theories of international trade that focus on inherited factors (e.g., land, natural resources, 
labour, size of local population) as key determinants of competitiveness, recent management 
theories have emphasised the significance of new advanced factor endowments (e.g., skilled 
labour, a strong S&T base, culture) by considering national conditions. The creation of new 
advanced factor endowments relies on four endogenous variables (factor conditions, demand 
conditions, supportive and related industries, and firm strategy, structure and rivalry) and two 
exogenous variables (government and technological change) (Porter, 1990, 1998). All 
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endogenous variables are affected by government and political decisions, subsidies, 
education policies, quality standards, public procurement, taxation and anti-trust laws (Porter, 
1990). In this sense, government acts as a catalyst and a challenger to encourage firms to 
innovate and invest for specialised factor creation, while providing the supportive 
infrastructure for increases in productivity and innovative activities (e.g., industrial cluster) 
(O'Donnellan, 1994; Porter, 1998). Government does not participate in product innovation 
and new technology creation in a straight line, but plays a pivotal role in improving the 
competitive and cooperative R&D environment to facilitate innovative activities (see 
Jameson and Soule, 1991; Goh, 2005). In this sense, government policy can affect innovation 
in various ways, including antitrust regulations, rousing early demand for advanced products 
and services and stringent standards for products and services.  
The diamond model can apply to the contexts of latecomer countries, because their 
industries are strongly influenced by government policies and economic conditions. However, 
the diamond model is inappropriate for analysing the dynamics of innovation since this 
model does not include important factors that affect national and industrial competitiveness 
in the contexts of latecomers. First, this model considers innovation as a new commodity or 
product created under the pressure of competition, but pays no direct attention to the nature 
and types of innovation, especially “the interactive nature of innovation process” (Lundvall, 
1999, p.62). With an absence of resources, building and developing technology capabilities 
through the process of learning and cooperative relations among actors within the NIS are 
essential for latecomers to move from the imitation to the innovation stage (Lundvall, 1999). 
Second, this model based on market relations fails to capture close ties between big business 
groups (e.g., chaebols) and government (non-market relationships) in latecomer countries. 
Non-market organisations, such as governments, and their relationship with market 
organisations play the leading role in the development of industries in developing countries. 
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For example, Korea’s government made and changed its policy and structure to benefit 
chaebols in the allocation and utilisation of resources, which resulted in successful economic 
and technology catch-up in Korea. Third, this model ignores the importance of international 
factors, especially the globalisation process, and their impacts on innovative activities despite 
the absorption of foreign knowledge being the core of learning innovation systems in 
developing or latecomer economies (Viotti, 2002). Therefore, the present study attempted to 
compensate for these theoretical shortcomings in Porter’s diamond model by considering the 
dynamics of innovation, and both national and international conditions, which extend 
perspectives on the NIS and late industrialisation. 
Globalisation refers to “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the 
world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation 
and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, 
services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 
9). From a technological perspective, an increase of border-crossing promotes the 
liberalisation of capital flow, technology trade and R&D cooperation across countries through 
various channels, such as FDI, internationalisation of R&D and strategic alliances (Freeman, 
1991; Kobrin, 1997; Rycroft, 2002; Castells and Himanen, 2002). By eliminating the national 
border under globalisation, resources become more mobile due to reductions in transaction 
and information costs that create the dynamics of innovation activities for acquiring, learning 
and transferring knowledge (Kleinknecht and Wengel, 1998).  
These advantages produce large institutional reforms towards a relaxation of previous 
government regulatory policy, while stimulating firms to undertake organisational 
restructuring, such as ownership structuring (Sassen, 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Lee 
and Yoo, 2007). The current status of economic development in high-income countries is 
attributable to effective institutional reform and policy change in response to the 
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technological change caused by globalisation. As a primary step in sustainable growth, high-
income countries introduced an open-door policy, including privatisation, stabilisation and 
liberalisation in terms of finance, trade and investment to strengthen market mechanisms and 
a seize profitable status in international markets. At that time, their markets were exceedingly 
buoyed by political and institutional changes that led to private and public firms’ 
restructuring (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). However, rashly opening domestic markets to the 
world entails economic dislocation, stagnation and marginalisation in the face of fierce 
competition that yields falling-off prices, shortening product cycles and rapid technology 
changes (Chew and Goh, 1993; UNCTAD, 2003; Goh, 2005). The best example is Latin 
American economies.  
The increasing globalisation causes changes in government ownership and regulation 
policy, forcing institutional transformation to conform to market mechanisms (Friedman, 
1993; Lee and Yoo, 2007). To efficiently allocate and utilise valuable resources (e.g., R&D), 
the government reduces the tax burden for technology trade and investment abroad, while 
easing regulations in local credit, labour and product markets to encourage economic actors 
to actively cooperate with each other and with the state (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  In this 
sense, a liberal regulatory regime can improve technology capabilities and innovation 
performance by promoting the dynamics of information flow, technology transfer and joint-
R&D across firms, industries and countries (Gilpin, 1987; Kobrin, 1997; Castells and 
Himanen, 2002; Kogut and Macpherson, 2003), which gives rise to a heated debate on neo-
liberalism versus state coordination issues (McMichael, 1996; Evans, 1997).  
The present study attempted to prove that policy and institutional factors affecting 
national and international conditions have an important impact on national technology 
capabilities and innovation, because the creation of competitive factors for the growth might 
strongly depend on liberal (or regulatory) government policy and structure. Given the fact 
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that government policy seriously affects the mobility of capital, availability of skilled labour 
and venture capital, as well as FDI., direct intervention in the market mechanism and 
restrictive policy on foreign trade might hinder the stock and flow of knowledge and R&D 
cooperation in the creation of new advanced factor endowments.  
 
3.3.2 Legal Structure, Intellectual Property Regime and Technology Capabilities 
In recent research based on the institutional approach to innovation, IPRs have become 
increasingly important in the sustainable development strategy of a firm and country. The 
intellectual property (IP) regime is the specific institution through which to legally secure 
exclusive rights for intangible assets, such as ideas, knowledge, inventions and discoveries 
(Song, 2006). IPRs protect owners that are granted monopolies against the utilisation or 
reproduction of innovations without a license for a certain period of time. IPRs include 
patents, trademarks, copyrights, industrial design rights and trade secrets in various fields 
(Boldrin and Levine, 2004).  
IPRs have been frequently discussed and debated in the area of social science in 
relation to various topics, such as international trade, human resources, finance, innovation 
and industrial development, including biotechnology and media industries (Maskus, 2000; 
Lesser, 2001; Lall, 2003; Schneider, 2005; Branstetter et al., 2007). IPRs are broadly 
categorised by two objectives in the process of technical innovation: pro-creation and pro-
diffusion. The creation of novel ideas and innovative technologies is the main agenda in the 
former, whereas the latter focuses on the diffusion of existing knowledge and technologies 
with the channel of imitation or licensing (also see Song, 2006). In developing countries, the 
pro-diffusion role of IPRs tends to be given a great deal of weight in the improvement of 
innovation capabilities over pro-creation, which plays a significant role in developed 
countries, because of a lack of financial, technical and organisational resources in the process 
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of technical innovation (Maskus, 2000; Lall, 2003). In the absence of intellectual assets, 
Hobday (1995) underscored the significance of technological linkages with multinational 
enterprise (MNEs) or firms in advanced economies as an important channel of knowledge 
learning, transfer, diffusion and spillover in emerging economies.  
The large body of research on innovation provides discussion of the positive effects 
of tough IPRs on the development of technology capabilities through the promotion of 
knowledge generation and diffusion, technology transfer and private investment flows. Policy 
makers have reinforced IPRs with the aim of making active research capital investments in 
the generation and diffusion of knowledge in the local market by supporting technology 
proprietors (Maskus, 2000; Song, 2006). Also, tough IPRs target the increase of FDI inflows 
and innovation processes of technologically advanced countries (i.e., the United States) in 
host countries, because they are unlikely to enter into licensing contracts with firms and 
conduct R&D spending in countries with weak IPRs (Mansfield, 1994; Song, 2006); “weak 
property rights in many emerging markets mean that firms have only limited ability to 
negotiate enforceable arms-length contracts. Fearful that they will lose intellectual property, 
firms from developed economies may hesitate to license technology in emerging economies” 
(Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004, p.1350:1). Based on this view, the World Bank (1998) 
highlighted the importance of FDI, stronger IPRs and openness as significant factors 
influencing knowledge acquisition and foreign technology imports in developing countries.  
However, strong IPRs can negatively affect local technology capabilities with the 
high likelihood of delays in the innovation rate in emerging economies, especially heavily 
FDI or foreign technology-dependent nations (Kim, 2002; Falvey et al., 2006; Branstetter et 
al., 2007; Lee and Kim, 2008). Falvey et al. (2006) pointed out the positive effect of a soft IP 
regime on economic and technological growth in low-income countries by facilitating 
technology transfer and FDI, but their negative links in middle-income countries because of 
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the difficulty of technology catch-up through imitation. Lall (2003) emphasised the 
importance of the level of development in terms of industry, technology and economy in 
producing a beneficial result in local markets under a tough IP regime (also see Lesser, 2001).  
“Weak IPRs can help local firms in early stages to build technological capabilities by 
permitting imitation and reverse engineering. This is certainly borne out by the experience of 
the East Asian ‘Tigers’ like Korea and Taiwan that developed strong indigenous capabilities 
in an array of sophisticated industries. The available historical and cross-section evidence 
supports the presumption that the need for IPRs varies with the level of development. Many 
rich countries used weak IPR protection in their early stages of industrialization to develop 
local technological bases, increasing protection as they approached the leaders” (Lall, 2003, 
p.1661:2). From the perspective of pro-diffusion, the strong protection of IPRs obstructs the 
flows of foreign capital and technology transfer in early industrialisation due to the high costs 
of imitation and technology import (Helpman, 1993; Maskus, 2000). Kim (2003) highlighted 
the point that “a) IPR protection would hinder rather than facilitate technology transfer to 
and indigenous learning activities in the early stage of industrialization when learning takes 
place through reverse engineering and duplicative imitation of mature foreign products; b) 
only after countries have accumulated sufficient indigenous capabilities with extensive 
science and technology infrastructure to undertake creative imitation in the later stage that 
IPR protection becomes an important element in technology transfer and industrial activities” 
(Kim, 2003, p.7:3). 
This suggests that weak IPRs could benefit countries with a small domestic R&D 
base and scant talent, especially when entering the immature technology stage. Existing 
studies on technological advanced countries have shown the casual relationship among strong 
IPRs and innovative research capacity (Park and Ginarte, 1997; Song, 2006), and among 
strong IPRs and high-quality human capital (Helpman, 1993; Branstetter et al., 2007). To 
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benefit from IPRs in the context of developing countries, the development of autonomous 
R&D capacity and human capital are urgent for the improvement of imported techniques and 
further development of new products and technologies.  
Therefore, the present study has analysed effective policy measures supporting IPRs 
as an important determinant of national technology capabilities, and by extension how the 
Korean and Japanese governments have tried to facilitate R&D and innovative activities in 
the creation, protection and utilisation of IP, the main driving forces for the reform of IPRs, 
especially patent-related policies, toward strong IPRs to accelerate patent registration and 
faster commercialisation; it has also analysed how policy measures and IP regime facilitate 
patented technology transfer, as well as the role that IPRs play in catching  up and developing 
technology capabilities.  
 
3.3.3 Finance System, Business System and Technology Capabilities 
The role of national conditions and their causal effects on industrial and technological 
competitiveness have been variously addressed in a large number of comparative studies on 
national capitalisms (Hall and Soskice, 2001), national business system (Whitley, 1992; 
1999), national governance system (Hollingsworth et al. 1994), social system of production 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997), national innovation system (Lundvall 1992) and sectoral 
innovation system (Malerba, 2002). These studies commonly point out that national 
variations in trajectories of innovation and patterns of technological change come to 
characterise countries with institutional arrangements, which produce contrasting styles of 
sectoral specialisation across countries (also see Sorge, 1991; Kitschelt, 1991; Soskice, 1997; 
Caspar, 2000).  
A number of political economists have demonstrated that different types of capitalism 
reflecting diverse forms of coordination, patterns of authority or governance produce 
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idiosyncratic innovation paths for industrial-specific competitiveness by illustrating the 
industrial competitive profiles of liberal-market economies (LMEs) and coordinated-market 
economies (CMEs). “ The institutional structure of the political economy provides firms with 
advantages for engaging in specific kinds of activities … each economy displays specific 
capacities for coordination that will condition what its firms and government do” (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001, p.32-35). LMEs have a strong competitiveness in revolutionary and radically-
innovating industries that need the quick reallocation of firm-unspecific and transferable 
knowledge, as well as flexible adoption of external knowledge through a reconfiguration of 
social relationships. CMEs, in which there are closely knit corporate communities, on the 
other hand, enjoy a comparative advantage in evolutionary and incrementally-innovating 
industries with firm-specific process of knowledge accumulation developed by an 
idiosyncratic set of organisational routines (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Haake, 2002; Taylor, 
2004; Lazonick, 2007; Tylecote and Vertova, 2007; Jackson and Deeg, 2008).  
Differences in national financial systems generate contrasting styles of state science 
and technology (S&T) policies: government ‘diffusion-oriented’ policies aimed at 
incrementally upgrading innovative capabilities through strong collaboration between firms, 
industry associations and state agencies; government ‘mission-oriented’ policies aimed at 
radically developing new competences with large numbers of highly skilled human capital.  
“Diffusion-oriented … as the state often involve them in diffusing technological knowledge, 
developing research programmes and establishing standards. Mission-oriented policies and 
agencies … encourage flexibility in public science systems when combined with 
decentralization of resource allocation decisions through a peer-review system” (Whitley, 
2002, p.521). One important implication of the two models of national financial system is 
that institutional complementarities particular to each type of capitalism constrain the path of 
sectoral specialisation by promoting different types of innovative capabilities: more 
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explorative and revolutionary capabilities of LMEs; more exploitative and evolutionary 
capabilities of CMEs .  
National business systems that generate organisational types and firms’ relationships 
with labour, financial sectors, the state and other organisations are also interrelated with 
national financial systems. “ National business systems … distinctive patterns of economic 
organization that vary in their degree and mode of authoritative coordination of economic 
activities, and in the organization of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, 
experts, and other employees” (Whitley, 1999, p.33). Different characterisations of business 
systems, such as individualism and communitarism, lead ‘relational requirements’ for 
developing innovative competences, and result in prevailing patterns of innovation and 
sectoral specialisation in different societies (Soskice, 1997; Caspar, 2000). The ‘relational 
requirements’ involved in pursuing distinctive innovation strategies and priorities can be 
explained in contrasting ways in terms of more reliance on internal resources (or external 
resources), collective organisational capabilities (or individual specialist skills) and path-
dependent technology changes (or radical technology change) in the development of 
innovative capabilities (Whitley, 1999; 2002).  
Individualistic business systems in which individual autonomy is guaranteed through 
a loose interface between a changeable set of parties parallel LMEs’ market-based financial 
systems that favour radically-innovating sectors, such as life science and ICT sectors. 
Individualistic business systems and market-based financial systems share similar 
institutional features, such as short-term employment relationship, firms’ arm's-length 
relationship to financial investors and the state,  deregulated labour markets, strong inter-firm 
competition, as well as the limited role of government in regulating the economy (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001; Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008; Jackson and Degg, 2008). 
Relying on the specialist skills of particular individuals involved in high levels of 
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appropriability and modularity of innovations, as distinct from firm-specific knowledge that 
are more organisational and institutionalised into routines, firms are able to alter 
organisational skills radically and easily change their organisational contexts to develop 
radically new products, implying an institutional advantage in generic and transformational 
innovations (Teece, 1986; Langlois and Mowery, 1996; Whitley, 2002). In such 
circumstances, specialist experts and venture firms play the central role in the development 
of national technology capabilities by setting up short- to medium-term innovation strategies 
due to the high levels of market and technical uncertainties and network externalities in fast-
growing and newly-emerging industries (Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Tylecote, 2007).  
In contrast, communitarian business systems based on tight interface between an 
idiosyncratic set of parties closely resemble CMEs’ bank-based financial systems, in which 
there are long-term employment relationship, cooperative relationships with banks and the 
state, cooperative industrial relations, vocational and firm-specific training, as well as 
cooperation in technology and standard-setting across firms (Hall and Soskice, 2001; 
Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008; Jackson and Degg, 2008). Tight relationships 
with labour, banks and the state on a continuing basis facilitate the long-term finance for the 
accumulation of a stock of organisation-specific knowledge in continuous innovation, while 
reducing the appropriability risks and uncertainties surrounding these long-term investments 
through long-term alliances between them (Haake, 2002). The high levels of industry 
embeddedness, involvement of industrial collaboration and dependence of inter-firm also 
promote cumulative and collective knowledge production in pursing incremental and 
customer-focused innovation strategies involved in competence enhancing (Whitey, 2002; 
Tylecote, 2007). In business systems approach, individualism embraces two types: 
‘fragmented systems’ dominated by small firms (e.g., the UK); ‘compartmentalised systems’ 
oriented by large integrated firms (e.g., the US). Communitarianism covers four types: 
85 
 
‘highly coordinated systems’ based on horizontal alliances between large firms (e.g., Japan); 
‘collaborative systems’ based on sectoral associations (e.g., Germnay); ‘state-organised 
systems’ based on close ties with government and large firms (e.g., Korea); ‘industrial 
districts’ (e.g., Italy) (Jackson and Deeg, 2008, p.547).  
In theory, national business systems, in which firms’ innovative activities are mainly 
performed by their own organisational resources and in-house R&D, can be a major obstacle 
to developing newly-emerging industries that need incorporation of varied kinds of new 
knowledge and different skills in various fields, as well as active cooperation with external 
organisations responding to rapid change of technological trajectories (Whitey, 2002; Haake, 
2002; Taylor, 2004; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008; Casper, 2009). Hence, communitarian 
business systems generating fewer opportunities to change the organisational context, with 
limited openness to new knowledge from outsiders, provide fewer incentives to invest in 
incrementally-innovative sectors, but stronger incentives in incrementally-innovating sectors. 
Incrementally-innovative sectors, where appropriability is difficult and technological change 
is systemic, embrace consumer electronics, machine tools, cars and other assembly 
manufacturing products (Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008).  
These comparative studies on national financial systems and business systems 
provide the critical linkages between institutional arrangements, firms’ strategies and patterns 
of technological changes in two idealized types of economy. In this stylised comparison, 
Japan is the representative of CMEs with communitarian business systems focusing on 
incremental innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In recent years, however, many CMEs, 
including Japan and Germany, have adopted LME-style institutions and Silicon Valley model 
of entrepreneurism through the mission-oriented S&T policies for radical innovation, 
particularly in biotechnology, since their reliance on long-term commitments from employees 
and collaboration with internal business partners make it difficult to move a new 
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technological paradigm for radical reconfiguration of their organisational structure (Dore et 
al., 1999; Whitely, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2004; Casper, 2009). Meanwhile, Korea is often 
lumped together with CMEs from the VoC typology due to the lack of market-based 
institutions and venture capital (Lee and Yoo, 2007). Although recent research distinguishes 
Korea’s financial system (state-led capitalism) from Japan’s innovation system (stakeholder 
capitalism) in stronger central government influence over the banking system (Lee and Yoo, 
2007; Tylecote, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008), firms in both countries more reply on 
bank finance than private equity (stock market financing) in the process and product of 
innovation (Whitely, 1992; Kneller, 2007; Casper, 2009). The bank-oriented financial system 
can lead relatively conservative investment portfolios, since venture business are owned and 
controlled by banks or insurance companies (Casper, 2009). A detailed explanation on the 
countries’ distinctive institutional characterisations was presented in section 2.2.3 in Chapter 
2.  
However, in reality, many countries have showed pluralistic business systems and 
hybrid technological paths for national technology capabilities in distinctive sectoral contexts. 
For example, Korea’s ICT industry has more individualistic labour relations with a more 
communitarian financial system. Armed with large venture financing and government 
funding, also firms’ relationships with banks become looser in Japanese biotechnology 
industry (Dore, 2000; Lee and Yoo, 2007; Kneller, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008). 
Although VoC approach suggests the adoption of new institutions is associated with high 
costs and risks due to an incremental and path-dependent institutional change, based on the 
existing institutional endowments (Lether, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Talyor, 2004), 
Korea and Japan have experienced drastic institutional changes toward Silicon Valley styles 
developing entrepreneurial high-tech firms to strengthen competitiveness in radically-
innovating sectors (Lee and Yoo, 2007; Jackson and Deeg, 2008; Casper, 2009). Successful 
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institutional changes in the countries might be attributable to effective government science 
and technology (S&T) policies, regulatory rules and technology regime toward targeted 
industries in promoting radical innovation.  
Hence, the rigid interpretations of this dichotomy, in which contrasting types of 
strategy and form innovation are driven by different financial systems and organisational 
structures operating within the two different systems of economy, should be further 
developed by combining with differentiating features of government S&T policies (i.e., 
clustering), NIS and sectoral innovation system. Differences in government strategic policies 
(i.e. clustering, sectoral supporting programmes) and innovation systems provide incentives 
for individuals and firms to seek distinctive innovative competence and strategies, and hence 
generate differences in patterns of technological development and sectoral specialisation 
(Whitley, 2002). “… just as sectoral differences in technology and market conditions give 
rise to differences in industrial order within countries, national differences produce different 
governance regimes within sectors. Differences in governance within sectors are often 
recognizable as national differences in that they follow a similar logic across sectors” 
(Hollingsworth et al., 1994, p.272). 
Despite different institutional arrangements proposed by VoC perspective, both Korea 
and Japan show the state-led innovation system, in which actors within NIS and their 
innovative activities are coordinated and performed by state initiatives and policies in 
pursuing radical innovation, which might result in similar types of industrial concentration 
between the countries. “Even though they are substantially adapting to market forces, 
especially in financial and employment systems, to support radical innovation … the global 
trend of cooperation among the state, academia, and industry strengthens the rationale for 
the state-led coordination of innovation activities through legislations and government 
policies” (Lee and Yoo, 2007, p.460-461). Compared with Japan, Korea is more active in 
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industrial restructuring and institutional change to increase venture entrepreneurship and 
shareholder value in financial market in the development of radically innovative capabilities, 
particular in ICT sectors, while more effectively coordinating the contradictory forces of 
market-based restructuring and relationship-based innovation by state initiatives (Lee and 
Yoo, 2007; Tylecote and Vistintin, 2008).  
Hence, this thesis investigates how government sectoral-specific policy and 
institutional frameworks promote radical innovation in Korea and Japan, particularly 
attention to biotechnology and wireless telecommunication industries. It is also critical to 
analyse how sectoral-specific rules and technology regimes interact with broader institutional 
incentives and constraints proposed by VoC scholars in the contexts of Korea and Japan.   
 
3.3.4 Sectoral Innovation System and Technology Capabilities 
Technological change is highly affected by different sectoral characteristics in knowledge and 
learning processes (technology regime), demand conditions (market regime), networks and 
institutions, which shape the specific system of sectoral innovation; “A sectoral system of 
innovation and production is a set of new and established products for specific uses and the 
set of agents carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production 
and sale of those products. A sectoral system has a knowledge base, technologies, inputs and 
an existing, emergent and potential demand” (Malerba, 2002, p.250:2). In short, the sectoral 
innovation system (SIS) suggests that sector differences in knowledge base, actors and 
processes can produce various patterns of innovation across the sectors.  
The SIS perspective is rooted in the basic concepts of institutional theory and the NIS 
perspective that highlight the importance of the country-specific institutional setting and 
networks of agents in national growth; “Agents are characterized by specific learning 
processes, competencies, beliefs, objectives, organizational structures and behaviors. They 
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interact through processes of communication, exchange, co-operation, competition and 
command, and their interactions are shaped by institutions (rules and regulations)” 
(Malerba, 2002, p.250:2). Agents within the SIS are firms (suppliers, producers, customers) 
and non-firm organisations (universities, financial institutions, government agencies, trade 
unions, technical associations). In both market and non-market relations, they interact 
through five channels, “communication”, “exchange”, “cooperation”, “competition” and 
“command”,  to create, absorb, distribute and utilise knowledge and technology. (Malerba, 
2004, p.24-26). This departs from the traditional concept of sector used in industrial 
economics that focus on the industry size, concentration and uncertainty as key determinants 
of the growth (Williamson, 1965; Sutton, 1998), without proper consideration of the 
dynamics of SIS. However, recent research on the SIS has provided a dynamic view of 
sectors, focusing on the co-evolution of different aspects of sectors (knowledge base, actors, 
network, demand and institutions) which are affected over time by social factors and 
institutions (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996). 
Sectoral characteristics are linked to different knowledge bases of production and 
innovative activities (Winter, 1984; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Breschi et al., 2000), basic 
technologies, inputs and demand (Rosenberg, 1982; Grandstand et al., 1997; Bresnahan and 
Malerba, 1999), types and structure of interactions among heterogeneous agents (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Dosi et al., 1998; Malerba, 2002) and institutions, such as standards and 
regulations in markets (Levine et al., 1987; Dosi and Malerba, 1996). More specifically, 
Catellacci (2007) identified five factors related to sectoral innovation systems as important 
determinants of innovation: appropriability conditions, levels of technological opportunities, 
education and skill levels, degree of openness to foreign competition and size of the market. 
Park and Lee (2006) employed eight variables related to the technological regime and other 
country-specific institutional or policy factors affecting knowledge creation, learning process 
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and spillovers to identify important determinants of technology capabilities at a sectoral level. 
These eight variables are property of the knowledge base, technology opportunity, 
cumulativeness, appropriability of technological innovation, relative technological cycle time 
and accessibility to external knowledge flows, initial stock of accumulated knowledge and 
uncertainty of a technological trajectory.  
The study of SIS provides an understanding of how the innovation process takes place 
in a sector by focusing on sector structure and boundaries, interaction among specific agents 
and sectoral transformation. It differs from Porter’s diamond model, which analyses how 
national conditions influence the international competitiveness of industries. Despite both 
attempts to identify key factors that produce differences between industries, the former 
emphasises a specific knowledge base characterised by technology regime (i.e., 
appropriability, opportunity, accumulativeness) that determines the boundaries of sectors, and 
the latter highlights the degree of dependency on factor conditions, supportive and related 
industries and specific industrial structures.   
The SIS concept is more suitable for analysing which industrial sectors of Korea 
rapidly caught up with those of Japan and what factors affected technological catch-up 
occurrence, speed and performance of Korean firms, since national conditions in Korea are 
similar to those in Japan within high-income countries and other East Asian NICs. As 
mentioned in section 3.2.1, the national conditions comprise industry rivalry, strategy and 
structure (inadequate rivalry will undermine innovation and adequate rivalry will revive 
innovation); factor conditions of basic resources (climate, demographics, resources and size) 
as well as advanced resources (communications, infrastructure, specialists and technology); 
demand conditions (domestic catalysts can drive innovation); and related and supporting 
industries (collaborative or competitive in their offerings) (Porter, 1990). Given similar 
national institutional conditions, the present study analysed why some industries in Korea are 
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more competitive and innovative than those in Japan, and vice versa, by considering different 
technology regimes, financial market structures, institutional arrangements and sectoral 
contexts.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has developed a theoretical framework for analysing the key factors influencing 
national technology capabilities across countries and technology catch-up performance in the 
contexts of Korea and Japan. By elaborating on previous research on institutions, 
industrialisation and innovation, the analytical framework conceptualised the successful 
catch-up and innovation in Korea and Japan as a co-evolutionary process of acquiring the 
properties of technological capabilities supported by political and economic instability and 
efficient policy and institutional frameworks. This theoretical framework is rooted in three 
main theoretical bases - institutional economics, NIS, late industrialisation - and tries to 
suggest a synthesised model for latecomer countries by compensating for these theoretical 
shortcomings. 
 The main strengths of this theoretical framework are as follows. This thesis employs 
new institutional economics that mainly focus on the role of institutions and the political-
economic structure in technological growth and competiveness (North, 1997; Aoki and 
Masahiko, 2001; Easterly, 2001).  However, the new institutional economics pays little 
attention to the role of institutions in national technology capabilities and innovation, despite 
that unique political and legal systems are important in producing different patterns of 
innovation activities and levels of technology capabilities across countries and industries 
within countries. To compensate for these weaknesses, I employed the NIS approach to 
address NIS configurations and national institutional networks as key sources of the variety 
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in patterns of the product and process of innovation at various levels (Kogut, 1991; Nelson, 
1993; Lundvall, 1998). In contrast to new institutional economics focused on the role of 
social norms and legal rules that govern individual behaviour and structure social interactions, 
the NIS approach highlights a complex set of relationships among the key players in the 
country-specific system of the stock and flow of knowledge to explain distinctive paths 
towards technology development. However, the NIS approach has many theoretical 
weaknesses for explaining and analysing distinctive patterns of innovation and sectoral 
specialisation in the contexts of latecomer countries, especially state-led capitalist economics, 
where non-market actors play an active role in technology catch-up and innovation. From the 
NIS perspective, it cannot fully explain how Korea and Japan rapidly caught up and became 
the world leaders in many high-tech sectors. This is because those countries have weaknesses 
underlying their innovation systems, such as a weak State-University-Industry relationship, 
while technological change is often determined outside the system. Also, the NIS approach 
provides static descriptions of national institutional devices and mechanisms without proper 
regard for the special characteristics of regional and sectoral contexts and international 
contexts (e.g., globalisation). These theoretical limitations for analysing latecomers’ 
technology development and innovation are compensated for by employing the late 
industrialiser perspective that focuses not only on the role of national endowment of S&T, 
but also on the role of institutional and contextual factors in industrialisation and innovation, 
with particular attention to emerging economies. Therefore, this thesis extends perspectives 
on the NIS and late industrialisation. 
Based on an institutional perspective on NIS and late industrialiser, this thesis has 
investigated the existing theoretical research on determinants of technology catch-up and 
capabilities. However, most related studies have not considered policy, institutional and 
contextual issues despite the significance of political and institutional reform to catch-up 
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economies, like Korea and Japan. Some strategy and management studies based on the 
resource-based view have focused on the allocation of strategic resources as a key 
determinant of innovativeness and performance with no thought for the process of resource 
development or contextual factors (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The 
dynamic capability view, highlighting the specific capacity for resource development and 
renewal in response to a changing business environment (Teece et al., 1997), compensates for 
the weaknesses of the management theories based on the resource-based view. However, it 
does not explicitly consider contextual, institutional and international conditions of economic 
technological development, and thereby fails to analyse rapid economic and technological 
catch-up, since successful institutional reform and policy change directly influence the flow 
of valuable resources and investments in the countries. Meanwhile, Porter’s diamond model 
emphasises the significance of national economic and institutional conditions as determinants 
of industrial competiveness, but it also ignores important factors affecting growth in the 
contexts of Korea and Japan. This model pays no direct attention to non-market relationships 
(e.g., government-firm relationships) and international factors (e.g., FDI, internationalised 
R&D), or their impacts on technology capabilities, despite these being essential for catch-up 
economies.  
Therefore, this thesis fills the gaps in the existing studies by covering institutional and 
international factors to some extent through examination of the roles of government policy in 
domestic market and foreign trade, IP regimes, finance systems, technology regimes and 
sectoral contexts in technical innovation and catch-up. These investigations will provide a 
more balanced perspective for understanding under-explored national, sectoral and 
international contexts in innovation studies, as well as overcoming the methodological 
limitations of existing innovation research in the contexts of East Asian latecomers, which 
has been mainly dominated by historical description and qualitative case analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the research design and methodological framework used in my PhD 
thesis. On the basis of two methodological criteria, comparison and control, I attempted to 
set up a proper research design to operationalise the research questions with the rational 
use of measurements of variables, modelling, procedures, sample size and data sources. 
“A good research design can be judged by the way it approaches the two issues of 
comparison and control. Designing a piece of empirical research requires the researcher 
to decide on the best ways of collecting data in research locales which will permit 
meaningful and insightful comparisons. At the same time the research design must 
achieve the control which gives some degree of certainty that the explanations offered are 
indeed superior to competing explanations” (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000, p.2).  
Given the characterisation of research questions in my PhD thesis, quantitative 
and qualitative methods were jointly used to test hypotheses in large number cases 
(particular observations of 69 high and upper-middle income countries), and evaluate the 
validity of findings and arguments in small number of cases (particular observations of 
Korea and Japan). The selected cases, namely Korea and Japan, are homogenous vis-à-vis 
my theoretical framework and also meet conditions for causal inference in social science. 
Given that heterogeneity leads misspecification of relationships, unstable estimates of 
causal effects, spurious correlation for the relationships, and thereby causing serious 
errors (Ragin, 2000; Goertz, 2006; Mahoney, 2007), Korea and Japan exhibit sufficiently 
similarity to be meaningfully compared to one other meet conditions for causal inference 
in social science. 
The statistical research that estimates average effects of independent variables on 
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dependent variables in 69 countries, and qualitative research on Korea and Japan that 
infers the causality and determines similar or different catch-up patterns and sectoral 
specialisation through a comparative historical analysis and Granger causality test 
allowed assessing the existing theory of NIS and developing a new theory in both 
probabilistic and deterministic approaches. After examining typical causal effects in 69 
countries, I attempted to analyse whether particular cases of Korea and Japan follow a 
general causal patterns by using homogenous and contextual variables in a comparative 
historical research. The existence or absence of causality though the correlation tests 
inferred from the large number of sample were appraised within specified contexts 
through a comparative historical analysis.  
As denoted by the research questions outlined in Chapter 1, the methodological 
approach for the analysis of institutional conditions of national technology capabilities 
requires deep historical knowledge and contextualised case-intensive knowledge from a 
comparative historical perspective, since it involves in large-scale explanatory variables 
(e.g., government policy), and complexities of  temporal process and causal relationships. 
The comparative historical analysis pursuing qualitative research helped the identification 
of the specific values of policy and institutional factors that enabled Korea and Japan to 
develop national technology capabilities. In the causal explanation of explanatory 
variables influencing technological capabilities, individual institutional factor was 
identified as a necessary cause and the interrelation among the included factors (e.g. S&T 
policies and financial system) were sufficient for the outcome. Typological theory and 
temporal process analysis were used to examine descriptive and causal inference about 
the linkages between institutional factors (e.g., S&T policies, IP regime, financial system, 
NIS and SIS) and national technology capabilities over time.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic research 
strategy of this thesis to develop an appropriate research design and appraise the worth of 
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my methodological framework. Section 4.3 discusses the rationale for the choice of Korea 
and Japan as case countries and the data reliability of this study. In section 4.3, I address 
the key issues of methodology that have been used in the existing innovation studies to 
decrease the risk of method effect. 
 
4.2 Research Design for the Thesis  
 
Research design for this thesis was based on idea that neo-liberalism is not almost always 
sufficient for national technology capabilities. If it is true, are economic freedom and 
government inactivism not almost necessary conditions for technology catch-up in 
latecomer countries? Such an underlying assumption helped to frame research questions, 
formulate testable hypotheses and test theories. This hypothetic reasoning was addressed 
in a top-down manner, starting from identification of typical causal effects in large 
number cases through correlation test to identification of the values on variables that 
actually caused the particular outcomes in the examination of specific cases. A cross-
national research in 69 countries was performed by estimating the partial effects of 
institutional variables governing business, labour and capital market and 
internationalisation on technology creation and investment, preferentially. Then, a case 
research on Korea and Japan was undertaken to indentify the causes though a comparative 
historical analysis in the light of specific contextual factors and temporal processes in 
order to elaborate and modify the findings derived from statistical research.  
In a cross-national research, indicators of neo-liberalism supporting economic 
freedom were regarded as probability raisers stemmed from the probability theory. “A 
probabilistic account ─ essentially the idea that a cause raises the probability of its 
effect— is now commonplace in science and philosophy” (Dowe and Noordhof, 2004, p.1). 
Some policy and institutional factors relating to economic freedom that probabilistically 
increase (or decrease) the likelihood of national technology creation and investment in 
high and upper-middle income countries were included in this empirical study. Under the 
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assumption that countries may not have developed national technology capabilities 
without these factors (i.e., necessary causes), this empirical study aimed at generalising 
the typical effects of causal factors that promote a liberal (or controlled) market system in 
credit and labour and business, low (or high) regulatory burden on foreign trade, sound 
(or feeble) monetary system and a tough (or soft) IP regime on the development of 
national technology capabilities and innovation. These variables were estimated in 
multivariate statistical models to evaluate their substantive and statistical significance, 
given that “independent variables that meet a specified level of statistical significance … 
considered important causes” (Mahoney, 2008, p.421).  
If I found that explanatory variables are necessary (or unnecessary) for national 
technology capabilities in high and upper-middle income countries, what detailed 
evidence should I provide to draw an inference? This requires case-intensive knowledge 
of actual contexts to elaborate and modify findings and often reject hypotheses developed 
in the large number of sample (with deviant cases) (Skocpol, 1979, Savolainen, 1994; 
Mahoney, 2004). Hence, I undertook case studies to demonstrate the empirical validity by 
examining necessary institutional and political conditions that are sufficient producing the 
rapid technological catch-up in Korea and Japan. Government S&T policies, financial 
systems, IP regimes, national innovation systems and sectoral innovation systems were 
addressed as necessary causal factors that produce sufficient for the development of 
national technology capabilities in long-run analysis, while determining similar or 
different innovation patterns, catch-up styles and sectoral specialisation between the 
countries. Since these political and institutional variables characterised path-dependent 
process of change and long-run evolution, a comparative historical approach that allows 
highly contextualised comparisons, temporal process analysis and long-run analysis might 
be the most appropriate method for this case study. A comparative historical analysis 
based on historical events and social processes across times and places helped 
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conceptualise and clarify both internal and external factors affecting national technology 
capabilities.  
A comparative historical analysis is the most powerful method in social science to 
make novel hypothesis and propositions and demonstrate their empirical validity in the 
light of causal relationships, historical sequences over time and contextualised 
comparisons of the similarities and the differences between cases (Savolainen, 1994; 
Ragin, 2000; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).“In this confrontation of theoretical 
claims with empirical evidence, analytical history enjoys two significant advantages 
compared to all but the most exceptional quantitative research: it permits a much more 
direct and frequent repeated interplay between theoretical development and data, and it 
allows for a closer matching of conceptual intent and empirical evidence” 
(Rueschemeyer, 2003, p.316). This approach that draws descriptive and causal inference 
from historical and contextual singularities by comparing cases is distinguished from 
rational choice analysis and interpretive analysis in qualitative methods (Djelic, 1998; 
Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney, 2004). The comparative historical analysis 
is particularly appropriate for a small number of cases focusing on the causal effects on 
large-scale outcome, such as industrial revolution, political regimes, capitalism and NIS 
(Skocpol, 1979; George and Bennett, 2005, Schutt, 2006; Mahoney, 2008).  
The comparative historical analysis was employed here to test the validity of 
findings and arguments derived from the cross-national research, and generate valid 
conclusion, since a given variable largely depends on historical events, sequence and 
duration, which could cause different outcome to cross-sectional analysis. As tools for 
analysing necessary and sufficient conditions for technology catch-up and capabilities in 
Korea and Japan, typological theory was used in conjunction with process analysis, which 
allows the analysis of combinations of variables and multiple paths producing outcomes 
by using over-time data.  “Necessary causes assume that the absence of a particular value 
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(or range of values) on an independent variable will always be associated with the 
absence of a particular value (or range of values) on a dependent variable; sufficient 
causes assume that the presence of a particular value (or range of values) on an 
independent variable will always be associated with the presence of a particular value (or 
range of values) on a dependent variable” (Mahoney, 2004, p.84). In short, a necessary 
cause implies that it does not deliver outcome without a factor (i.e., Y only if X), whereas 
a sufficient cause indicates that a factor lead to outcome (i.e., if X then Y) and its 
interaction with other factors promotes outcome (also see Mahoney, 2007; 2008). 
Typological theory that evaluates necessary and sufficient causes in similar or 
difference cases in theoretical dimensions relies on the method of agreement or positive 
comparison and difference or negative comparison (George and Bennett 2005, Mahoney, 
2004). “Typological theory involves the construction of typologies whose cells represent 
different values on independent and dependent variables. Different theoretical types are 
systematically matched to determine whether cases follow patterns of correspondence 
consistent with necessary or sufficient causation” (Mahoney, 2004, p.87). Although it has 
the same weaknesses as Mill’s methods, such as disregard for probabilistic view of 
causality, measurement errors, multiple causes and interaction effects (Lieberson, 1991; 
1994), the combination between typological theory and process analysis compensates 
these limitations in social research (Mahoney, 2004; 2007).  
Taking into consideration the large role of government in state-led innovation 
system, in which actors within NIS and their innovative activities are coordinated and 
performed by state initiatives and policies (Lee and Yoo, 2007), this thesis dealt with 
government policies as an interacting factor that influences to change the values of all 
included institutional factors (e.g., financial system, IP regime, NIS and SIS). In 
deterministic approach, the combinations of government policies and institutions 
governing innovative activities were analysed as sufficient conditions for national 
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technology capabilities in the contexts of Korea and Japan through a comparative 
historical analysis. Also, Granger causality test was employed to examine specific 
institutional conditions for the countries’ technological development over time. The 
causality test allowed me to econometrically indentify necessary casual factors and 
estimate multiple causal paths for the outcome under probabilistic assumption. Hence, 
this thesis could overcome criticisms pertaining to application of Mill’s methods of causal 
inference to small-N research in terms of “the presence of only one causes” , “the 
presence of only one cause” and “the absence of interaction effect” (Lieberson, 1994, 
p.1225). 
For systematic comparisons, this thesis relied on the method of positive 
comparison preferentially, given that Korea and Japan share similar institutional features 
as the state-led innovation model (a close a political-commercial link), and then the 
method of negative comparison to identify their distinctive innovation patterns and 
sectoral catch-up performances. “The method of agreement or positive comparison … is 
to track down regularities and similarities in patterns of conditions. The method of 
difference makes it possible to compare cases with fairly different outcomes … leads to 
the identification of those conditions or patterns of conditions which may be responsible 
for variation in outcomes” (Djelic, 1998, p.4).  
A number of studies used these methods have demonstrated that similar or 
different growth paths are caused by similar or different national conditions, such as (i.e., 
market-based versus bank-based), legal origins (i.e., common law versus civil law) and 
corporate governance systems (i.e., shareholder versus stakeholder model). To apply these 
methods, some institution-related theories that are categorised Korea and Japan into 
different groups, such as new capitalism, legal systems, business systems, were 
eliminated in the method of positive comparison, since the explanatory variables were 
considered the same in both countries. To find distinctive innovation paths, catch-up 
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speed and sectoral specialisation that must account for national technology capabilities in 
Korea and Japan, the method of negative comparison was also used by eliminating any 
common features shared by the two countries.  
The reason why more than one case from the state-led innovation model was 
selected is that previous comparative studies revealed weaknesses in capturing the 
underlying significance of political and institutional conditions for technology input and 
output in comparing patterns of innovation and sectoral specialisation. The two-sided 
comparison has been widely used to formulate novel hypothesis, discover a new 
explanation and conceptualise causation in social science research designs, given that a 
description of a single case, without an implicit or explicit comparison with something 
else, makes it difficult to develop a theory and test a theory (Bechhofer and Paterson, 
2000; Ragin, 2000; Mahoney, 2008).  
In short, this thesis jointly used quantitative and qualitative methods to infer the 
existence or absence of causality though the correlation between dependent variables and 
independent variables across the diverse contexts, and through typological analysis, 
process analysis and Ganger causality test in Korea and Japan. The statistical findings 
were appraised within specified contexts through a comparative historical analysis. Case 
studies on Korea and Japan (the state-led innovation model) might be innovative works to 
find theoretical shortcomings in existing theories in social science, since the statistical 
findings that that economic freedom (e.g., LME-style institutions and triple-helix 
innovation model) is not always sufficient for national technology capabilities in the large 
number of cases (See Chapter 5) do not conform to various theories, including VoC and 
NIS. The use of typological theory and process analysis enabled me to elaborate on the 
findings for statistical correlation between liberal/regulatory institutional conditions and 
national technology capabilities in 69 countries by drawing on fine-grained evidence from 
within Korea and Japan to show that how their institutional and policy frameworks affect 
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technology catch-up and capabilities. In this thesis, rejections of several hypotheses 
developed in cross-national research, indicating that neo-liberalism is not sufficient for 
the development of national technology capabilities were supported in the examination of 
actual cases though typological theory and process analysis which provided convincing 
evidence and additional implications for arguments and theories. Through typological 
analysis, the type of innovation system of Korea and Japan (e.g., state-led innovation 
model) serves new explanation and conceptual development in innovation studies.  
 
4.2.1 Rationale for Choice of Research Method 
This section attempts to justify the validity of the methods used in this thesis. Most 
research methods used in previous innovation studies have weaknesses in application to 
selected case countries’ contexts (i.e., Korea and Japan) because of advanced countries-
biased methodology for developing theory and testing conceptual frameworks. A 
qualitative approach, such as the survey or interview method, has been widely used in this 
field to capture an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons (e.g., 
institutions) that govern such behaviour. The qualitative method produces invaluable 
information for the contextual dynamics of phenomena in a particular case, which are 
useful especially for studies on emerging countries (Peng et al., 2001). However, high 
heterogeneity and complexity of institutional features in Korea and Japan make validation 
of the research findings and generalisability of their essential insights and concepts more 
difficult. Therefore, this thesis employed a comparative historical research method using 
descriptive methodology and a quantitative research method to seek empirical support for 
the analytical frameworks proposed in Chapter 3. 
An appropriate methodological stance for this thesis is as follows. First, this thesis 
attempted to undertake an integrated and systematic analysis by extracting multiple levels 
of factors from various theoretical perspectives and innovation research. As explained in 
Chapter 3, the theoretical framework in this thesis was developed by integrating new 
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institutional theory, NIS approach and late industrialser perspective, which allow filling 
the gaps in the existing innovation research of Korea and Japan in terms of theoretical 
perspective. To my best knowledge, no comprehensive studies exist that have examined 
the relationship of institutional, organisational and policy factors with respect to 
technology capabilities and innovation performance in a systematic and empirical way. 
Therefore, this integrated theoretical approach contributes to the existing innovation 
studies by addressing the specific economic, political and institutional conditions for 
product and process of innovation with multiple theoretical lenses.  
Second, this thesis addressed research questions based on empirical investigations 
with a broad sample covering 37 high-income countries and 32 middle-income countries 
to quantitatively analyse the correlation between institutional factors and national 
technology capabilities. With a cross-country regression, looking at the big picture 
enabled me to generalise significant institutional and policy determinants of technology 
capabilities before analysing these linkages in the particular cases. Although a cross-
sectional estimation has some weaknesses in examining these linkages due to the high 
heterogeneity of countries, this empirical study successfully controlled huge technology 
gaps, different levels of economic development and various institutions by using relevant 
control and dummy variables. This empirical testing constructed comprehensive datasets 
around government size, monetary system, IPRs and regulatory burden on business and 
trade. With the empirical findings, I introduced a historical comparative analysis in the 
case studies of Korea and Japan. Considering historical and contextual dynamics of 
innovation, this method helped in identifying significant determinants of technology 
capabilities and different or similar technology catch-up patterns and sectoral 
specialisations between the countries. As mentioned above, historical comparative 
analysis is an appropriate method for this study, since it aims not only to explore general 
patterns, but also to capture the historical and contextual singularities across countries 
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(Child, 2000; Kogut, 2001). The discussion based on comparative analysis of empirical 
findings highlights the importance of specific institutional-setting in national technology 
capabilities, drawing a profile of technological and innovation patterns and sectoral 
specialisation.  
Third, the dynamics of triple helix indicators within NIS and the contextual 
factors in Korea and Japan have been statistically analysed by using time-series data to 
remedy methodological shortcomings in the existing studies on NIS that have used 
historical and descriptive research methods. By testing the causal relationship of research 
and development (R&D) expenditures by sectors within NIS with respect to the 
production of patents, this empirical analysis enabled me to compare empirically specific 
institutional conditions for technology input-output relationships and different innovation 
patterns between Korea and Japan. With regards to validity, this empirical testing 
introduced longitudinal data collection approaches to reduce the bias coming from rapid 
changes of the transition periods in Korea and Japan.  
Fourth, distinctive styles and determinants of sectoral technology catch-up in 
Korea and Japan have been analysed by coupling historical comparative research with an 
empirical investigation. After identifying institutional and policy factors affecting the 
catch-up occurrence, speed and performance, the delay factors and the contributing 
factors affecting technology catch-up performances have been investigated with 
comparative case studies on the two path-creating catch-up models of biotechnology and 
wireless telecommunications technology in Korea and Japan. 
Therefore, this thesis fills the methodological and theoretical gaps in prior 
innovation research by historical comparative research and an empirical investigation of 
social phenomena via statistical techniques. The findings of this study may be generalised 
to apply in other catching-up or emerging countries.  
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4.2.2 Rationale for Choice of Cases 
Case study research is essential for this study because it provides a systematic way to 
explore historical events for institutional reform and technological change and to analyse 
their impacts on innovation activities in the real-life contexts of Korea and Japan. In 
studies of institutional change and its impacts on economic and innovation activities, a 
comparative research method using particular case(s) (e.g., nation, region, sector) is a 
major research method in social sciences and life sciences for direct comparison with 
other phenomena and theory-building or theory-testing (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994; 
Stake, 1994). “Case studies are analyses of persons, events, decisions, periods, projects, 
policies, institutions, or other systems that are studied holistically by one or more 
methods. The case that is the subject of the inquiry will be an instance of a class of 
phenomena that provides an analytical frame—an object—within which the study is 
conducted and which the case illuminates and explicates” (Thomas, 2011, p.513:5). In 
this sense, case study research helps in detailed contextual analysis of events or 
conditions and their relationships using a descriptive method or an explanatory method 
(Yin, 1994).  
A rational case selection that is based on representativeness (not randomness) is 
important for reliability and credibility issues or generality of findings because a limited 
number of cases or instances can produce case-biased findings (issues of validity and 
generalisability) (Saunders et al., 2003). To select the cases, this study adopted both a 
positivist approach and a phenomenological approach. Based on the positivist approach, 
which picks out as many cases as possible from similarity of case background, 69 high-
income and upper middle-income economies are selected on the basis of gross national 
income (GNI) per capita in 2009, calculated by using the World Bank Altas method. 
Cross-sectional research using such large numbers can avoid the controversial issues of 
the case-biased findings and generalisability.  However, this approach shows some 
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weaknesses that ignore the intrinsic importance of cases as well as their contextual 
background conditions (Yin, 1994).  
A phenomenological approach that selects small numbers of cases complements 
the methodological shortcomings in the positivist approach. Although a 
phenomenological approach has difficulty in generalising from the specific cases (Stake, 
1994), it provides in-depth understanding of the phenomenon with a detailed contextual 
analysis and an examination of the outlier characteristics of the cases (Gerring, 2004). 
Therefore, this study also adopted a phenomenological approach for a detailed study of 
how institutional reform and policy change affect technological catch-up patterns and 
capabilities in the contexts of Korea and Japan. 
The problem of conceptualising and generalising the findings from a few cases 
can be resolved in the research method with a rational choice of representativeness using 
a clustering process with a systematic comparison (Ragin, 1994). By drawing two-sided 
comparisons with the clustering method (i.e., categorisation), many studies using only a 
few cases have proven the application of research results to cases or situations beyond the 
specific contexts in which the research was conducted (Whitley, 1999; Whittington and 
Mayer, 2000; O’Sullivan, 2000; Guillén, 2001; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003). In 
the clustering method, representativeness is selected from several sub-groups that are 
somehow similar in characteristics (e.g., in market-based vs. bank-based economies, 
common law vs. civil law systems, stakeholder vs. shareholder corporate governance 
models). Therefore, this thesis selected Korea and Japan from the state-led capitalist 
model while introducing a two-sided comparison.  
The cases selected for this thesis satisfy the criteria for case section proposed by 
Van Evera (1997): (i) data richness and diverse predictions; (iii) similarity of case 
background; and (iii) prototypicality and importance of case background conditions. First, 
since the selected countries (i.e., Korea and Japan) are member countries of the 
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Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), large amounts of 
data and previous studies analysing specific characteristics of the cases are available. Also, 
there are diverse arguments, explanations and theories to address the research questions of 
this study. The details are presented in Chapter 2.  
Second, Korea and Japan have similar backgrounds in economic and technological 
development. The resemblance of case backgrounds makes easier the controlled 
comparison of several cases and the unit of analysis (Yin, 2003). The similarities in 
backgrounds of Korea and Japan are as follows. Both Korea and Japan have made 
remarkable progress in their innovation capabilities and rapid technological catch-up in 
East Asia. The two countries are currently the world’s top scientific technology-oriented 
countries due to their successful transition from imitation to innovation in their 
technological capability, which enabled them to transform from technology users to 
technology generators (Kim, 1997; Chang et al., 2006).  
As shown in Table 4.1, Japan is the world’s leader in number of patent 
applications and the third largest country in R&D expenditures, whereas Korea is ranked 
as the world’s leader in terms of resident fillings per R&D expenditure and the fourth 
largest nation in number of patent applications. Recently, Korea has joined the ranks of 
high-income countries in the World Bank classification. As historical background, Korean 
was under Japanese colonial rule during the World War II, underwent poverty after the 
Korean War (1950-53) and suffered economic recession after the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis (Chang, 2003, 2008). Despite such economic and social chaos, Korea has 
demonstrated rapid economic growth and technological catch-up, which could be 
attributable to effective industrial and innovation policies under strong government 
leadership.  
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Table 4.1 World Top 10 for Patent and R&D Activities 
 
 
 
Rank 
No. patent 
applications 
(2008) 
 
 No. patent granted by 
countries (2008) 
 Resident filings  
per R&D 
expenditure (2008) 
 Expenditures on 
R&D (billions of 
US$, PPP, 2011) 
1 Japan  502,054   Japan  239,338   Korea  5.08   USA  405.3  
2 USA  400,769   USA  146,871   Japan  3.37   China  153.7  
3 China  203,481   Korea  79,652   New Zealand  1.82   Japan  144.1  
4 Korea  172,342   Germany  53,752   Russia  1.56   Germany  69.5  
5 Germany  135,748   China  48,814   Ukraine  1.09   Korea  44.8  
6 France  47,597   France  25,535   Australia  1.02   France  42.2  
7 UK  42,296   Russia  22,870   China  0.91   UK  38.4  
8 Russia  29,176   Italy  12,789   Germany  0.91   India  36.1  
9 Switzerland  26,640   UK  12,162   Poland  0.77   Canada  24.3  
10 Netherlands  25,927   Switzerland  11,291   USA  0.72   Russia  23.1  
 
Source: Compiled from the data from WIPO and UNCTAD statistics. 
 
In some ways, Korea has followed the Japanese growth patterns for economic 
recovery and technological catch-up. A great success of Japan’s post-war growth 
strategies - moving first from labour-intensive industries (e.g., textiles, food) to heavy and 
chemical industries (e.g., ship construction, steel, machinery) and then R&D-intensive 
industries (e.g., automobile, electronic goods, semiconductors, ICTs such as mobile 
phones) - reflected Korea’s economic policy to transform its industrial structure in the 
same way (Stern et al., 1995). This has enabled Korea to enter the same markets as Japan 
as a competitor. The combination of high quality, low price, cheap labour and rapid 
delivery that causes strong demand for Korean products from other developing countries, 
including China, could benefit Korean firms and make them more competitive than 
Japanese firms in the export markets. Also, a highly over-valued Japanese yen during the 
1970s and 1990s against a managed valuation of the Korean won could have helped 
Korean firms gain a global competitive edge in shipbuilding, semiconductors (DRAMs), 
automobiles and handsets (Forge and Bohlin, 2008). 
Third, the case countries were selected in light of the criteria of the typical 
characteristics and contextual importance. Although many case studies meet the criteria 
for data richness and similar case backgrounds, cases have been selected without 
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considering contextual similarities, which can misconstrue research findings (Locke and 
Thelen, 1995). For this reason, this study considered unique socio-economic contexts of 
the cases that share similar features of policy and institutional frameworks, industrial 
structures, finance and innovation systems.  
The similarities in socio-economic contexts between Korea and Japan are as 
follows. First, both countries’ finance systems are characterised by strong government 
intervention in the financial sectors, strict regulation regarding the allocation of financial 
resources and significant government subsidisation of the cost of borrowing in the 
product and process of innovation. The governments act as a risk-sharing partner with 
industry and banks to facilitate R&D expenditures in high-yield industries. Second, 
government and large firms play the central role in shaping the NIS as a major driving 
force behind the rapid catch-up success in both Korea and Japan. However, the countries 
have the same weaknesses; many universities still have lower levels of research capability 
and make smaller contributions in both countries’ innovation systems compared with the 
frontier countries. The lack of universities’ capacity is responsible for the low levels of 
knowledge transfer, R&D cooperation and university spin-offs, which is a problem in 
Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems.  
Third, in both countries, large established industrial firms (chaebol in Korea and 
keiretsu in Japan) are key contributors to their innovation systems, which are 
distinguished by venture companies in the network-based innovation system of the US. 
Korea’s large chaebol-centred system and chaebols’ close ties with government are much 
more similar to Japan’s than any other business model within high-income countries and 
other East Asian newly industrialised countries (e.g., Taiwan, Singapore). The Korean 
chaebol is analogous to the Japanese zaibatsu (family-owned conglomerate), which is 
different from the current Japanese corporate ‘families’ centred on a bank, namely 
keiretsu (Chang, 2003). The government adopted the business model of zaibatsu and 
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intentionally formed chaebols, such as Hyundai, Samsung and Daewoo, after the Korean 
War as a national objective because zaibatsu succeeded in rebuilding a destroyed 
economy and played a key role in laying the foundation for economic growth in Japan in 
the post-war era (Forge and Bohlin, 2008). Like the Japanese, the Korean industrial 
structure centred on large business groups, a hierarchy controlling commercial operations 
and also some political parties from the early stage of economic development. The 
countries’ industrial and innovation policies were favourably created for the groups, 
which allowed them to gain monopolistic profits from product markets, raise funding 
from credit markets and acquire expertise from labour markets in order of precedence 
(Kim and Nelson, 2000; S-J. Chang, 2003). Although the Korean chaebol-centred system 
has been the target of criticism as the root cause of the financial crisis and the subsequent 
economic recession from 1997 through 2001, chaebols have rendered a great service in 
the rapid economic growth and technological catch-up with developed countries. The 
financial crisis brought about economic reform and organisational restructuring that 
changed its growth strategy to a high-tech-based growth, particularly ICT-driven growth, 
moving away from scale- or cost-based competition for basic consumer goods, electronics 
and other lighter manufacturers with low- and middle-income countries (Kim, 2009). For 
example, the profiles of chaebols, such as Samsung and LG, have changed from focusing 
on low-tech home appliances to focusing on high-tech products with sophisticated design 
in the field of ICTs to compete with foreign firms in developed economies (Forge and 
Bohlin, 2008).  
Therefore, the selected cases of Korea and Japan satisfy the three criteria of case 
selection and the condition for a comparative analysis. A comparative analysis of cases 
that have similar characteristics of historical socio-economic contexts can overcome the 
risk of comparing apples with oranges (Locke and Thelen, 1995). Since Korea and Japan 
are exemplified as successful technological catch-up countries in the state-led capitalist 
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model, this study sheds light on the comparative studies on NIS in which the principles 
and configurations are modelled on the systems of advanced countries by examining the 
trajectory of state-business relationships and external heterogeneity in contextual 
homogeneity.   
 
4.2.3 Data, Sources and Reliability 
This study was based on a comparative historical analysis and an empirical investigation 
via statistical techniques using different sources of secondary data to validate analytical 
frameworks and to examine the research questions proposed in my thesis. Broadly, there 
are two methodological approaches for data analysis in social sciences: qualitative 
methods and quantitative methods. Since these methods have pros and cons, a rational 
choice of method that fits the research purposes and questions is required for data analysis 
(Yin, 1994). A qualitative method provides in-depth understanding of real-life phenomena 
and contemporary issues, but is less able to be generalised (Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Remenyi et al., 1998). On the other hand, a quantitative method is more efficient for 
testing hypotheses and more reliable for generating research findings, but tends to miss 
contextual detail (Hart and Banbury, 1994).  
I have employed a comparative historical approach using descriptive methodology 
to interpret detailed institutional features in the specific contexts of Korea and Japan, as 
well as statistical models to numerically analyse this contextual interpretation in the 
analytical frameworks proposed in Chapter 3. Chapters 6 and 7 take a comparative 
historical approach to operationalise the research questions. This approach can facilitate 
insightful interpretation of institutional change in a national context, considering diverse 
institutional aspects, including S&T policy, industrial structure, finance system, NIS, SIS 
and IP regime. Empirical investigations attempted to validate contextual interpretations.  
Chapters 5 and 7 are based on a triangulation technique to check data validation 
by using more than two sources and measurements.  Triangulation is defined as “a method 
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of cross-checking data from multiple sources to search for regularities in the research 
data” (O’Donoghue and Punch, 2003, p.78). Based on the triangulation technique, 
multiple data sources, periods, predictor variables and methods of data analysis were 
introduced to investigate whether the data examined though different methods leads to the 
same empirical outcomes with the data used in this thesis, which might help increase data 
reliability and the overall validity of this study. Reliability, which refers to the degree to 
which the data collection method yields consistent findings and similar conclusions 
(Saunders et al., 2003), is an essential pre-requisite for validity. Compared with primary 
data, secondary data are more effective in increasing reliability because of lower risks of 
observer error or bias (Robson, 2002) and greater ease in other researchers verifying the 
reliability (Denscombe, 1998).   
With such advantageous use of secondary data, the empirical studies of Chapters 5 
and 7 collect S&T indicators and policy and institutional data from various sources, 
including the World Bank, OECD, International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Economic Freedom 
(WEF), National Science Foundation (NSF), US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), Japan Patent Office (JPO) and government 
official reports and white papers from Korean and Japanese ministries. Data coding of 
economic, institutional and innovation variables were initially performed in Microsoft 
Excel 2007, and regressions were run in Eviews 4.0. Specific data descriptions are 
mentioned in relevant chapters, depending on the aims of the empirical investigations.  
 
4.3 Methodology Issues of Innovation and Validity   
Various indicators for innovation input and output are used as the proxy of technology 
capabilities and competitiveness, depending on aims, types of questions and research 
contexts. Since the credibility of research findings is determined by the selection of 
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appropriate variables and measures (Schoenfeldt, 1984), the selection of innovation 
measures must be carefully considered in conjunction with methodology issues, validity 
and the research context. Therefore, this section addresses methodology issues of 
innovation and discusses the strengths and weaknesses of previous empirical studies on 
technology capabilities and innovation performance. 
 
4.3.1 Measurement of Technology Capabilities: A National Dimension  
There are five empirical approaches to measuring national technology capabilities across 
countries:  the World Economic Forum (WEF) Technology Index; the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) Technology Achievement Index (TAI); the ArCo 
Indicator of Technological Capabilities; the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) Industrial Development Scoreboard; and the Science and 
Technology Capacity Index developed by the RAND Corporation. Table 4.2 summarises a 
wide variety of constituents that form national technology capabilities.  
National technology capabilities can be measured by three sub-indexes: (i) 
knowledge generation; (ii) technological infrastructure for knowledge diffusion; and (iii) 
human capital. First, all technology capabilities indexes employ patent statistics as one 
component of national technology creation. However, R&D resource is included in the 
only two indexes among them: the UNIDO (enterprise financed R&D) and RAND (R&D 
expenditure). The reason why the others do not employ the monetary value of R&D may 
be because of the problem of missing value with data unavailability, which restricts the 
data-setting for number of countries. For example, the ArCo index covers 167 nations 
with the exclusion of R&D sources, but the use of R&D resource reduces the sample size 
to 87 nations in the STCI (RAND) and 76 nations in the Industrial Development 
Scoreboard (UNDIO). Although the patent covers many nations including poor countries 
due to the ease of the data collection, there has been controversy over the use of patent 
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statistics in research, including that the quality of patents substantially varies from 
country to country in different legal systems and institutions (e.g., commercial relations, 
investor protection, property rights), and all patents are not inventive, innovative and 
citable (Griliches, 1998; Almeida et al., 2002). Also, relying on patents granted by the 
USPTO could overestimate the technology capacity of the US (Archbugi and Pietrobelli, 
2003; James, 2006; Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Rycroft, 2002). Another important indicator of 
knowledge generation is the number of S&T publications, which are included on the sub-
index of technology creation in the ArCo and the RAND. With the S&T articles, the 
RAND adds the number of internationally co-authored papers to the sub-indicator of 
embedded knowledge. Considering today’s internationally integrated environment, the 
count of internationally co-authored papers might be useful to look at the globalisation 
process of academia. Like patents, however, the use of scientific and engineering 
publications has disadvantages, including that the quality of the articles fluctuates widely 
among countries and that the prevalence of English-speaking can be overestimated since 
the academic journals monitored by the Institute for Scientific Information are published 
in English (Archbugi and Coco, 2005; James, 2006). 
Second, sufficient technological infrastructure is essential for developing 
technology capabilities. As a sub-indicator of technological infrastructure, the WEF, the 
UNDP and the ArCo include telephone and Internet penetrations and electricity 
consumption. In general, technological infrastructure covers the two ICT sectors 
supporting creating, accessing, storing, transmitting and manipulating information 
(Archibugi and Coco, 2004; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). One is telephony, including 
fixed and wireless telephones. This is commonly used for the delivery of ideas, 
information sharing and interactions among entrepreneurs (O’Donnell et al., 2007). The 
growth of wireless telephones contributes to the development of electronic components 
(e.g., MP3, digital TV, voice recording, digital camera) and provides many job 
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opportunities in the digital content industry (Bigne et al., 2007). Another development is 
the Internet, which has been used worldwide to share, acquire and transfer the latest 
information and knowledge. Communication over a network increases business efficiency 
and productivity by engaging in e-payment, e-commerce, e-banking and e-insurance 
(Davison and Cotten, 2003). However, it cannot be the universal standard to measure the 
country’s technology infrastructure because Internet usage and penetration are still at low 
levels in developing countries due to the high costs of access and installation (Archibugi 
and Coco, 2004).  
Third, human capital is an important indicator of national technology capabilities. 
Many theories prove the positive impact of human capital on economic development, 
productivity and innovation, while emphasising the role of government subsidies for 
education and training systems in the development (Bowles and Gintis, 1975; Becker, 
1993; Mahroum, 2007). In this sense, all of the indexes of technology capabilities employ 
the mean years of schooling and the tertiary science enrolment ratio to measure countries’ 
possession of human resources. Notably, the ArCo index employs the literacy rate to 
estimate marginal human abilities, which might help reduce the problem of biased 
measurement and cover many more poor countries. 
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Table 4.2 Components of National Technology Capabilities: A National Dimension 
 
 
  WEF UNDP(TAI) ArCo UNIDO RAND(STCI) 
       
Knowledge 
Generation  
 No. of patents; No. of 
Tertiary enrolments. 
No. of patents; Receipts 
of royalty & license fees. 
No. of patents; No. of 
scientific articles. 
No. of patents; 
Enterprises finance 
R&D. 
No. of patents; No. of 
scientific articles;   
No. of internationally co-
authored papers. 
       
Technological 
Infrastructure  
 The Internet penetration; 
PCs penetration; 
Telephone penetration; 
Non-primary exports; 
Public institutional & 
macroeconomic 
conditions in the growth; 
Competitiveness Index. 
The Internet penetration; 
telephone penetration; 
Electricity consumption; 
Medium and high 
technology exports. 
 
The Internet penetration; 
telephone penetration; 
Electricity 
consumptions. 
FDI; Foreign royalty 
Payments; Capital 
goods; Telephone 
mainlines; Manufactured 
value added (MVA); 
Medium and high 
technology share in 
MVA; Manufactured 
exports; Medium and 
high technology share in 
manufactured exports. 
R&D expenditure; No. of 
institutions; No. of 
scientists & engineers. 
       
Human  
Capital 
 Included in the sub-index 
of Technology 
Generation. 
Years of schooling; No. 
of tertiary science 
enrolments. 
No. of scientific tertiary 
enrolments; Years of 
schooling; Literacy rate. 
No. of technical 
enrolments. 
GDP; No. of tertiary 
science enrolments 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from Lall and Albaladejo (2001), Wagner et al. (2001), UNDP (2001), WEF (2001), Furman et al. (2002), Desai et al. (2002), UNIDO (2002) and 
Archibugi and Coco (2002; 2004).  
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Table 4.3 Components of National Technology Capabilities: An International Dimension 
 Tech. Exploitation Tech. Generation Tech. Cooperation 
 
Innovation Input  
  
(i) FDI in acquiring control of an 
existing enterprise aboard; 
(ii) FDI in wholly owned facilities 
aboard; 
(iii) Internationalized R&D funding. 
 
Work groups or teams that integrate 
codified & tacit knowledge. 
Innovation Process    (i) Purposes of international innovation 
network (e.g., exploitation, 
Generation); 
(ii) Members of innovation networks 
(e.g., government agencies, firms, 
universities); 
(iii) International R&D performance & 
other types of learning activities (e.g., 
learning by interaction) 
Innovation Output (i) International trade: intra-firm trade, 
technology trade and wholesale trade; 
(ii) Patents extended to foreign 
countries. 
Patents produced by foreign 
subsidiaries of MNC. 
Transactional social capital 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from Rycroft (2003). 
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Despite such weaknesses, the synthetic indexes of national technology capabilities 
not only suggest the key components, but also provide a meaningful numerical statement 
that helps in interpreting the level of individual country technological competitiveness 
versus other countries (a cross-country comparison). However, the aggregation of various 
components into a single number has been criticised for conflicting testimonies that 
distort the reality of a country’s S&T capacity level (James, 2006). Furthermore, the 
indexes of national technology capabilities do not consider international factors, such as 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and internationalised R&D. In the context of increasing 
global production and competition, cross-border innovation activities and cooperation are 
essential for developing national technology capabilities and competitiveness, especially 
in developing countries. In fact, many developing countries rely on foreign techniques to 
build up technology capabilities due to a lack of intellectual capital. Therefore, the 
following section discusses the measurement of technology capabilities in international 
dimension.   
 
4.3.2 Measurement of Technology Capabilities: An International Dimension 
This section introduces the global technology index to investigate key components 
influencing technological capabilities, considering increases to the connectivity and 
interdependence of business and innovation caused by globalisation. Broadly, 
international activities for technology capabilities are undertaken with the three 
motivations: (i) new knowledge exploitation; (ii) new knowledge generation; and (iii) 
technological cooperation (Freeman, 1997; Raycroft, 2002; Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 
2003). Table 4.3 summarises indicators of global technology input and output.  
First, the cross-border activity for exploiting new technology is measured by the 
number of patents extended to foreign countries, foreign investment and trade (Archbugi 
and Iammarino, 2002; Archbugi and Pietrobelli, 2003). This is undertaken mainly by 
profit-seeking firms through the channels of (i) intra-firm trade in products between 
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affiliated units of multinational enterprises(MNEs); (ii) technology trade (i.e., royalties 
and license payments); and (iii) wholesale trade - importing finished goods then reselling 
them (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996; Rycroft, 2002).  Wholesale trade should be the key 
channel used for the exploitation of new knowledge in developing countries.  
Second, the international activity for generating new technology is measured by 
FDI, internationalisation of R&D and patents yielded by foreign subsidiaries of MNCs 
(Rycroft, 2001). Such international activity is performed mainly by the largest MNEs in 
the leading industrialised countries of the triad (North America, Europe, and East Asia); it 
includes FDI, the reallocation of R&D facilities to, and the acquisition of existing R&D in 
foreign countries (Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Archbugi and Pietrobelli, 2003). FDI plays an 
important role in acquiring new skills and technologies by facilitating the purchase of 
existing facilities or firms in the host country (the technology pull effect), as well as by 
utilising and transferring knowledge generated by the home country through establishing 
new plants and facilities in the host country (the technology push effect) (Ostry, 1998; 
Rycroft, 2002). Cross-border R&D investment and patenting also are regarded as major 
components of technology capabilities. In reality, these activities are at work in old 
manufacturing industries such as food and paper products, but rarely undertaken in high-
tech industries (Cantwell and Santangelo, 2000).  
Third, national technology capabilities is measured by the level of technical and 
research cooperation among domestic and foreign players, which include universities, 
research institutes, intermediate organisations (e.g., professional and trade associations) 
and firms (by building up strategic alliances and  joint ventures) (Freeman, 1990; Rycroft, 
2002). The building of a sound science and innovation network is essential to keep 
domestic organisations current with changing technologies. The network enables 
domestic organisations to form international partnerships, strategic alliances and joint 
ventures so as to acquire skills and techniques needed to succeed in specific or complex 
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innovative projects that are difficult to complete with self-developed technology (Chen, 
1997; Mowery et al., 1998; Archibugi and Pietrbelli, 2003). R&D cooperation is 
performed through several channels: technology exchange agreements (e.g., cross-
licensing, mutual second-sourcing), one-directional technology flow agreements (e.g., 
licensing), direct investment, management contracts, product sharing, R&D collaboration 
and manufacturing/marketing/services agreements, among others (Freeman, 1990; 
Rycroft, 2002). Technical cooperation for manufacturing is also performed through 
various channels, including original equipment manufacturing (OEM), second sourcing 
arrangements and manufacturing arrangements (i.e., assembly and testing agreements) 
(Marceau, 1994; Archibugi and Piretrobelli , 2003).  
Research for the technology index might suggest that national technology 
capabilities is measured not only by indicators of domestic innovation input and output 
proposed in section 4.2.1, but also by innovation variables related to the cross-border 
activities.  The internationalisation of R&D and joint R&D with foreign organisation can 
provide effective learning and technology accumulation in the development of national 
technology capabilities (Hobday, 1995; L. Kim, 1997): “learning by doing, learning from 
spillovers, learning from advances in science and technology taking place in other sectors 
and/or other countries, and especially learning by interaction (with suppliers and users, 
as well as with competitors) may be just as important as R&D-based learning” (Rycroft, 
2002, p.5:30). 
 
4.3.3 Measurement Issues of Innovation and Validity 
Considering the methodological issues for various innovation indicators used in prior 
studies, I explored an appropriate methodological stance for my study. There is no 
consistent measurement of technology capabilities or innovation performance, which 
depends on the goals and contexts of the research. Table 4.4 presents the strengths and 
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weaknesses of the main explanatory variables commonly used in the innovation literature 
as a proxy of innovation. First, R&D data are widely used as an input measure of 
innovation process because the data are regularly updated and easily collected across 
sectors and times of research. However, all R&D expenditures are not productive in 
generating new products and technology (Becheikh et al, 2006). Second, the counts of 
patents and scientific papers are considered as well-screened indicators by a third party, 
such as a government agency, and universally used as an output measure of innovation 
process. However, their main weakness is that not all innovations are patentable 
(Becheikh et al., 2006). Third, new product counts are regarded as a direct measure of 
innovation performance. However, new product announcements are subjectively made 
based on the company plan for marketing and with no objective screening system 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2003). Innovation indicators stemming from a firm-based survey or 
interview have several weak points due to biased results caused by the firm’s self-
interested responses and unqualified dichotomous measures of innovation (Balzat and 
Hanusch, 2004; Neil et al., 2004; Becheikh et al., 2006). 
Despite the pros and cons of innovation indicators shown in Table 4.4, patent data 
are widely used as a proxy of innovation output in many empirical innovation studies. 
The limitation of patent data is that they do not cover tacit and implicit knowledge, and 
therefore all inventions are not patentable and all patents are not innovative (Griliches, 
1998). Also, there is a structural bias in patenting across the size of firms because of 
patents’ high registration and maintenance costs as well as different administrative laws 
for which to apply (Almeida et al., 2002). However, the count of patents is a reliable 
indicator of innovation output because it represents efforts in the development of new 
ideas and new products, as well as outcomes of innovation input. 
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Table 4.4 Strengths and Weaknesses of Key Innovation Indicators 
 
Measurement Indicators Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Indirect 
measure 
 
 
R&D expenditure 
 
 Regular and standardised data collection; 
 Internationally comparable. 
 
 
 Input measure of innovation process; 
 Monetary adjustment for international comparison. 
Patents   Regular and structured data collection; 
 Regular update; 
 Precise Breakdown across time, industry and   
technology; 
 Direct measure of technology development. 
 
 Measure invention rather than innovation; 
 Not all inventions are patented and patentable; 
 Different registration system across countries. 
Patent citations  Measure of specific impact of patent. 
 
 Difference of citation across time and sectors. 
Scientific paper  Regular and structured collection; 
 Internationally comparable and precise breakdown 
across sectors. 
 
 Measure of scientific output rather than 
innovation. 
 
Direct 
measure 
 
New products   Direct measure of innovation; 
 Direct use for research purpose. 
 
 Identifying by company itself (self interest, value-
laden and fashion); 
 No objective screening system. 
Firm based 
survey 
 
 Direct measure of innovation; 
 Uncovering underlying activities related to 
innovation; 
 Possibility of identifying multiple variable or 
indicators for innovation. 
 
 Biased result depending on sample, measure and 
response rate (unqualified dichotomous measurer 
to innovation); 
 Intrinsically manipulative. 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from Patel (1988), Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003), Archibugi and CoCo (2005) and Becheikh, et al. (2006). 
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Many economists have repeatedly examined its correlation with economic 
indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP) and productivity, to validate patents as 
an innovation output. The leading examples of earlier investigations are Schmookler 
(1952, 1954) and Pakes and Griliches (1984). Schmookler (1952; 1954) was the first to 
use patent statistics as an indicator of innovation output and as an explanation of 
correlations between number of patents and aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). 
Pakes and Griliches (1984) developed the knowledge production function by employing 
productivity growth, the stock market value of a firm or industry and patent counts as the 
technology output. In their production function of knowledge, R&D expenditures and a 
number of scientists directly affect knowledge creation and patenting. 
Meanwhile, the monetary value of R&D data is commonly used as an indicator of 
innovation input since it has a direct or indirect effect on innovation performance by 
providing various learning opportunities, cross-border knowledge flow, spillovers and 
externalities (Griliches, 1998; Rycroft, 2002). A great deal of empirical evidence has 
proven a strong relationship between patents and R&D activity by examining the 
elasticity of patents with respect to R&D expenditures, the distributed lag of R&D effects, 
as well as the significance and signs of a trend in the relationship between R&D 
expenditures and patents (Scherer, 1983; Hausman et al., 1984; Hall et al., 1986; Acs and 
Audretsch, 1989). The strong relationship implies that patents and R&D expenditures are 
good indicators of technology output and technology input, respectively.  
However, Pakes and Griliches (1984) pointed out stronger relationships between 
R&D and patents in the cross-section dimension, but weaker relationships in the time-
series dimension. In their study, the median R-square was on the order of 0.3 in the time-
series dimension in contrast to 0.9 in the cross-sectional dimension.“Because the bulk of 
R&D expenditures are spent on development, most of the time-series variance in this 
variable must come from the differential success in the further development of existing 
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projects rather than from the initiation of new ones. The relatively low correlations in the 
time dimension should, therefore, not be all that surprising, but they imply that patent 
numbers are a much poorer indicator of short-term changes in the output of inventive 
activity or the ‘fecundity’ of R&D” (Griliches, 1998, p.302:1).  
Therefore, this thesis used the data of patents and R&D expenditures as 
technology input and output indicators to identify key determinants of national 
technology capabilities across countries in the cross-sectional dimension. The data of 
patents and R&D were also employed to examine specific institutional conditions for 
technology input-output relationship and technology catch-up patterns in Korea and Japan 
in the time-series dimensions. Patent data and R&D data fit well with the main aim and 
argument of this thesis to empirically examine technology catch-up performance in Korea 
and Japan, which are the world’s leaders in global patenting, R&D and high-tech trade.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has developed a methodological framework by addressing the important 
issues of research design, case selection, data analysis and measurement. Heterogeneity of 
methodological approaches has been used in the existing empirical studies on innovation 
due to various innovation indicators, sources and measures; hence, I have explored an 
appropriate research design to decrease the risk of method effect and increase confidence 
in the conclusions. Given the longitudinal characteristics of innovation studies, a 
comparative historical research method was used for a systematic and contextualised 
comparison between the selected cases. Based on the method of positive comparison, the 
case selection of Korea and Japan relied on similar socio-economic contexts and 
institutional characteristics, including science and technology policy, financial system, 
industrial structure, NIS and IPRs. With the coupling of a comparative historical research 
method, empirical models are intended for quantitatively testing hypotheses and theories. 
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To verify data validation and gain reliable research findings, I have introduced multiple 
data, sources and measurements. Therefore, my research framework has been constructed 
to balance the potential benefits and costs in selecting cases, data and methods.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Institutional Conditions for National Technology 
Capabilities: A Cross-country Study 
5.1 Introduction 
Globalisation leads the dynamics of innovation activities for the stock and flow of 
knowledge across borders. To strengthen international competitiveness and develop 
national technology capabilities at a global level, countries have introduced open-door 
policies supporting international technology exploitation, generation and cooperation 
through foreign direct investment (FDI), internationalised research and development 
(R&D) activities and international value chains and clusters (Dicken, 1998; Lall, 2001; 
Rycroft, 2002; Rodrik, 2004). In general, cross-border innovation activities are 
undertaken with three intentions and motivations: (i) technological exploitation through 
international trade; (ii) technological generation through the internationalisation of R&D; 
and (iii) technological cooperation through international strategic alliances and 
partnerships (Freeman, 1991; Rycroft, 2002; Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003). The details 
were presented in Chapter 4. 
All cross-border innovation activities are significantly affected by government 
policies and institutions supporting economic freedom that allows the voluntary exchange 
of knowledge, cooperation and entrepreneurial activity (Strong, 2009; Fabro and Aixala, 
2009; Levie and Autio, 2011). The government plays a pivotal role in establishing a 
favourable climate for the dynamics of cross-border innovation activities by minimising 
or removing obstacles that organisations encounter in pursuit of innovation (Hobday, 
1995; Mathew and Cho, 2000). The government plays a facilitating role to maximise 
innovation input, process and output by setting up legal systems and incentives supporting 
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global technology exploitation, generation and cooperation (Jameson and Soule, 1991; 
Goh, 2005). These systems and incentives cover a wide range of macro regimes and 
monetary policies, including tax, tariff, intellectual property rights (IPRs) protection and 
subsidies for start-ups, among others (Goh, 2003, 2005).  
In neoclassical economics, liberal government policies that support economic 
freedom in open market systems and trade liberalisation are regarded as the engine for 
economic development. This suggests reducing political intervention in national 
economies and privatisation of nationalised industries, while enhancing the role of the 
private sector in modern society (Crouch, 2001; Campbell and Pedersen, 2001; Friedman, 
2002; Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2009). In this sense, neo-liberalism contributes to the 
development of national technology capabilities by promoting productive and innovative 
activities through cross-border information flow, technology transfer and joint R&D 
under globalisation.  
However, does the liberalisation of trade and capital movement (labour, credit, 
businesses) always make a positive contribution to the stock and flow of knowledge and 
technology? Do government intervention and regulatory policy impede the dynamics of 
innovation activities?  How did state-led economies, such as Korea and Japan, rapidly 
catch up and develop technology capabilities? To answer these questions, this study 
empirically investigates the effects of government policies and institutional conditions 
(liberalised versus regulative systems) on national technology capabilities, given that the 
stock and flow of knowledge, as well as R&D cooperation/competition, are directly 
affected by the country’s policy and institutional frameworks from an national innovation 
system (NIS) perspective (Nelson, 1991; Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1998; Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff, 2000; Marques et al., 2006).  
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Table 5.1 Recent Studies on Economic Freedom 
 
 
Key Arguments  Authors Topic 
Economic freedom leads to more 
investment, higher per capita 
incomes, and growth rates. 
Azman-Saini, W.N.W et al. (2010) Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Freedom and Economic Growth: International Evidence 
Bergh, A. & M. Karlsson (2010) Government Size and Growth: Accounting for Economic Freedom and Globalization 
Djankov, S. et al. (2010) The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship. 
Fabro, G. & J. Aixala (2009) Economic Growth and Institutional Quality: Global and Income-Level Analyses 
Faria, H.J. & H.M. Montesinos (2009) Does Economic Freedom Cause Prosperity? An IV Approach 
Gwartney, J.D. et al. (2006) Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth 
Hall, J.C. et al. (2010) Institutions, Capital, and Growth 
Heckelman, J.C. & S. Knack (2009) Aid, Economic Freedom, and Growth. 
Lothian, J.R. (2006) Institutions, Capital Flows and Financial Integration 
N’Da, K. et al. (2009) Economic Freedom and the Impact of Technology on Productivity 
Economic freedom leads to less 
poverty and improvements in the 
general living conditions of a 
society. 
Bjornskov, C. et al. (2010)  Formal Institutions and Subjective Well-Being: Revisiting the Cross-Evidence 
Connors, J. & J.D. Gwartney (2010)  Economic Freedom and Global Poverty 
Leeson, P. (2010) Two cheers for capitalism? 
Shleifer, A. (2009) The Age of Milton Friedman 
Stroup, M.D. (2007)  Economic Freedom, Democracy, and the Quality of Life 
Economic freedom leads to more 
cooperation, tolerance, and 
peaceful relations. 
de Soysa, I. & H. Fjelde (2010) Is the Hidden Hand an Iron Fist? Capitalism and Civil Peace, 1970–2005 
Eriksen, S. & I. de Soysa (2009)  A Fate Worse than Debt? International Financial Institutions and Human Rights, 1981–2003 
Gartzke, E. (2007)  The Capitalist Peace 
Strong, M. (2009) Peace through Access to Entrepreneurial Capitalism for All 
Steinberg, D.A. & S.M. Saideman (2008) Laissez Fear: Assessing the Impact of Government Involvement in the Economy on Ethnic 
Violence 
Economic freedom leads to 
entrepreneurial business 
activity; political allocation leads 
to crony capitalism and 
political corruption 
Bjornskov, C. & N.J. Foss (2008) Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial Activity: Some Cross-Country Evidence 
Dreher, A. et al. (2007) Corruption around the World: Evidence from a Structural Model 
Freytag, A. & R. Thurik (2007) Entrepreneurship and Its Determinants in a Cross-Country Setting 
Heckleman, J.C. & B. Powell (2010)  Corruption and the Environment for Growth 
Levie, J & E. Autio (2011) Regulatory Burden, Role of Law, and Entry of Strategic Entrepreneurs: An International Panel 
Study 
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I could not find any relevant theoretical or empirical studies to explain the 
relationship of liberal (or regulatory) policies and institutions with respect to national 
technology capabilities. Table 5.1 provides a list of selected recent studies in this area. 
Most examine the impact of neo-liberalism on economic growth, productivity and social 
performance. Economic freedom is considered to be a key contributing factor influencing 
investment and economic growth (Bergh and Karlssson, 2010; Hall et al., 2010), human 
welfare (Shleifer, 2009; Lesson, 2010), cooperation and peaceful relations (de Soysa and 
Fjelde, 2010; Strong, 2009) and entrepreneurship (Heckleman and Powell, 2010; Levie 
and Autio, 2011). Despite the linkage to innovation, these studies did not address policy 
and institutional factors relating to economic freedom as determinants of national 
technology capabilities and innovation performances despite their linkages. The low level 
of political intervention and liberal policies for market and trade might influence the 
dynamics of innovation in a free and fair competitive environment, which facilities 
market entry for start-ups, the mobility of capital and labour, FDI and international R&D 
cooperation. The positive relationship between liberalism and innovation has been 
confirmed; countries with highly open and free trade systems are on the lists of 
technologically advanced countries, including the United State and Western Europe (EFW, 
2007).  
Therefore, this study is a new attempt to empirically examine the effects of 
government regulation and policy on technology capabilities across countries. Under the 
argument that economic freedom provides the fuel for technology progress and 
innovation performance, I investigate a direct correlation between innovation variables 
and policy (or institutional) variables, as related to political intervention and government 
policy for credit, labour and product markets and foreign trade. The study extends 
previous studies that mainly focused on economic and social consequences.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the theoretical 
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background of the hypotheses. Section 5.3 outlines data-setting, modelling and 
procedures to test hypotheses. Section 5.4 discusses the findings and the limitations of 
this empirical testing. Last, section 5.5 offers conclusions and directions for future 
research. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Background of Hypotheses: Determinants of National        
Technology Capabilities 
Globalisation based on the concepts of economics, trade and financial freedom among 
countries spread rapidly across the border after the break-up of the Soviet Union (EFW, 
2007). Globalisation reduces transaction and information costs by eliminating the national 
boundary and thereby facilitates cross-border economic and innovation activities. 
(Kleinknecht and Wengel, 1998). Although both political democracy and economic 
freedom seek constitutional and structural protection for economic efficiency, they have 
substantially different characteristics. For example, democracy guarantees personal 
liberty, equality and individualism, whereas economic freedom permits free trade and 
liberal competition, and also allows individuals to allocate and utilise resources (James, 
2006). Economic freedom is consistent with low barriers to economic activities by 
increasing the labour mobility that would allow resources to be allocated more efficiently 
(Lethrer and Asakawa, 2004). In this sense, economic freedom can contribute to national 
technology capabilities by facilitating cross-border technology trade and R&D 
cooperation and international partnership.  
The advantages of economic freedom induce countries to undertake institutional 
and policy reforms to create a cooperative (or competitive) R&D environment by opening 
up technology sectors, while transferring the role of government from leader to 
intermediator or facilitator within the NIS. Based on the world rankings of economic 
liberalisation from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) annual report, all 
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advanced countries belong to the top ranking; that is, countries with low levels of politics 
in their economy and high levels of freedom enter high-income countries with high gross 
national income (GNI), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and life expectancy. 
Given that technological progress is the key factor in economic growth in knowledge-
intensive societies, one can assume that weaker government regulations and stronger 
liberal regulatory systems have positive effects on technology creation and investment. 
Based on this, three government variables are introduced in this study to empirically 
examine their relationship with national technology creation and investment across 
countries: (i) a liberal (or controlled) market system in credit and labour and business; (ii) 
freedom (or restriction) on foreign trade; and (iii) a large (or small) size of government.  
First, I assume that tight government regulation in the credit, labour and product 
markets negatively affects national technology capabilities. More specifically, restrictions 
on the credit market indicate that credit allocation and interest rates are controlled by the 
government, and the government sets a limit on foreign banks and investors that enter into 
domestic credit markets and compete with local banks (Allen et al., 2006; EFW, 2011). 
Hence, credit markets might be related to innovation activity since the condition of credit 
markets directly affects capital flow and investment for resource allocation and utilisation, 
which are crucial for the product and process of innovation. Likewise, long-term 
technology investment (e.g., R&D) and venture capital that funds technology start-ups 
might be very sensitive to interest rates (determined by the market or controlled by the 
government). This implies that technical innovation depends on a stable monetary policy 
and credit (or capital) market climate. In this sense, a liberal system of credit markets can 
positively influence technology creation and investment.   
The condition of labour markets might directly affect the extent of national 
technology capabilities.  Freedom in the labour market is consistent with a high labour 
turnover rate, as well as the liberty of employees and employers that allows for 
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determining wages and hiring and firing (EFW, 2011). A flexible wage-setting system 
with the freedom of hiring and firing improves productivity of labour by arousing 
emulation. In corporations’ effort to sustain and upgrade their position, the market has 
become very competitive due to the accumulation of know-how, skills and knowledge and 
thereby the development of national technology capabilities. Also, the mobility of human 
resource is indispensible in the innovation process. Mobility allows academic scientists to 
start up their own companies or work in private science-based ventures (Lethrer and 
Asakawa, 2004). As the primary source of technology progress in the United States, the 
mobility of scientists and the consequent close ties between industry and the academic 
community that promote university spin-offs have been highlighted in many studies (e.g., 
Blumenthal et al., 1986; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993; Lethrer and Asakawa, 2004). 
Therefore, I anticipate that the liberal system of labour markets has a positive impact on 
national technology capabilities.  
Last, regulation of the product market indicates non-freedom in price-setting, 
barriers in the entrepreneurial process, high transaction and bureaucracy costs and other 
illegal payments aimed at influencing government policies (Fay et al., 2007). Hence, 
regulation might result in the dominance of a few giant corporations and monopolies, a 
low quality of entrepreneurship and a low level of start-ups, which makes for an 
uncooperative and uncompetitive R&D environment.  Consequently, I expect that strict 
government regulation of the credit, labour and product markets negatively affects 
technology creation and investment. 
 
Hypothesis 1   
(a): Strict government regulation in the credit, labour and product markets 
negatively affects national technology creation. 
(b): Strict government regulation in the credit, labour and product markets 
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negatively affects national technology investment. 
 
Second, I assume that free trade increases technology input and output by 
facilitating the cross-border technology trade, R&D cooperation and FDI. In today’s age 
of globalisation, freedom of exchange across national boundaries is an essential condition 
for economic growth and technological progress. Many goods and services are now 
produced abroad while being covered by external resources in the product and process of 
innovation.  The removal of trade barriers leads to intense competition in both domestic 
and international markets, with differentiated goods (or services) needed to survive and 
subsequently stimulate cross-border innovation activities to exploit, as well as the 
creation of new technology (Gu, 1997; Rycroft, 2002).  Market competition is intensified 
by various free trade agreements (FTAs) and global organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), which expedites the free flow of capital and global interdependence 
in the product and process of innovation (Amable, 2003). Under liberalised foreign trade, 
FDI, internationalised R&D and technology trade (exporting and importing technology 
licensing) become prevalent as the main channels for building up and developing 
technology capabilities (Rycroft, 2002). Since these channels have a direct or indirect 
effect on technology development and innovation by providing learning opportunities, 
spillovers and externalities, free trade opens a gate for mastering, absorbing and 
transferring advanced technologies in a highly collaborative or competitive environment. 
Consequently, I expect that foreign trade liberalisation contributes to national technology 
capabilities. 
 
Hypothesis 2  
(a): More freedom in international trade positively affects national technology 
creation. 
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(b): More freedom in international trade positively affects national technology 
investment. 
 
Third, I assume that excessive government involvement (i.e., a large government) 
in economic activities has a negative influence on national technology capabilities. A 
large government indicates large government expenditures as a proportion of the total 
expenditures and high marginal tax rates, as well as more input and output from state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) versus private firms. A country with a large government 
suggests that the public sector plays the dominant role in economic and technological 
development. The larger expansion and market share of the public sector over the private 
sector might create unfair and uncompetitive innovation environment, which impedes 
productive and innovative activities of firms. Consequently, I expect that a large 
government (a high level of government spending as a share of total spending, a larger 
government enterprise sector and a high marginal tax rate) negatively affects technology 
creation and investment.  
 
Hypothesis 3   
(a): A large government has a negative effect on national technology creation. 
(b): A large government has a negative effect on technology investment. 
 
Finally, I assume that size of government moderates these effects such that low 
regulatory burdens on credit, labour and business and foreign trade have positive effects 
on national technology capabilities if the government is small. Why is that? A large 
government can be the main obstacle to the flow of capital, the entrepreneurial process 
and foreign trade in the process of innovation since the increase of government spending 
relative to spending by individuals and businesses implies that resources are allocated not 
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by personal choice, but by political choice and government decision-making. Similarly, 
the country that relies on SOEs over private firms in the production of goods and services 
is likely to restrict the mobility of capital and labour, new business entry and technology 
trade because SOEs generally engage in protected industries with government funds, 
concentrating more on producing commodities for domestic markets rather than exporting. 
In this sense, SOEs play by rules and public wants (or demands) that are different from 
those of private firms, which are dependent on consumers for their revenue or on 
investors for their capital. Also, high marginal tax rates and low income thresholds 
indicate heavy reliance on government that causes tight regulation of credit, labour, 
business and international trade, as well as the consequent exacerbation of innovative 
activities. Therefore, I expect that the combination of government size and liberal (or 
control) systems strengthens the effects on technology investment and creation.  
 
Hypothesis 4  
(a): Government size and regulatory burden on credit and labour market access, 
business and trade interact such that the lighter the regulatory burden and the 
smaller the size of government, the larger the relative prevalence of national 
technology creation. 
 (b): Government size and regulatory burden on credit and labour market access, 
business and trade interact such that the lighter the regulatory burden and the 
smaller the size of government, the larger the relative prevalence of national 
technology creation. 
 
The four hypotheses are tested with the sample of high-income and upper middle-
income countries. The research design and methodological framework used in this 
empirical study are discussed in the next section.  
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5.3 Models, Sample, Measurements and Procedures   
This section outlines the sample, variables, modelling and procedures used in this 
empirical study. To test the four hypotheses, a sample of 69 countries, 37 high-income and 
32 upper middle-income, was selected on the basis of the countries’ grouping from the 
World Bank. Rational choice of sample is the key issues of reliability and credibility for 
conceptualising and generalising the findings (Stake, 1994; Saunders et al., 2003; Gerring, 
2004). Is the sample of high income and upper-middle income economies, excluding low 
income economies is reliable to generalise significant institutional and policy 
determinants of national technology capabilities across countries? The reasons why this 
study omitted lower-middle income and low income countries are, because the countries’ 
institutional conditions for national technology capabilities are little important due to 
almost no reliance on innovation and technological change to increase income, production 
and export. Even in innovation input and output indicators used here as dependent 
variables most low-income countries showed practically no R&D investments and zero 
count of patents granted at the USPTO (USPTO and UNESCO statistics), thus I feel 
justified in ignoring them.  
The criterion of classification of high income and upper-middle income countries 
was GNI per capital in 2009, calculated by using the World Bank Altas method. The 
World Bank classifies 70 countries into high-income economies by 2009 GNI per capita 
of $12,196 or more, while 54 upper middle-income economies are those in which GNI 
per capita was between $3,946 and $12,195. The reason why I ended up with only 69 
countries out of the total of 124 high-income and upper middle-income countries in the 
World Bank classification is because some small economies (e.g., Cayman Islands, 
French Polynesia) and some centrally planned economies (e.g., Dominica, Libya) were 
excluded due to data unavailability as well as comparability issues in terms of time frame, 
variables and the like. Also, US data are omitted due to a big numerical difference with 
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other countries in terms of patent production and R&D expenditures. In the dataset, total 
patents in the United States numbered 89,869,327 whereas only 5 were granted at the US 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for Albania (the lowest country) from 2006 
through 2010. Likewise, on average from 2005 through 2009, the United States spent 
more than US$368 million for R&D whereas the amount of R&D spending in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the lowest countries) was only US$6.632. Table 5.2 shows a list of samples 
included and excluded in this study. 
 
Table 5.2 List of Sample 
 Inclusion Exclusion 
High-income 
Economies 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Korea (Rep.), 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, Croatia, Curacao, Hong 
Kong SAR (China), Kuwait, Malta, 
Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Andorra, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Barbados, Bermuda, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cayman Islands, 
Channel Islands, Cyprus, Equatorial 
Guinea, Faeroe Islands, French 
Polynesia, Gibraltar, Greenland, 
Guam, Isle of Man, Liechtenstein, 
Macao SAR (China), Monaco, New 
Caledonia, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Oman, Puerto Rico, Qatar, 
San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sint 
Maarten (Dutch part), St. Martin 
(French part), Turks and Caicos 
Islands, United Arab Emirates, 
Virgin Islands (U.S.), United States 
Upper 
Middle-
income 
Economies 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Iran (Islamic Rep.), Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, South Africa, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay 
American Samoa, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Belarus, Botswana, Cuba, 
Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, 
Lebanon, Libya, Macedonia (FYR),  
Maldives, Mayotte, Montenegro, 
Namibia, Palau, Seychelles, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Venezuela (RB) 
 
Total  69 55 
 
With the sample of 69 countries, the two innovation input and output indicators 
that are widely used in existing empirical studies on innovation were employed as 
dependent variables. As a proxy of national technology investment, the countries’ data on 
gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) was collected for 2005 through 2009 from 
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the database of UNESCO institutes. As a proxy of national technology creation, the data 
of patents granted at the USPTO were employed. The counts of US patents granted by 
country of origin based on the residence of the first-named inventor from 2006 through 
2010 were collected from the database of the USPTO. The average monetary value of 
R&D was used for 5 years due to a large missing value, while the total count of patents 
was used for 5 years due to a cumulative effect. The time frame of GERD was from 2005 
through 2009 and the patent was from 2006 through 2010, with a time lag of one year to 
four years since innovation results from the inherently complex nature of innovation 
activities are time consuming, risky and uncertain. Table 5.3 presents a description of 
variables used in this study.  
All independent variables, comprising institutional and policy factors related to 
economic liberalisation, were taken from EFW 2011 annual report for 2006 through 2009. 
As many renowned economists, including Adam Smith, Milton Friedman and Friedrich 
Hayek, have mentioned, voluntary exchange and market coordination are the engines of 
economic growth. Policies and institutions supporting freedom of personal choice, 
exchange, competition and entrepreneurial activity coordinated through markets are 
important sources of long-term growth (EFW, 2011). The EFW annual report provides the 
degree to which the policies and institutions of various countries support economic 
liberalisation. It attempts to make a synthetic index of economic freedom of countries by 
combining five areas: size of government; regulation of credit, labour and business; 
freedom to trade internationally; legal structure and security of property rights; and access 
to sound money. According to the EFW index, Hong Kong has the highest rating for 
economic freedom, 9.01 out of 10 in 2010. The other open economies among the top ten 
are Singapore (8.68), New Zealand (8.20), Switzerland (8.03), Australia (7.98), Canada 
(7.81), Chile (7.77), the United Kingdom (7.71), Mauritius (7.67) and the United States 
(7.60). The bottom ten nations, relatively closed economies, probably linked to centrally 
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planned economies are Zimbabwe (4.08), Myanmar (4.16), Venezuela (4.28), Angola 
(4.76), Democratic Republic of Congo (4.84), Central African Republic (4.88), Guinea-
Bissau (5.03), Republic of Congo (5.04), Burundi (5.12) and Chad (5.32). 
The EFW data have been widely used in many academic studies to examine the 
causal or correlation relationship between economies’ freedom and various measures of 
economic and social performance, such as investment, income, GDP growth, human 
welfare and entrepreneurship (see Table 5.1). This study employed the EFW data of 
government size, regulation (credit, labour and business) and regulatory burden of 
overseas trade as independent variables while introducing the monetary system, and legal 
structure and property rights, as control variables. Also, size of government used a 
moderator of government regulation and trade barrier effects on national technology 
capabilities since their interaction influences the strength of the relationship between 
dependent variables (patent and R&D expenditures) and independent variables 
(government regulation and trade barriers).  
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Table 5.3 Description of Variables 
 
 Description Year Source 
Dependent Variables 
    
Patent  Data is taken from numbers of patents granted at USPTO during the periods of 2006-2010. The 
total count of each country’ patent data is used for 5 years. 
 
2006 -
2010 
US Patent Trademark Office 
http://www.uspto.gov/patft/ 
R&D 
Expenditure 
Data of gross domestic intramural expenditure on R&D in current PPP$ is taken from UNESCO 
institute during the period of 2005-2009. Logarithmic of average value of each country’s R&D 
investment is used for 5 years.  
2005 -
2009 
United Nations Educational, 
scientific and Cultural 
Organization        
http://www.uis.unesco.org/ 
Independent Variables 
 
Regulations of 
Credit, Labor 
and Business 
First, credit market controls and regulations are measured by three sub-components (i) the 
percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks; (ii) foreign bank competition 
estimated by foreign bank assets as a share of total baking sector assets; (iii) private sector credit 
calculated by the share of domestic credit allocated to the private sectors; (iv) determinants of 
interest rates. The ratings are from 0 to 10. The larger share of privately held deposits and 
domestic credit, the larger share of foreign bank, and interest rates determined by market forces 
with positive real rates (the large difference among the deposit and lending) are given the high 
rating, 10. Second, labour market regulations are estimated by (i) minimum wage calculated by the 
ratio of mandated minimum wage to the average value added per worker; (ii) hiring and 
bargaining regulation; (iii) centralised collective bargaining; (iii) mandated cost of hiring 
measured as a percentage of salary; (iv) mandated cost of worker dismissal measured in weeks of 
wages; (v) the length of conscription. These sub-components are calculated the zero-to 10 rating. 
The lower mandated minimum wage, the hiring by no obstructive regulation, wage-setting by no 
centralized bargaining process and no military conscription receive 10. Third, business regulation 
estimated by (i) price controls; (ii) administrative requirements; (iii) bureaucracy costs; (iv) the 
time and money costs to start a business; (v) undocumented extra payments and bribes; (vi) the 
2005 -
2009 
Economic Freedom of the World 
2011 Annual Report     
http://www.freetheworld.com/rel
ease.html 
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time and money costs for licensing; (vii) the time cost of tax compliance. The scale of six sub-
components is from 0 to 10. None price control, none burdensome administrative requirements 
and the lower time and money costs for start-up business, licensing and tax compliance are given 
the highest value of 10. These different three regulations (credit markets, labour market and 
business) are set by zero-to 10 ratings and then averaged to construct the regulation index. 
International 
Free Trade 
The constitutions of trade liberalisation are: i) taxes on international trade comprised by taxes on 
international trade as a share of exports and imports, the unweighted mean of tariff rates and 
standard deviation of tariff rates; (ii) regulatory trade barriers measured by non-tariff barriers and 
the time cost values to exports and imports a good; (iii) the actual size of the trade sector relative 
to expected; (iv) black-market exchange rates measured by the percentage difference between the 
official and the parallel market exchange rate; (v) International capital market control estimated by 
the restriction of foreign ownership and FDI. The lower average tax rates, the lower regulatory 
barriers, the larger trade sectors relative to the expected size, the lower black market exchange 
rates and the lower international capital market controls set a high value on the freedom of 
international trade. These components underlying of the free trade are averaged then calculated the 
zero to 10 rating for each country: (observation maximum value − the country’s actual value) / 
(observation maximum value − observation minimum value) multiplied by 10. The average value 
of each country’s index is used for 2005-2009. 
 
2005-
2009 
Economic Freedom of the World 
2011 Annual Report     
http://www.freetheworld.com/rel
ease.html 
Size of 
Government 
Government size is measured by four components: (i) the general government consumption 
spending as a percentage of total consumption; (ii) the general government transfers and subsidies 
as a percentage of GDP; (iii) State owned enterprises (SOEs) output and government investment 
as a share of total output and investment; (iv) top marginal income and payroll tax rate. The large 
government size that is high proportion of government expenditure, transfer sector, investment and 
taxes is obtained the lower value. The valuation of government size for each country under 0 to 10 
scale calculating by the (observation maximum value − the country’s actual value) / (observation 
maximum value − observation minimum value) multiplied by 10. The average value of each 
country’s index is used for 2005-2009. 
 
2005 -
2009 
Economic Freedom of the World 
2011 Annual Report     
http://www.freetheworld.com/rel
ease.html 
 
Control Variables 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP), which is converted to current 
international dollars using PPP rates. Logarithmic of average value of each country’s GDP per 
2005-
2009 
World Bank  
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
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capita is used for 5 years. 
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Average 
percentage of each country’s annual GDP growth rate is used for 5 years. 
 
2005-
2009 
World Bank  
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Population 
Growth 
Annual population growth rate. Average percentage of each country’s annual population growth 
rate is used for 5 years. 
 
2005-
2009 
World Bank  
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Education Level The counts of the tertiary or higher education enrollment counts in all programmes devoting to 
advanced research and professions are collected as a proxy of education level. Logarithmic of 
average value of each country’s tertiary enrolment count is used for 5 years. 
2005-
2009 
United Nations Educational, 
scientific and Cultural 
Organization        
http://www.uis.unesco.org/ 
Access to 
Sound Money 
Access to sound money is measured by four components: (i) the average annual growth of the 
money supply in the last five years minus average annual growth of real GDP in the last ten years; 
(ii) the standard deviation of the inflation rate over the last five years; (iii) the rate of inflation 
during the most recent year; (iv) freedom to own foreign currency bank accounts. The scale of six 
sub-components is from 0 to 10. The country receives a rating 10 if that money growth was equal 
to the long-term growth of real output with no variation in the rate of inflation over the five-year 
period, perfect price stability and no restrictions on  foreign currency bank accounts. The average 
value of each country’s index is used for 2005-2009. 
 
2005-
2009 
Economic Freedom of the World 
2011 Annual Report     
http://www.freetheworld.com/rel
ease.html 
Legal Structure 
and Property 
Rights 
Legal structure and security of property rights are measured by seven components: (i) Judicial 
independence; (ii) impartial courts; (iii) protection of property rights; (iv) Military interference in 
rule of law and the political process; (v) Integrity of the legal system; (vi) Legal enforcement of 
contracts; (vii) Regulatory restrictions on the sale of real property. The scale of six sub-
components is from 0 to 10. The country receive a 10 rating if the legal framework is efficient and 
follows a clear, neutral process with entirely Judicial independence, well-protection of property, no 
involvement of military in politics, impartiality of the legal system and no restrictions on transfer 
ownership of property. The average value of each country’s index is used for 2005-2009. 
2005-
2009 
Economic Freedom of the World 
2011 Annual Report     
http://www.freetheworld.com/rel
ease.html 
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In detail, the first predictor of government regulation was measured by restriction 
on market entry to engage in voluntary exchange. The three markets of credit, labour and 
product were considered as sub-indexes of government regulation to examine their 
linkages to national technology creation and investment. The credit market regulation 
index was calculated with four components: share of privately owned bank deposits, 
foreign bank assets as a share of total banking sector assets, share of domestic credit 
allocated to private sectors and determinants of interest rates. The regulatory components 
indicated the extent to which the banking industry is dominated by private firms, whether 
foreign banks are allowed to enter and compete in the market, which credit is supplied to 
the private sector and whether interest rates interfere with the market in credit. The labour 
market regulation index was calculated with six components: the ratio of mandated 
minimum wage to the average value added per worker, hiring and bargaining regulations, 
centralised collective bargaining and mandated cost of hiring measured as a percentage of 
salary, mandated cost of worker dismissal measured in weeks of wages and the length of 
conscription. The regulatory components indicated the extent to whether wages and hiring 
(or firing) conditions are determined by economic freedom of employees and employers, 
and whether conscription interferes with the market in labour. The business (product 
market) regulation index was calculated with six components: price controls, 
administrative requirements, bureaucracy costs, time and money costs to start a business, 
undocumented extra payments and bribes, time and money costs for licensing and time 
cost of tax compliance. The components were designed to identify the extent to which 
regulations and bureaucratic procedures restrain pricing decisions, competition and new 
business entry.  
The value of each component was established by 0 to 10 ratings and combined to 
form the index of credit, labour and business regulation. The three indexes were 
individually used as an independent variable. They were also united in a synthetic index 
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of regulation so as to examine the general impact of regulation on dependent variables. 
The regulation variables from 2006 through 2009 were averaged due to the missing value 
problem. The country with a tight regulatory restraint that limits the freedom of exchange 
in credit, labour and product markets was given the lowest value of zero.  
The second predictor of the international trade barriers index was created by the 
combination of five components: taxes on international trade as a share of exports and 
imports, the mean of and standard deviation of tariff rates, non-tariff barriers and the time 
cost values to export and import a good, the actual size of the trade sector relative to 
expected black market exchange rates, the restriction of foreign ownership and FDI. 
Tariffs, quotas and hidden administration of customs, and controls on exchange rate and 
capital movement can limit international trade. With 0 to 10 ratings, the index of trade 
barrier was created by integrating the five components. The average value of the summary 
index was used with the time frame of 2005 through 2009. The country with tight trade 
restrictions was given the lowest value, zero.  
The third predictor of government size index was formed by combining five 
components: government consumption spending as a percentage of total consumption, 
government transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP, SOE output and investment 
as a share of total output and investment, top marginal income and payroll tax rate. These 
components indicated the extent to which a country relies on the political process to 
allocate resources, whether the public sector plays the dominant role in the production of 
goods and services and which high marginal tax rates apply at relatively low income 
levels. On the scale of 0 to 10, a country with more government spending as a share of 
total spending, a larger government enterprise sector and higher marginal tax rates earned 
the lowest ratings. The average value of the government size index was used for 2005 
through 2009.  The index of the government size was also used as a moderator of 
government regulation and international trade barrier effects on national technology 
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capabilities.  
Regarding control variables, GDP per capita, GDP change, population growth, 
higher education, monetary system and legal system and property rights, as well as 
dummy (upper middle-income countries=1) were employed to control their influences in 
the analyses. First, since the level of economic development parallels the extent of 
technology capabilities, I used GDP per capita (purchasing power parity, PPP), as well as 
GDP (PPP) per capita squared to capture any curvilinear effects. Second, the changes in 
GDP from the previous year to the current year, as well as the population growth during 
the previous year, were used as control variables, since economic expansion can facilitate 
the dynamics of innovation activities to exploit new markets. These data of GDP and 
population were taken from World Bank datasets for the period 2005 through 2009. Third, 
this model was controlled by the counts of tertiary enrolments since a knowledge-creating 
institution, namely a university, is one of the key players in not only cultivating highly 
skilled personnel, but also participating in new product and innovation processes 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2006; Marques et al., 2006). The data 
were obtained from UNESCO datasets. The time frame was from 2005 through 2009. 
Fourth, the index for access to sound money was used as a control variable.  Since “high 
and volatile rates of inflation distort relative prices, alter the fundamental terms of long-
term contracts, and make it virtually impossible for individuals and businesses to plan 
sensibly for the future” (EFW, 2011, p.6), the consistency of monetary policy with long-
term price stability and the ease with which other currencies can be used as alternative 
currencies are indispensable factors for innovation projects involved in risk, uncertainty 
and long-term investment. The data were taken from EFW datasets for 2005 and 2009. 
Finally, this model was controlled by countries’ varieties of legal systems: rule of law, 
security of property rights, an independent judiciary and an impartial court system. In the 
absence of security of property rights, protected by the rule of law, individuals are 
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unlikely to undertake productive and innovative activities since the fruit of their labour 
cannot be properly protected. Therefore, the index of legal system and property rights was 
employed for 2005 and 2009. 
For these data analyses, a cross-sectional regression was used with a relatively 
short time series (five years). Given that I am interested in the effects of institutional 
conditions on developing national technology capabilities, possible low variability in 
institutional variables was a plausible concern. To verify that the use of cross-sectional 
regression techniques was appropriate, I computed standard deviation of predictor 
variables: government regulation, trade barriers and government size. Standard deviation 
is widely used to examine how much variation or dispersion exists from the mean. A low 
standard deviation suggests low variability in values whereas a high standard deviation 
indicates that the data points are spread over a large range of values (Gujarati, 2003). 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables used in this empirical model. As 
shown in Table 5.4, I confirmed that the variability of the index values was trivial through 
relatively low standard deviations in values of policy and institutional variables, even 
though the set of countries was highly heterogeneous. For this reason, I chose to employ 
cross-sectional regression instead of panel regression to analyse the dataset.  
With the cross-sectional data analysis, the methods of least squares (LS) and 
negative binominal count (NBC) were employed in Eviews 5.0 to test the correlation 
between independent variables and dependent variables. After the correlation test, I also 
employed alternative data, periods and predictor variables to check the robustness of my 
data analysis. For robust statistics, first, I separately ran a regression including and 
excluding the US data due to a big difference in patent production between the United 
States and other countries. Second, high-income economies and upper middle-income 
countries were separately estimated due to different levels of economic development and 
huge technology gaps. Third, I employed the data of the World Bank’s regulatory quality 
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index as an alternative predictor variable of government regulation. I also tested 
numerous alternative proxies by employing the data of the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor National Expert Survey: business freedom, trading freedom and corruption. The 
findings proved robust against specification changes. Fourth, the raw data of patent 
counts were replaced by logarithmic value of patents, and a correlation test with 
independent and control variables was performed using the LS method instead of the 
NBC method. This robustness check did not reveal major differences in estimation results. 
Furthermore, I undertook several diagnostic tests by employing correlation matrix and 
White heteroskedasticity and confirmed that there were no concerns about 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. I briefly discuss these diagnostic test outcomes 
after the analysis of multivariate regression results in the next section.  
 
5.4 Estimation Results and Discussion 
This section discusses the estimation results for the correlation between liberal regulatory 
institutional systems and national technology across countries. Given the expectation that 
institutional restrictions on market entry and international trade with a large government 
interrupt the dynamics of innovation activities, four hypotheses were tested with the 
sample of high-income and upper middle-income countries. To verify the hypotheses, as a 
first step, I computed descriptive statistics to examine the basic features of variables used 
in this study (see Table 5.4). By summarising a large set of observations with a single 
indicator, descriptive statistics allow simply looking at the asymmetry of the probability 
distribution of a real-valued random variable (skewness), as well as a range of variations 
in the dataset within observations (standard deviation). Then, I ran multiple regressions on 
a number of patents and logarithmic values of R&D expenditures though the respective 
methods of NBC and LS to identify significant determinants of success or failure in the 
development of national technology capabilities.  
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 Total Patents 
 
(2006-10) 
GERD 
 
(2005-9) 
Gov. 
Regulation 
(2005-9) 
Trade 
Barriers 
(2005-9) 
Gov. Size 
 
(2005-9) 
Monetary 
System 
(2005-9) 
Legal 
Structure 
(2005-9) 
Tertiary 
Enrolments 
(2005-9) 
GDP per 
capita 
(2005-9) 
GDP  
Change 
(2005-9) 
Population 
Growth 
(2005-9) 
            
 Mean  6541.783  10151527  7.030531  7.141210  6.221316  8.653246  6.600857  1255475.  22839.12  3.560527  0.865237 
 Median  166.0000  1768341  7.012039  7.146930  6.332794  9.229501  6.431991  293565.0  19089.29  3.159330  0.785382 
 Maximum  197075.0  1.43E+08  8.744320  9.499740  9.285694  9.740075  8.913120  25059114  81143.90  21.20980  3.789816 
 Minimum  5.000000  6632.094  4.991756  5.405593  3.582443  5.458890  3.651374  0.000000  5072.834 -0.473307 -0.567607 
 Std. Dev.  25093.17  23424865  0.806423  0.805516  1.197137  1.060843  1.364535  3264560  14714.63  3.087181  0.841720 
 Skewness  6.640026  3.895711 -0.202111  0.344016  0.010790 -1.167766  0.032199  5.985385  1.177086  2.951283  0.885599 
 Kurtosis  49.89532  19.50793  2.881816  3.422725  2.524977  3.434033  2.131233  42.78051  4.958726  16.99854  4.843037 
 Jarque-Bera  6829.651  958.0019  0.509917  1.874745  0.650075  16.22388  2.181848  4961.641  26.96387  663.5480  18.78505 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.774949  0.391656  0.722500  0.000300  0.335906  0.000000  0.000001  0.000000  0.000083 
            
 Obs. 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
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Table 5.5 Multivariate Analysis 
  Patent 
 
Log (R&D expenditure)  
Verification of 
Hypotheses 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Control Variables      
Dummy  -0.841 
(0.219) 
-0.798 
(0.236) 
-0.110 
(0.769) 
-0.102 
(0.791) 
  
Log(GDP per   capita)  -5.374*** 
(0.002) 
-5.496*** 
(0.002) 
-2.426** 
(0.013) 
-2.335** 
(0.023) 
  
Log (GDP per capita)
2 
 0.373*** 
(0.000) 
0.378*** 
(0.000) 
0.196*** 
(0.000) 
0.191*** 
(0.001) 
  
GDP change  -0.001 
(0.981) 
-0.004 
(0.925) 
-0.000 
(0.979) 
-0.000 
(0.985) 
  
Population growth  0.126 
(0.536) 
0.119 
(0.560) 
-0.042 
(0.707) 
-0.037 
(0.747) 
  
Log(Tertiary 
Enrolment) 
 1.129*** 
(0.000) 
1.232*** 
(0.000) 
1.093*** 
(0.000) 
1.091*** 
(0.000) 
  
Monetary System   0.017 
(0.921) 
0.031 
(0.858) 
-0.047 
(0.708) 
-0.050 
(0.695) 
  
Legal System & PRs  0.316* 
(0.063) 
0.259* 
(0.100) 
0.456*** 
(0.000) 
0.478*** 
(0.001) 
  
 
Independent 
Variables 
       
Gov. Regulation (GR)  -2.209** 
(0.075) 
 -1.332* 
(0.100) 
 H1 Rejection 
  Credit   -0.763* 
(0.071) 
 -0.424* 
(0.100) 
  
  Labour   -0.737* 
(0.100) 
 -0.467* 
(0.100) 
  
  Business   -0.539* 
(0.093) 
 -0.502* 
(0.100) 
  
Trade Barrier (TB)  2.815** 
(0.019) 
2.794** 
(0.019) 
1.681** 
(0.038) 
1.658** 
(0.047) 
H2 Acceptance 
Gov. Size (GS)  0.312 
(0.776) 
0.355 
(0.754) 
0.493 
(0.423) 
0.427 
(0.512) 
H3 Rejection 
GS x GR  0.388** 
(0.041) 
0.381* 
(0.053) 
0.164* 
(0.100) 
0.171* 
(0.093) 
H4 Acceptance 
Gs x TB  0.417** 
(0.019) 
0.417** 
(0.019) 
0.237** 
(0.050) 
0.234* 
(0.062) 
H4 Acceptance 
Constant  -0.094 
(0.549) 
-0.102 
(0.516) 
-0.311* 
(0.069) 
-0.298* 
(0.076) 
  
        
R
2
    0.923 0.923   
Adjusted R
2
    0.905 0.902   
F Statistics    52.38 43.31   
P value (F-Statistics)    0.000 0.000   
Observations     69    69    69    69   
Methods  NBC LS   
 
Notes: *. **, *** indicate statistical significant at the 10%. 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Table 5.5 outlines the estimation results. Glancing over Table 5.5, no differences 
are found between the two models using patents and R&D expenditures as dependent 
variables. Government regulation and trade barriers have statistically significant effects 
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on patent creation and R&D spending, whereas government size has an insignificant 
effect on the dependent variables (patents and R&D expenditures). However, the 
relationship of government with patent creation is stronger (p<0.05) than that with R&D 
spending (p<0.1), while significance levels of trade barriers are identical in both 
regressions (p<0.05).  
In the estimation result, first I found that government regulation has a 
statistically significant effect on patent creation and R&D spending at the 5 percent and 
10 percent significance levels (Model 1 and Model 3), respectively. However, it has a 
negative direction, meaning that government restrictions in local markets positively 
affect national technology creation and investment since a country with a free market 
system is given a high value. This is a surprising result since I anticipated that tight 
government regulation limits the allocation and utilisation of resources, knowledge 
exchange and entrepreneurial processes, and consequently arrests technological 
development. With such an unexpected result, I divided the index of government 
regulation into three areas, credit, labour and product markets, so as to examine the 
details (Model 2 and Model 4). However, I obtained identical results from this 
estimation; all regulation variables were statistically significant, but their minus signs 
remained unchanged.  Therefore, I could not accept hypothesis 1 that strict government 
regulation in credit, labour and product markets negatively affects national technology 
creation and investment. 
There are three possible explanations for a positive correlation between 
government regulation and national technology capabilities. First, the sample of high-
income and upper middle-income countries used in this empirical study could produce 
an effect opposite to what was expected. Compared with lower middle-income countries 
or low-income countries, the countries have relatively free market systems to engage in 
voluntary exchange and allocate resources to private parties through market force. In 
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this context, an excessively liberal regulatory system with no government interference 
could produce myopic behaviours among market participants (short-term oriented) that 
concentrate on obtaining immediate profit and discourage long-term value creation and 
investment, such as R&D. Second, free market entry without any strings attached is 
likely to result in excessive and unfair competition that makes for low viability of new 
start-ups andSMEs. Blind reliance on the principle of market economy without any 
government intervention in market entry could cause the monopolisation of established 
firms since new firms (latecomers) are incapable of competing with them due to 
difficulties in cutting costs, attracting more clients and improving the supply chain. 
Start-ups and S&M businesses are key contributors to the development of technologies 
in frontier countries. Third, excessive deregulation could create an air of anxiety about a 
flight of capital, illegal leakage of knowledge and surreptitious use without licensing 
that discourages innovative and productive activities in technology investment and 
creation. Given that relatively well-off economies (e.g., the sample of high- and upper 
middle-income countries) are competent to generate their own technologies with 
advanced indigenous capabilities, stricter regulation may be needed so as to prevent the 
leakage of important knowledge incurred in the inordinate mobility of capital (e.g., 
credit, labour, techniques), as well as to protect innovators against the illegal use of their 
intellectual properties. For such reasons, I concluded that government regulation in 
domestic markets positively affects the development of national technology capabilities 
in the contexts of high-income and upper middle-income economies.  
Second, I found that trade liberalisation is an important determinant of 
technology capabilities. It has a strongly significant effect (p<0.05) with a positive sign, 
meaning that more freedom in international trade leads to an expansion of R&D 
expenditures and patent production. According to my expectation that an open-door 
policy promotes the stock and flow of knowledge by facilitating active FDI, technology 
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trade and R&D cooperation across the border, I accepted hypothesis 2 and confirmed 
that the removal of trade barriers play an important role in increasing technology input 
and output. 
Third, I found that the size of government has a statistically insignificant effect 
on both patent production and R&D expenditure, in contrast to my expectation that the 
preponderance of the public sector’s investment and output over those of the private 
sector negatively affects technology progress and innovation performance. Therefore, I 
did not accept hypothesis 3 and concluded that there is no connection between 
government size and technology capabilities. However, the significance of government 
size becomes stronger when it is used as a moderator of regulation and foreign trade 
effects on national technology capabilities. This result indicates that government size 
does not directly correlate with patent production and R&D expenditures, but its 
interaction with the regulatory (or liberal) institutional condition of the domestic market 
and foreign trade is strongly correlated with national technology capabilities. As shown 
in Table 5.5, the interaction of small government with weak government regulatory 
burden on market entry and foreign trade positively correlates with national technology 
investment and creation at a 5% significance level.  Therefore, I accepted hypothesis 4 
and concluded that small government size in combination with liberalised domestic 
markets and foreign trade systems facilitates more active technology investment and 
creation.  
Regarding control variables, first, both patent production and R&D expenditures 
have a curvilinear association with GDP per capita. Second, GDP per capita has a 
negative effect on national technology capabilities, indicating larger investments in 
technology input and output as a percentage of GDP in less wealthy rich countries, such 
as newly industrialised countries (e.g., Korea, Singapore, Taiwan). Third, increasing 
enrolment in tertiary education facilitates the expansion of R&D expenditures and 
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patenting. Fourth, a strong rule of law to secure property rights used as a proxy of IPRs 
here has a positive influence on innovation climate, as expected. Other control variables, 
including population growth and monetary system, are not significant. In this multiple 
equation, the adjusted R
2 
value shows that over 90 percent of dependent variable 
account for all the explanatory variables, which is a fairly high value considering its 
maximum value. 
Several diagnostic tests proved the reliability of this regression model with 
nospecification errors. First, the joint hypothesis was tested by the ANOVA technique to 
detect the overall significance of the included independent variables in the regression 
model. Since the p value of the observed F is zero, as shown in Table 5.5, the null 
hypothesis that all slope coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero can be rejected, 
and I confirmed the overall significance of explanatory variables used in this model. 
Second, I employed a correlation matrix to detect the possible consequence of 
multicollinearity. Table 5.6 shows the result of the correlation matrix. Since all of the 
pair-wise correlation coefficient between two repressors is lower than 0.7, there is no 
concern about mulitcollinearity. Third, I undertook the White heteroskedasticity test. 
Since the p value is very low (near zero), there is no concern about heteroskedasticity. 
Alternatively, the chi-square value obtained from the White test was lower than the 
critical chi-square value at the chosen level of significance; hence, I confirmed that the 
errors (residuals) are both homoskedastic and independent of the regressors. Table 5.7 
summarises the White heteroskedasticity test result. 
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Table 5.6 Diagnostic Tests:  Correlation Matrix 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
             
(1) Patent  1.000                     
(2) Log(GERD) 0.397 1.000                   
(3) Gov. Regulation 0.146 0.010 1.000                 
(4) Trade Barriers -0.134 0.093 0.550 1.000               
(5) Gov. Size -0.025 -0.292 0.058 0.045 1.000             
(6) Monetary System 0.201 0.256 0.478 0.466 -0.187 1.000           
(7) Legal Structure 0.173 0.425 0.650 0.423 -0.227 0.603 1.000         
(8) Log(Tertiary Enrolments) 0.261 0.700 -0.375 -0.192 -0.063 -0.208 -0.199 1.000       
(9) Log(GDP per capita) 0.175 0.409 0.529 0.352 -0.211 0.633 0.669 -0.272 1.000     
(10) GDP Change -0.192 -0.347 -0.257 -0.126 0.159 -0.388 -0.393 -0.014 -0.545 1.000   
(11) Population Growth -0.161 -0.341 0.039 -0.048 0.145 -0.073 -0.072 -0.349 -0.022 0.174 1.000 
 
Note: 
(1) This table above shows the intercorrelations among eleven regressors; the main diagonal is the correlation of one variable itself, which is always 1 by definition, and the others 
are the pair wise correlations among the explanatory variables.  
(2) If the pair-wise or zero-order correlation coefficient between two regresor is exceed 0.8, then muliticollineraity problems is likely to occur (See Gujarati; 2003, p.387-436). 
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Table 5.7 Diagnostic Tests:  White Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
 
Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3) 
 
F-statistic 2.7856 Probability  0.0020 
(Observations) x (R
2
) 
 
40.668 Probability 0.0181 
    
Log Likelihood  -23.123 Durbin-Watson Statistics 1.8069 
R
2
 0.6256 Adjusted R
2
 0.4010 
Included Observations  65 Excluded Observations 4 
 
Note: 
(1) If the p value is low, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is hetroskedasticity. As shown in this 
table, p value 0.002 is very low, thus there is no hetroskedasticity problem. 
(2) If the chi-square value obtained in this regression exceeds the critical chi-square value at the chosen 
level of significance, we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no hetroskedasticity. The chi-square 
value is obtained by observation 2R with df , dfXNR 22 ~ . In this equation, observation
2R = 
40.668 is lower than the 5 percent critical chi-square value for 24 df  is 36.415. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion and Further Studies 
This empirical study has shown that technology capabilities are influenced by political 
and institutional conditions for market entry, voluntary exchange of capital and foreign 
trade. The findings are as follows. First, the regulatory system of domestic market entry 
and transaction facilitates the expansion of R&D expenditures and patenting in high-
income and upper middle-income countries. This may suggest that reliance only on the 
principle of the market economy with no government interference discourages productive 
and innovative activities since excessive freedom can cause short-termism, capital flight, 
the monopolisation of established firms, the leakage of important knowledge and illegal 
use of intellectual properties. Second, a low regulatory burden on international trade 
increases technology input and output, as expected; hence, I suggest that removing trade 
barriers is necessary to promote the stock and flow of knowledge and the consequent 
development of technology capabilities. Third, I found that the size of government acts as 
a moderator of regulation and foreign trade effects on national technology capabilities, 
but does not directly correlate with it. This may imply that small government size 
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combined with liberalised domestic markets and foreign trade systems facilitates 
technology investment and creation. Therefore, I concluded that the regulatory system of 
domestic markets, liberalised systems of trade and their interaction with small 
government size positively affect national technology capabilities in industrialised 
countries.  
However, this empirical study has several limitations that can direct future 
research. First, the study excluded the data of developing and transition countries (low 
middle-income and low-income countries) due to data unavailability. This could have 
produced strikingly different results. With a larger sample, it may be possible to control 
the different legal origins or varieties of capitalism for greater statistical significance. 
Second, a more reliable methodology selection should be required by using panel data 
with longitudinal approaches, which allows for looking at all variable changes over time 
and thereby estimating those linkages in more detail. Finally, while I have chosen a 
country-level analysis, an analysis of the effect of liberal regulatory systems on 
innovation at the sectoral level could also be fruitful since the institutional condition and 
the degree of government interference varies from industry to industry.  
Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the existing literature. Most 
research on innovation has neglected the study of institutional context although there is 
widespread recognition that innovators are susceptible to institutional or contextual 
influences because of the unique characteristics of technological innovation - it is a risky, 
costly, uncertain and long-term investment. Also, most political economists have 
addressed institutional and policy factors as important determinants of economic growth, 
human welfare and entrepreneurship despite innovative activities being affected by 
institutional and policy frameworks that shape competitive and cooperative research 
climates. Therefore, this study fills gaps in the existing political economy and innovation 
studies by demonstrating the effect of institutions on technology capabilities.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Institutions, Government Policies and Technology Capabilities 
in Korea and Japan 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In a knowledge-intensive economy, technological innovation is the most significant 
source of economic growth and social development (Cantwell, 1989; Kogut, 1991; Porter, 
1990). The country-specific institutional setting for the stock and flow of knowledge, 
reflecting the creation of new sources for comparative advantages of a country or a firm, 
produces distinctive innovation patterns, directions and magnitudes (Nelson, 1993; 
Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000).  As the contributing 
factors influencing technology capabilities in Korea and Japan, this study explores the 
distinctive features of industrial science and technology (S&T) policy, the intellectual 
property (IP) regime, financial system and national innovation system (NIS).  
Prior to a discussion of distinctive institutional setting and configuration, first, the 
evolution of S&T policies over the past four decades is explored in Section 6.2. With a 
brief outline of historical background and current status of economic and technological 
development in Korea and Japan, I evaluate effectiveness of changes in government S&T 
polices and the consequences of institutional reforms in sub-section 6.2.3. I analyse 
distinctive legal systems and innovation environments for the creation, protection and use 
of intellectual property in Section 6.3. In particular, effective patent-related regimes and 
policy measures to accelerate patent registration, commercialisation and patented 
technology transfer are emphasised as the key success factors influencing national 
technology capabilities. Section 6.4 discusses unique characteristics of the financial 
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system in the two countries, given that the national finances for investment and funding 
systems determine not only wealth creation, but also innovation success (Krugman, 1986; 
Taylor, 2004). Section 6.5 explores the evolution of NIS to analyse how key players 
within NIS and contextual factors have contributed to the rapid technology catch-up and 
success in innovation in the contexts of Korea and Japan. I also discuss strengthens and 
weaknesses underlying their innovation systems. With the historical and contextual 
comparative analysis (S&T policy, IP regime, financial system and NIS), similarities and 
differences of specific institutional conditions for the technology input-technology output 
relationship are also discussed in econometrical models (Section 6.6). This empirical 
investigation enables us to identify different mechanisms and paths for national 
technology capabilities between the countries. Finally, Section 6.7 presents key arguments 
and the conclusion.  
 
6.2 Science and Technology Policies and Institutions 
This section presents the historical background of economic and technology development 
in Korea and Japan. The fast growth of Korea and Japan is attributable to rational 
industrial, international and S&T policies towards innovation-driven growth. A successful 
change in government policies with institutional reforms responding to the level of 
economic development enabled the countries to become the world’s top scientific 
technology-oriented countries. Their effective S&T policies provide lessons for policy 
makers in developing countries.  
 
6.2.1Korea’s Science and Technology Policy  
Korea has shown rapid economic growth over the past four decades, so dramatic that it is 
often called the ‘East Asia miracle’. Korean gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
(current PPP$) eased past the $10,000 mark and had markedly increased to 29,004 
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(current PPP$) in 2010 (Word Bank Statistics). Such a great achievement is attributable to 
effective changes in S&T policy and institutional reforms responding to the level of 
economic development over time. Broadly, Korea’s S&T policy has evolved in the three 
developmental stages – the imitation and importation of technologies in the 1960s and 
1970s, domestic innovation steps in the 1980s, and high-technology improvements since 
the 1990s (Kim and Dhalman, 1992; L. Kim, 1997; Kim and Nelson, 2000; Lee, 2000). 
Table 6.1 summarises the government policy priority, key strategic industries, and staple 
items for export and investment in different stages. 
In the earlier stage of economic development, covering the 1960s and 1970s, the 
government formed the ‘Economic and Social Development 5 Year Plan’, which enabled 
Korea to stand on tiptoe among modern industrial nations. Under the 5-year plan, Korea’s 
gross national product (GNP) per capita jumped from US$100 in 1963 to US$1,000 in 
1977, while exports sharply rose from US$100 million to US$10 billion in the same year 
(Bank of Korea Statistics). Imitation or copying mechanisms were used for exports of 
home goods, learning foreign skills and technical improvement. The 5-year plan was 
intended to increase export competitiveness by fostering the heavy chemical industry and 
changing its industrial structure from light-centred industries (e.g., textiles, food) to 
heavy-centred industries (e.g., ship construction, steel, machinery). It set the stage for 
Korea to become the world’s leader in shipbuilding capacity.  
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Table 6.1 Evolution of Korea’s Science and Technology Policies  
Terms Innovation Steps Structure Key S&T Polices and Framework Laws Objectives of S&T polices & Government Role 
1960s  
 
Imitation or factor-
driven 
Labour intensive 
industries 
5 Years Economic Plan (1962-1966); S&T Promotion Act (1967) Establishing scientific institutions (e.g., MOST and 
KIST); promoting export for light products. 
1970s Internationalisatio
n or investment-
driven  
Scale intensive 
industries 
Technology Development Promotion Law (1972); Engineering 
Technology Promotion Law (1973); Government-sponsored 
Research Institute Law (1973); Korea Science and Engineering 
Foundation Law (1976). 
Building scientific infrastructure, GRIs and Science Park 
(Daedok Science town); promoting knowledge transfer; 
improving the imported foreign technologies. 
1980s Domestic 
Innovation 
(manufacturing 
capabilities) 
Technology 
intensive industries 
Technology Development Promotion Law (1982); Industrial 
Research Associations Promotion Law (1986); Act on Korea 
Institute of Nuclear Safety (1989) 
Promoting private research labs, industrial firms’ 
innovation and indigenous R&D; developing higher 
education system; learning the need of skills. 
1990s  
 
 
 
High Technology 
Innovation 
(Innovation 
capabilities) 
 
 
 
 
 
High-tech intensive 
industries (transition 
to knowledge-based 
economy) 
Space and Aeronautics programme (1990); Highly Advanced 
National Project (1992); Cooperative R&D Promotion Law 
(1993); Creative Research Initiative project (1997); Special Law 
on Science and Technology (1997); Five Year Plan for S&T 
Innovation (1998); 21
st
 Century Frontier R&D programme 
(1999); the National Research Laboratory Programs (1999) 
Upgrading the national S&T system, cultivating S&T 
independence, fostering human capital, developing the 
cutting-edge technology, improving the private sector’s 
research capabilities, promoting collaborative R&D 
activities. 
2000s Vision 2025 (2000); Biotech 2000 (2000); National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (2001); Nanotechnology 
Development Promotion Law (2002); Daegu Gyeongbook 
Institute of S&T Act (2003); The Revised National S&T 
Promotion and Development Program (2003); IT 839 Strategy 
(2004); Act on the Establishment, Operation and Nurturing of 
Government Research Institute in the Fields of S&T (2004); 
Space Development Promotion Act (2005); Nuclear Energy 
R&D Program (2006); Bio-Vision 2016 (2007) 
Improving quality of education and research; 
Strengthening S&T competitiveness, upgrading the public 
awareness of innovation, focusing future-oriented frontier 
research; fostering world-class scientists; building world-
class informatisation.  
 
Source: Compiled by the data from various national policy reports and white papers: MOST (various year), MEST (2010), ISI et al. (2008). 
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As an S&T development plan, the government started to establish public research 
organisations, such as the Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), and 
enacted a number of innovation laws, such as the ‘Technology Development Law’ and the 
‘Engineering Service Promotion Law’ (Lee, 2000). The S&T policy focused on building 
up technological infrastructure, the introduction of foreign techniques and the increase of 
research and development (R&D) investment in basic science (Chang, 2003). With this 
governmental effort, the gross domestic expenditure on research and development 
(GERD) markedly increased from a mere US$4 million in 1963 with a proportion of 0.25 
percent to GDP to US$33 million in 1970 with the proportion of 0.38 pe cent to GDP 
(KOSIS Statistics). However, R&D expenditure was undertaken by the public sector in 
most cases although the proportion of private R&D steadily increased, accoutring for 3 
percent of GERD in 1963 and 29 percent of GERD in 1970 (KOSIS Statistics). This 
suggests that government was the key contributor to Korea’s innovation system as both 
financier and performer, while firms played a minor role in the national S&T 
development plan in the earlier development stage.  
Entering the 1980s, the S&T policy stressed the significance of domestic 
innovation to rapid economic and technological catch-up with developed countries. It 
brought about institutional reform towards the quality of economic growth from 
quantitative expansion (Lee, 2000; Teubal, 2000). Starting from the ‘Technology 
Development Promotion Law’ enacted in 1982, the government established a number of 
R&D programmes to increase the stock and flow of knowledge at both firm and national 
levels, as well as the consequent development of indigenous skills in science and 
technology (Lee, 2000). To facilitate the industrial firm’s innovative activities, the 
government set up various financial incentives, including tax reduction or exemption for 
technology trade, R&D investment and subsidies for human capital, among others (MOST, 
2003; Teubal, 2000). Such a political measure bolstering the private sector’s R&D 
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expenditures led to an increase in GERD by a factor of ten, from US$428 million in 1980 
to US$4,428 million in 1989, while changing the ratio between the public sector and the 
private sector from 64:36 to 19:81 (KOSIS Statistics). In this stage, the larger share of 
R&D financed by the private sector suggests that the industrial firms became a major 
player in Korea’s innovation system.  
In the 1990s, Korea underwent an economic boom and bust simultaneously. 
Korea’s GDP per capital passed the $10,000 mark in 1995 and it joined the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1996, but suddenly fell into 
financial crisis in 1997. The introduction of financial liberalisation brought about large 
economic reforms, including the financial system (e.g., taxation, accounting system, 
banking industry), public enterprises (i.e., privatisation) and regulatory policy (i.e., open-
door policy). Based on the liberalisation, the government loosened some controls on the 
flow of capital (e.g., credit, labour, technology) and investments abroad. However, these 
reforms led to a trade deficit, increasing foreign debt, excessive overseas expansion and 
massive capital flight due to the nature of political, structural and institutional defects 
(Chang, 2003).The cozy relationship between politics and business, the outdated 
corporate structure (i.e., nepotism) and the chaebols-dominated economic system were 
important causes of the financial crisis in Korea (Chang, 2003). The crisis (1997-1999) 
led to negative growth, with GDP shrinking 6.9 percent from 1997 to 1998 (see Table 6.2).   
 
164 
 
  
Table 6.2 Korea’s Economic and Innovation Indicators, 1986-2010 
 
 
 1986 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
             
GDP (constant 2000 US$, million) 206,381 295,602 342,368 394,387 460,681 449,061 533,384 594,230 639,102 698,799 751,360 800,206 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 5,011 6,895 7,841 8,872 10,119 9,701 11,346 12,478 13,303 14,468 15,457 16,372 
GDP growth (annual %) 10.61 9.15 5.87 8.53 6.99 -6.85 8.48 7.15 4.61 5.17 2.29 6.16 
             
High-tech exports (current US$, million) 8,909
(1) 
10,819 13,891 20,054 27,416 30,645 53,950 46,600 75,742 92,944 112,486 n.a. 
High-tech exports (% of total exports)  15.94
(1)
 18.03 19.76 22.65 24.06 27.05 35.06 31.52 32.91 32.14 27.59 n.a. 
             
GERD (constant 2000 Won, million) 1,523 
 
3,210 4,989 7,894 10,878 11,336 13,848 17,325 22,185 27,345 34,498 n.a. 
Royalty & license fees              
     Payments (current US$, million) 473 1,364 1,628 1,719 2,431 2,469 3,221 3.002 4,446 4,650 5,656 8,964 
     Receipts (current US$, million) 15 37 105 155 185 260 688 853 1,861 2,045 2,381 3,145 
             
No. Patents application by KIPO             
     Resident 3,640 9,082 15,951 28,554 68,405 50,596 72,831 76,570 105,250 122,188 127,114 131,805 
     Non-Resident  9,115 16,738 15,122 17,158 21,921 24,672 29,179 29,566 34,865 38,733 43,518 38,296 
No. Patents granted at USPTO n.a. 290 586 1,008 1,567 3,362 3,472 4,009 4,671 6,509 8,730 12,508 
 
Note: The data of  
(1)  
is 1988 
Source: Compiled by the data from KOSIS, KIPO, USPTO, World Bank, WIPO and UNESCO Statistics.  
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However, the activity of innovation was not interrupted by the crisis. Despite a 
deep economic recession, the Korean national technology input and output steadily 
increased during the crisis. As shown in Table 6.2, R&D expenditures and the payments 
of royalties and license fees were unaffected by negative GDP growth, and the two 
indicators of technology input continued to grow from pre-crisis to during the crisis. As 
indicators of national technology output, high-tech exports increased by about 0.9 percent 
and the number of patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) doubled between 1996 (pre-crisis) and 1998 (during the crisis).  
Such vigorous activity for technology investment and creation may have resulted 
from the government effort to shift to an innovation-driven economy by setting up a long-
term innovation strategy. In the pre-crisis period, Korea’s government enforced the long-
term S&T policies supporting cutting-edge innovation by establishing a series of R&D 
programmes. For example, the ‘Space and Aeronautics Programme’ launched in 1990 to 
develop the aerospace engineering and national defence industry by 2000 (MOST, 2007). 
This programme proposed to create new satellite technology in three areas: scientific 
satellite, multipurpose satellite and communication satellite (MOST, 2007). Another 
typical example is the ‘Highly Advanced National Project’ (the HAN project). The HAN 
project was a long-term (1992-2002) plan for large-scale investments (US$3.2 billion) to 
develop the national technology capabilities (MOST, 2007). The HAN project embraced 
two schemes for product and process of innovation. First, it planned to build up 
internationally competitive high-tech industries so as to strengthen Korea’s competitive 
edge in exporting. These high-tech products included HDTV (high-definition television), 
ISDN (Integrated Services Digital Network), ASIC (Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit), biomedical, micromachining and next-generation automobiles (MOST, 2007). 
Second, the HAN project proposed to develop fundamental technology to realise 
sustainable economic growth.  As the improvement plan for the living environment, it 
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focused on the progress of environmental technology, manufacturing systems, new energy, 
human sensibility ergonomics and new-generation semiconductors with the objective of 
sustainable economic growth (MOST, 2007). To achieve these goals, the government 
formulated special laws for promoting high-tech start-ups and joint R&D with private 
organisations, such as the ‘Cooperative R&D Promotion Law’ (1993) and the ‘Special 
Law on Science and Technology’ (1997) (MOST, 2007). Such long-term S&T policies in 
the pre-crisis era might have contributed to the expansion of R&D activities in the 
creation of Korea’s own technologies during the crisis, regardless of economic recession, 
as shown in Table 6.2.   
During the crisis period, Korea more strongly stressed the importance of technical 
innovation through autonomous R&D. The building of world-class technology 
capabilities might have been the only way to cope with the financial crisis in the absence 
of national resources. It led to far-reaching economic reform as a whole, including 
political and social structure, financial system, trade policy, IP regime and NIS (Jang, 
2000; H.J. Chang, 2002). To efficiently carry out industrial S&T policies, the public 
sector was restructured by removing superfluous parts (i.e., officials, departments), while 
faltering firms and local banks were liquidated through merger and acquisition (M&A) 
(H.J. Chang, 2002). Also, Korea’s government changed its funding system and corporate 
policy to promote venture capital and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in contrast to 
the previous policy that offered preferential treatment for chaebols’ expansion and 
innovation processes (S. Kim, 1998; Jang, 2000; S. Kim, 2002).  
With these reforms,  Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) established the 
‘21st Century Frontier R&D Programme’ and the ‘National Research Laboratory 
Programme’ in 1999 to develop cutting-edge science and technology.  The 21st Century 
Frontier R&D Programme targeted advanced technological capabilities by the year 2010 
in newly emerging areas: information and communication technology (ICT), 
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biotechnology, nanotechnology and culture technology. For the duration of this program 
(1999-2010), US$3.4 billion was assigned for sub-R&D projects to develop the four 
strategic technologies (MEXT, 2010). To meet the goal, the National Research Laboratory 
(NRL) programme was launched in the same year to promote research centres of 
excellence (ISI et al., 2008). More than 440 public and private research laboratories (278 
higher education institutions, 114 national research institutes and 50 corporate research 
centres) were sponsored by the government, which had created about 12,300 S&T papers 
and 3,600 patents through 2006 (Tsipouri and Patsatzis, 2006, p.131; Bartzokas, 2007, 
p.19). Such a government effort to rebuild its economy by transforming to a high-tech 
economy might have increased public awareness of the importance of innovation, 
facilitating R&D expenditure, patenting and technology trade in high-tech fields. Table 
6.2 illustrates a constant increase in innovation activities, despite negative GDP growth 
during the crisis. Hence, it enabled Korea to recover its economy and redeem the full 
amount of its International Monetary Fund (IMF) relief loans, US$1.96 billion in 2001 
(MOST, 2003). 
 
Figure 6.1 Korea’s Government Expenditures in Key High Technology areas, 2004 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from ATIP (2006) and ISI et al. (2008). 
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In the post-crisis, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) drew up 
the ‘National S&T Promotion and Development Plan’ in 2002. With a five-year plan, it 
aimed to increase GDP per capita to US$15,000 and enhance the overall living standard 
by 2006, fostering six promising technologies – IT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, 
environmental technology, space technology and cultural technologies (BMBF website; 
Bark, 2003, p.5). In 2004, the government spent more than US$3.6 billion to establish 
research centres at universities, cultivate a creative workforce and support innovation 
activities in these areas (ATIP, 2006, p. 9). Figure 6.1 shows Korea’s expenditures in the 
six areas under the S&T plan. 
However, the National S&T Promotion and Development Plan was revised in 
2003 when Mr. Noh Moo-Hyun was inaugurated as the president of Korea. The revised 
National S&T Promotion and Development Plan changed its time frame to 2003-2007 and 
emphasised networking among R&D players to attain balanced national development 
(Bark, 2004; Yim, 2005). This plan was designed with five goals for shifting from a 
catch-up to a frontier country (Baek and Jones, 2005, p.14). First, it aimed at improving 
technological capabilities of government research institutes (GRIs), academia and firms 
by setting up various policy measures, including tax incentives to firms’ R&D spending, 
technical and financial assistance for SMEs and start-ups and subsidies for the 
employment of R&D personnel (Baek and Jones, 2005). A special programme for SMEs, 
such as the ‘Techno Park Programme’ designed by the Institute of Industrial Technology 
Evaluation and Planning (ITEP), supports SMEs and start-ups through the formation of 
innovation complexes that promote joint R&D with universities, research institutions and 
large regional firms (ISI et al., 2008). The government also relaxed regulations on labour 
mobility and capital control in GRIs and universities to promote spin-offs and the 
dynamics of innovation while expanding their autonomy (ISI et al., 2008). Second, it 
proposed an increase in the efficiency of R&D investment by minimizing the overlapping 
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of public and private spending, while putting new emphasis on elevating S&T personnel 
by reforming science education systems and expanding the job market for highly 
qualified workers (ISI et al., 2008). Third, it focused on enhancing international 
competitiveness in ICT, biotechnology, environmental and energy technology, space and 
marine technologies, as well as system and materials and processing technologies as core 
technologies for future growth. To develop indigenous technology in these areas, several 
medium-term and long-term projects have been set up with annual funding from the 
government budget of more than US$200,000, for example, Biotech 2000 (2000-2007), 
Bio-Vision 2016 (2007-2016), National Nanotechnology Initiative (2001-2009), Nuclear 
Energy R&D Programme (1992-2005) and the IT 839 Strategy (2004-2007) (Suh, 2002; 
Lim, 2004; MIC, 2004; Wieczorek, 2007; Bartzokas, 2007). Also, this plan suggested that 
the improvement of the diffusion mechanism was stipulated by strengthening IPR 
protection system and developing intermediaries, such as regional and sectoral innovation 
clusters (Tsipouri and Patsatzis, 2006). Fourth, it aimed to develop effective NIS for a 
cooperative relationship among government, universities and industry, as well as joint 
R&D with foreign organisations. The government set up the ‘Technology Innovation 
Centre Programme’ to facilitate active R&D cooperation among universities and firms 
and the ‘Technology Business Incubator Program’ to promote entrepreneurs and start-ups 
through an injection of funds, information and technologies (Kotilainen 2005, p.39). New 
performance-oriented evaluation and management systems were also suggested for the 
progress (Kotilainen, 2005; ISI et al., 2008). Fifth, it planned to create an S&T-friendly 
culture and favourable climate for high-calibre talent by reducing the burden of military 
service obligation and expanding the reward system for scientists and engineers (ISI et al., 
2008). A more detailed description of the ‘National S&T Promotion and Development 
Plan’ is presented in Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.3 The Revised National S&T Promotion and Development Programme (2003-2007) 
 
Main Goals  Measures (Instruments) 
Development of technology capabilities of government 
research institutes, universities and firms.  
 Increasing R&D spending to 3% of GDP by 2007 by setting up tax incentives. 
 Fostering 10,000 SMEs by offering technical and financial assistance. 
 Providing subsidies for the employment of R&D personnel. 
 Relaxing regulations (e.g., on land use, environment) for and entrepreneurs and start-up companies. 
 Expanding the government R&D budget for basic research to 25%. 
 Raising the share of universities' R&D to 15% by 2007. 
 Promoting organizational flexibility and labour mobility in the GRIs and expanding their autonomy. 
 Deregulating ceilings on Chaebol shareholding and on capital control. 
Increase in the allocative efficiency of R&D investment 
and securing the supply of a high-quality human 
resource. 
 Minimizing the overlapping of public and private spending. 
 Cultivating high skilled and trained manpower in the field of S&T to be responsive to industry’s needs. 
 Securing the supply of highly qualified engineering and scientists by reforming engineering and vocational education. 
Development of high technologies and improvement of 
diffusion mechanism.  
 
 Intensively fostering future core technologies (ICT, biotechnology and nanotechnology), mega-science (e.g., space and 
marine technologies), energy, and public welfare (e.g., health, transportation). 
 Promoting ten technology areas by US$ 3 million by 2008 – intelligent robots, future automobiles, non-memory 
semiconductors, digital televisions and broadcasting, next-generation mobile telecommunications, display devices, intelligent 
home networks, digital content and software, next-generation rechargeable batteries and biomedical products. 
 Building up internationally competitive the material and component-related industries. 
 Upgrading the diffusion mechanism by creating intermediaries between technology invention and diffusion, improving 
technology evaluation schemes, and strengthening the intellectual property rights system (e.g., providing patent information 
and streamlining patenting procedures). 
 Creating regional and sectoral innovation clusters. 
Development of institutional framework and NIS  Facilitating the dynamics of R&D cooperation among government, universities and firms. 
 Promoting the cross-border R&D collaboration. 
 Making an East Asia regional R&D hub in Korea. 
 Establishing a national information system for S&T by 2008. 
 Building up a performance-oriented evaluation and management system. 
 Expanding the roles the NSTC and MOST for the coordination of S&T policies and R&D programmes. 
Development of technology infrastructure  Offering the social compensation for highly qualified workers by reducing the burden of military service obligation, raising 
the share of scientists and engineers' career tracks in the government, and developing the reward system for scientists and 
engineer. 
 Establishing an S&T-friendly culture and social environment.  
 
Source: Compiled by the data from Bark (2003), Yim (2005), Tsipouri and Patsatzis (2006) and ISI et al. (2008) 
171 
 
  
Furthermore, the government reformed its education system by setting up the 
reform programme called ‘Brain Korea 21’ so as to upgrade research capabilities of 
universities, train top-level human resources, strengthen industry-university ties, promote 
international cooperation and facilitate university spin-offs (MOEHRD, 2001). More than 
US$1.2 billion were invested from 1999 to 2005 to accomplish these objectives by 
forming 570 research teams from 74 universities (ISI et al., 2008).  In 2006, the second 
reform programme of Brain Korea 21 was designed by the Ministry of Education & 
Human Resource Development (MOEHRD). With an investment plan of US$2.2 billion 
from 2006 to 2012, a wide range of academic disciplines, including humanities, social 
and natural sciences as well as engineering and applied sciences, has been supported for 
training human resources and facilitating R&D activities (The Korea Herald, 27.4.06).  
In a nutshell, government policies that focused on the development of home-
grown S&T capabilities by supporting indigenous R&D enabled Korea to rapidly catch up 
and join the ranks of technologically developed countries. Korea had become the third 
largest country in terms of number of patents granted by the USPTO (12,568) in 2010, 
followed by Japan and Germany (USPTO Statistics); it ranked fifth in R&D spending 
(US$44.8 billion) in 2011, while taking first place in terms of R&D spending as 
percentage of GDP (UNESCO Statistics). Also, S&T policy supporting sectoral 
innovation allowed Korea to attain global leadership status in many high-tech fields, 
including electronics, automobiles, ships, machinery, petrochemicals, robotics and 
wireless telecommunications (MEXT, 2010). The remarkable economic growth in the 
post-crisis might have been driven by exporting products manufactured in these high-tech 
sectors. Hence, the rapid technology catch-up of Korea is attributable to successful 
changes in policy and institutional frameworks towards high-tech innovation-oriented 
growth under strong government leadership. The redirection of S&T policy towards an 
advanced S&T-oriented society, and the consequent institutional reforms during the crisis, 
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allowed Korea to recover its economy and reach world leader in many high-tech fields, 
which has been an inspiration to the world economy. 
 
6.2.2 Japan’s Science and Technology Policy  
Japan has long focused on technology capabilities and innovation as the main engines of 
economic growth, starting with the Meiji-restoration in 1868 when the ruling elite set up a 
number of industrialisation programmes to modernise the physical infrastructure and 
education system with the aim of reinforcing national military and economic growth 
(through catching up) after the model of Western imperialism (Beasley, 1990; Fagerberg 
and Godinho, 2005). The technology-based growth policy of Japan is up to 50 years older 
than that of Korea. Research centres, universities and family-owned business groups, the 
zaibatsus (similar to Korean chaebols) were also founded to develop engineering and 
applied science. In this stage, the public sector and the zaibatsus played a pivotal role in 
growth and in interaction with the bureaucracy and the military (Fagerberg and Godinho, 
2005). The industrial structure was concentrated on food processing and textiles, but 
moved to machinery and heavy chemical industries after the First World War (Odagiri 
and Goto, 1996). The defeat of Japan in the Second World War brought about large 
structural reform by dissolving the military-based system and the zaibatsus-centred 
structure to catch up economically and technologically with the West. With a growing 
role for private initiatives, new business groups, the keiretsus, emerged. The keiretsus are 
distinguished from the zaibatsus by a greater role of banks and less family control. Banks 
and businesses became more autonomous, getting out the state control and the power of 
the bureaucracy.  
Since before World War II, public research institutes have existed in Japan to 
build up modern industrial society through technological revolution. Typical examples of 
public institutes include the Electric Experimental Laboratory (1891), the Tokyo 
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Industrial Experimental Laboratory (1900) and the Institute of Physical and Chemical 
Research (1917) (METI, 2008).  The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (GHQ/SCAP) controlled military and naval research organisations, 
while setting a limit on basic science research, particularly in the areas of atomic physics 
and aeronautical science, by other research organisations. Private firms (i.e.., Zaibatsus) 
were forced to undertake military-related R&D for electronic technology (RIETI, 2009). 
Gijutsuin (the Cabinet's board of technology) was responsible for the wartime 
mobilization of science and technology; it was abolished in 1945 (RIETI, 2009). 
After the war, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) was founded in 
1948 to draw up and implement industrial and technology policy. The MCI initiated a 
programme of institutional reform to improve public awareness of technical innovation, 
facilitate industrial firms’ R&D and cultivate engineers and technicians (Harayama, 2001). 
The government also promoted the introduction of foreign techniques and production by 
technical transfer by enacting the ‘Foreign Capital Law’ and the ‘Foreign Exchange Law’ 
as a measure of post-war reconstruction; “Based on these laws, the Japanese government 
allocated its scarce foreign currency selectively to those firms capable of adapting and 
improving import technology in order to encourage the importation of advanced 
technology and to promote a domestic technology base” (Sakakibara and Cho, 2002, 
p.678). Due to a lack of resource in the creation of Japan’s own technologies, Japanese 
industries heavily relied on foreign techniques, and hence imitation was a key method for 
industrialisation and internationalisation in that period (AIST, 2007). The public sector 
was a dominant player within  NIS, since the modest incentives (e.g., tax and financial 
incentives) set by the government, combined with weak institutions (e.g., capital support 
system, HR support system, corporate R&D support system, NIS), did not encourage the 
private sector to undertake innovation activities (Sakakibara and Cho; Harayama, 2001).  
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Table 6.4 Evolution of Japan’s Science and Technology Policies  
Terms Key Events Key S&T Polices & Framework Laws Major Objectives of S&T polices & Government Role 
1940s 
1950s 
Foundation of the MCI (Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry) and the AIST (Agency of Industrial S&T) 
in1948.   
Policy Concerning Industrial Rationalisation (1950); 
Foreign Capital Law (1952); Foreign Exchange Law 
(1952).  
Promoting research activities for post-war reconstruction; 
Introducing foreign techniques and technology transfer; 
Supporting testing laboratories & research institutes.  
1960s Relocation of its affiliated testing laboratories outside 
Tokyo in 1961; Plan to construct research & academic 
city in Tsukuba in 1963; Emergence of the first central 
research laboratory boom. 
Act on the Mining & Manufacturing Technology 
Research Associations (1961); Big Project (1966).  
Reducing the dependence on imported techniques; Assisting 
private-sector R&D activities; Building private-sector research 
laboratories; Encouraging joint mining & manufacturing 
technology research between SMEs.  
1970s The two oil shocks (1973; 1979); A change in S&T 
policy to the focus of private-sector research activities, 
from the government-led research activities.  
Sunshine Programme (1974); VLSI Programme 
(1976); National R&D Programme for Medical & 
Welfare Apparatus (1976); Moonlight Programme 
(1978). 
Promoting private-sector R&D and its collaboration with the 
national research organisation; Developing new energy and 
energy-conservation technologies, very large-scale integrated 
(VLSI) circuits for next-generation computers, and medical & 
welfare devices.    
1980s Friction with USA against Japan’s free ride in basic 
research; Relocation of  national research institutes 
focusing on basic research in Tsukuba to the new 
science city; Foundation of Japan Key Technology 
Centre (1985); Foundation of the New Energy and 
Industrial Technology Development Organization 
(NEDO) (1988); Emergence of the second central 
research laboratory boom. 
Next Generation R&D Programme (1981); System 
for Promotion of Coordinated & Creative Science 
and Technology (1981); Human Frontier Science 
Program (1987); Act for Strengthening Infrastructure 
for R&D of Industrial Technologies (1988). 
Developing key next generation industrial technologies; 
Facilitating private-sector basic research activities; Promoting 
industry-academia-government R&D collaboration; Promoting 
international research cooperation.  
1990s The collapse of the bobble economy; Reform of R&D 
programmes & national research organisations in 1993; 
Foundation of the National Institute for Advanced 
Interdisciplinary Research in 1993; Foundation of 
Technology License Organisations in 1998 
Industrial S&T Frontier Program (1993); New 
Sunshine Program (1993); Basic Act on S&T (1995); 
S&T Basic Plan I (1996). Law for Promoting 
Research Cooperation (1998); Law for Promoting 
University-Industry Technology Transfer (1998). 
Creating an internationally appealing centre of excellence 
(COE) for basic research as a response to the R&D free-ride 
criticism; Upgrading NIS for strengthening State-University-
Industry relationship; Promoting domestic knowledge stock and 
flow; Developing technology for practical research application. 
2000s  The recovery of economic recession; Build of high-tech 
parks and specialised innovation cluster; Promotion of 
inter-ministerial policies. Development of and support 
of non-profit organisations and social entrepreneurs.  
S&T Basic Plan II (2001); S&T Basic Plan (2006); 
Biomass Nippon Strategy (2006); New Health 
Frontier Strategy (2007); Innovation 25 (2007). Asian 
Gateway Initiative (2007); Intellectual Property 
Strategic Programme (2007); Priority Policy 
Programme (2007) 
Establishing a fair R&D evaluation system; Securing experts 
and providing specialised training; Supporting researcher’s 
mobility and autonomy; Strategically promoting international 
R&D activities; Creating socially valuable technologies; 
Developing high-quality basic applied research, Making a 
competitive R&D for academia and researchers; Accelerating 
research commercialisation through a triple cooperation;   
Source: Compiled by the data from various national policy reports and white papers: CSTP (Various years), METI (Various years), RIETI (various years) and ISI et al. (2008). 
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Table 6.4 summarises the evolution of Japanese S&T policies over time. In the 
1960s, the government began to support corporate R&D by providing tax reductions or 
exemptions that encouraged industrial firms to establish their research laboratories and 
join in national R&D programmes, such as the ‘Big Project’ (Harayama, 2001). In 1966, 
the Big Project was planned and designed by the Agency of Industrial Science and 
Technology (AIST), which is the advisory body of the MITI, the predecessor of the 
current METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) (RIETI, 2009). It was an 
ambitious R&D plan to reduce dependence on imported techniques and promote the 
private sector’s R&D activity as well as strengthen state-industry cooperation 
(Yamaguchi, 2008; RIETI, 2009). All participants in this project received various 
subsidies from the government to assist with R&D, which led to a boom in private-sector 
research laboratories in the 1960s (RIETI, 2009). Under such circumstances, the 
government planned to construct an internationally competitive research and academic 
city, in Tsukuba, Ibaraki Prefecture, in 1963 to resolve the problems of poor 
communication between individual research institutes and inactive R&D cooperation 
among various actors (RIETI, 2009). A total of 43 testing laboratories and research 
institutes affiliated with 10 government ministries and agencies related to S&T were 
located in the Tsukuba until 1979 (RIETI, 2009). The government also founded the 
Japanese Industrial Technology Association in 1969, which was charged with developing 
the Tsukuba science city by facilitating joint research activities among government 
laboratories, private research organisations and universities (Harayama, 2001; METI, 
2008). 
Various medium-term or long-term S&T policies, series of  R&D programmes 
and financial incentives were formed from the 1970s to the 1990s to shift to a knowledge 
economy based on science and technology. In the 1970s, the Japanese government 
designed energy R&D programmes against the backdrop of the oil shocks. Since Japan 
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heavily relied on imported oil and overseas natural resources, the two oil shocks of the 
1970s triggered the promotion of R&D for new energy technologies (Sunshine Program, 
1974) and R&D for energy-saving technologies (Moonlight Program, 1978) (RIETI, 
2009).  Also, a number of subsidy programmes supported private sector R&D to develop 
state-of-the art technologies so as to catch up with frontier countries, such as the United 
States, Germany and the UK. The VLSI Program (1976) aimed at promoting very large-
scale integrated (VLSI) circuits for next-generation computers, and the National Research 
and Development Program (1976) for developing health, medical and welfare devices are 
prime examples (RIETI, 2009). The national S&T policy involved a shift of emphasis 
from government-led research activities to those under private-sector initiative, 
whereupon the private-sector firms became key contributors to the Japanese innovation 
system in technology investment and creation from the 1970s (Freeman, 1995; Branstetter 
and Ug, 2004).  
In the 1980s, Japan entered the post catch-up stage. There was a great government 
effort to promote basic research activities by setting up various R&D programmes and 
policy measures, such as (i) formation of the ‘Next Generation Industry Basic Technology 
R&D Program’  and ‘System for Promotion of Coordinated and Creative Science and 
Technology’ in 1981; (ii) the introduction of policy measures supporting private-sector 
basic research activities and corporate R&D in form of tax exemptions in 1985; (iii) the 
foundation of the ‘Japan Key Technology Center’ in 1985; and (iv) the ‘Act for 
Strengthening Infrastructure for Research and Development of Industrial Technologies’ in 
1988 (Kuwahara, 1999; Watanabe, 1999; METI, 2008; RIETI, 2009). Also, Japan-
initiated international research collaboration program, the so called ‘the Human Frontier 
Science Program’, was launched in 1987 to undertake joint R&D with foreign research 
organisations, mainly in the research of living organisms and the development of research 
findings for the benefit of all humankind (RIETI, 2009). Such effective government 
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policies might lead to an upsurge in technology input and output, such as patenting, R&D 
investment, high-tech exporting and royalty/licensing fee payments (or receipts). As 
shown in Table 6.5, the number of patent applications doubled from 1980 to 1990, while 
receipts for royalty/licensing fee increased more than eight-fold during from 1980 to 1991. 
However, despite government support for the industry-academia-government relationship, 
the problem of inactive R&D collaboration between public and private R&D 
organisations still existed in this period (Harayama, 2000).  
In the 1990s, following the burst of its asset-price bubble, government carried out 
large reforms of industrial structure and NIS, since Japan faced a slowdown of economic 
growth and international competitiveness (Branstetter and Ug, 2004). The government 
revised previous R&D programmes to formulate a new integrated S&T policy, while 
restructuring national research organisations to minimise duplication of work done by 
different organisations as well as their overlapping investments. In 1993, the ‘Industrial 
Science and Technology Frontier Program’ and the ‘New Sunshine Program’ were born 
by integrating the three national programmes (the ‘Big Project program’, the ‘Next-
Generation R&D program’ and the ‘National Research and Development Program for 
Medical and Welfare Apparatus’) and the two national programmes (the ‘Sunshine 
Program’ and the ‘Moonlight Program’), respectively (RIETI, 2009). In the same year, the 
two R&D institutes, the National Institute of Materials and Chemical Research and the 
National Institute of Bioscience and Human-Technology,  merged with four national 
research institutes, the National Chemical Laboratory for Industry, the Fermentation 
Research Institute, the Research Institute for Polymers and Textiles and the Industrial 
Products Research Institute (RIETI, 2009).  
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Table 6.5 Japan’s Economic and Innovation Indicators, 1980-2010 
 
 
 1980 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
             
GDP (constant 2000 US$, million) 2,819,571 4,150,255 4,323,346 4,368,141 4,567,702   4,544,072 4,667,448 4,688,317 4,885,067 5,081,105 5,140,555 5,010,032 
GDP per capita (US$) 28,196 33,595 34,801 34,956 36,320 35,947 36,789 36,786 38,235 39,771 40,253 39,309 
GDP growth (annual %) 2.81 5.20 0.82 0.86 2.64 2.05 2.86 0.26 2.74 2.04 1.17 4.00 
             
High-tech exports  
(current US$, million) 
60,158
(2)
 65,586 77,209 95,072 100,165 94,011 127,375 94,729 124,045 126,618 123,732 n.a. 
High-tech exports  
(% of total exports)  
23.93
(2)
 24.24 24.07 25.55 26.15 26.15 28.69 24.78 24.10 22.06 17.31 17.06 
             
GERD (constant 2000 Yen, 
million) 
8,414
(1) 
13,078 13,596 15,079 14,155 15,169 15,304 15,551 15,782 17,273 17,377 n.a. 
             
Royalty & license fees              
     Payments (current US$, million) 1,330 6.050
(3) 
7,199 8,306 9,828 8,947 11,006 11,020 13,644 15,500 18,311 18,768 
     Receipts (current US$, million) 350  2,365
(3) 
3,060 5,184 6,680 7,388 10,227 10,421 15,701 20,095 25,700 26,680 
             
No. Patents application by JPO             
     Resident 165,730 332,952 337,498 319,261 339,045 357,379 384,201 365,204 368,416 347,060 330,110 290,081 
     Non-Resident  25,290 27,752 24,699 21,940 37,629 44,716 35,342 56,601 54,665 61,614 60,892 54,517 
No. Patents granted at USPTO n.a. 20,743 23,164 23,517 24,059 32,118 32,992 36,339 37,032 39,411 36,679 46,978 
 
Note: The data of (1) is 1986, (2) is 1988, and (3) is 1991. 
Source: Compiled by the data from KOSIS, KIPO, USPTO, World Bank, WIPO and UNESCO statistics.  
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However, an economic slump with massive unemployment lasted throughout the 
year, while the neighbouring nation, Korea, was catching up with Japan’ manufacturing 
techniques at a blinding speed, giving rise to a sense of crisis in Japan. This brought about 
a change in national S&T policy away from international R&D cooperation to a focus on 
domestic technology transfer and state-university-industry cooperation, as well as the 
development of new manufacturing industries that would increase domestic employment 
(METI, 2008). Also, the Japanese S&T policy promoted R&D activity for market-induced 
applied research, in contrast to the previous S&T policy that strongly focused on the 
research of basic sciences. Against this backdrop, the ‘Science and Technology Basic 
Plan I’ was born in 1996 after enactment of the Basic Act on Science and Technology in 
1995 (Watanabe, 2000; Yamaguchi, 2008).  
With the goal of creating an advanced S&T-oriented society, the first Basic Plan 
(1996-2000) mainly focused on fostering high-quality human resources and a cooperative 
R&D environment, suggesting financial support to 10,000 post-doctoral researchers, joint 
research and technical cooperation among ministries related to S&T and NIS based on 
tripartite cooperation (JFEO, 1998; Watanabe, 2000; Harayama, 2001; Nolan, 2007). Also, 
the first Basic Plan proposed to increase R&D investment of government since its share 
of GERD had the lowest percentage compared to Western industrialised countries 
(Sakakibara and Cho, 2005). In this sense, the government formed investment schemes to 
increase public R&D investment and to double research funding until 2000 (also see 
Hiroo, 2002; Yamaguchi, 2008). 
Meanwhile, the Law for Promoting Research Cooperation and the Law for 
Promoting University-Industry Technology Transfer were enacted in 1998 to promote 
technology transfer and joint R&D between universities and industrial firms (Yamaguchi, 
2008; Motohasi, 2005). These laws led the Japanese education system and NIS reforms to 
compensate for weaknesses in universities’ R&D capacity and collaboration with industry. 
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With cooperation between the Ministry of Education (ME) and other ministries related to 
S&T, university personnel were allowed to work as consultants in private companies, 
private firms could establish research facilities on university campuses and excellent 
students were trained in internship programmes (Schacht, 1998; Fujisue, 1998; 
Yamaguchi, 2008; Motohasi, 2005). Under the leadership of the Technology Licence 
Organisations (TLOs), universities started to transfer their research findings to private 
firms mainly through tacit agreements and licensing contracts (Takenaka, 2005; Motohasi, 
2005). As the fruits of that labour for creation and utilisation of scientific knowledge by 
developing R&D capabilities of universities, Japan ranked first in the listings of US 
patents granted to foreign investors with 32,992, as shown in Table 6.5.  
 
Table 6.6 International Comparisons of Science and Engineering Articles,  
1995 and 2007 
 
 
Rank 
 
Country 1995 2007 
Average Annual 
Change (%) 
% of World Total, 
2007  
      
1 US 193,337 209,695 0.7 27.7 
2 China 9,061 56,806 16.5 7.5 
3 Japan 47,068 52,896 1.0 7.0 
4 UK 45,498 47,121 0.3 6.2 
5 Germany 37,645 44,408 1.4 5.9 
6 France 28,847 30,740 0.5 4.1 
7 Canada 23,740 27,799 1.3 3.7 
8 Italy 17,880 26,544 3.3 3.5 
9 Spain 11,316 20,981 5.3 2.8 
10 Korea 3,803 18,467 14.1 2.4 
      
Total (World) 564,645 758,142 2.5 n.a 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from NSF statistics. 
 
Also, Japan was ranked the world’s third highest nation in terms of number of 
S&T articles , behind two English-speaking nations, the United States and the UK in 2000 
(see Table 6.6). Considering most academic journals and books in English monitored by 
the Institute for Scientific Information (James, 2006), Japan’s R&D expenditures in 
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education and academic research capabilities are at the highest level in the world. 
Therefore, the first Basic Plan (1996-2000) secured innovation success in improving 
human capital, universities’ R&D capabilities and infrastructure of R&D system. 
Nevertheless, the government announced the second Basic Plan by revising the first Basic 
Plan in 2001 with recognition of the urgent need for institutional reform related to S&T, 
including R&D evaluation, supporting and management systems to strengthen 
international competitiveness further and to acquire the ability for sustainable 
development (Harayama, 2001; Noland, 2007).  
Following the first plan, which ended in 2000, this second plan ran from 2006 
through 2011. The second Basic Plan aimed at (i) the construction of a competitive 
environment; (ii) the establishment of R&D evaluation systems based on fairness and 
transparency; (iii) the improvement of supporting systems for autonomy and mobility of 
researchers; (iv) the elevation of R&D management; (v) the building of properly 
operational university-industry-state relationships; (vi) the promotion of technology 
transfer to the private sector; (v) the creation of small and medium-sized innovative firms; 
and (vi) international technical tie-up (MEXT, 2003; Noland, 2002; Harayama, 2001; 
Hiroo, 2002). The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) was in charge of 
promoting international S&T collaboration (Sikka, 1998). Table 6.7 outlines the key 
objectives of the Japanese S&T Basic Plan II and Basic Plan III.  
In comparison with the Basic Plan I, first, the Basic Plan II more strongly focused 
on fostering high-tech businesses and entrepreneurs. This might follow the American 
innovation model, since small industrial entrepreneurial firms contributed to the 1990s 
economic recovery and the development of S&T in the United States. These firms were 
more productive and innovative, generating more patents and new products per employee, 
than the large and diversified firms (Hane, 2002; Eto, 2005).  Second, the Basic Plan II 
stressed the increase of government R&D expenditures and the need for competitive 
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funding in newly emerging fields, including life science, ICTs, environmental science and 
nanotechnology and materials (ISI et al., 2008). These areas were maintained as priorities 
in the Basic Plan III, as shown Table 6.7 (ISI et al., 2008). This plan also emphasised the 
role of regional government in building up technology parks or specialised innovation 
clusters to increase the stock and flow of knowledge as a measure of regional economic 
and technological development (Kondo, 2005). Third, the Basic Plan II addressed a fair 
and transparent R&D evaluation system and a researcher support system with mobility, 
autonomy and flexibility as decisive factors for generating excellent innovation 
performance (Harayama, 2001). This plan also pursued educational reform to secure 
experts and provide specialised training (Harayama, 2001). Fourth, the Basic Plan II 
stressed the acceleration of commercialisation of research findings through active 
industry-academia-government collaboration to create socially valuable technologies, 
such as health, welfare and security technologies (MEXT, 2003; AIST, 2007; Yamaguchi, 
2008). Some could be regarded as highly successful, contributing to the recent recovery 
of the economy and S&T development.  
However, a serious coordination problem arose among ministries and government 
agencies in formulating their innovation policies due to overlapping functions and areas 
in some cases (Harayama, 2001, Hiroo, 2002). To solve this problem, the ‘General 
Science and Technology Council’ was created in 2001 through structural reform of the 
‘Science and Technology Council’. The government assigned the role of consultant and 
coordinator to this newly built S&T Council so as to implement national S&T policy in an 
efficient and comprehensive way (MEXT, 2003). In the same year, the STA the ME were 
integrated into the MEXT to coordinate education, industrial and innovation policies. The 
MEXT was in charge of cultivating human resources and promoting R&D and innovation 
in various fields, including natural science, social science and humanities (Harayama, 
2000; MEXT, 2003).  
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Table 6.7 Japan’s Science and Technology Basic Plan in the 2000s  
 
Categories Basic Plan II (2001-2005): Key objectives and measures Basic Plan III (2006-2011): Key objectives and measures 
S&T System 
Reform 
Improving S&T activities and creation of world-class excellent achievements by (i) 
constructing competitive R&D environment by increasing competitive funds; (ii) 
enhancing the mobility of human resources using fixed-term appointment; (iii) 
developing self-reliance of young researchers; (iv) establishing flexible, effective, and 
efficient management of R&D systems; (v) utilising qualified persons and development 
of a variety of career paths; (vi) promotion of basic researches by setting fair and 
transparent evaluation system. 
Improving the foundation for promoting S&T and intellectual infrastructure  to maintain 
the global S&T competitiveness by (i) increasing competitive funds/indirect cost in a fair 
and highly transparent screening system; (ii) revitalizing research activities of 
organisations through competition;  (iii) developing  laboratory/research facilities in 
basic research; (iv) implementing selective development of key elemental technologies 
and system integration for equipment; (v) building up a framework for creating, 
protecting and utilising IP; (vi) establishing a cross-ministerial R&D management 
system 
NSI Reform Upgrading industrial technology capabilities and cooperative industry-academia-
government by (i) building up joint-research centres and TLOs for free exchange of 
information; (ii) promoting technology transfer from academia to industry; (iii) 
developing systematic measures in academia to facilitate inter-faculty personnel change; 
(iv) developing patent management by research organisations to efficiently 
commercialise useful R&D results using transfer contracts; (v) improving a system for 
venture firms by fostering entrepreneur spirit and increasing funds for start-ups. 
Increasing the role of universities in NIS and creating persistent innovation from its own 
unique research results by (i) improving the mobility of human resources in universities; 
(ii) providing preferential indirect costs to private universities to strengthen the research 
functions; (iii) operating various R&D system according to the development stage and 
the characteristics of the R&D; (iii) building a sustainable/progressive industry-
university-government collaboration system; (iv) revitalising the collaboration of 
university IP centres and TLOs; (v) promoting the utilization of new technologies 
through public procurement; (vi) promoting high-tech start-ups and university spin-offs. 
Education 
Reform 
Building up internationally competitive universities and upgrading the quality of 
education/research by (i) increasing practical and vocational training; (ii) enlarging 
financial supports and scholarships; (iii) establishing a social system to certify engineer’s 
qualification in the international community. 
Developing and securing human resources that meet the needs of society and future S&T 
by (i) fostering young researchers, female researchers and offering researchers; (ii) 
enlarging financial aids for doctorate course students; (iii) establishing a long-term 
internship system; (iv) promoting the activities of academic societies.  
Regional 
Innovation 
Vitalizing Japan’s economy through regional technical innovation and new industrial 
creation by (i) establishing and supporting intellectual clusters to facilitate the triple 
collaboration in region; (ii) promoting inter-regional technology transfer. 
Enhancing safe and quality lives for local residents, and producing creative/innovative 
regions by (i) forming regional clusters; (ii) promoting inter-ministerial coordination by 
eliminating vertical divisions between ministries. 
Strategic 
International 
Innovation 
Assembling world-class researchers and information into Japan and solving global 
problems (e.g., food security, energy shortage and infectious diseases prevention) by (i) 
strengthening partnership with all countries; (ii) supporting publication of research 
results in English and systematic disseminating world-class papers in cooperation with 
academic societies; (iii) internationalising domestic R&D environment. 
Fostering world-class researchers and upgrading S&T capabilities by improving the 
diversity of research and standards of research through accepting outstanding foreign 
researchers by (i) forming of a multilayered network (government, research institutions, 
academic societies, researchers); (ii) strengthening the S&T community with Asian 
nations through network formation. 
Strategic 
Priority Areas  
(i) life sciences; (ii) ICT;  (iii) environmental sciences; (iv) nanotechnology & materials; 
(v) energy;  (vi) manufacturing technology; (vii) Infrastructure; (viii) frontier- outer 
space and the oceans 
(i) life sciences; (ii) ICT;  (iii) environmental sciences; (iv) nanotechnology & materials; 
(v) energy;  (vi) manufacturing technology; (vii) basic for society –security, safety, 
infrastructure, administration;  (viii) frontier- outer space, satellite,  oceans and the earth. 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from various national policy reports and white papers: CSTP (various years), METI (various years), RIETI (various years) and ISI et al. (2008). 
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In light of these circumstances, the third S&T Basic Plan (an upgraded version of 
Basic Plan II) was launched in 2006 and ended in 2011; it still has an impact on on-going 
R&D projects (White Paper of S&T Basic Plan, 2006). The third Basic Plan aims at 
creating new intellectual, cultural, social and economic values by improving public 
understanding and backing of S&T and applying the results of S&T activities to the 
benefit of society (MEXT, 2010). To make sure this scheme succeeds, the third plan 
emphasises developing human resources to be capable of producing a wide variety of 
high-quality research and creating a highly competitive research environment, while 
promoting persistence and spawning innovation (JSPS, 2006).  In other words, the third 
plan has been executed based on the following two stances, ‘S&T to be supported by 
public and to benefit society’ and ‘Emphasis on fostering human resources and 
competitive research environments’ (MEXT: White Paper of S&T Basic Plan, 2006, p.8), 
which might lead a change in Japanese S&T growth strategy, moving from infrastructure 
investment to education/research investment. More than US$208 billion in total R&D 
investment was financed by the Japanese government between 2006 and 2011 to 
successfully complete the third plan (MEXT, 2010). 
The focus of long-term S&T progress through the development of world-class 
human resources in the third Basic Plan resulted in systemic reforms, including R&D 
evaluation systems in every ministry, regional R&D systems, an NIS (emphasis on the 
role of universities), R&D management systems and supporting systems(ISI et al., 2008). 
A fair evaluation system (non-sectionalism) that offers an equal opportunity for 
individuals to compete with each other is stressed in this plan to exert its ability to the 
maximum from the viewpoint of creating a more competitive R&D environment (JSPS, 
2006; White Paper of S&T Basic Plan, 2006). With these reforms, the government 
established a range of measures supporting young, female and foreign 
students/researchers to take on new challenges and to work independently based on their 
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own freely held ideas, thereby providing autonomy to researchers (JSPS, 2006). 
Specialised training is provided for talented people to improve learning ability, originality 
and creativity, for the purpose of fostering, securing and proactively using human 
resources (MEXT, 2010; ISI et al., 2008).  
In sum, Japan’s government successfully reformed its economy by setting up a 
series of laws and policies supporting dynamic R&D and innovation activities. The long 
economic recession in the 1990s led the government to start the re-examination of the 
past polices and establishment of new S&T development plans every five years by 
revising the running projects. As a measure of long economic recession, the government 
has formulated the five-year projects of Science and Technology Basic Plan I, II and III 
by reflecting current issues and compensating the defect from 1996. The first Basic Plan 
emphasised training top-level human resources by setting up specific programmes to 
finance and foster 10,000 post-doctoral researchers as a key measure of technological 
breakthrough. The second plan focused on a strategic distribution of capital investment 
and R&D funding as important means to raise the quality of research in eight priority 
areas - life sciences, ICTs, environmental sciences, nanotechnology and materials, energy, 
manufacturing technology, social infrastructure, outer space and oceans, and other 
emerging fields. The third plan set up more specific actions to systematically advance 
S&T over its 5-year implementation period (AIST, 2007, MEXT, 2010). However, the 
coordination problem among of ministries and agencies related to S&T still exists, which 
might be the main obstacle to a sustainable technological development in Japan. 
 
6.2.3 Summary and Discussion 
Government policies for industrial and S&T growth have successfully evolved over time 
corresponding to the level of domestic economic development and global economic 
trends (e.g., liberalism) in both Korea and Japan. Effective institutional reforms and S&T 
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policies have enabled Korea and Japan to change from imitation-driven to innovation-
driven activities, from labour-intensive to R&D-intensive industrial structures and from a 
favourable climate for government enterprise (public sector) to an individual enterprise-
centred R&D environment (private sector). The private sector’s R&D has been actively 
supported by direct subsidies and low-interest bank loans for the purpose of developing 
core technologies and strengthening international competitiveness (Yim and Kim, 2005; 
Cuhls, 1998). Considering weaknesses in the current Korean and Japanese innovation 
systems, such as the weak tripartite cooperative relationship, low levels of universities’ 
R&D capabilities, and low availability of venture capital, progress might be made by 
effective government S&T policies and institutional reforms.  
Korea’s S&T policy reflected an ambitious goal to become a leading nation, 
catching up with G7 countries in terms of newly emerging and high-tech fields, which 
produced long-term specific sectoral programmes. For instance, after 1990 when the 
‘Space and Aeronautics Program’ was launched, Korea launched 10 satellites into space 
by 2007 (Korea Herald, 2009.06.13). Furthermore, the government set an ambitious goal 
of making Korea one of the seven largest aerospace powerhouses in the world during the 
next decade, while planning to land robots and human beings on the moon by 2020 and 
2030, respectively (Korea Herald, 2009.06.13). Rapid catch-up with the frontier countries 
in high-tech fields was the motto of the 1990s and the 2000s S&T policies - the ‘HAN 
Project’, ‘the 21st Century Frontier Programme’ and the ‘Revised National S&T 
Promotion and Development Programme’. Details were stated in section 6.2.1.  To 
achieve this goal, the government established various policy measures supporting 
corporate R&D. Compared with tax on R&D in other OECD member countries, Korea’s 
tax incentive system might be more systematically created and organised. It covers a wide 
range of areas, including customs tax support, capital investment tax support, human 
resources (HR) tax support and tax support for R&D centres (ISI et al., 2008). The tax 
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exemption for the development of human resources has been effectively managed to 
overcome the shortage of skilled workers in the context of Korea. 
Meanwhile, Japan’s S&T policy, especially the second and third Basic Plan, 
offered an effective plan for dealing with existing problems and a new direction for 
development of S&T. It set clear objectives, instruments and policy prioritisations that 
were codified in strategy papers or white papers to inform the public and relevant 
stakeholders about current and future policies regarding S&T (MEXT, 2010). In this 
context, the Japanese foresight studies are active in filtering out future directions (Cuhls, 
1998). Compared with the Chinese fixed, 5-year S&T plan, it had more dynamic and 
guiding functions and did not operate strictly by orders. The guiding function might be 
much more effective in a hierarchically oriented society like Japan than in a decentralised 
democracy like Germany. The Japanese S&T Basic Plan III has brought about a reform of 
NIS towards a network-based system to promote closer state-university-industry 
relationships and internationalisation of S&T activities. The internationalisation of S&T is 
aimed at creating new knowledge and disseminating it widely across countries to resolve 
social problems confronting human beings throughout the world (MEXT, 2010).  Despite 
this reform, inward orientation and inter-firm linkage are still quite strong in Japan, which 
is similar features in Korea (ISI et al., 2008).  
Is the S&T policy of Japan a model for that of Korea? First, overall, the top-down 
and government-directed industrial S&T policies were one of the most conspicuous 
characteristics of Korea, which resembles Japan. Although Japan is a highly centralised 
country like Korea, meaning that the central government directs S&T policy to local 
authorities for regional innovation, S&T parks and cluster policies have made many 
regions stronger by improving regional autonomy in Japan (Toshiyuki, 2007; Shigeru, 
2007). Some specialised clusters, especially the Sapporo venturing cluster, have produced 
good results for technology transfer from academia to firms and joint R&D between them, 
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as well as an increased number of venture businesses based on seeds from universities 
(Kondo, 2006). The reform of the overall decentralisation of policy and measures 
supporting more freedom and self-responsibility of regional authorities and institutions 
are on-going, with a high ranking on the agenda in Japan (ISI et al., 2008). 
Second, R&D in both Korea and Japan is internationalised but not globalised. The 
firms invest in and send their employees all over the world to exploit new markets and 
learn new knowledge and techniques. However, most R&D is performed within the 
country, and firms are not willing to export knowledge and undertake international 
cooperation in the field in which they are recognised as the world’s leader (Cuhls and 
Kuwahara 1994). Perhaps, this is the key reason why the countries have a relatively low 
level of international cooperation compared with advanced countries.  
Third, government funds for research and product development are distributed in a 
highly competitive manner, while picking out priority areas through various means to 
allocate resources in Korea and Japan. Nevertheless, the priority areas listed as promising 
industries have until now held a different status. For instance, nanotechnology and 
materials research and ICT have produced better innovation performance in Japan and 
Korea, respectively, but life science and biotechnology have progressed less than 
expected despite a longer period of investment in both countries (ISI et al., 2008). 
Regarding this issue, a policy for supporting bio-clusters to attract MNEs and make a 
good international partnership might be needed to achieve the goal in the absence of a 
science base.  
Finally, the evolution and reform of Korea’s innovation system might be 
influenced by the Japanese S&T policy. This is reflected in Korea’s technology foresight 
activities conducted by the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) and later by 
the MOST with its affiliated agency, the Korean Institute for Science and Technology 
Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP) (Holtmanspötter et al., 2006, p.111; Shin and Cuhls, 
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2007). As an important policy tool in S&T policy, Korea’s foresight studies, which began 
in the early 1990s, were strongly inspired by the Japanese Delphi studies (Shin et al., 
1999; Shin and Cuhls, 2007; Schlossstein, 2007). With the adoption of Japanese 
methodology, three Delphi foresight studies have been undertaken so far to provide vision 
and direction to the eight emerging S&T areas that have high potential for the growth of 
national wealth and the betterment of quality of human life: space and earth, material and 
manufacturing, information and knowledge, food and bio-resource, life and health, energy 
and environment, safety and security and social infrastructure. The third Korean 
technology foresight study influenced the second Basic Plan (2008-2011) (Park and 
Schlossstein, 2005; KISTEP, 2011).  
 
6.3 Patent Policies and Intellectual Property Regimes 
The security of proprietary rights to intellectual assets that allows local innovators to 
reward ingenuity and creativity stimulates technology acquisition, diffusion and creation, 
and thereby contributes to growth of the economy (Song, 2006). There are two different 
angles on the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs). IPRs act as a facilitator for 
foreign technology transfer and foreign direct investment (FDI), while playing a 
defensive role in the leakage of important technologies (Kim, 2003).  
Numerous previous studies have focused on the role of intellectual property (IP) 
regime in economic development and innovation performance as an important policy 
measure to facilitate creative and innovative activities. From the Schumpeterian 
perspective on innovation, Romer (1991) stressed the role of patent protection in 
economic development and its impact on R&D and innovation activities. Park and 
Ginarte (1997) examined an indirect effect of IPR instruments on economic growth and 
concluded that new business development and R&D intensity are affected by IP regimes.  
More recently, many empirical studies have addressed IPRs as the key driving force of 
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economic and technology developments. Maskus (2000) examined the causal relationship 
between IPRs and the growth of national income and found that an increase in income 
leads to stronger IPRs to protect highly sophisticated products. Schneider (2005) analysed 
the role of high-tech trade, IP regime and FDI in determining the rate of innovation and 
economic growth in 47 developed and developing countries and concluded that strong 
IPRs have more significant effects on technological and economic growth in developed 
economies than in developing economies. Meanwhile, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) 
estimated the linkages of IPRs and innovation performance in 64 developing economies 
and proved the positive impact of IPRs on innovation and the inverted U-shaped 
relationship between strong IPRs and GDP per capita.  
However, there has been a heated controversy on the effect of a tough IP regime 
on economic development and technical innovation in developing countries. The main 
question under debate is whether a tough IP regime to protect IPRs draws the interest of 
both technology suppliers (i.e., advanced countries) and recipients (i.e., developing 
countries) or whether the protection of IPRs always encourages technology transfer, 
diffusion and creation in the context of developing economies (Maskus, 2000; Lall, 2003). 
Regarding this issue, Lall (2003) argued that the strong protection of IPRs by itself does 
not facilitate active FDI, technology transfer or local innovation in developing countries.  
He suggested that a soft IP regime is suitable for countries in the early stage of 
technological development, whereas a tough IP regime is pertinent to technologically 
advanced countries. Therefore, a study of the evolution of IPR regimes is needed to 
analyse how Korea and Japan have reformed their government policies and legal systems 
to create, protect and utilise IP.  
This section discusses the specific institutions and policies related to IPRs to 
analyse the means by which the countries realise rapid catch-up and become a world 
leader in IP creation and utilisation. The dramatic increase of Korean and Japanese 
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patenting is attributable to the effective change of IP regimes according to level of 
industrialisation, which is in line with previous studies on the effects of IPRs with respect 
to the level of industrial, technological and economic development (Lall, 2003; Lesser, 
2001; Branstetter et al., 2007). Hence, this study supports previous research suggesting 
that the countries could not have reached their current levels of innovation capabilities if 
strong IPRs had been enforced in the early stage of industrialisation (Lall, 2003).  
 
6.3.1 Korea’s Patent Policy and Intellectual Property Regime 
The Korean government has reformed a number of policy measures to create, utilise and 
protect IPRs over time. The first patent law was formulated in 1946 to stimulate domestic 
patenting with the foundation of the Patent Bureau in Korea. The Patent Bureau was in 
charge of controlling and managing all types of IP, including patents, utility models, 
industrial designs and trademarks, to increase intellectual assets as a national objective 
(H.K. Chang, 2003). After the promulgation of the ‘Trade Law’ in 1949, the ‘Design Law’ 
in 1961, and the ‘Copyright Act’ in 1986, the Patent Bureau was renamed the Korean 
Industrial Property Office (KIPO) in 1988. The KIPO has played an important role in 
upgrading its IP scheme in Korea and harmonising patent procedural laws with changing 
international standards (H.K. Chang, 2003). 
The Korean government began to revise its patent law in the early 1980s, starting 
with the amendment of patent law adapting to the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property in 1980, the amendment of patent law adapting to the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty in 1982 and the amendment of patent law that covers the patenting of 
substances or compositions in the areas of the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries in 1986 (Song, 2006). With the successful reform of patent policy, the number 
of Korean patent applications and registrations dramatically increased by the end of the 
1980s after Korea introduced substance patents. However, the share of Korean patent 
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registrations and applications by local residents was still a very low percentage compared 
with those of foreigners. This may imply that foreign organisations played a larger role in 
knowledge creation and commercialisation and, by extension, copying or imitating 
foreign technologies and products were main channels for building national technology 
capabilities in the 1980s at the pre-catch-up stage. Table 6.8 shows the proportion of local 
residents to foreigners in terms of Korean patent registration and applications  
In the stages of the post-catch-up period, Korean underwent a serious economic 
recession starting in the mid-1990s, but Korean patent registrations and applications were 
unaffected by the crisis, as shown in Table 6.8. The constant increase in patent production 
might be attributable to the effective reform of IP regimes, especially patent-related 
policies. Korean patent law and its court of appeals/trials system were revised and 
reformed to promote the dynamics of innovation: the amendment of patent law adapting 
to Uruguay Round/Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (UR/TRIPs) in 
1995; the amendment of patent law that covers the opposition to grants after patent 
registration in 1997; and the establishment of the Examination Guideline for E-Commerce 
Related Inventions in 2000 (Song, 2006). Above the rest, the establishment of the 
guideline for e-commerce-related inventions in 2000 triggered the multiplication of 
related start-ups and patent applications in business method (BM), which multiplied 
almost 10 times, from 978 in 1999 to 9,655 in 2000 (KIPO Statistics).  
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Table 6.8 Korean Patent Registrations and Applications by Local and Foreign Residents, 1980-2007 
 
Year Koreans Foreigners Total Korean Foreign Total 
Registrations Proportion% Registrations Proportion% Applications Proportion% Applications Proportion% 
 
1980 
 
186 
 
11.4 
 
1,446 
 
88.6 
 
1,632 
 
1,241 
 
24.5 
 
3,829 
 
75.5 
 
5,070 
1982 274 10.5 2,335 89.5 2,609 1,556 26.3 4,368 37.7 5,924 
1984 297 12.6 2,068 87.4 2,365 2,014 23.3 6,619 76.7 8,633 
1986 458 24.2 1,436 75.8 1,894 3,641 28.5 9,118 71.5 12,759 
1988 575 26.4 1,599 73.6 2,174 5,696 28.4 14,355 71.6 20,051 
1990 2,554 32.9 5,208 67.1 7,762 9,082 35.2 16,738 64.8 25,820 
1992 3,570 34.0 6,932 66.0 10,502 15,952 51.3 15,121 48.7 31,073 
1994 5,774 49.4 5,909 50.6 11,683 28,564 62.5 17,148 37.5 45,712 
1996 8,321 50.4 8,195 49.6 16,516 68,413 75.7 21,913 24.3 90,326 
1998 35,900 67.9 17,000 32.1 53,900 50,596 67.3 24,592 32.7 75,188 
2000 22,943 65.6 12,013 34.4 34,956 72,831 72.4 29,179 28.6 102,010 
2001 32,833 63.0 12,842 37.0 34,675 73,714 70.5 30,898 29.5 104,612 
2002 30,175 66.6 15,123 33.4 45,298 76,570 72.1 29,566 27.9 106,136 
2003 30,525 69.1 13,640 30.9 44,165 90,313 76.1 28,339 23.9 118,652 
2004 35,284 71.9 13,784 28.2 49,068 105,250 75.1 34,865 24.9 140,115 
2005 53,419 72.7 20,093 27.3 73,512 122,188 75.9 38,733 24.1 160,921 
2006 89,303 73.9 31,487 26.1 120,790 125,476 75.5 40,713 24.5 166,189 
2007 91,645 74.2 32,060 25.9 123,705 128,701 74.6 43,768 25.4 172,469 
Total 511,260 65.9 203,170 31.9 636,206 1,005,742 70.0 430,181 30.0 1,435,923 
 
Source: Compiled by data from KIPO statistics 
http://www.kipo.go.kr/kpo/index.html 
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The jump in BM patents after launching the guideline suggests the important role 
of IP regimes in industrial development as well as the need for IP regime changes in 
response to the change of techniques. Such an effective change of IP regimes enabled 
Korea to steadily increase patents, despite the economic recession, by facilitating 
residents in creating patents and using the commercialised knowledge. In this sense, the 
share of Korean patents by local residents has grown larger than those by foreigners since 
the mid-1990s, as shown in Table 6.8. Among foreigners, Japanese, Americans and 
Germans have played the leading role in both patent registrations and applications in 
Korea (KIPO Statistics, 2007).  
The Korean government has focused on a pro-creation role with a strong IP 
regime to protect new knowledge and techniques by developing autonomous R&D 
capabilities, after its industrial structure moved to knowledge-intensive products. 
Likewise, the government has strengthened its IPRs with the aim of active FDI and 
technology transfer from technologically advanced foreign firms through the construction 
of a protective IP environment, preventing illegal knowledge leaks and surreptitious use 
without licensing (Song, 2006).  Hence, it suggests that Korean IP regime embraces both 
a pro-creation role and a pro-diffusion role of IPRs: encouraging local firms to conduct 
innovative R&D in the creation of new knowledge while inducing foreign firms to pursue 
technology licensing and direct investments in Korea.  
 
6.3.2 Japan’s Patent Policy and Intellectual Property Regime 
Japan has a long history of protecting its IPRs. The first full-fledged patent law was 
formulated in 1885 in the Meiji Era when agriculture was the major industry in a 
resource-based economy (Flamm and Nagaoka, 2007). After industrialisation, moving to 
a knowledge-based economy, intellectual assets became a significant source of national 
growth in Japan. The revolution of information technology (IT) accelerated the reform of 
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IP regimes to make software and intangible assets patentable in a highly IP-protected 
environment, which facilitated innovative and creative activities in Japan (Wade, 2005; 
Arai, 2006).  
The Japanese government has changed its IP regime to strongly protect IPRs by 
focusing on the pro-creation role since the middle of the 1990s when Japanese underwent 
a long economic recession (Branstetter and Ug, 2004). Through the revision of existing 
patent law, the legal environment has changed from a soft IP regime to a tough IP regime, 
while extending the scope of patentability and enforced the restriction on compulsory 
licensing (Arai, 2006). The prevention of infringement also has been strengthened by the 
reform of the private damage system and criminal sanctions. The underestimated private 
damage system has been changed by the inclusion of opportunity costs in estimating the 
lost profits to infringements (Nagaoka, 2005). 
In detail, Japan’s political and legal reforms for IPRs were motivated by the 
Structural Impediments Initiative (1994), which is a mutual agreement for structural 
reform between Japan and the United States. Under this agreement, the Japanese 
government changed its patent system from a pre-grant opposition system to a post-grant 
opposition system (the post-grant re-examination), and then it was integrated into the 
patent invalidation trails in 2004. The pre-grant opposition system involves the delay of 
patent examination because it allows competitors to oppose a proposed patent before it is 
formally granted (Jaffe and Lerner, 2004; Nagaoka, 2005). Also, the US-Japan agreement 
reflected the restriction of the possibility of compulsory licensing unless for the purpose 
of public interests, satisfying domestic demand and correcting anti-competitive conduct 
and for medicine export. Many of these applications have been made by the medical, 
biotechnology and cable/satellite industries (Merges, 1996; Nagaoka, 2005).   
In the same year, the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on trade-related 
aspects of IPRs (TRIPS) brought about a reform of IP regime; the protection covers all 
196 
 
  
inventions and discoveries, except for a specified technology field, and for no less than a 
period of 20 years counted from the filing date guaranteed for the protection (Flamm and 
Nagaoka, 2007). The Japanese government also extended the scope of patentability to 
computer programmes through amendment of the patent law. Software was not patentable 
without the combination of hardware before 1993; however, a computer-readable storage 
medium in 1997 and then software itself obtained product patents in 2000 (Merges, 1996; 
Nagaoka, 2005). Later, drugs and even DNA sequences became patentable (Arai, 2006). 
The change to strengthen copyright and patent protection of software contributed to the 
increasing proportion of contracts with patents in software licenses, from less than 1 
percent of the contracts in 1990 to 22.6 percent in 1998 (Nagaoka, 2005).  
 
Table 6.9 Top Five Countries: U.S. Patents Granted to Foreign Inventors  
(1990-2006) 
 
  Japan Germany Taiwan U.K. Korea 
1990 19,525 7,614 732 2,789 225 
1991 21,026 7,680 906 2,800 405 
1992 21,925 7,309 1,001 2,425 538 
1993 22,293 6,893 1,189 2,295 779 
1994 22,384 6,731 1,443 2,234 943 
1995 21,764 6,600 1,620 2,478 1,161 
1996 23,053 6,818 1,897 2,453 1,493 
1997 23,179 7,008 2,057 2,678 1,891 
1998 30,840 9,095 3,100 3,464 3,259 
1999 31,104 9,337 3,693 3,572 3,562 
2000 31,296 10,234 4,667 3,667 3,314 
2001 33,223 11,259 5,371 3,965 3,538 
2002 34,858 11,280 5,431 3,843 3,786 
2003 35,515 11,444 5,298 3,631 3,944 
2004 35,348 10,779 5,938 3,450 4,428 
2005 30,341 9,011 5,118 3,148 4,352 
2006 36,807 10,005 6,360 3,585 5,908 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from USPTO statistics.  
 
With successful reform, Japan ranked at the top with 36,807 patents in the listings 
of US patents granted to foreign investors in 2006 (see Table 6.9). The recent change of 
IP environment with the aim of lifting the IP level to the top, first the Japanese 
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government has emphasised the importance of creativity and inventiveness. For these, 
knowledge-creating institutions, especially universities, have been restructured to actively 
promote IP resource exploitation, knowledge diffusion and technology transfer to industry 
in Japan (Wade, 2005). Second, the development of specialist human resources has been 
focused on the promotion of IP. To cultivate the talents equipped to deal with IP, the 
Japanese government encouraged universities to set up law courses related to IP in 2004 
and built up two IP graduate schools in 2005 (Arai, 2006). Third, the government 
formulated the ‘Basic Law on IP’ (2003) to improve the creation, protection and use of 
intellectual assets, while establishing intellectual property headquarters to effectively set 
up new IP policy and coordinate among government departments and other interested 
parties (Arai, 2006). Finally, the Intellectual Property Plan 2005 was launched to increase 
international patenting, as well as protect trade secrets and diffusion of pirated copies by 
introducing the Patent Examination Acceleration Law and establishing the Intellectual 
Property High Court (Flamm and Nagaoka, 2007), which might be modeled on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. The IP High Court plays an important role in the 
speedy resolution of disputes through predictable decision timing and controlling the 
inward flow of counterfeit products to Japan (Arai, 2006). The strong IPRs of Japan are 
proved by reports from the Business Software Alliance of the level of business software 
piracy. In 2006, Japan was the third lowest country, at 25 percent, in terms of business 
software piracy, after New Zealand (22 percent) and the United States (21 percent) (Arai, 
2006). 
 
6.3.3 Summary and Discussion 
There are successful reforms of legal and political institutions for IPRs protection 
responding to the level of economic development in Korea and Japan. The countries 
benefit from strong protection of IPRs because they have attained a certain threshold in 
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the process of industrialisation, which supports Lall’s (2003) argument of a positive effect 
of a soft IR regime (a negative effect of a tough IP regime) on national technology 
capabilities in the early stage of industrialisation.   
 
Table 6.10 International Property Right Index, by Ranking, 2008 
 
 
Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR  Rank Country IPRI LP PPR IPR 
1 Finland 8.7 8.9 8.5 8.6  27 Estonia 6.6 6.8 7.4 5.5 
2 Netherlands 8.5 8.4 8.6 8.6   Malta 6.6 7.5 6.3 6.0 
 Denmark 8.5 8.6 8.3 8.6  29 Chile 6.5 6.6 7.0 6.0 
4 New Zealand 8.3 8.8 8.3 7.9   Israel 6.5 6.0 6.6 7.0 
 Sweden 8.3 8.6 8.5 7.8   Qatar 6.5 7.0 6.8 5.6 
 Germany 8.3 8.3 7.9 8.7   Taiwan 6.5 5.9 7.3 6.3 
 Norway 8.3 8.5 8.7 7.7  33 Hungary 6.4 6.1 6.6 6.5 
8 Switzerland 8.2 8.8 8.0 8.0  34 Slovakia 6.3 5.6 7.1 6.2 
 Australia 8.2 8.3 8.1 8.2   Cyprus 6.3 6.6 6.4 5.9 
10 Austria 8.1 8.4 7.8 8.1  36 Malaysia 6.2 5.9 6.8 5.9 
 Iceland 8.1 8.9 8.5 6.8  37 Italy 6.1 5.6 5.9 6.8 
 Singapore  8.1 8.2 8.2 7.8   Rep. Czech 6.1 6.0 5.7 6.5 
13 Ireland 8.0 8.1 7.9 7.8  39 Greece 6.0 5.8 6.1 6.0 
14 Canada 7.9 8.3 7.5 8.0  40 Tunisia 5.9 5.7 7.1 5.0 
15 United Kingdom 7.8 7.9 7.1 8.5   Jordan 5.9 5.6 6.6 5.5 
 United States 7.8 7.1 7.8 8.6   Lithuania 5.9 5.5 6.9 5.2 
17 Japan 7.6 7.4 7.2 8.2  43 Botswana 5.8 6.7 6.4 4.1 
18 Belgium 7.5 7.4 6.7 8.2  44 Bahrain 5.7 5.5 6.5 5.2 
19 Hong Kong 7.3 7.8 7.8 6.2   Mauritius 5.7 6.3 6.0 4.9 
20 France 7.2 7.1 6.4 8.1  46 Costa Rica 5.6 6.3 5.9 4.7 
 Luxembourg 7.2 8.4 5.1 7.9   Kuwait 5.6 6.3 6.9 3.7 
22 Portugal 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.0   Slovenia 5.6 6.6 4.7 5.5 
23 United Arab 
Emirates 
6.9 6.6 7.7 6.4   India 5.6 4.9 6.7 5.1 
24 Spain  6.8 6.1 7.1 7.3  50 Uruguay 5.5 6.5 5.2 4.9 
 Rep. Korea 6.8 6.3 7.3 6.8        
 South Africa 6.8 5.9 7.1 7.4        
 
Note: The IPRI comprises three macroeconomic indicators: (i) legal and political environment (LP) 
measured by judicial independence, rule of law, political stability and control of corruption; (ii) physical 
property rights (PPRs) measured by protection of physical property rights, registering property and access 
to loans; and (iii) IPRs measured by protection of IPRs, patent protection and copyright piracy. 
Source: Compiled by the data from the 2009 International Property Right Index (IPRI). 
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ 
 
Under a tough IP regime, patent laws and the court of appeals/trials systems have 
been also substantially changed for the expansion of patentable scopes, restrictions on 
compulsory licensing and stronger protection against infringement and piracy by 
reinforcing penalties against infringers and increasing criminal sanctions and patentees’ 
power to collect evidence of infringement in the countries (Flamm and Nagaoka, 2007). 
Several policy measures to strengthen IPRs contribute to the upsurge of domestic 
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patenting by inducing both local and foreign residents to conduct the dynamics of 
innovation, which enables Korea and Japan to make IP rich countries. A tough IP regime 
could attract foreign organisations to make technology licensing, join-R&D and strategic 
alliances with local firms and research institutes with less fear about illegal knowledge 
leakage, thereby facilitating the transfer and diffusion of new technologies more actively. 
Table 6.10 provides country rankings for degrees of IPRs. Although both Korean 
and Japanese IPR scores are far higher than the mean value for the world (5.4), IP regimes 
for IPRs protection in the countries are relatively weak compared with those of other 
technologically advanced countries. However, progressive institutional reforms toward a 
tough regime have enabled the countries to accelerate patent registration, patented 
technology transfer and faster commercialisation, which might provide important 
implications for other countries, especially those in the transition stage, to upgrade their 
IP regimes.  
 
6.4 National Financial System  
This section analyses similarities and differences in financial systems supporting 
innovative activities and key financial factors contributing to national technology 
capabilities in Korea and Japan, given that innovation success depends upon national 
finance system, including funding system and taxation system. The importance of 
national financial system as determinants of economic and innovation performances have 
been highlighted by recent works on endogenous growth theory (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 
2009; Ang, 2010) on varieties of capitalism perspective (e.g., Taylor, 2004; Tylecote and 
Vertova, 2007), and NIS (Lundvall, 2002; Leydesdorff and Fritsch, 2006). The details are 
presented in Chapter 3. Along with NIS, national finance system might directly affect 
coordination mechanisms, roles of players, innovation paths and sectoral specialisation, 
hence distinctive features of the countries’ financial system and policy frameworks were 
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explored as important factors affecting rapid technology catch-up.  
 
6.4.1 Korea’s financial system 
Korea’s financial system has been constantly reformed over the past four decades to 
increase domestic savings and foreign investments, while creating a favourable 
environment for technology trade and R&D expenditures. With the scarcity of foreign 
exchange, foreign loans and external finance play an important role in raising funds for 
R&D and innovation in Korea.  
The Korean financial system has been reformed corresponding to the changing 
needs and structure of the economy over time. The 1970s financial policy offered 
financial aid to local firms, especially GRIs and chaebols, to intensively foster strategic 
industries (i.e., heavy and chemical industries) and increase competitiveness in exports. 
Export-oriented firms enjoyed credit and lower borrowing costs than domestic-oriented 
firms to encourage export growth and internationalised R&D. The government provided 
export-oriented firms with preferential access to credit at substantially subsidised rates 
(Cho and Kim, 1995). Entering the 1980s, Korea’s government started to restructure the 
national financial system to produce more balanced industrial sectors due to the chaebol-
dominated structure. With reform of the taxation system, the government was forced to 
redirect financial policy towards redistribution. Tax credits to business activities of the 
chaebols began to decline while improving tax favours and lending conditions for SMEs 
(Cho and Kim, 1995).  
The 1990s was a chaotic period of boom and bust in Korea. With financial 
liberalisation  came large economic reform, including the taxation systems, financial 
institutions and banking industry structures, alleviation of money market regulations, 
stabilisation of currency credit, execution of real-time accounting systems, liberalisation 
of interest rates and privatisation of public sectors (MOST, 2007). Deregulation of 
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financial policy towards liberalisation of banking caused short-term foreign debts, 
massive capital flights and drop in monetary value, which yielded US$40 million of trade 
gap every year until the mid-1990s (S-J. Chang, 2003). These problems hindered 
economic growth and ultimately the economy fell into financial crisis in 1997. The 
financial crisis led to extensive reform of the financial system as a whole. Based on free 
competition and market principles (the motto of the new liberalism of the financial 
policy), the government did not directly participate in economic activities and firms’ 
profit creation, as contrasted with the former characterised by heavy intervention and 
control of financial sectors (Jang, 2000; Kim, 1998).  
The government set up a package of tax and financial incentives to encourage 
firms with minimum equity to enter priority industries, and it used its control of the 
banking system to exert strong leverage on the behaviour of firms (World Bank, 1987; 
Cho, 1989; Vittas and Wang, 1991; Cho and Kim, 1995). With better market access, 
SMEs had more incentives and opportunities for direct investment and functional 
activities, such as R&D and investment in equipment, in the 1990s (Cho and Kim, 1995). 
Such a successful reform of the financial system helped fuel the economic recovery and 
contributed to the current economic and technological developments in Korea.  
 
6.4.2 Japan’s Financial System  
Japan is the second largest economy in the world with substantial foreign exchange 
reserves and healthy corporate/banking sectors. Japanese banks have strong capital 
positions with massive deposit bases and serve as a source of liquid global capital in the 
national financial system (Sharma, 2010). The fast growth of Japan as a global economic 
power, rapidly moving away from a defeated nation, might be partly driven by its sound 
monetary policy and financial system, which could create a stable environment with low 
taxes, inflation and interest rates.  
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Japan’s financial system was reformed in three different phases, linking to 
important economic reform events. The first phase was the post-war period, when direct 
government allocation of funds was the key source for the reconstruction of Japan’s 
economy and the development of industrial capabilities (Vittas and Wang, 1991; Vittas 
and Kawaura, 1995). The second phase covered from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, when 
Japan’s financial system was rigidly segmented and subject to wide-ranging controls. 
Until the mid-1970s, the Japanese financial system was characterised by heavy 
government control of financial resources, the dependence of city banks on credit from 
the Bank of Japan to fund their loans to industrial firms and over-borrowing of industrial 
firms with a low level of artificial interest rates (Kuroda and Oritani, 1980; Horiuchi, 
1984; Ikeo, 1987).  
The third phase started from the mid-1970s when the financial market was 
liberalised. The introduction of financial liberalisation removed credit constraints while 
allowing innovators to obtain external finance (Vittas and Cho, 1996). The Japan 
Development Bank was the first bank guaranteed its managerial autonomy, meaning that 
it does not suffer political pressure to fund projects without prospects and can allocate 
project funds and investments based on the professional judgment of bank staff. This is 
attributable to the low level of loan losses despite the Development Bank focusing on 
long-term industrial finance and risky projects (e.g., R&D). Commercial and trust banks 
concentrated more on short-term loans and diversified loan portfolios (Vittas and Cho, 
1996).   
Overall, Japan’s financial system (bank-based structure) is quite unique and 
distinct from Anglo-American financial systems (liberal-market structure). The 
idiosyncratic features of the Japanese financial system include the large role of banks as 
lenders, shareholders and providers of other finance services, a close relationship between 
banks and firms and the intermediary role of large industrial firms in channelling funds to 
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small firms at the periphery of different industrial groups (Vittas and Cho, 1996; Sharma, 
2010). Regarding sources of funds used for policy loans to promote R&D investments in 
the target fields, Japan relies on funds mobilised through the government, such as postal 
savings, which differs from Korean (Vittas and Cho, 1996).  Korea has relied heavily on 
central bank credit and deposits mobilised by commercial banks. Domestic savings and 
investments are major sources of finance for the implementation of industrial S&T 
projects, while funds raised through foreign loans are scarce. Large domestic savings are 
attributable to the stability of prices that encourages the growth in savings in Japan (Vittas 
and Kawaura 1995).  
 
6.4.3 Summary and Discussion 
Recent research on endogenous growth theory has addressed R&D efforts and financial 
factors as key sources of long-term economic growth, since credit market imperfection 
(e.g., credit constraints) is thwarted in innovators’ attempts to obtain sufficient external 
financing (Blackburn and Hung, 1998; Aghion et al., 2005; Ang, 2008; Aghion and 
Howitt, 2009). The national finance policy has evolved with industrial S&T policy and 
influenced each other, implying that the direction of finance policy and measures change 
in response to a changing national S&T development plan in different economic growth 
stages. In general, the government acts as a financier and an investor in industrial and 
technological development in the early stage of economic development, since most 
financial sectors’ activities are controlled by the central government, including their 
ownership and deposit/lending rates (Vittas and Cho, 1996). Meanwhile, there is relative 
openness in the banking and financial system in the mature stage, providing the bank has 
autonomy to manage monetary policy and allowing for external finance, to increase 
venture capital and attract private lenders to undertake innovative and R&D activities 
(Vittas and Wang, 1991; Vittas and Cho, 1996).  The national finance system plays a 
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pivotal role in not only wealth creation, but also in technical innovation by facilitating 
R&D activities (Krugman, 1986; Taylor, 2004), which are the driving force behind the 
rapid economic and technology catch-up of Japan and Korea.  
The idiosyncratic features of financial systems in Korea and Japan can be 
summarised as follows. First, Korea’s finance system is characterised by strong 
government intervention in the financial sectors and significant government subsidisation 
of the cost of borrowing in the product and process of innovation. To strengthen state 
control over finance, the Korean government owns both development and commercial 
banks, which allows for expansion of the scope of government control over the allocation 
of financial resources and directly implements industrialisation and innovation. The scope 
of directed credit programmes is also much broader than in Japan.  
Second, there are different sources of funds for policy loans between Korea and 
Japan. In Korea, the greater part of policy loans and expenses are financed through central 
bank credit at a discounted rate, with less reliance on fiscal funds, unlike in Japan. The 
heavy dependence on the central bank in Korea could explain why its prices and 
inflationary pressures have been less stable and higher than in Japan because the central 
bank creates money to raise funds when necessary for implementing public policy. With 
less stable prices, the Korean financial sectors are relatively less mature than those of 
Japan.  
Third, foreign capital rather than domestic savings or investments is a more 
significant source of policy-based finance in Korea, compared with Japan. In the absence 
of capital accumulation, foreign capital has been the key source of funding to achieve 
industrial and S&T policy goals even if foreign capital influx was controlled by the 
government with a repressive policy that enabled Korea to accelerate economic growth in 
an immature stage, but negatively affected the mobilisation of financial resources.  
Finally, governments in both Korea and Japan have implemented a selective 
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financial policy that offered great access to credit and low borrowing costs to the priority 
sectors as a national objective. A number of scholars have criticised the selective policy 
because of the potential for misallocation of resources and an imbalance in the industrial 
structure incurred by high borrowing costs of non-priority sectors (Koo, 1984; Kwack, 
1984). However, the countries’ financial policy succeeded in rapidly expanding 
production and developing technology capabilities through the selection of industries with 
futures, the smooth adjustment of declining industries, the restructuring of companies 
facing difficulties and the rationalisation of entire sectors of industry suffering from 
overcapacity (Vittas and Cho, 1996). Furthermore, the government in both countries act 
as a risk-sharing partner with banks and industry by controlling finance to support and 
encourage R&D.  
 
6.5 National Innovation System  
Innovative activities are governed by networking and cooperative relationships among the 
five major agents within NIS: administrative organisations, public/private research 
institutes, higher education institutes, industrial firms and intermediaries (Senker, 1996; 
Chang and Shin, 2004; ISI et al., 2008). Government, large firms and universities play the 
central role in shaping NIS as major driving forces behind rapid catch-up success in both 
Korea and Japan. Various ministries and governmental agencies are in charge of 
innovation programs and policy design and coordination. Through government research 
institutes, a strong linkage exists among the political system, the research system and the 
education system. Intermediaries help enhance the link of research and education systems 
with the industrial system to support R&D collaboration among government, university 
and firm. Since a science park builds a bridge to facilitate R&D cooperation among 
players within the NIS (Castells and Hall, 1994), this thesis considered not only 
government agencies, but also industrial S&T clusters as intermediaries.  
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With the success story of Silicon Valley that contributed to regional or urban 
renewal, reindustrialisation and synergism (Castells and Hall, 1994), there were many 
comparative studies on industrial S&T parks in different local contexts; for example, 
Cambridge science park in the UK (Keeble et al., 1999), Sophia-Antipolis in France 
(Longhi 1999), Swedish science parks (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002), Australian 
technology park (Phillimore, 1999), Tsukuba research park in Japan (Bass, 1998), 
Singaporean science parks (Koh et al., 2005), the St. Petersburg Technology Park in 
Russia (Kihlgren, 2003) and Zhangjiang high-tech park in China (Lai and Shyu, 2005).  
The large body of innovation studies highlighted the advantages of clustering in 
the development of technology capabilities at sectoral, regional and national levels 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Hsu et al., 2003; Koh et al., 2005; Roberts, 1998; Storey and 
Tether, 1998; Vedovello, 1997). From the institutional perspective, a science-based 
industrial park is considered as a specialised physical infrastructure that provides a 
competitive environment for creating new institutional forms, such as venture capital 
(Koh et al., 2005; Dodgson, 2008). It is designed to promote R&D activities in 
organisations located in the vicinity of the park by facilitating technology transfer and 
joint-R&D among research institutes and firms (Löfsten and Lindelöf, 2002; Lai and 
Shyu, 2005). In this sense, S&T parks fit well for addressing intermediaries within NIS. 
The following sections provide a detailed discussion of strengths and weaknesses 
underlying the Korean and Japanese innovation systems.  
 
6.5.1 Korea’s Innovation System 
The analysis of Korea’s NIS investigates distinctive coordination mechanisms, learning 
processes and the roles of various players as well as contextual factors within the system. 
Figure 6.2 presents the specific institutional configurations for national technology 
capabilities in Korea.  
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Figure 6.2 Korea’ Innovation System      
 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from various national policy reports and white papers (various years). 
 
Government 
Korea’s government has played a large role as a planner of S&T policy, as well as a 
performer, sponsor and facilitator of R&D in NIS (Kim, 1997; Kim and Nelson, 2000). 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis resulted in the redirection of S&T policy to develop 
indigenous and autonomous R&D capabilities as measures of economic recovery, while 
restructuring administrative institutions to efficiently coordinate ministries and 
government agencies related to science and technology by establishing the National S&T 
Council in Korea (NSTC) (Suh, 2000; Yim and Kim, 2005). The NSTC acted as the 
overall coordinator for S&T-related policies pursued by various ministries: the Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) - S&T policies; the Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Energy (MOCIE) - industrial policies; the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC) - ICT polices; the Ministry of Education and Human Resource 
Development (MOEHRD) - HR policies and the Ministry of National Defence (MND) 
(ISI et al., 2008).  
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Likewise, the NSTC controls four research councils: Korea Research Council of 
Fundamental S&T (KRCF), Korea Research Council of Industrial S&T (KOCI), Korea 
Research Council of Public S&T (KORP) and Korea Research Council for Economics, 
Humanities and Social Sciences (NRCS)
1
 (MEST, 2010). These four research councils 
are in charge of determining GRIs’ research areas and funding, as well as supervising and 
evaluating GRIs’ performance, as well as submitting the budget for the GRIs (Yim and 
Kim, 2005). Among 18 ministries involved in S&T, MOST was the key contributor to 
Korea’s innovation system as a planner and forecaster in developing core and future-
oriented technologies (ISI et al., 2008). Regarding the recent change of the government 
structure, MOST with its newly established S&T+1-Office (OSTI) has been subordinated 
to NSTC (MOST, 2010). This office is responsible for S&T planning, coordination, 
evaluation and R&D budget allocation (MEST, 2010).  
 
Research Performers: Government Research Institutes, Chaebols and Universities 
GRIs and large private firms (chaebols) play the leading role of research performer, 
whereas SMEs and education institutes (universities) contribute less to Korea’s 
innovation system than in other technologically developed countries, implying a low level 
of knowledge transfer and R&D cooperation between universities and firms. First, GRIs 
are key research performers in the innovation system of Korea. “GRIs often acted as 
agencies in the execution of ministerial R&D programs, lacking autonomy in operation, 
management and decision-making” (Yim, 2005, p.14).  
52 GRIs were under the auspices of the country's four research councils and the 
MOST as shown in Table 6.11.  One of the public research institutes with a strong 
research performance is the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology 
                                            
1
 The NRCS was established in 2005 after the dissolution of its predecessors, the Korea Research Council 
for Humanities and Social Sciences (KCHSRI) and the Korean Council for Economic & Social Research 
Institutes (KCERI) (MOST, 2006).  
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(KAIST). The KAIST was founded in 1971 with the aim to generate top-quality scientists 
and engineers by setting up world-class training and education systems (Lim, 2000; Yim 
and Kim, 2005). Another leading public research institute is the Korea Science and 
Engineering Foundation (KOSEF). The KOSEF provides financial support for several 
academic organisations to promote academic and publication activities (Guettler, 2007). 
The number of researchers in public research institutes amounted to 14,395 in 2003, a 
share of 7.3 percent of the total number of researchers in public, private sector and 
university research institutions. In terms of R&D expenditure, the public research 
institutes' share declined between 1996 and 2005 from 17.4 percent to 13.2 percent. Table 
6.12 shows Korea’s R&D expenditures and researchers by sector.  
Second, large private firms are the major players in the process of catch-up and 
innovation in the NIS of Korea. In the early stage of economic development, GRIs played 
the leading role in national technology creation and investment in Korea. In 2005, 
corporate R&D expenditures contributed 76.9 percent to total R&D (see Table 6.12). 
However, R&D was heavily concentrated in a small number of cheabols, while SMEs and 
foreign companies were much less involved in corporate R&D (Hemmert, 2007). The 30 
largest companies accounted for 91 percent of the corporate sector's R&D in 2005; 
Samsung Electronics’ share of total corporate R&D amounted to 37.3 percent, while other 
chaebols such as Hyundai Motors and LG Electronics spent more than 1 trillion won each 
on R&D (ISI et al., 2008).  Chaebols’ R&D expenditures were concentrated in the 
electronic, automobile and ICT sectors, accounting for more than 75 percent of the total in 
2005, indicating a strong bias in the Korean economy. Many chaebols focus on economic 
and technology research, policy and business consultancy by setting up their own research 
institutes. Examples include the Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI), the 
Samsung Advanced Institute of Technology (SAIT), the Hyundai Research Institute (HRI) 
and the LG Economic Research Institute (LGERI) (Hemmert, 2007; ISI et al., 2008). 
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Table 6.11 Korea’s Government-Funded Research Institutes 
 
 
Administration   GRIs 
The National Research 
Council for Economics, 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences (NRCS) 
 Korea Development Institute (KDI), Korea Energy Economics 
Institute (KEEI), Korea Environment Institute (KEI), Korea 
Information Strategy Development Institute (KISDI), Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHASA), Korea Institute 
for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP), Korea Institute for 
National Unification (KINU), Korea Institute of Curriculum and 
Evaluation (KICE), Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF), 
Korea Labour Institute (KLI), Korea Legislation Research Institute 
(KLRI), Korea Maritime Institute (KMI), Korea Research Institute 
for Human Settlements (KRIHS), Korea Research Institute for 
Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET), Korea Rural 
Economic Institute (KREI), Korean Educational Development 
Institute (KEDI), Korean Institute of Criminal Justice Policy 
(KICJP), Korean Women's Development Institute (KWDI), 
National Youth Policy Institute (NYPI), Science and Technology 
Policy Institute (STEPI), Korea Institute of Public Administration 
(KIPA), Korea Transport Institute (KOTI). 
The Korean Research Council 
of Fundamental Science and 
Technology (KRCF) 
 Korea Basic Science Institute (KBSI), Korea Astronomy and 
Space Science Institute (KASI), Korea Institute of Science and 
Technology (KIST), Korea Research Institute of Bioscience and 
Biotechnology (KRIBB) 
The Korea Research Council 
for Industrial Science and 
Technology (KOCI) 
 Korea Institute of Oriental Medicine (KIOM), Korea Institute of 
Industrial Technology (KITECH), Electronics and 
Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), National Security 
Research Institute (NSRI), Korea Food Research Institute (KFRI), 
Korea Research Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM), 
Korea Research Institute of Chemical Technology (KRICT), Korea 
Institute of Toxicology (KITOX), Korea Electro-Technology 
Research Institute (KERI) 
The Korea Research Council 
for Public Science and 
Technology (KORP) 
 Korea Institute of Science and Technology Information (KISTI), 
Korea Institute of Construction Technology (KICT), Korean 
Railroad Research Institute (KRRI), Korea Ocean Research & 
Development Institute (KORDI), Korean Research Institute of 
Standards and Science (KRRIS), Korea Institute of Energy 
Research (KIER), Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral 
Resources (KIGAM), Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), 
Korea Polar Research Institute (KOPRI) 
Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) 
 Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), 
Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), Korea Institute 
of Nuclear Safety (KINS), Korea Science and Engineering 
Foundation (KOSEF), Kwangju Institute of Science and 
Technology (KJIST), Korea Institute of Advanced Study (KIAS), 
Korea Institute of Radiological and Medical Sciences (KIRAMS), 
Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP) 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from national policy reports and white papers: ISI et al. (2008), MOST 
(2007) and MEST (2010). 
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Table 6.12 Korea’s R&D expenditures by Sectors, Researchers, Research Types, S&T Publications, and Patents 
 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
             
R&D Expenditure (Million won)            
  Government 591,662 1,060,356 1,540,615 1,895,618 2,099,470 2,031,981 2,160,166 2,552,632 2,626,356 2,964,646 3,192,887 3,497,050 
  University 244,322 302,874 608,851 1,018,822 1,265,074 1,561,865 1,676,777 1,797,096 1,932,663 2,200,886 2,398,284 2,721,874 
  Firm 2,374,502 3,625,801 5,745,280 7,963,611 7,972,073 10,254,655 12,273,579 12,975,354 14,509,663 17,019,811 18,564,243 21,126,780 
  Total 3,210,486 4,989,031 7,894,746 10,878,051 11,336,617 13,848,501 16,110,522 17,325,082 19,068,682 22,185,343 24,155,414 27,345,704 
No. of Researchers             
  Government 18,407 24,233 26,137 24,203 19,431 21,563 20,984 21,702 22,025 24,057 22,604 23,874 
  University 43,582 43,392 74,877 77,220 92,591 100,643 102,501 111,083 121,039 121,968 125,039 132,042 
  Firm 63,523 81,322 89,284 100,924 87,169 115,026 138,317 147,021 153,996 166,289 187,785 209,878 
  Total 125,512 148,947 190,298 202,347 199,191 237,232 261,802 279,806 297,060 312,314 335,428 365,794 
Research Types (Million won)            
  Basic Research 514,843  628,637  1,131,935  1,439,020  1,585,367  1,746,138  2,025,019  2,373,234  2,758,620  3,399,400  3,706,840  4,143,273  
  Applied Research 771,062  1,313,326  1,880,824  2,927,270  2,848,458  3,370,088  4,075,940  3,763,601  3,973,994  4,712,161  5,034,149  5,430,098  
  Experimental Development 1,924,581  3,047,068  4,881,987  6,511,761  6,902,792  8,732,274  10,009,561  11,188,245  12,336,067  14,073,782  15,414,425  17,772,333  
  Total 3,210,486  4,989,031  7,894,746  10,878,051  11,336,617  13,848,501  16,110,521  17,325,081  19,068,681  22,185,343  24,155,414  27,345,704  
No. S&T Publications N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 33,190 47,143  55,414  63,588  73,333  N.A. N.A. N.A. 
             
No. Patents(1,000)             
  Applications 25.8  31.1  45.7  96.6  130.0  75.2  172.2  190.0  190.0  203.7  203.7  160.9  
  Registrations 7.8  10.5  11.7  12.5  24.6  52.9  35.0  34.7  34.7  45.3  45.3  73.5  
 
Sources: Compiled by the data from KOSIS, NTIS, OECD and WIPO statistics. 
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Third, universities are emergent players in Korea’s innovation system. 
Universities published 83.5 percent of the total number of scientific publications, while 
GRIs published 11.6 percent and private sector research institutes only 4.9 percent from 
1995 to 2000 (ISI et al., 2008).
 
The reform of education system has made remarkable 
progress in terms of student enrolment, quality of students (PISA standards) and science 
and engineering articles publications over the last decades. Between 1970 and 2004, the 
number of institutions of higher education grew from 142 to 411, the number of students 
exploded from 201,436 to 3.555 million. The higher education enrolment rate increased 
between 1990 and 2002 from 33.2% to 81.3% and surpassed 95% in 2006, which was the 
highest share of all OECD countries (MEST, 2010). As a result, Korea ranked as the 10
th
 
highest country for science and engineering articles publications (18,467), while being the 
fastest with China among top ten countries in terms of average annual growth rate 
between 1995 and 2007 as shown in Table 6.6.  
To build the research capabilities of universities, the Korean government provides 
support to establish research centres, specifically, centres of excellence (COE), in 
universities. Under the auspices of the government (MOST, KOSEF), more than 150 
COEs have been funded specialising in several disciplines to build specific research 
capabilities, foster talents, facilitate technology transfer and promote cooperation with 
firms in related fields (Yim, 2005; Guettler, 2007). According to the Korean Statistical 
Information Service (KOSIS) Statistics, universities transferred 591 patents and 
technologies to private companies in 2005; Seoul National University earned 1.5 billion 
won for transferring 54 technologies, followed by the Korea University with 743 million 
won and 140 technology transfers. KAIST showed an outstanding performance in 
university-industry cooperation, accounting for 1,285 patent registrations and trademarks 
in 2005. Despite increases in academic R&D efforts for patenting, technology transfer, 
few university spin-offs and a low level of R&D cooperation with firms are still serious 
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problems for Korean. 
 
Intermediaries (State-University-Industry Cooperation) 
First, S&T parks play the pivotal role in promoting the dynamics of industry-university 
cooperation in Korea’s innovation system. As a prime example, Daedok Innopolis, the 
largest research complex in Korea, has created a highly competitive research environment 
by building a network for knowledge flow that facilitates R&D cooperation, university 
spin-offs and entrepreneurial processes (Kim and Ko, 1998; Shin, 2001); “the objective of 
a science park is to be a seedbed and an enclave for technology, and to play an incubator 
role, nurturing the development and growth of new, small, high-tech firms, facilitating the 
transfer of university know-how to tenant companies, encouraging the development of 
faculty-based spin-offs and stimulating the development of innovative products and 
processes’’ (Koh et al., 2005, p.219). 
Daedok Innopolis was established by the central government initiative with the 
aim of developing future industries and regional development through resolving the 
overpopulation and industrial overconcentration in Seoul (Park, 2004). Table 6.13 shows 
size, the number of tenant organisations, key players and major research areas and 
industries in the typical state-driven high-tech clusters in East Asia. Before 1993 when the 
project of Taejon EXPO launched, GRIs and government-funded universities had the 
dominant role in R&D and innovation in the Daedok Innopolis, but Taejon EXPO 
launched in 1993 sparked off the establishment of private firms and R&D centres to 
locate in the Daedok Innopolis (Oh, 2002). By the end of 2007, the Daedok Innopolis has 
977 organisations (73 government-sponsored research institutes, 6 universities and 898 
firms), which was eight times larger than Tsukuba since city.   
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Table 6.13 East Asian State-driven High Technology Clusters 
 
 Tsukuba (Japan) Daedoek (Korea) Hsinchu (Taiwan) 
    
Plan Announced  1963 1973 Early the 1970s 
    
Size 6669 acres 6860 acres 1811 acres 
    
Residing 
institutions 
172 (14% of the public 
sector, 86% of the 
private sector) (2008) 
977 (7% & Gov.-
sponsored research 
institutes, 0.6 % 
Universities, 91% 
firms) (2007) 
384 (1.9% of the public 
sector, 9.5 % 
foreigners, 88.6% of 
private sector) (2004) 
    
Employments 13,000 (2008) 40,338 (2007) 10,918 (2003) 
    
Venture Firms  146 (2008) 322 (2007) n.a. 
    
Key Players Education and 
Research Institutes 
(IAIs), and   
Large established firms 
(e.g., Mitsubishi, NEC, 
Hitachi) 
GRIs (government-
sponsored research 
institutes), universities 
and Chaebls (e.g., 
Samsung, LG, 
Sunkyung) 
Research institutes, 
universities and SMEs 
    
Major Research 
Areas 
Basic and experimental 
research 
Basic and applied 
research 
Production-oriented 
technology 
    
Major Industries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environment and 
Energy (23 %), Life 
Science and 
Biotechnology (18%), 
IT and Electronics 
(17%), 
Nanotechnology, 
material and 
manufacturing (16%), 
Metrology and 
Measurement Science 
(16%) and Geological 
Survey and Applied 
Geosciences (10%) 
(2008) 
ICT (40%), Biotech 
(14%), Material Science 
(9%), Chemical 
Engineering (8%), 
energy resource (8%) 
(2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ICT (87%) Biotech 
(7%), Precision 
machinery (5%) (2004)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by data from Tsukuba Science City, Daedok Technopolis and Hischu Science Park 
websites. 
 
Universities residing in Daedok Innopolis played the crucial role in transferring 
knowledge to firms through supplying highly skilled manpower, as well as establishing 
several industrial liaisons and small business assistance programmes that support 
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entrepreneurships, spin-offs and R&D collaboration with venture firms (Park, 2004). As a 
result, the number of venture firms derived from the residing research laboratories and 
universities organisations sharply increased from only 7 firms in 1991 to 322 firms in 
2007 with 20 incubating institutions in Daedok Innopolis (Daedeok Technopolis 
Statistics). In particular, Technology Transfer of Business Incubator established in KIST 
facilitates the staff and graduates to start new firms in high-tech field (Kim and Ko, 1998). 
However, most spin-offs were created by public research institutes, especially the KIST 
and Chungnam National University (Daedeok Technopolis statistics). The lower 
proportion of new start-ups spun off from the private sector should be the facing problem 
of Daedok Innopolis as well as NIS in Korea. 
Regarding government agencies as intermediaries, Small and Medium Business 
Administration (SMBA) supports SMEs' R&D activities and innovation. The SMBA 
encourage to engage in partnership with academia and research institutes, while assuring 
that governmental institutions purchase their technological products for a certain period of 
time under the programmes of the ‘Industry-University-Research Consortium Project for 
Technological Development’ and the ‘New Technology Purchasing Assurance Program’ 
(Kim, 2006). Also, there are a number of intermediaries facilitating joint R&D across 
industries and countries; the Korean Industrial Technology Association (KOITA), the 
Research Institute of Industrial Science and Technology (RIST), the Korea Technology 
Transfer Institute (KTTC), the Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI), the 
Korea Foundation (KF) and the Korean Research Foundation (KRF), among others.  
(Guettler, 2007; ISI et al., 2008). 
 
6.5.2 Japan’s Innovation System 
Like Korea’s innovation system, the main actors in Japan’s innovation system are the 
government and large companies, while universities play a minor role in the process and 
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product of innovation. Figure 6.3 presents the structure of the innovation system in Japan. 
 
Figure 6.3 Japan’s Innovation System 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from various national policy reports and white papers (various 
years). 
 
Government 
Japans government has the mediating role, bringing different stakeholders in the 
innovation system to create, utilise and transfer knowledge. In the Japanese innovation 
system, five ministries are in charge of national polices design and implementation (see 
Figure 6.3): the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT), 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and the 
Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (MIC). 
By integrating the former Science and Technology Agency (STA) and the National 
Institute of Science and Technology Policy (NISTEP), MEXT plays larger role in 
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formulating S&T policy and R&D programmes among these ministries (Nakamura et al., 
2008).  The Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) within the cabinet office 
participates in NIS to effectively coordinate and implement policies related to science and 
technology (Nakamura et al., 2008). The Science Council of Japan (SCJ) is responsible 
for deliberating important matters, promoting liaisons for research concerning S&T and 
international exchanges concerning S&T (ISI et al., 2008). 
 
Research Performers: Independent Research Institutes, Multinational Enterprises 
and Universities 
Independent research institutes (IRIs), MNEs and universities are key contributors to 
Japan’s innovation system. First, there are several IRIs acted as R&D performers, 
especially in basic research. National Institute of Advanced Industrial science and 
Technology (AIST) and Institute of Physical and Chemical Research (RIKEN) are typical 
examples. The AIST is the largest research performer with 2,288 researchers including 82 
foreign researchers (AIST Statistics). In 2012, the AIST spends 79,734 million yen to 
develop basic research and further industries. Composition of research fields are 
environment and energy (24%), life science and biotechnology (17%), ICT (17%), 
nanotechnology, metrology and measurement science (16%), material and manufacturing 
(15%), and applied geosciences (11%)  (AIST Statistics). AIST has over 40 autonomous 
research laboratories located at six research bases, which are spread all over Japan
2
.  
Another larger performer in Japan’s innovation system is the RIKEN with over 
4000 domestic researchers and 500 foreign researchers. The RIKEN undertakes R&D 
activities in a wide range of fields, including physics, chemistry, medical science, biology, 
                                            
2
 For example, AIST Hokkaido (genome-based biofactory), AIST Tohoku (chemical processes with low 
environmental loads), AIST Chubu (advanced material processes), AIST Kansai (R&D in medical 
engineering and ubiquitous energy devices), AIST Chugoku (biomass energy), AIST Shikoku (health 
technology) AIST Kyushu (on-site sensing and diagnostic system), AIST Tokyo Waterfront (bio-IT fusion 
technology) and Akihabara Site (collaboration among industry, academia, and government for IT) (AIST 
webaiste).  
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and engineering technology (excluding only the humanities and social sciences). RIKEN 
plans to invest 90,036 million yen in the creation of cutting-edge technology until 2012 
(RIKEN website). RIKEN has been located in nine regions (Wako, Sendai, Sayo-gun, 
Kobe, Tsukuba-shi, Yokohama City, Nagoya and Tokyo), while establishing 
collaboration centres in five foreign countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Singapore, China and Korea (RIKEN website). Unlike Korea’s GRIs, neither RIKEN nor 
AIST is a government institution, although both receive funding from the Japanese 
government and financial support from industry (ISI et al., 2008). Despite such great 
efforts of the AIST and the RIKEN, in the gross, R&D expenditures of IRIs have 
continued to decrease as national technology output increase (e.g., patent production) 
since 2002 (see Table 6.14), which equates to less innovative and lower contribution to 
NIS compared with Korean GRIs.  
Second, the large industrial firms (keiretus) are also major players in the Japanese 
innovations system, indicating more than 70 percent share of GERD (See Table 6.14). 
Nearly half of the R&D expenses in the private sector are spent by the top 10 large 
companies: : Toyota Motors, Honda Motors, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone, Nissan 
Motors, Hitachi, Matsushita Electric Industrial, Sony, Toshiba, Nippon Life Insurance and 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group (Fortune, 2007). However, their R&D cooperation with 
domestic universities and public institutions is very low levels because most of them (e.g., 
Toyota, Sony, Canon) are global actors (MNEs) and have R&D centres all over the world. 
This implies that Japanese private companies tend to outsource more R&D to overseas 
universities than to home-based Japanese knowledge institutes.  
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Table 6.14 Japan R&D Expenditures by Sectors, Researchers, Research Types and S&T Publications and Patents 
 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
             
R&D Expenditure (Million￥)             
  Government 1,416,443  1,707,775  1,816,054  1,977,817  2,091,760  2,320,197  2,602,478  2,633,758  2,598,310  2,696,296  2,454,625  N.A. 
  University 2,296,992  2,576,281  2,752,551  3,013,120  3,222,879  3,208,418  3,233,392  3,282,338  3,263,109  3,273,966  3,407,410  N.A. 
  Firm 9,267,166  9,560,685  8,980,253  10,058,409  10,800,063  10,860,215  11,451,011  11,576,840  11,758,939  11,867,276  12,745,840  N.A. 
  Total 13,078,315  13,909,493  13,596,030  15,079,315  16,139,925  16,289,336  16,527,998  16,675,053  16,804,155  16,937,584  17,845,224  N.A. 
             
No. of Researchers (1,000) 505.0  518.9  N.A. 617.4  625.8  647.6  675.9  646.5  675.3  677.2  N.A. 704.9  
             
Research Types (Million￥)             
  Basic Research 1,577,700  1,783,077  1,858,568  2,016,004  2,139,520  2,205,448  2,203,655  2,298,896  2,316,931  2,239,012  2,355,047  N.A. 
  Applied Research 2,923,559  3,115,674  3,052,779  3,366,285  3,648,374  3,585,494  3,525,765  3,503,195  3,567,933  3,589,801  3,754,619  N.A. 
  Experimental Development 7,590,307  7,895,840  7,514,304  8,463,489  9,062,521  9,197,692  9,359,615  9,541,535  9,607,933  9,771,088  10,362,433  N.A. 
  Total 12,091,565  12,794,589  12,425,651  13,845,776  14,850,414  14,988,634  15,089,034  15,343,626  15,492,798  15,599,901  16,472,099  N.A. 
             
No. S&T Publications N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 305,604  327,465  336,634  344,200  354,832  N.A. N.A. N.A. 
No. Patent             
  Applications (1,000) 376.8  384.5  N.A. 401.3  437.4  486.2  496.6  496.6  486.9  486.9   427.1  
  Registrations (1,000) 59.4  92.1  N.A. 215.1  141.1  125.9  121.7  121.7  120.0  120.0   122.9  
 
Source: Compiled by the data from KOSIS, NTIS, OECD and WIPO statistics 
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Third, universities are emergent players in Japan’s innovation system. To promote 
the research capabilities of universities, the education system was reformed in 20043. The 
reform led to the semi-privatisation of a number of public universities and the expansion 
of government budgets for private universities. Among semi-private universities, the 
University of Tokyo, University of Kyoto and University of Osaka have made significant 
contributions to research advances in a variety of fields by promoting joint-use inter-
university research institutes (Christensen, 2011). However, most universities still 
concentrate on education, not research (Kondo, 2006). Universities’ R&D expenditure 
amounted to 3,407,410 million yen, accounting for 19 percent of the total in 2005 (see 
Table 6.14). 
 
Intermediaries (State-University-Industry Cooperation) 
Like the Korean Science Town Daedok Innopolis, the well-known Japanese Tsukuba 
Science City as an intermediary between the public and private sectors by bringing 
together people from universities, national laboratories and domestic firms, as well as 
attracting multi-national enterprises (MNEs) to promote active R&D cooperation.  
Tsukuba Science City was the first high technology industry complex in East Asia. 
It aimed at dispersing population concentrated around Tokyo and creating the largest and 
world-class research and education centres to maximise clustering effects (Yuta, 2010).  
This city concentrates on advanced basic and experimental research: environment and 
energy (23%), life science and biotechnology (18%), IT and electronics (17%), 
nanotechnology (16%), metrology and measurement science (16%) and geological survey 
and applied geosciences (10%) (Yuta, 2010; Tsukuba Science City website). As shown in 
Table 6.13, Tsukuba Science City has over 13,000 researchers (40% of the total for the 
                                            
3
 The MEXT was required to distribute research funding through open competition (rather than on a 
historical basis) and develop a rigorous assessment system for evaluating institutions' teaching and research 
(Christensen, 2011). 
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whole country) and 5,500 of who hold doctorate degrees and 3,500 foreign researchers in 
148 corporate R&D institutes, 20 government laboratories and IRIs, 5 educational 
institutes and 146 venture firms. Some corporate R&D institutes have the world top level 
experimental facilities with advanced research and technical skills, such as Electron-
Positron Supercollider TRISTAN’s and Photon Factory at KEN, High Magnetic Field and 
High Voltage Electron Microscopy Facility at NIMS (Yuta, 2010). Among universities, 
the national University of Tsukuba (NUT) plays the leading role in fostering specialised 
manpower, transferring scientific knowledge and increasing spin-offs and join R&D, 
indicating 5 new spin-offs (76 accumulated totals), 295 cooperation research with 
industry (746 million yen), 118 patent applications and 14 licenses in 2008 (Yuta, 2010). 
Along with Tsukuba Science City, several specific industrial clusters, such as Sapporo 
Valley specialised in ICT, promoted R&D cooperation in the product and process of 
innovation (MEXT, 2010). 
Regarding government agencies acting as intermediaries, Japan society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS), Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) and the 
Japanese External Trade Organisation (JETRO) were key contributors to NIS. They 
encouraged the private sector to undertake innovative actives and joint R&D through 
offering information (or advice) regarding for trading partners and investment contexts, as 
well as financial supports for entrepreneurial processes and R&D cooperation (ISI et al., 
2008).  
 
6.5.3 Summary and Discussion 
Large structural reforms of governmental, industrial and educational sectors have 
streamlined NIS in Korea and Japan. Distinctive features of Korea’s and Japan’s 
innovation systems are summarised as follows. First, the countries undertook an 
administrative restructuring to effectively design S&T policy and solve serious 
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coordination problems caused by overlapped functions and duplicated research among 
ministries and research institutions (MOST2007; MEXT, 2010). The Korean government 
plays a strong leadership role in the process of technology catch-up as a 
financier/performer of R&D than the Japanese government, which acts more as a 
mediator or facilitator than a leader in NIS. GRIs played and still play a pivotal role in 
Korea’s innovation system (Sohn and Kenny, 2007).  
Second, large industrial firms (rather than SMEs and venture firms) were and still 
are the dominant players in both Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems despite 
industrial reform and S&T policy redirection supporting venture capital and start-ups. The 
Korean conglomerates, namely chaebols, and the Japanese MNEs still account for more 
than two-thirds of total R&D expenditures (ISI et al., 2008). Their share of R&D 
expenditures accounted for 77.3 percent of firms, 12.8 percent of government research 
institutions and 10 percent of universities in 2006 in Korea (KOSIS Statistics). The largest 
share in Japan also came from business sectors, at 71.4 percent, and the percentage of the 
government and education sectors was 9.4 percent and 19.1 percent, respectively, in 2005 
(KOSIS Statistics).  
Third, universities are emergent players in the innovation systems of Korea and 
Japan. Due to universities’ lack of research capabilities, the Korean and Japanese 
government reformed the education sectors and redesigned S&T policies to train high-
calibre talent and internationalise the university research system (Park, 2004; Lehrer and 
Asakawa, 2004). Also, the government established various intermediaries, including S&T 
parks, incubators and S&M business administrations, to facilitate R&D cooperation 
between the academic community and industry, university spin-offs and international 
scientific collaboration and to produce better knowledge transfer and closer ties between 
public and private research (Park, 2004; ISI et al., 2008). However, many universities still 
have lower levels of research capabilities and make smaller contributions to both 
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countries’ innovation systems, compared with the frontier countries such as the United 
States and Europe, which is the rising issue in Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems 
(Haryana, 2001; Rhee, 2004). 
Finally, Japan’s Tsukuba Science City and Korea’s Daedok Innopolis could 
supplement a weak state-university-industry relationship by facilitating entrepreneurial 
processes, university spin-offs as well as joint R&D with venture firms. However, both 
clusters are less internationalised compared with the Taiwanese Hsinchu Science Park, 
which has a close connection with the Silicon Valley and foreign MNEs in manufacturing 
electronics and other ICT-related products. Since the sustained growth obviously depends 
on interactions between foreign organisations and local organisations in globalisation, 
close linkages with foreign research institutes, MNEs and other countries’ technopoles are 
essential for national technology capabilities in Korea and Japan.  
 
6.6 Specific Institutional Conditions for Technology Input and Output  
The previous sections emphasised that public research institutes and local firms are key 
actors in innovation systems, while universities and start-ups make smaller contributions 
to NIS (MEXI, 2008; MEST; 2010). To further investigate specific institutional 
conditions for technology input-output relationships and patterns of technological 
development in Korea and Japan, this section empirically examines which sectors within 
NIS strongly contribute to national technology creation in Korea and Japan, and how 
much time lags are required for creating and communalising knowledge by using the 
Granger causality test. Before the causality test, the unit root and cointegration 
estimations were undertaken as pre-tests to avoid spurious regression situations.  
 
6.6.1 Models, Sample, Measurements and Procedures 
A two-way causation test was performed with the sample of Korea and Japan. The 
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number of patents registered at the Korean Intellectual Property Office and the Japan 
Patent Office were used as the variable for national technology output (technology 
creation) in Korea and Japan, respectively. In general, national technology creation is 
measured using three elements: patents, S&T articles and innovation counts (Archibugi 
and Coco, 2004; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008; WEF, 2001). In this study, however, S&T 
articles were not appropriate for testing the causal relationship with R&D and technology 
trade, and longitudinal data on the innovation count were unavailable; therefore, 
commercialised knowledge, the patent, was used as the proxy for national technology 
creation. As enabling sources influencing national technology creation, five monetary 
values were used―public R&D, private R&D, FDI inflow, export of technology licensing 
and import of technology licensing―because they have a direct or indirect effect on the 
creation of technologies by providing various learning opportunities, cross-border 
knowledge flow, spillovers and externalities (Griliches, 1998; Rycroft, 2002). The time 
lags of t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4, t-5 and t-6 were also used since technology creation is 
innovationtime-consuming process.The time frame was 1986-2006 because of the issue of 
data availability – the “zero value” of the time period was omitted (see Table 6.15: Data 
Description and Table 6.16: Descriptive Statistics). 
Prior to the Granger causality test, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root 
test is performed to check whether the variables are individually stationary or 
nonstationary using the integrated order 0, 1 and 2, denoted as I(0),  I(1) and I(2). If the 
variables obtained from the ADF test equal I(1), in the next step the cointegration test is 
undertaken to see whether the two variables are cointegrated. Econometrically, the 
cointegration between the two variables implies that their linear combination becomes 
stationary, and the residuals obtained from the cointegrating regression become stationary 
although the individuals are nonstationary (Engle and Granger, 1987; Gujarati, 2003). If 
this is not the case, the causality test is questionable and meaningless, which violates the 
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Granger representation theorem.  Eview 5.0 was used for the tests in this research.  
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
The ADF test is employed to check a unit root, meaning the variable in the time series 
data is nonstationary. The ADF test includes the lagged values of the difference terms and 
considers the possibility of serial correlation in the error term (Gujarati, 2003). The ADF 
test is performed in the three different forms: (i) tY  is a random walk, (ii) tY  is a random 
walk with drift and (iii) tY  is a random walk with drift around a stochastic trend. Here tY  
indicates patent, public R&D and private R&D, FDI inflow, technology export and 
technology import. In each case, the time series is nonstationary if the computed tau value 
of ( 1trY- ) in absolute term is less than 10 percent of the Mackinnon critical tau value. If 
there is a unit root I(0), the variables are differenced once I(1) or twice I(2) until they 
becomes stationary. In this study, the time series was individually tested by using from 
1t- through 5t- in the above three random walk models. 
 
Cointegration Test 
The VAR-based Johansen’ method is employed to test for cointegration if each variable 
obtained from the ADF test is nonstationary. The cointegrating relationship suggests a 
stationary linear combination of two series given a group of nonstationary series, meaning 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between the variables (Johansen, 1991). In 
this study, Likelihood Ratio (LR) in the Johansen’ method was used to test the 
cointegration among the two variables: (i) patent and R&D expenditures (public and 
private sectors), (ii) patent and FDI inflow and (iii) patent and technology trade 
(technology export and technology import). For a robust estimation, the cointegration test 
was run with lag intervals of 1-1, 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4 under the two models, the intercept-
included model and the model with an intercept plus trend. If the value LR was larger 
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than 5 percent critical value, then there were cointegrating relationships between the two 
variables. Also, the mechanism of vector error correction was used as the diagnostic test 
to confirm the cointegration relationships, as well as to determine the number of 
cointegrating equations (CEs). To estimate the amount of cointegration, the null 
hypothesis is that there is one cointegrating equation at most; that is, two cointegration 
relationships exist.  
 
Causality Test 
As mentioned above, the cointegrating relationship between two variables is the 
precondition to the Granger causality test. If the variables (e.g., patent and R&D 
expenditure) are cointegrated, although each is individually nonstationary, then we can 
test whether R&D expenditure causes patent or patent causes R&D expenditure. 
The Granger Causality test can be written as follows: 
   ttttttt XXYYaY  11110  
   ttttttt YYXXaX  11110  
where Y is patent, X is R&D expenditure (public and private), FDI inflow and technology 
trade (export and import), t is time, and  is the lag length.  
Bivariate regression was used to test the two-way causation: X Granger causes Y 
and Y Granger causes X. The null hypothesis is that X does not Granger cause Y in the 
first regression and Y does not Granger cause X in the second regression. For the two-way 
causation test, the null hypothesis is built as below. The null hypothesis can be rejected if 
the p value of the observed F is lower than the 10 percent significance level. All variables 
are transformed into their logarithmic values. 
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Table 6.15 Description of Data 
 
 Description Year Source 
 
Patent  
 
Data are a number of patents registered at the KIPO and the JPO. It 
includes utility patents, design, plant, and reissue patents, defensive 
publications, and statutory invention registrations.  
 
1986-2006 
 
 
 
Korea : Korean Intellectual Property Office  
Japan : Japan Patent Office  
 
 
Public R&D  
 
Gross Domestic R&D expenditure in the public sector, converted to 
U.S dollars at official exchange rates. R&D covers basic research, 
applied research and experimental development.  
 
 
1986-2006 
 
 
 
Korea : Korean Statistical Infomation Service  
Japan: Korean Statistical Infomation Service  
 
Private 
R&D  
Gross Domestic R&D expenditure in the Private Sector, converted to 
U.S dollars at official exchange rates. 
1986-2006 
 
 
Korea : Korean Statistical Information Service   
Japan : Korean Statistical Information Service   
 
FDI Inflow 
 
Foreign direct investment is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, and other short-long and long-term capital. Data of FDI 
inflow are in current U.S dollars. 
 
1986-2006 
 
 
 
Korea : OECD, World Bank   
Japan: Bank of Japan 
 
Technology 
Export 
Technology export includes high R&D intensive products, such as 
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and 
electrical machinery. Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
1986-2006 
 
 
Korea : World Bank   
Japan: World Bank   
 
Technology 
Import 
Data are in current U.S. dollars. 1986-2006 
 
 
Korea : World Bank  
Japan: World Bank   
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Table 6.16 Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Korea (1986-2006)  Patents GERD  Public R&D Private R&D FDI Inflows Tech. Exports Tech. Imports 
 Mean 22271.43 109.26  26.84  83.37 31.83  2.71 19.95 
 Median  11700.00  100.00  29.28  74.89  23.25 1.12 19.47 
 Maximum  73500.00  286.30 68.71 217.59 93.33  16.25 45.20 
 Minimum  1900.00 19.30  3.67 15.63 4.59  0.11 4.11 
 Std. Deviation  20983.81 69.27  18.21  51.07 30.12 3.93 11.47 
 Skewness 0.94 0.89  0.50  0.99 1.11 2.30 0.34 
 Kurtosis  2.74 3.40  2.53  3.72 2.92 7.81 2.09 
 Jarque-Bera  3.18  2.94  1.07 3.91  4.37 3.84 1.13 
 Probability  0.20  0.22  0.58  0.14  0.11 0.00 0.56 
 Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
        
        
Japan (1986-2006) Patents GERD Public R&D Private R&D FDI Inflows Tech. Exports Tech. Imports 
Mean 579347.70 1615.71 505.25 1111.41 106.02 68.68 51.35 
Median 621400.00 1659.92 577.45 1122.46 43.67 58.27 49.40 
Maximum 704900.00 2055.89 625.47 1468.41 521.24 184.02 82.97 
Minimum 381000.00 935.06 250.74 684.32 -200.88 7.23 23.61 
Std. Devivation 102683.80 336.86 119.67 225.07 162.93 53.47 16.91 
Skewness -0.60 -0.79 -1.03 -0.51 0.83 0.88 0.26 
Kurtosis 1.98 2.51 2.75 2.33 3.43 2.71 1.91 
Jarque-Bera 2.30 2.41 3.77 1.30 2.72 2.92 1.33 
Probability 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.52 0.25 0.23 0.51 
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
 
Note: Patents are the numerical numbers. R&D, FDI, Technology exports, and Technology imports are the monetary values, US$ 100 million. 
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6.6.2 Estimation Results and Discussion 
To test the causal relationships between the production of patents and the enabling 
sources influencing national technology capabilities, the Granger causality test was 
performed in this study because it allows for the identification of important determinants 
of national technology creation in Korea and Japan. Before the causality test, as the first 
step, the ADF test was employed to check a unit root in the time series. All variables I(0) 
of the Korean and Japanese times series in the above three random walk models were 
nonstationary. After consideration of possible autocorrelation in the error term, they 
became stationary I(1) or I(2). Therefore, the cointegration test was performed to check 
whether their linear combination was I(0), although each variable is individually I(1).  
Table 6.17 shows cointegration test results for the pairs of nonstationary series in 
Korea and Japan. The LR values of the five pairs exceed a 5 percent significance level, in 
which case the null hypothesis is rejected, implying that a coinegration relationship exists 
between them. In detail, first, all the models are statistically significant in the equation of 
patent and public R&D, except for the Korean model using the lag interval 1-1. Second, 
there are cointegrating relationships between patent and private R&D, expect for the 
Korean model using the lag intervals 1-2 and 1-3. Third, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
the Korean model using the lag interval 1-4 while the Japanese model using 1-2, 1-3 and 
1-4 is statistically significant in the equation of patent and FDI inflow. Fourth, the Korean 
model using the lag intervals 1-2 and 1-4 is statistically significant in the equation of 
patent and technology export. In the case of Japan, there are coinegration relationships in 
the model using the lag intervals 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4. Regarding the test for patent and 
technology import, the null hypothesis is rejected in the Korean model using the lag 
intervals 1-1 and 1-4 and in the Japanese model using the lag intervals 1-2, 1-3 and 1-4. 
Therefore, it is confirmed that the combination of patent and others (GERD, public R&D, 
private R&D, FDI inflow, technology export and technology import) become stationary; 
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that is, they have a long-term equilibrium relationship, although each variable obtained 
from the ADF test is individually nonstationary.  This meets the condition of the Granger 
causality test. All variables are transformed to their logarithmic values. Table 6.18 
presents the results of the Granger causality test. This test was run in the four models to 
investigate the direct influence of R&D, FDI and technology trade (export and import) on 
national technology creation in Korea and Japan. For the test, the time lags of t-1, t-2, t-3, 
t-4, t-5 and t-6 were used in this study because technology output is time-consuming, and 
it carries an uncertain return.  
First, I found that GERD causes the creation of patents (Model 1), but there is no 
causal relationship between patent and FDI inflow (Model 4) in the case of Korea or 
Japan. The p value of the observed F is higher than the 10 percent significance level, and 
consequently the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in Model 4. This suggests that 
domestic R&D expenditures greatly contribute to national technology capabilities while 
MNEs of foreign investors lack influence in the development of technologies and 
innovation in the contexts of Korea and Japan. In detail, Korean Model 1 using t-1, t-2, t-
3, t-4 and t-5 rejected the null hypothesis, meaning GERD causes the creation of patents 
from one year to five years later, while the Japanese causal relationships exists from three 
years to four years later. This has the implication of a shorter life cycle of products, as 
well as more costly and time-consuming processes to develop technologies in Japan than 
in Korea. This may be attributable to a more high-tech intensive system in Japan. 
Compared with a strong GERD and patent relationship, the weak causal relationship 
between FDI inflow and patent creation supports Hobday’s (2003) argument. He 
classified emerging or developing economies into four models: the R&D-based growth 
model (e.g., Korea, Taiwan), the import-substitution industry restructuring (e.g., Latin 
America, India), the passive FDI strategies (e.g., Malaysia, Philippines) and the MNEs or 
FDI-dependent growth model (e.g., Singapore) (also see UNCTAD, 2003a). 
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Table 6.17 Cointegration Test (Deterministic Trend) 
(1) Korea 
 
LR Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
    
Lag interval Log Patent and Log GERD Log Patent and Log Public R&D Log Patent and Log Private R&D  
1-1 17.89 None* 22.51 None 15.20  None 17.93  None 32.91  None** 37.71  None** 
1.49 At most 1 5.86 At most 1 1.70  At most 1 4.05  At most 1 0.99  At most 1 5.43  At most 1 
1-2 31.74 None** 37.76 None 21.26  None** 23.42  None 12.80  None 18.70  None 
1.07 At most 1 4.36 At most 1** 2.13  At most 1 3.97  At most 1 0.21  At most 1 3.90  At most 1 
1-3 13.10 None 19.93 None 22.34  None** 26.83  None* 13.35  None 20.26  None 
0.25 At most 1 6.68 At most 1 1.20  At most 1 5.39  At most 1 0.11  At most 1 5.43  At most 1 
1-4 18.91 None* 30.94 None** 21.86  None** 26.42  None* 27.15  None** 48.73  None** 
4.01 At most 1* 7.63 At most 1 2.99  At most 1 7.46  At most 1 2.68  At most 1 7.51  At most 1 
 
Lag Interval Log Patent and Log FDI Inflow Log Patent and Log Technology Export Log Patent and Log Technology Import 
1-1 8.73  None 17.75  None 9.39  None 21.65  None 16.20  None* 21.81  None 
2.60  At most 1 6.12  At most 1 0.01  At most 1 9.35  At most 1 2.95  At most 1 8.37  At most 1 
1-2 5.58  None 13.19  None 22.28  None** 38.93  None** 11.28  None 17.48  None 
1.17  At most 1 2.85  At most 1 0.23  At most 1 9.15  At most 1 2.85  At most 1 7.30  At most 1 
1-3 11.07  None 16.03  None 10.02  None 16.08  None 8.77  None 19.68  None 
2.86  At most 1 4.59  At most 1 0.00  At most 1 5.31  At most 1 0.95  At most 1 7.77  At most 1 
1-4 29.34  None** 38.83  None** 9.14  None 41.92  None** 19.19  None* 30.54  None** 
4.22  At most 1 * 13.65  At most 1 * 0.00  At most 1 8.82  At most 1 0.93  At most 1 6.85  At most 1 
             
Hypothesized no. of CEs 
 
 5 % Critical value: 
Intercept 
1 % Critical value: 
Intercept 
5 % Critical value: 
Intercept & Trend 
1 % Critical value: 
Intercept & Trend 
  
non  15.41 20.04 25.32 30.45   
At most 1  3.76 6.65 12.25 16.26   
 
Note:* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level. None*
(
**
) 
suggest 1 cointegrating equation. At most 1*
(
**
)
 suggest 2 cointegrating equations. Lag 
intervals 1-1 indicate the test VAR regresses tYD on 1tY-D  . Otherwise, the lag intervals 1-2 indicate tYD on 1tY-D , 2tY-D etc. 
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(2) Japan 
 
LR Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept No. of 
CE(s) 
Intercept 
& Trend 
No. of 
CE(s) 
    
Lag interval Log Patent and Log GERD Log Patent and Log Public R&D Log Patent and Log Private R&D  
1-1 22.34  None** 27.11  None* 16.51  None* 30.59  None** 22.55  Non** 25.03  None 
6.60  At most 1* 8.49  At most 1 5.73  At most 1* 7.65  At most 1 6.93  At most 1** 9.39  At most 1 
1-2 19.75  None* 27.11  None* 13.37  None 49.69  None** 18.20  None* 23.81  None 
5.95  At most 1* 9.22  At most 1 3.77  At most 1* 7.39  At most 1 6.26  At most 1* 10.89  At most 1 
1-3 24.96  None** 29.72  None* 14.17  None 34.55  None** 21.32  None** 31.34  None** 
8.00  At most 1** 10.09  At most 1 2.80  At most 1 7.01  At most 1 4.23  At most 1* 13.40  At most 1* 
1-4 15.41  None** 42.84  None** 13.67  None 39.74  None** 22.72  None** 44.45  None** 
3.76  At most 1** 20.03  At most 1** 4.03  At most 1* 9.22  At most 1 3.55  At most 1 19.17  At most 1** 
 
Lag Interval Log Patent and Log FDI Inflow Log Patent and Log Technology Export Log Patent and Log Technology Import 
1-1 13.19  None 13.95  None 11.04  None 21.79  None 12.91  None 20.50  None 
3.73  At most 1 3.74  At most 1 1.46  At most 1 7.43  At most 1 4.75  At most 1* 7.60  At most 1 
1-2 15.65  None* 15.93  None 13.28  None** 23.43  None 12.66  None 18.52  None 
5.58  At most 1* 5.72  At most 1 0.66  At most 1 9.65  At most 1 5.87  At most 1* 6.75  At most 1 
1-3 35.59  None** 38.95  None** 14.68  None 37.67  None** 25.75  None** 26.88  None* 
6.93  At most 1** 10.19  At most 1 0.00  At most 1 14.47  At most 1* 6.22  At most 1* 7.33  At most 1 
1-4 29.81  None** 31.89  None** 14.82  None 36.93  None** 26.61  None** 32.26  None** 
    4.17  At most 1*     5.96  At most 1     0.01  At most 1    8.10  At most 1    11.70  At most 1** 12.30  At most 1* 
             
Hypothesized no. of CEs 
 
 5 % Critical value: 
Intercept 
1 % Critical value: 
Intercept 
5 % Critical value: 
Intercept & Trend 
1 % Critical value: 
Intercept & Trend 
  
non  15.41 20.04 25.32 30.45   
At most 1  3.76 20.04 12.25 16.26   
 
Note:* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level.  
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Second, GERD is divided into two domestic performers, the public sector and the 
private sector, to identify the major players in the progress of technologies in the context 
of Korea and Japan. In both countries, the causal relationship between patent and private 
R&D (Model 1-1) is more strongly significant than the interrelation between patent and 
public R&D (Model 1-2). In detail, the number of patents is affected by public R&D and 
private R&D after one year, and then their relationships are continued for three years in 
Korea. However, Japan’s R&D expenditure in the public sector causes patents for only 
one year (t-1), and then the causal relationship disappears after that. This may imply that 
the Japanese public sector is less effective and innovative than the Korean public sector in 
national technology creation. Furthermore, in Japan, patent activity is not immediately 
influenced by R&D expenditure in the private sector, unlike in Korea, but private R&D 
facilitates patenting from four years to six years later. The high-tech-based industrial 
structure in Japan is also confirmed because it is required for long-term R&D investment 
in the creation of cutting-edge technology. 
Third, I found that patents create technology export in Korea. The causal effect is 
held from the first to the third years after patenting. This suggests that patent activity 
contributes to an increase in technology export and international competitiveness in Korea. 
With this test result, Korea’s export-oriented policy is confirmed. The export of 
technologies could stimulate the competitive spirit of local firms to rapidly catch up to 
narrow the technology gap. However, the causality between patent and technology export 
exists in the reverse order in Japan. That is, the export of technology causes patents, but it 
is not affected by patenting. This may suggest that export is the channel for the stock and 
flow of knowledge to produce patents in Japan. The causality test is statistically 
significant in the model using t-1, meaning after one year the number of patents is 
increased by the increase in technology export.  
Finally, there is the stronger causal relationship between patent and technology 
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import in Korea. In the model using the time lag 1, the null hypothesis that technology 
import does not cause patent is rejected at a 1 percent significance level.  This implies that 
Korea depends more on foreign techniques as the means of technology development and 
innovation than Japan. The causation is strengthened after one year and disappears after 
three years. In the case of Japan, the causal relationship is weak and only significant in 
the model using the time lag 6, meaning that patent creation is influenced six years after 
foreign technologies are introduced. This may be attributable to the introduction of 
sophisticated technologies because it takes time to master, absorb, transfer and improve 
imported technologies in national technology creation. The weak causal relationship 
between patent and technology trade (both export and import) might suggest an 
innovation pattern of ‘learning by research’ (not ‘learning by doing’).  
This empirical investigation contributes to the existing literature. It suggests an 
alternative method for estimating institutional conditions for technology input-output 
relationships by using the Granger causality test. Previous studies have addressed 
technology input variables as determinants of technology output variables through 
correlation tests. This study is a new attempt to empirically examine country-specific 
institutional conditions and innovation patterns employing innovation variables for key 
actors within NIS and contextual factors, in contrast to existing research that has used 
historical and descriptive approaches. However, this empirical study has two limitations. 
Due to the lack of university R&D data availability, I have used data from the public and 
private sectors. Also, I have not considered the dynamics of NIS, such as R&D 
cooperation, which directs future study.  
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Table 6.18 Granger Causality Test 
 
(1) Korea 
 
  Null Hypothesis   Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag5 Lag6 
           
Model 1 (1) GERD does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob. 
7.912** 
(0.011) 
5.097** 
(0.021) 
8.007*** 
(0.004) 
6.999*** 
(1.010) 
5.616** 
(0.040) 
2.993 
(0.271) 
 (2) Patent does not cause GERD.  F  
Prob. 
0.436 
(0.517) 
0.867 
(0.441) 
0.380 
(0.768) 
1.808 
(0.220) 
1.289 
(0.393) 
2.300 
(0.336) 
Model 1-1 (1) Public R&D does not cause Patent.  F 
 Prob.  
8.088** 
(0.011) 
3.800** 
(0.048) 
3.850** 
(0.041) 
1.835 
(0.215) 
1.258 
(0.403) 
0.915 
(0.605) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Public R&D.   F  
Prob.  
0.502 
(0.488) 
0.946 
(0.411) 
0.592 
(0.632) 
1.810 
(0.220) 
0.494 
(0.770) 
2.819 
(0.284) 
Model 1-2 (1) Private R&D does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob.  
9.784*** 
(0.006) 
9.206*** 
(0.002) 
3.634** 
(0.048) 
1.871 
(0.208) 
1.367 
(0.369) 
5.482 
(0.162) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Private R&D.  F  
Prob.  
0.118 
(0.734) 
1.176 
(0.336) 
0.404 
(0.752) 
0.818 
(0.547) 
0.855 
(0.565) 
4.010 
(0.213) 
Model 2 (1) FDI inflow does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob.  
1.172 
(0.208) 
0.323 
(0.728) 
0.218 
(0.881) 
0.453 
(0.767) 
0.302 
(0.892) 
0.099 
(0.987) 
 (2) Patent does not cause FDI inflow.  F  
Prob.  
1.278 
(0.273) 
0.538 
(0.595) 
0.205 
(0.890) 
1.623 
(0.259) 
2.140 
(0.211) 
2.579 
(0.305) 
Model 3 (1) Technology export does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob.  
2.150 
(0.160) 
0.819 
(0.460) 
0.740 
(0.549) 
1.185 
(0.386) 
0.748 
(0.621) 
0.215 
(0.939) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Technology Exports.  F  
Prob.  
4.810** 
(0.042) 
2.454* 
(0.100) 
3.597** 
(0.049) 
1.629 
(0.257) 
0.939 
(0.526) 
9.230 
(0.121) 
Model 4 (1) Technology Imports does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob. 
8.915*** 
(0.008) 
3.613* 
(0.054) 
1.309 
(0.320) 
0.493 
(0.741) 
1.867 
(0.254) 
1.141 
(0.220) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Technology Imports.  F  
Prob. 
1.021 
(0.326) 
0.598 
(0.563) 
0.195 
(0.897) 
0.276 
(0.885) 
0.243 
(0.926) 
0.456 
(0.806) 
           
Obs.     20 19 18 17 16 15 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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(2) Japan 
 
  Null Hypothesis   Lag1 Lag2 Lag3 Lag4 Lag5 Lag6 
           
Model 1 (1) GERD does not cause Patent.   F  
Prob. 
1.861 
(0.190) 
1.232 
(0.321) 
1.734 
(0.217) 
5.757** 
(0.017) 
3.953* 
(0.078) 
3.399 
(0.052) 
 (2) Patent does not cause GERD.  F  
Prob. 
0.873 
(0.363) 
2.450 
(0.160) 
2.940 
(0.139) 
1.463 
(0.299) 
1.147 
(0.441) 
7.177 
(0.127) 
Model 1-1 (1) R&D expenditure in the Public Sector does 
not cause Patent. 
 F  
Prob.  
5.254** 
(0.034) 
1.974 
(0.175) 
0.671 
(0.586) 
0.331 
(0.849) 
1.284 
(0.395) 
1.394 
(0.474) 
 (2) Patent does not cause R&D Expenditure in 
the Public Sector. 
 F  
Prob.  
0.000 
(0.990) 
0.029 
(0.971) 
0.136 
(0.936) 
0.219 
(0.919) 
0.313 
(0.885) 
1.548 
(0.442) 
Model 1-2 (1) R&D Expenditure in the Private Sector 
does not cause Patent. 
 F  
Prob.  
0.426 
(0.522) 
2.202 
(0.147) 
2.442 
(0.119) 
3.974** 
(0.045) 
4.080* 
(0.074) 
4.881* 
(0.064) 
 (2) Patent does not cause R&D Expenditure in 
the Private Sector. 
 F  
Prob.  
1.341 
(0.262) 
3.524* 
(0.057) 
0.607 
(0.623) 
1.665 
(0.249) 
0.609 
(0.699) 
4.952 
(0.177) 
Model 2 (1) FDI inflow does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob.  
0.869 
(0.369) 
2.878 
(0.122) 
1.197 
(0.485) 
1.896 
(0.394) 
2.459 
(0.143) 
2.598 
(1.753) 
 (2) Patent does not cause FDI inflow  F  
Prob.  
6.861 
(0.122) 
0.451 
(0.654) 
6.110 
(0.143) 
4.991 
(0.287) 
2.774 
(0.194) 
3.441 
(0.228) 
Model 3 (1) Technology Exports does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob.  
2.245* 
(0.100) 
0.848 
(0.447) 
1.400 
(0.290) 
0.313 
(0.862) 
0.973 
(0.501) 
1.032 
(0.533) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Technology Exports.  F  
Prob.  
0.000 
(0.984) 
0.162 
(0.851) 
0.121 
(0.945) 
0.122 
(0.970) 
0.472 
(0.785) 
0.324 
(0.888) 
Model 4 (1) Technology Imports does not cause Patent.  F  
Prob. 
0.317 
(0.580) 
0.403 
(0.675) 
0.140 
(0.933) 
1.004 
(0.453) 
1.185 
(0.414) 
6.224* 
(0.081) 
 (2) Patent does not cause Technology Imports.  F  
Prob. 
2.310 
(0.185) 
1.131 
(0.348) 
0.989 
(0.430) 
1.703 
(0.232) 
2.109 
(0.195) 
1.824 
(0.332) 
           
Obs.     20 19 18 17 16 15 
 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate the rejection of null hypothesis at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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6.7 Conclusion  
This chapter analyses distinctive features of S&T policies, IPR regimes, financial systems 
and NIS for national technology capabilities in the contexts of Korea and Japan, given 
that the technological catch-up process and innovation performance depend on a country-
specific institutional setting and policy framework.  Government regulations and priorities, 
as well as legal institutions, are perhaps the only factors that explain countries’ variations 
in trade and production patterns and sectoral specialisations, as well as their different 
trajectories in innovation. The empirical investigations for causal relationships among key 
actors within Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems and contextual factors have proved 
the critical role of local firms (rather than MNEs) in both countries, more 
internationalised R&D system in Korea, as well as more innovative and effective of 
Korean public sectors than Japan’s public sector in the creation and investment of 
technologies.  
Korea’s government has more heavily intervened in the process and product of 
innovation as a financier and performer of R&D than Japan’s government, which has 
acted more as a mediator or facilitator than leader in NIS (ISI et al., 2008). As R&D 
performers, large industrial firms were and still are the dominant players in both Korea’s 
and Japan’s innovation systems despite significant institutional reform for venture capital 
and start-ups. Korean chaebols and Japanese MNEs still account for more than two-thirds 
of total R&D expenditure (MEXT, 2008; MEST, 2010). Also, many universities still have 
lower levels of research capability and make smaller contributions in both countries’ 
innovation systems, compared with frontier countries such as the United States and 
Europe. This is a major problem in Korea’s and Japan’s innovation systems.  
Despite the problem of universities’ R&D capabilities producing low degrees of 
joint R&D, spin-offs and knowledge transfer, both countries have achieved rapid 
technology catch-up with the United States and Western Europe in many high-tech fields, 
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such as ICTs. Rational S&T and financial systems make it possible to upgrade national 
technology capabilities.  First, the countries’ financial policies are well-coordinated with 
industrial, export and innovation policies. Export-oriented and R&D-based firms receive 
tax favour and other financial aid through various government programmes to develop 
world-class products and technology capabilities in both Korea and Japan. Second, strong 
government leadership and an effective mechanism for collective risk-sharing by industry, 
government and lenders in both countries contribute to national technology capabilities. 
Such a partnership is essential to encourage industrial firms to undertake long-term 
innovation investment (e.g., R&D), especially in an immature stage. Third, the 
government S&T policy and funding systems focus on the fast-growing and high-yielding 
industries in which income elasticity of demand has been high, technological progress has 
been rapid and labour productivity has risen quickly. Their strategies focus on dynamic 
comparative advantage rather than static cost considerations (Johnson, 1982; Yotopoulos, 
1991). Fourth, the countries’ financial systems have been reformed to meet their S&T 
goals. The focus on financing priority industries in Japan and Korea has been flexibly 
adjusted by phasing out declining industries in an orderly and timely fashion.  
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CHAPTER 7  
Technology Catch-up and Sectoral Innovation Systems: Case 
Studies on Biotechnology and Wireless Telecommunication 
Industry in Korea and Japan 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the specific policy and institutional frameworks for sectoral catch-
up performance and technology capabilities, with particular emphasis on biotechnology 
and wireless telecommunication industries. Prior to an analysis of these industries, 
Section 7.2 looks at which industrial sectors of Korea rapidly caught up with those of 
Japan by examining productivity and technology gaps between the two countries’ 
manufacturing industries. Given different levels of sectoral catch-up performance of 
Korean firms versus Japanese firms (as a comparative benchmark), I investigate key 
external factors around the firms, including industrial structure, market system, 
knowledge regime and sectoral innovation system, as determinants of catch-up 
occurrence, speed and performance in the context of Korea. Also, distinctive styles, paths 
and determinants of Korean sectoral catch-up performance are briefly compared to those 
of other catch-up countries, particularly Taiwan.  
Sections 7.3 and 7.4 analyse specific policies and sectoral innovation systems to 
identify the main cause of the delay in biotechnology catch-up and the success of wireless 
telecommunication catch-up in the contexts of Korea and Japan. Compared to the wireless 
telecommunication industry, both countries have experienced a pathetic return on large-
scale government funding and corporate research and development (R&D) in 
biotechnology, given the top policy priority on attaining rapid catch-up in that field. 
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Korean innovation capability even lags behind the Japanese in many biotechnology 
sectors, such as clinical medicine and medical technology and brain science (OECD, 
2006). Hence, Section 7.3 discusses weaknesses in the underlying biotechnology polices 
and innovation systems of Korea and Japan so as to determine the root cause of the 
countries’ delay in leapfrogging advanced countries’ biotechnology capabilities. Section 
7.4 analyses strengths of specific policies and innovation systems for wireless 
telecommunications to find the key contributing institutional and contextual factors that 
have affected the rapid technology catch-up in Korea and Japan. Despite larger 
investments and government funding in Japan’s information and communication 
technology (ICT)-related industries, the ICT capabilities of Korea far surpass those of 
Japan in the creation of new technologies, especially wireless telecommunication 
technology. Korea’s mobile telecommunication has recently overtaken Japan in terms of 
production, sales, export and innovation. As key actors in the innovation system of ICT, 
government, education institutes and firms are examined to investigate their roles in and 
contribution to the diffusion of 3G mobile phones and the creation of new wireless 
technologies.  
 
7.2 Sectoral Technology Catch-up  
There is no doubt that Japan is a role model for the East Asian newly industrialised 
countries (NICs) in the process of technology catch-up. Among the NICs, institutional 
conditions for technology catch-up and innovation in Korea resemble those in Japan, as 
mentioned in Chapter 6. The established large industrial firms are in the vanguard of 
catch-up and scientific progress in Japan and Korea, whereas small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) and foreign multinationals play the leading role in industrialisation 
and innovation in Taiwan and Singapore, respectively (Hobday, 1995; Rodrik, 1999). 
Also, extensive government intervention, political-commercial links, large firm-centred 
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industrial structures and export-oriented policies, as well as in-house R&D and home-
grown talent-based innovation are unique and distinct from other high-income countries 
(Stern et al., 1995; Kim and Nelson, 2000; Chang, 2003). Because of similar institutional 
frameworks and climates surrounding the technology catch-up process, dealing with 
Japan as a comparative benchmark might be appropriate for the detailed analysis of 
Korea’s catch-up. Considering Japanese firms as forerunners and Korean firms as 
latecomers, I investigate how far behind Korean firms lag Japanese firms within the same 
industry and in which industrial sectors Korea rapidly caught up with Japan, in addition to 
what determined the catch-up occurrence, speed and performance of Korea.  
 
7.2.1 Levels and Determinants of Catch-up Performance 
Countries are categorised as technology catch-up economies on the criteria of higher 
growth and better innovation performance in new products/services compared with 
advanced countries (Park and Lee, 2006). Table 7.1 shows that the East Asian NICs 
(Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) had two-digit average annual growth rates in 
US patents from 1975 through 1995. Among them, Korea increased its share of total US 
patents rapidly and surpassed the level of technology capability in advanced countries, 
including Germany, France and the UK. Over the past three years, Korea has become the 
largest patent producer and R&D performer in the world. Among advanced countries, 
Japan had the highest growth rate in patent production, except for the United States.  
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Table 7.1 Ranking of Technology Catch-up Status and Level of Technology Capabilities in Korea 
 
Average growth rate of the USA 
patents registered by countries 
(1975-1995)* 
 
 No. patent applications 
(2008) 
No. patent granted by countries 
(2008) 
Resident filings per R&D 
expenditure (2008) 
Expenditures on R&D 
(billions of US$, PPP, 2011) 
Rank Country 
 
  Rank  Country   Rank  Country   Rank  Country   Rank  Country   
1 Korea 31.75  1  Japan  502,054  1  Japan  239,338  1  Korea  5.08  1  USA  405.3  
2 Taiwan 23.09  2  USA  400,769  2  USA 146,871  2  Japan  3.37  2  China  153.7  
3 Singapore 20.22  3  China  203,481  3  Korea  79,652  3  New Zealand  1.82  3  Japan  144.1  
4 Hong Kong 10.80  4  Korea  172,342  4  Germany  53,752  4  Russia  1.56  4  Germany  69.5  
5 Israel 9.46  5  Germany  135,748  5  China  48,814  5  Ukraine  1.09  5  Korea  44.8  
6 Finland 8.59  6  France  47,597  6  France  25,535  6  Australia  1.02  6  France  42.2  
7 Ireland 8.49  7  UK  42,296  7  Russia  22,870  7  China  0.91  7  UK  38.4  
8 Japan 7.54  8  Russia  29,176  8  Italy  12,789  8  Germany  0.91  8  India  36.1  
9 Brazil 6.85  9  Switzerland  26,640  9  UK  12,162  9  Poland  0.77  9  Canada  24.3  
10 Chile 6.83  10  Netherlands  25,927  10  Switzerland  11,291  10  USA  0.72  10  Russia  23.1  
 
Note: the USA data was excluded. 
Source: compiled by data from Park and Lee (2006), WIPO statistics and UNCTAD statistics.
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To investigate the level of catch-up in Korean manufacturing industries, the 
productivity catch-up index was introduced. The productivity catch-up index has been 
widely used for comparisons to determine the degree of competitiveness and technology 
progress across firms, industries and countries (Schreyer, 2005; Motohasi, 2006; Lee and 
Jung, 2010). The catch-up index is measured by firm productivity distance from industry 
average productivity in the country or distance between the industry average levels of 
total factor productivity (TFP) or labour productivity within countries (also see Jung et al., 
2008). That is, {(each firms’ TFP in country A – industry average TFP in country A) + (1+ 
industry TFP in country A – industry TFP in country B)}*100. An index value higher than 
100 indicates higher TFP of country of A (e.g., Korea) compared to that of firms in 
country B (e.g., Japan), meaning that a firm in county A leapfrogs a firm in county B.  
Lee and Lim (2001) analysed the three catch-up models of Korean firms in six 
manufacturing sectors by estimating the productivity and technology gaps with their 
competitors in Taiwan and Japan. The first model is the path-following catch-up model, 
indicating that latecomer firms (e.g., Korean firms) follow the growth path undertaken by 
forerunners (e.g., Japanese firms). Electronics, personal computers and machine tools are 
included in this model. The second model of skipping catch-up suggests that latecomer 
firms follow the path to an extent but leapfrog some stages. D-RAM and automobiles 
belong to this model in the case of Korea. The third model of path-creating catch-up 
indicates that latecomer firms explore and create their own path of technological 
development and innovation. A typical example is Korean wireless 
telecommunication.More recently, Lee and Jung (2010) classified Korean firms into four 
catch-up models, as a competitive benchmark of Japanese firms, through the TFP index: 
overtaking, convergence, slow catch-up and increasing gap.  
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Table 7.2 Technology Catch-up Patterns in the Selected Manufacturing Industries, 
Korea 
 
ICPA code  Industry name 1990 1995 2000 2004 Patterns 
 
 
 
TFP gap  TFP gap  TFP gap  TFP gap  
 
6  Food & related products 110.3 116.7 111.2 110.9 Overtaking 
9  Lumber & wood 141.1 131.8 137.9 150.9 Overtaking 
10  Furniture & fixtures 99.6 119.2 125 129.1 Overtaking 
16  Stone clay glass 92.2 108.9 108.6 112.6 Overtaking 
14  Petroleum & coal products 163.7 195.3 114 102.7 Convergence 
18  Fabricated metal 100 128.5 110 96.3 Convergence 
19  Machinery non-elect 92.5 122 110.2 108.5 Convergence 
20  Electrical machinery 30.8 75 73.1 96.6 Convergence 
22  Transportation equipment 84 103.8 92.5 97 Convergence 
7  Textile mill products 57.1 81.3 87.8 82.4 Slow Catch-up 
8  Apparel 19.4 53.2 57.5 59.6 Slow Catch-up 
11  Paper & related products 75.6 92.2 74 86.6 Slow Catch-up 
12  Printing publishing  98.4 106.4 111.1 88.3 Slow Catch-up 
13  Chemicals 78.7 91 90 80.9 Slow Catch-up 
21  Motor Vehicles 54.5 75.1 78.8 88 Slow Catch-up 
23  Instruments 40.7 73.1 60.2 61 Slow Catch-up 
24  Rubber & misc plastics 61.6 80.5 81.7 76 Slow Catch-up 
15  Leather 104.3 128 121.1 104.2 Increasing gap 
17  Primary metal 70 89.2 78.8 61.3 Increasing gap 
total  
 
69.5 92.1 86.5 91.2 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from Jung and Lee (2010). 
 
 
Table 7.2 presents the degrees and patterns of technology catch-up in 19 
manufacturing industries in Korea versus Japan through the TFP index. From 1990 
through 2004, the first level of overtaking included the industries related to food, lumber 
and wood, furniture and fixtures, in addition to son-clay-glass products in Korea. These 
industries are involved in relatively low technology. One Korean manufacturing firm that 
surpassed Japanese firms in the sector of food and kindred products is the CJ Corporation. 
The second pattern of convergence embraces the industries related to petroleum, coal 
products, fabricated metal, electrical machinery, ship-building and transportation 
equipment in Korea. Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics and the Hyundai Heavy 
Industries Corporation are representative firms belonging to this pattern in terms of TFP. 
The third pattern of slow catch-up includes textile mill products, apparel, paper, chemicals, 
motor vehicles, instruments and the rubber and plastics industries in Korea. Of note, the 
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automobile-related industry of Korea rapidly caught up with that of Japan before the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997, but the gap between the two countries has widened in 
terms of sales, productivity and innovation performance (Jung and Lee, 2010). The last 
pattern of increasing gap indicates a negative catch-up performance of Korean firms 
versus Japanese firms. It includes the leather and primary metal industries. As shown in 
Table 7.2, the sectoral differences in catch-up patterns reveal a concentration on high-
value knowledge and R&D-intensive products over labour-intensive products in Korea.  
To further investigate key institutional factors affecting technology catch-up 
performance in the industries characterised by ‘overtaking’ and ‘convergence’, I employ a 
number of empirical studies to examine determinants of catch-up occurrence, speed and 
performance. Most of these studies highlight the role of knowledge regime, industrial 
structure, foreign trade policy and sectoral innovation system in technology catch-up. For 
example, Lee and Lim (2001) argued that the technological leapfrogging of the 
latecomers is conditioned on degrees of innovation frequency, uncertainty of the 
technological trajectory and access to foreign knowledge bases. In Catellacci’s (2007) 
catch-up model, appropriability conditions, levels of technological opportunities, 
education and skill levels, degree of openness to foreign competition and size of the 
market are emphasised as determinants of productivity and technology catch-up (also see 
Park and Lee, 2006; Lee and Jung, 2010).  
First, in the knowledge regime, explicit knowledge rather than tacit knowledge 
might be more important in the process of technology catch-up. Knowledge explicitness 
is related to the ease of the translation into information using formulas, diagrams, 
numbers and words, while knowledge tacitness cannot be easily codified and described, 
implying that the transfer of tacit knowledge is costly and uncertain (Grant, 1996; 
Gonzalez-Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin, 2007). In this regard, firms that depend on tacit 
knowledge are more likely to seek industrial secrecy than to file patents (Gonzalez-
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Alvarez and Nieto-Antolin, 2007; Jung and Lee, 2010). Thus, in the context of latecomers, 
a knowledge regime based on explicit knowledge (rather than tacit knowledge) might 
serve rapid technology catch-up, with the advantages of ease of codification and 
transferability among people, as well as low complexity for learning. Table 7.3 
demonstrates the contribution of the knowledge regime based on explicitness to the 
Korean manufacturing industries. The industries are classified by four catch-up patterns. 
Korean firms in the industrial sectors with the catch-up pattern of convergence have a 
higher degree of knowledge explicitness than those with slow catch-up and increasing 
gaps. The convergence pattern embraces the electronics and ICT sectors as shown in 
Table 7.2. Explicitness of knowledge is measured by the number of patents per unit R&D 
expenditure in each sector. 
 
Table 7.3 Degrees of knowledge explicitness by Four Catch-up Patterns, Korea 
 
Catch-up pattern 1990 1995 2000 2004 Total 
      
Overtaking 0.063 0.029 0.018 0.010 0.028 
Convergence 0.041 0.172 0.034 0.022 0.052 
Slow Catch-up 0.061 0.054 0.020 0.019 0.039 
Increasing Gap 0.058 0.097 0.029 0.020 0.045 
 
Note: Explicitness of knowledge and technology is calculated by (number of patents registered in each 
sector in each year) / (R&D expenditure in each sector in each year). 
Source: Compiled by the data from Jung et al. (2008), Jung and Lee (2010) and Park and Lee (2006). 
 
Second, the acquisition of imported technology embodied in capital goods, such 
as machinery, might play an important role in technology catch-up performance in the 
context of latecomers. A number of studies have demonstrated a positive correlation 
between embodied technology transfer and labour productivity of latecomer firms (Lee, 
1995; Lee and Lim, 2001; Mazumdar, 2001). This relationship is evident in the Korean 
case, as shown in Table 7.4. Industrial sectors with the catch-up pattern of convergence 
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are related to a higher degree of embodied technology transfer in Korea. The degree of 
embodied technology transfer is measured by the level of embodied technical change as a 
share of the sector’s total imported machinery and equipment by using industry-level 
machinery import data from input output (IO) tables (Jung and Lee, 2010). 
 
Table 7.4 Degrees of Embodied Technology Transfer by Four Catch-up Patterns, 
Korea 
 
Catch-up pattern 1990 1995 2000 2003 Total 
      
Overtaking 0.116 0.119 0.123 0.17 0.139 
Convergence 0.436 0.417 0.483 0.478 0.464 
Slow Catch-up 0.232 0.258 0.238 0.239 0.253 
Increaing Gap 0.401 0.315 0.228 0.266 0.316 
 
Note: Embodied Technology Transfer is calculated by (imported machinery input in each sector in each 
year) / (total machinery input of the sector in each year). 
Source: Compiled by the data from Jung et al. (2008), Jung and Lee (2010) and Park and Lee (2006). 
 
Table 7.5 Degrees of large firm dominance by Four Catch-up Patterns, Korea 
 
Catch-up pattern  1990 1995 2000 2004 Total 
      
Overtaking 0.177 0.213 0.139 0.166 0.178 
Convergence 0.347 0.419 0.382 0.448 0.406 
Slow Catch-up 0.235 0.251 0.264 0.249 0.245 
Increasing Gap 0.36 0.333 0.375 0.392 0.362 
 
Note: Large firm dominance is calculated by (largest firms’ sales in each sector in each year) / (total sales in 
each sector in each year). 
Source: Compiled by the data from Jung et al. (2008), Jung and Lee (2010) and Park and Lee (2006). 
 
With such different characteristics of organisations between the two catching-up 
countries, “ …the Korean firms find themselves more fitted in environments featuring low 
appropriability and high cumulativeness (persistence), whereas the Taiwanese firms are 
more fitted to those featuring high appropriability…” (Park and Lee, 2006, p.746:4).  
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Chaebols prefer the technology regime involving low appropriability and high 
cumulativeness. On the other hand, Taiwanese SMEs are more sensitive to 
cumulativeness than Korea’s chaebols, and they enjoy relatively high appropriabiltiy 
because of worries about their knowledge linkage to large firms and multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) (Park and Lee, 2006). This has implications for other catching-up 
economies. Table 7.5 presents the degree of top-firm dominance measured by the largest 
firm’s sales as a share of total sales in each sector. The sectors with convergence patterns 
are led by the largest firms.  
 
7.2.2 Findings and Discussion 
I have introduced previous empirical works on latecomers’ technology and productivity 
catch-up to analyse the levels of catch-up performance and the catch-up patterns of 
Korean firms compared to those of Japanese firms. As important determinants of catch-up, 
knowledge explicitness, monopolistic market structure and acquisition of advanced 
technology embodied in capital goods (e.g., machinery, equipment) are identified in the 
context of Korea. The four determinants are drawn from existing studies on the sectoral 
innovation system (Malerba, 2002; 2004) and technology regime (Nelson and Winter, 
1977; 1982), as well as a number of case studies on latecomers’ technology catch-up and 
innovation (Park and Lee, 2006; Lee and Jung, 2010). Therefore, this study extends the 
literature on technology regime, market structure and trade policy to the catching-up 
context to examine in which sectors catch-up tends to occur or not, and what affects the 
speed of catch-up and innovation. 
The main findings of our analysis are as follows. Technology and productivity of 
Korean firms have rapidly caught up with Japanese firms in industrial sectors 
characterised by more explicit knowledge, a higher degree of embodied technology 
transfer, a shorter product cycle, easier access to external knowledge and higher 
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appropriability, given the limited sources for R&D. On the other hand, advanced countries, 
including Japan, hold higher technology capabilities in industrial sectors related to 
relatively more tacit knowledge, longer cycle time and lower appropriability. This 
suggests that explicitness of knowledge and embodied technology transfer enable 
latecomer firms and countries to close the productivity and technology gaps, since such 
knowledge and technology are related to the ease of codification, transfer and 
commercialisation of R&D outcomes. Furthermore, the industries with a more 
monopolistic market structure and a higher degree of external discipline from pursuit of 
world market competition led better innovation performance in the context of Korea.  
This study has provided a comprehensive evaluation of technology catch-up 
models that enables us to compare significant determinants and levels of technology 
capabilities with other caching-up countries and advanced countries. Based on this study 
for the identification of important determinants of sectoral catch-up performance, the next 
section analyses sectoral specific institutional conditions and policy mechanisms for the 
progress in detail by employing the two industries, biotechnology (a slow catching-up 
model) and wireless telecommunication industries (a rapid catching-up model) in Korea 
and Japan. Considering the interplay between national innovation system (NIS) and 
sectoral innovation system (SIS), key factors delaying and accelerating rapid technology 
catch-up in the industries are determined to find policy measures for improvement. 
 
7.3 Policies and Innovation Systems of Biotechnology in Korea and 
Japan 
A country-specific institutional setting and top priority policy cause idiosyncratic styles 
and patterns in national and sectoral development. For example, Korea’s innovation 
system characterised by a good partnership between government-sponsored research 
institutes (GRIs) and firms with the government priority policy for intensively fostering 
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ICTs enabled Korea to become the most powerful ICT country in the world (Lee and Yoo, 
2007). Meanwhile, the rapid growth of biotechnology in France is attributable to a strong 
research capacity of universities and their close links to public/corporate research 
institutions in NIS, as well as a priority policy for biotechnology sectors (Lee and Yoo, 
2007).  
The progress of newly emerging and knowledge-intensive industries, such as 
biotechnology and ICT, is significantly influenced by institutional and policy factors 
because of their unique characteristics. Biotechnology can be distinguished by heavy 
dependence on basic scientific research compared with other industrial technologies (e.g., 
electronics, automobile) and its close ties with market-induced applied research. It is 
widely used to create commercial products in various industries, including the agricultural, 
chemical, pharmaceutical and environmental fields (Kenney, 1986; Shan and Hamilton, 
1991). Such basic scientific research-based technology is needed to build up the capacity 
of universities and their close ties with research institutes and industry (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1993; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004; Casper and Kettler, 2001). Compared with 
other newly emerging high-tech fields, a domestic or international partnership based on a 
cooperative relationship, rather than a competing relationship (e.g., the case of ICTs), is 
an important channel for catching up and developing biotechnology. In this sense, the 
uniqueness of biotechnology brings about the reform of NIS and the revision of existing 
science and technology (S&T) policy to establish a cooperative innovation environment 
so as to promote active R&D cooperation among key players within NIS and strengthen 
the international partnership in the development of the commercial applicability of basic 
scientific research.  
Japan is one of the world’s largest countries, with the United States, Germany and 
the UK, in terms of R&D investment in biotechnology innovation. In Japan, the long 
economic recession and slowdown of international competiveness since the late 1980s 
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brought about R&D reforms and institutional change to create new frontiers and build up 
internationally competitive high-tech industries. Life science has been treated as a priority 
in the national development plan through enactment of special laws boosting 
biotechnology R&D since that time (Watanabe, 2000; Noland, 2007). In the absence of a 
scientific base, the government has pursued strategic alliances with the world’s top 
foreign R&D organisations while establishing bio-clusters to promote start-ups, university 
spin-offs and R&D cooperation (Whitley, 2003; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). Regarding 
the biotechnology sector, traditional biotechnology products have a large share of the total 
domestic production of biotechnology firms in Japan. It embraces traditional fermentation, 
cultivation, mutagenesis and pollution treatment technology. In Japan, food and drink 
manufacturing industries ranked first in terms of number of firms, employees, R&D 
expenditure and performance, followed by pharmaceutical industries (OECD, 2006). 
On the other hand, Korea has emerged as the key player in the global 
biotechnology market. In the early 1980s when chemical and genetic engineering 
emerged as the national economic growth sector in developed economies, Korea started to 
recognise biotechnology as an important discipline to strengthen industrial 
competitiveness and level up national technology capabilities (L. Kim, 1997; Kim and 
Nelson, 1999). Entering the 1990s, the national S&T policy included biotechnology as a 
key strategic technology by setting up several incentives supporting biotechnology R&D 
activties. In this period, under the special law to promote biotechnology, biotechnology-
related research institutes and firms were established (Rhee, 2003). Although almost ten 
years later than Japan, Korea has attained world-class capabilities in the areas of 
fermentation technology, antibiotics, diagnostics and hepatitis B vaccines (Rhee, 2003). 
In the field of biotechnology, bio-foods and biopharmaceuticals have the largest share of 
the total in terms of domestic production and employees (OECD, 2006). 
Compared to other priorities (e.g., ICTs, nanotechnology, environmental 
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technology), however, both countries have experienced a pathetic return on large-scale 
government funding and corporate R&D, which led to a slowdown in catching up with 
the frontier countries, such as the United States, Germany, France and the UK. Korean 
innovation capability even lags behind the Japanese in many biotechnology sectors, such 
as clinical medicine and medical technology and brain science (OECD, 2006). What is the 
root cause of countries’ delay in leapfrogging advanced countries’ biotechnology 
capabilities despite a huge investment and a top-priority policy on achieving rapid catch-
up? To find the answer, I critically analyse weaknesses underlying the biotechnology 
policy and innovation system in Korea and Japan by employing Bartholomew’s model of 
innovation system of biotechnology after a brief discussion of the nature of biotechnology 
and review of previous innovation research on biotechnology innovation system. 
Bartholomew (1997) highlighted important institutional and policy factors influencing the 
stock and flow of scientific knowledge: tradition of scientific education, patterns of basic 
research funding, links to foreign research organisations, degree of commercial 
orientation of academia, labour mobility, venture capital system, national technology 
policy and technological accumulation in related industrial sectors (Bartholomew, 1997, 
p.246).  
 
7.3.1 Literature on Biotechnology Innovation 
Biotechnology refers to the application of microorganisms, such as a bacterium, virus or 
parasite, to the production of goods and services (Bartholomew, 1997). Broadly, 
biotechnology can be divided into four fields of engineering: genetic engineering, cellular 
engineering, embryonic cell engineering and enzyme engineering. By employing useful 
properties of living organisms, the general aim is to make human life more abundant and 
comfortable (e.g., for longevity, dietary life improvement, prevention or cure of disease, 
including incurable and hereditary diseases) (Shan et al., 1994). Biotechnology is widely 
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applied in various fields of industry, including agricultural, chemical, pharmaceutical and 
environmental protection, for industrial and commercial value creation (Kenney, 1986; 
Shan and Hamilton, 1991). However, biotechnology involves a high level of 
technological uncertainty and continuous controversy over bio-ethics in the 
commercialisation process (George et al., 2001; Bartholomew, 1997). 
Compared with other industrial technologies (e.g., automobiles, textiles, 
shipbuilding), biotechnology relies more heavily on basic scientific research, hence 
academic scientists and researchers play a pivotal role in the development of this area 
(McMillan et al., 2000). A close link between basic research and market-induced applied 
research is essential, which blurs the traditional classifications of basic research and 
applied research (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993). With the nature of biotechnology, the 
catch-up process and performance are directly influenced by the country-specific 
institutional setting and policy measures that cover the scientific education system, 
venture capital system and research funding system, as well as government regulation and 
policy in resource mobility (e.g., labour, capital, technique) and international partnership 
with R&D institutions (see Kenney, 1986; Shan and Hamilton 1991; Mowery and 
Rosenberg 1993; Bartholomew, 1997).  
The importance of institutional and policy factors influencing biotechnology 
innovation are as follows. First, the national education system has a pivotal role in 
accumulating, disseminating and creating scientific knowledge through cultivation of 
scientists and engineers and promotion of research collaboration with R&D organisations 
(Kenney, 1986). Second, the national funding of basic research that sponsors academic 
scientists and research laboratories provides the opportunity to learn and generate new 
scientific knowledge. This supports machinery, equipment and materials relating to 
research and development in the process and product of biotechnology innovation 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993; Shan and Hamilton, 1991). Third, the availability of 
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venture capital that funds start-up firms is crucial for scientific advmentance and the 
subsequent technological progress. Venture capital encourages scientists and academic 
researchers to establish their own firms related to biotechnology; hence, it promotes 
scientific knowledge diffusion and spillover from research institutions to industry (Pisano, 
1996; Bartholomew, 1997). Fourth, the mobility of human resources and the cooperative 
relationship between research institutions and industry are essential to develop 
biotechnology. Mobility allows academic scientists to start up their own companies or 
work in private science-based ventures (Lethrer and Asakawa, 2004).  
As a primary source of the United States’ biotechnology advantage, close ties 
between industry and the academic community, and the mobility of scientists, have been 
highlighted in much of the literature (e.g., Blumenthal et al., 1986; Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1993; Lethrer and Asakawa, 2004). For example, Blumenthal et al. (1986) 
emphasised the importance of cooperative relationships between academia and 
biotechnology firms. By using US patent data, they found that patent applications in 
biotechnology firms linked to universities number almost four times as many as 
independent firms that do not collaborate with research institutions. Likewise, Lethrer and 
Asakawa (2004) demonstrated that a negative effect of labour immobility on 
biotechnology innovation performance by illustrating the Japanese case that restricts the 
top scientists’ movement to protect important knowledge related to national security 
secrets. Fifth, strategic alliances and cooperative relationships with foreign R&D 
organisations are important channels for the progress of biotechnology, especially in 
catching-up countries characterised by a shortage of skilled workers in the absence of a 
science base. Cross-border R&D cooperation enables innovators to acquire, master and 
transfer resources in the improvement of existing knowledge and generation of new 
discoveries (Shan and Hamilton, 1991). In this sense, a liberal regulatory environment is 
essential to increase the stock and flow of scientific knowledge (Porter, 1990; Shan and 
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Hamilton, 1991).  
 
7.3.2 Weaknesses of Polices and Innovation Systems of Biotechnology in Korea and 
Japan. 
This section critically analyses weaknesses underlying the biotechnology innovation 
systems in Korea and Japan to identify the main obstacles in the catch-up process by 
comparing them with the innovation system in the United States, which is the world’s 
most powerful nation in biotechnology.  
Several overlapping factors behind a slow rate of catching up in biotechnology in 
the countries are as follows. First, I found the weak point in the national education system. 
Knowledge-creating institutions, namely universities, are contributors to the innovation 
system of biotechnology with a role in not only cultivating highly skilled manpower, but 
also participating in new product and innovation processes. The triple helix theory 
highlights the important role of universities in newly emerging technology fields such as 
biotechnology (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2006; Marques et al., 
2006). This is analytically different from the traditional NIS models (e.g., statist and 
laissez-faire models) focusing on the central role of firms in technological innovation 
(Ludnvall, 1992) and the triangle model focusing on the decisive role of government in 
tradition (Inzelt, 2004). The success of biotechnology catch-up and innovation depends 
heavily on the R&D capabilities of universities. The main task of universities is to 
establish a close relationship between its faculty members and industry for active 
knowledge transfer and R&D cooperation, while establishing business assistance 
programmes supporting venture business and spin-offs for the dynamics of innovation 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Oh, 2002). However, higher 
education in both Korea and Japan is inactive for spin-offs and joint R&D compared with 
the United States; it also still concentrates on learning and mastering extant knowledge 
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rather than research based on creativity and originality despite a long-term investment in 
cultivating expertise in the fields of science and engineering (Bartholomew, 1989; 
Westney 1993; Oh, 2002). 
Second, basic research funding systems in Korea and Japan are comparatively 
inefficient. Although the governments have encouraged the study of scientific engineering 
by providing many jobs for graduates, public funding of basic research is relatively low 
and inefficiently allocated compared with the United States. The allocation of research 
funding in both countries was directed by a myopic approach based on seniority rather 
than merit, which obstructed the building of autonomous research capabilities (Harayama, 
2001; Odagiri and Goto 1993). Likewise, scientific research funding is overly weighted 
toward the publicly funded national universities and laboratories. This results in most 
university R&D and patenting activities being undertaken by the publicly funded national 
universities in Korea (e.g., the KAIST, Seoul University) and Japan (e.g., Tokyo 
University, Kyoto University), which also differs from the United States (Kneller, 2003; 
Rhee, 2003). In the United State, private top universities are key contributors to the 
innovation system of biotechnology (Kneller, 2003).  
Third, there is relatively inactive R&D collaboration among research institutes 
and biotechnology firms in Korea and Japan. This weak cooperative relationship may be 
due to the traditional tendency to belittle the commercialisation of academic research, 
which led to low availability of venture capital. The positive effects of R&D networking 
among R&D institutes and partnerships with biotechnology-related organisations, 
including venture firms and hospitals, on the growth of biotechnology are highlighted in 
many previous empirical studies on innovation (Zucker and Darby, 1995; Powell et al., 
1996; DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Nilson, 2001). The state-university-industry 
cooperative relationship in Korea and Japan is comparatively weaker than in the United 
State, linking to a low level of technology transfer (Branstetter and Ug, 2004; Motohasi, 
257 
 
2005). The tripartite relationship in Korea is even lower than in Japan due to relatively 
feeble scientific and information networks, which caused the delay in Korea’s 
biotechnology catch-up (Castells and Hall, 1994).  
Fourth, I found low availability of venture capital, low quality of 
entrepreneurship and low turnover rates of labour, including scientists, in Korea and 
Japan (Ergas, 1987; Bartholomew, 1997; Rhee, 2003). These are largely responsible for 
the government’s policy restricting top scientists and academia at national universities 
from engaging in their own businesses or working with private firms as partners so as to 
prevent knowledge leakage (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). Since most scientists and 
researchers in Korea and Japan are given the title of public officer with the role of 
producing public goods, their business activities are strictly controlled by the government, 
which negatively affects life science venture capital investment, spin-offs and 
entrepreneurial processes related to biotechnology in the countries (also see Whitley, 
2003; Kneller, 2003). Regarding venture capital investments in life science, Japan was at 
a lower level with US$73 million than even Korea (US$77.5 million) in 2007 (OECE, 
2009). 
The lower availability of venture capital in Japan may be due to its socio-cultural 
system, including its collectivist culture and the risk-averse nature of its society. In 
contrast to individualism characterised by the Anglo-American countries, the collectivist 
culture in Japan values trust and long-term relationships, and thereby attaches great 
importance to groups’ interests in relation to individual interests (Lee and O’Neill, 2003). 
In this sense, inter-firm cooperation plays an important role in the catch-up process of 
biotechnology in Japan, while venture capital and entrepreneurship are the engines of 
biotechnology progress in the United States (Bartholomew, 1997). The first high-tech 
entrepreneurial process, or new biotech firms (NBFs) through spin-offs, emerged in the 
Unites States in the 1970s (Jung et al., 2007). The established firms (rather than the 
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NBFs) acted as key financiers and performers of R&D in the Japanese innovation system 
of biotechnology, while inter-firm linkage was a key channel for increasing the stock and 
flow of scientific knowledge biotechnology catch-up, which is similar to Korea’s 
innovation system of biotechnology (Henderson et al., 1999; Shin, 2001; Jung et al., 
2007). 
 
7.3.3 Reforms of Policies and Innovation System of Biotechnology in Korea and 
Japan 
Against a slow rate of catch-up in biotechnology, there was large institutional reform in 
Korea and Japan to compensate for the weaknesses (as mentioned above in Section 7.3.2) 
that impeded the stock and flow of scientific knowledge. While evaluating the 
competitiveness of the Korean biotechnology industry, effective policy change and 
institutional reform toward the rapid catch-up are outlined below.  
Korea 
Korea started to promote biotechnology innovation mainly to resolve the food shortage of 
the early 1980s (Jung et al., 2007). With the promulgation of the Genetic Engineering 
Development Act (1983), the Biotechnology Promotion Law (1983) and the Basic 
Science Research Law (1989), the government established the Research Institute of 
Bioscience and Biotechnology in 1985 by spinning off from the Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology (KIST) and from the Bio-industry Association in 1991 (Rhee, 
2003). Entering the 1990s, biotechnology was selected as one of the national strategic 
industries (together with ICTs and nanotechnologies) under the Highly Advanced 
National (HAN) Project (MOST, 2007). The HAN Project (1992-2001) proposed the 
development of bioengineering, especially in the fields of biomaterials, pharmaceuticals 
and agrochemicals, as a national objective (MOST, 2007). This brought about large 
institutional reform, including the education system. Korean universities started to 
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establish biotechnology-related departments, industrial liaisons and research centres under 
special missions to foster talents and prompt spin-offs and R&D cooperation with other 
research institutes and industry (Rhee, 2003). However, the allocation of government 
funding for the biotechnology sectors was smaller than for other high technologies, such 
as ICTs. Under the HAN Project, about 19 percent of government budget was allocated to 
the biotechnology industry sectors while ICT-related industries received about 34 percent 
(Lee and Yoo, 2007). This might be the fundamental reason why biotechnology has not 
progressed as fast as ICTs in Korea.  
As a derivative of the HAN Project, the long-term plan of the Biotech 2000 
Programme was established in 1994, with an ambitious goal of Korea joining the world’s 
top seven competitive countries in biotechnology by 2010; “… forecasts the market for 
biotechnology goods to reach $12 billion by 2010, and it expects biotechnology exports to 
increase ten times over the next decade, particularly as South Korean innovations gain 
patent recognition in overseas markets” (Wong et al., 2004, p.42). The major areas were 
biosensors, BIOMEMS, DNA microarrays, bioinformatics, nanobiotechnology, antibody 
engineering, anti-aging drug development, neurobiology, drug delivery system, gene 
therapy, carbohydrate engineering and genomics and breeding technology for transgenic 
animals and plants (Rhee, 2003).  
To compensate the defect that obstructs biotechnology catch-up process, Korea’s 
government planned to invest US$15 billion for 14 years through a step-by-step process 
under the Biotech 2000 Programme: (i) establishing a sound scientific foundation to 
reduce the high level of dependence on foreign technologies (1994-1997); (ii) creating a 
cooperative R&D environment and strengthening the university-industry-state 
relationship (1998-2002); and (iii) reaching world-class capability in basic scientific 
research and its commercialisation (2003-2007) (Rhee, 2003). To achieve these goals, the 
government sharply increased its R&D investment, as shown in Figure 7.1. It grew by 
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more than 50 percent from 2001 (US$461 million) to 2005 (US$1,187 million). Despite 
this effort, the Biotech 2000 Programme did not progress as much as initially forecast due 
to inherent institutional and structural problems that produced inactive R&D cooperation 
and low availability of venture capital and home-grown talent. It led to the birth of the 
21st Frontier Research Programme with wide-ranging reforms. 
 
Figure 7.1 Korean Government R&D Investments in Biotechnology,  
Million PPP$, 2001-2005 
 
 
Source: compiled by the data from MEST statistics.  
 
In the 21st Frontier Research Programme, twenty R&D projects were formed 
with an investment of US$3.5 billion (MOST, 2007). The main research areas in the 
biotechnology sector were: (i) functional analysis of human, microbial and crop genomes; 
(ii) biodiversity of indigenous plants; (iii) stem cell biology and therapeutic applications; 
(iv) proteomics research; and (iv) high throughput screening of novel compounds for 
bioregulators using structural biology and pharmacogenomics (Rhee, 2003; Wong et al., 
2004). This programme more strongly focused on the development of human capital, 
internationalisation of R&D and strategic alliances with foreign organisations in the 
absence of a science base of facilities and capabilities (Lee, 2000). The government 
established the High Quality Human Resources Development Project by the reform of 
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national education and training systems to cultivate scientists and engineers in the fields 
of biotechnology (MOST, 2007). Likewise, the government promoted cross-border R&D 
cooperation to acquire, master and transfer scientific knowledge by establishing Korean 
biotech cooperation centres in foreign countries, for example, the Korea-UK Bioscience 
and Biotechnology Cooperation Centre in the Institute of Biotechnology of Cambridge 
University and the Korea-China Bioscience and Biotechnology Cooperation Centre on the 
campus of Shanghai Research Centre for Life Sciences (Rhee, 2003). Despite such 
government effort to promote cooperative innovation activities, however, Korean 
cooperative applications for patents still indicated low numbers, accounting for just 3 
percent (407) of the total patent applications to the KIPO (13,387) between 2000 and 
2004 in the field of biotechnology (KIPO Statistics).  
The Korean government also established  a number of legal institutions to 
bolster venture capital investments and new start-ups related to biotechnology, for 
example, the Act on Special Measures for the Promotion of Venture Businesses (1997) 
and the Brain Research Enhancement Act (1998) (Jung et al., 2007). The institutional 
reform led the success of an upsurge in venture capital investment and entrepreneurial 
processes in Korea. Table 7.6 shows that Korea is the 13
th 
highest country in total venture 
capital investment in life sciences with US$77.5 million, which overtook Japan’s venture 
capital investment (US$73 million) in 2007. Regarding venture businesses, the number of 
biotech start-ups markedly increased from only 70 in 2000 to 605 in 2003. In parallel, 
only one Korean biotechnology firm was publicly listed in 2000 and the number rose to 
23 by 2003. Over one-third of biotech venture firms are engaged in the biomedical field 
(Cho et al., 2007). 
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Table 7.6 Biotechnology Venture Capital Investments, OECD Countries, 2007 
 
 Life Sciences  All Venture Capital 
 Total 
(million US$) 
Average size per 
investment 
(thousand US$) 
 Total 
(million US$) 
Average size per 
investment  
(thousand US$) 
 
United States 
 
5,507.0 
 
10,255.1 
  
30,885.9 
 
8,110.8 
Canada 523.3 6,460.9  1,702.3 3,724.9 
France 483.1 2,268.2  1,802.1 2,130.1 
United Kingdom 447.6 2,062.6  4,388.6 3,971.6 
Germany 351.9 1,312.9  1,302.8 924.0 
Sweden  299.5 1,081.4  811.2 1,139.3 
Switzerland 167.4 4,184.6  622.2 6,549.4 
Australia 140.8   1,104.0  
Belgium 121.9 3,584.4  431.2 2,613.4 
Denmark 122.0 1,848.7  627.0 4,045.0 
Spain 101.9 2,830.2  1399.4 5.280.7 
Netherland 91.2 1,682.2  953.4 2,755.4 
Korea 77.5 1,937.0  1,322.5 2,150.4 
Japan 73.0 405.8  710.0 522.8 
      
OECD 8,631.3 2,059.3  50,117.2 3,535.9 
 
Note: The data of Japan is 2006. 
Source: compiled by the data from OECD biotechnology statistics (2009). 
 
Figure 7.2 Korean Biotechnology R&D by Sector of Performance,  
Million PPP$, 2006 
 
 
Source: compiled by the data from OECD biotechnology statistics (2009). 
 
Regarding R&D activities of key actors within Korea’s biotechnology innovation 
system, firms had the largest share of total biotechnology R&D expenditure, at 39.1 
percent, followed by universities (36.5 percent) and public research institutes (25.4 
percent) in 2006, as shown in Figure 7.2. Six hundred and forty firms were engaged in 
eight sectors of biotechnology in 2004: biopharmaceutical, biochemical, biofood, 
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bioenvironmental, bioelectronics, bioprocess and equipment, bioenergy and bioresource, 
and bioassay, bioinformatics and R&D services (OECD, 2009). In the eight sectors of 
biotechnology, the largest market is the biopharmaceutical sector with 189 firms and 
4,356 employees, followed by the biofood industry with 157 firms and 3,471employees. 
Meanwhile, the largest share of bio-production is in biofood (i.e., amino acids) with 43 
percent, followed by biopharmaceuticals (40 percent) and biomedical (6 percent), as 
shown in Table 7.7. Over half of R&D investments and production is undertaken by large 
established firms (e.g., LG Chemical Ltd., SK Chemical Ltd.), which contrasts to the 
United States (Rhee, 2003). The advanced biotechnology in the United States is 
attributable to new start-ups that were founded by venture capitalists, large incumbent 
chemical/medical firms and researchers in biotechnology (Jung et al., 2007).  
 
Table 7.7 Korean Biotechnology Firms by Biotechnology Sectors, 2004 
 
 Biotechnology firms and 
employment by application 
field 
 Production by field 
of activities 
 No. firms No. 
employees 
 Percentage 
Biopharmaceutical 189 4,356  40% 
Biofood 157 3,471  43% 
Bioenvironmental 87 1,583  5% 
biochemical 86 983  6% 
Bioprocess & equipment 55 657  2% 
Bioassay, Bioinformatics & R&D 
services 
33 531  3% 
Bioenergy and Bioresource 21 407  1% 
Bioelectronics 12 150   
 
Total  
 
640 
 
12,138 
  
 
Source: Compiled by the data from OECD biotechnology statistics (2006). 
 
 
Japan 
 
The slow catch-up in biotechnology with the United State brought about the revision of 
existing S&T policies and the reform of NIS and other institutions (e.g., education system, 
research funding system, IPRs) in Japan since the highly regulated institutional system 
retarded the stock and flow of scientific knowledge as well as the commercialisation of 
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basic research. On the whole, the existing scientific technology policy was reviewed to 
complement the vulnerabilities underlying the national innovation system. The function 
of government was extended to reduce or remove legal and culture barriers so as to 
promote dynamic innovation, which was proposed by the Second S&T Basic Plan 
launched in 2001. The Basic Plan II (2001-2005) strongly focused on creating a 
cooperative R&D environment, building properly operational university-industry-state 
relationships, increasing university spin-offs and NBFs and strengthening international 
technical tie-up (MEXT, 2003; Noland, 2007).  
The laws supporting merit-based salary, rather than seniority, and the 
administrative autonomy of public research institutions were established to stimulate 
competitive and cooperative R&D, which allows national universities and public 
laboratories convert into self-governing Independent Administrative Institutions (IAIs) 
(Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). By allowing academic freedom, universities could work as 
consultants in private companies, private companies could establish research facilities on 
university campuses and both could jointly conduct research (Yamaguchi, 2008; 
Motohasi, 2005). Also, they acted as a training partner through internships to foster high-
quality human resources (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004), which is beneficial to the industry 
as well as society as a whole.  
Japan’s innovation system based on industry-university-state tripartite 
cooperation was consolidated by revising the ‘Law for Promoting Research Cooperation’ 
(1998) and enacting the ‘Law for Promoting University-Industry Technology Transfer’ 
(1998), the ‘Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization’ (1999) and the ‘Law 
to Strengthen Industrial Technical Ability’ (2000) (Harayama, 2001; Lynskey, 2006). 
These laws contributed to the birth of technology licensing organisations (TLOs) at 
universities. TLOs stimulate technology transfer to commercialise research results by 
allowing academia and public research to obtain the ownership of patents and faculty 
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members to work in private firms (Lynskey, 2006); “By October 2003, 36 authorised 
TLOs had been established in Japan, a sharp increase from four in 1998, and they took 
various forms, including joint stock companies and limited liability companies. These 
TLOs had filed 3378 domestic patent applications and 602 foreign patent applications by 
March 2003, resulting in 705 technology transfer contracts and royalty income of ¥850 
million. Moreover, as of January 2002, there were 70 university professors or 
researchers working as company executives, 31 working as TLO executives and 13 as 
company auditors” (Lynskey, 2006, p.1395). 
Despite the government effort to create socially valuable technologies in 
biotechnology industry, the Japanese competitive power in biotechnology still far lagged 
behind the American. As a catch-up strategy, the ‘Basic Policy towards Creation of 
Biotechnology Industry’ was established in 1999 to intensively industrialise 
biotechnology. Quantitatively, the Basic Policy proposed (i) an increase of government 
budget for biotechnology; (ii) an increase of public funding for biologists, 
bioinformaticians and other scientists related to life science; and (iii) an increase of 
venture capital and biotechnology start-ups through enlarging financial support of 
government agencies (Harayama, 2001; Kneller, 2003; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004; 
Lynskey, 2006). Qualitatively, the network of relationships among academia, scientists 
and entrepreneurs was underlined to coordinate basic scientific research and applied 
research to swiftly commercialise research results (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). The 
freedom of university scientists was guaranteed by the establishment of a number of legal 
institutions which allow academics at national universities to hold patent rights, work in 
the private sector and found their own venture companies to develop and commercialise 
their discoveries (also see Kneller, 2003).  
In the absence of a basic science foundation, the government promoted cross-
border R&D and strategic alliances with firms and research institutes related to 
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biotechnology in technological advanced countries. The government sent a number of 
domestic scientists to the advanced countries, rather than local doctoral programmes 
(Saxonhouse, 1986), as well as encouraged Japanese firms to invest in foreign universities 
to develop basic research and its commercial application in the area of bioengineering 
(Westney, 1993; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). The United States was targeted for strategic 
alliances and partnerships to acquire and transfer advanced scientific knowledge and 
techniques, especially adaptability and applicable capabilities that allow scientific 
knowledge to translate into commercial products (Shan and Hamilton, 1991; Saxonhouse, 
1986; Bartholomew, 1997). This is strikingly different from US biotechnology firms that 
enter into cooperative agreements with foreign firms to raise funds for projects that 
involve a large investment, are time-consuming and contain high risk.  
 
Table 7.8 Number of biotechnology alliances, the Triad, 1990 to 2006 
 
 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
USA 28 77 125 141 120 165 274 219 274 277 358 360 
Europe 26 61 95 101 81 91 171 177 178 197 217 280 
Japan 6 8 11 20 11 9 17 41 28 32 54 53 
Other 11 11 12 20 6 22 48 56 52 50 75 96 
Total 45 98 161 177 147 200 355 332 368 389 481 526 
 
Source: compiled by the data from OECD biotechnology statistics (2009). 
 
Partnership with US research institutes and firms led to an upsurge in the 
accumulation of scientific knowledge by stimulating the flow of scientific knowledge 
from the United States to Japan, and thereby improving biotechnology progress, 
especially in molecular biology research, in Japan (Bartholomew, 1997). Table 7.8 
presents the increase in numbers of strategic alliances by domestic and multinational 
firms for the stock and flow of biotechnology in Japan. Although the number of 
biotechnology alliances steadily increased from 6 in 1990 to 53 in 2006, this was an 
extremely low number compared with the United States and Europe.  
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Traditional biotechnology products (i.e., traditional fermentation, cultivation, 
mutagenesis and pollution treatment technology) have accounted for a great portion of 
total domestic production of biotechnology firms, while modern biotechnology products 
(i.e., recombinant DNA, cell fusion, tissue culture, biomimetic technology) has had the 
smallest share of the total (OECD). Table 7.9 shows that traditional biotechnology and 
modern biotechnology products constituted 82 percent (PPP$45,623 million) and 18 
percent (PPP$9,886), respectively. Food products accounted for 62 percent of total 
domestic production of biotechnology firms, followed by pharmaceuticals, diagnostic 
reagents and medical instruments (20 percent) and chemical products (6 percent) in 2003. 
In the Japanese bio-industry, the majority of biotechnology firms worked in the food or 
drink manufacturing sector in 2003, at 20 percent (242 firms). The chemical industry was 
second, at 11 percent (127 firms), followed by pharmaceutical manufacturing (20 percent). 
In 2003 1,162 firms were active in the biotechnology industry of Japan (OECD, 2006). 
 
Table 7.9 
Japanese Biotechnology Production of Firms, by Biotechnology Sector, 2003  
 
 Total Traditional 
% 
Modern 
% 
 Share of total 
Production % 
Foods 36,132.2 98 2  62 
Pharmaceuticals, Diagnostic Reagents & 
Medical Instruments 
11,296.2 49 51  20 
Chemical Products 3,165.2 51 49  6 
Environment-related Equipment & Facilities 1,497.9 90 10  3 
Tech. Support and Services  1,057.7 34 66  2 
Equipment and Facilities for Research & 
Production 
460.5 24 76  1 
Agriculture-related 449.5 87 13  1 
Bioelectronics 252.0 100    
Livestock & Fisheries related 232.7 70 30   
Research Samples & Reagents 206.5 37 63   
Data Processing 127.5 28 72   
Fiber & Fiber Processing 19.0 56 44   
Other Products 606.9 89 11  6 
Total 55,512.6 82 18   
 
Source: Compiled by the data from the Japan Bioindustry Association (JBA) and OECD. 
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7.3.4 Summary and Discussion 
I have discussed weaknesses underlying the biotechnology innovation system in Korea 
and Japan to search for the cause of the slow catch-up with biotechnology in advanced 
countries, despite top priority policy for biotechnology progress. The main findings are as 
follows. First, both countries’ innovation systems of biotechnology are characterised by 
in-house R&D and innovation, which are distinct from the network-based innovation 
system found in the United State and other newly industrialised Asian countries, such as 
Singapore. In such an in-house-based innovation system, inter-firm cooperation (rather 
than international cooperation) is the main channel for the stock and flow of scientific 
knowledge and techniques. In the absence of a science base of facilities and capabilities, 
like Korea and Japan, a cooperative relationship with foreign institutes and firms is 
essential for progress in biotechnology. Second, the highly regulated institutional system 
results in a lack of commercial orientation in academia, a lack of mobility among 
scientists, as well as low-quality entrepreneurship and university spin-offs that impede the 
catch-up process. Third, the low availability of venture capital and the weak tripartite 
relationship are hindrances to rapid catch-up in biotechnology in both Korea and Japan. 
Japan lags behind even Korea in terms of the number of NBFs and venture capital 
investments in life sciences, while the weak university-industry relationship is a more 
serious problem in Korea due to the lower level of R&D capability of universities that are 
still focusing on learning and mastering extant knowledge.  
In Japan, biotechnology R&D is performed mainly by established firms 
(biopharmaceuticals), which is similar to the Korean innovation system but different from 
the NBFs-based innovation system of the United States. Although several biotechnology 
start-ups have grown through financial support from several ministries, Japan still lags 
behind the United States, the UK and even Korea in terms of the number of biotech firms 
and venture capital investments in life sciences. This is attributable to Japan’s socio-
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cultural system, such as its collectivist culture that causes lower mobility of labour and 
less availability of venture capital compared with the Anglo-American system 
characterised by individualism. Although Japan has removed the regulatory system by 
carrying out radical reforms to foster an increase in biotechnology start-ups, the mobility 
of human resources and cooperation between academia and business, the problems are 
still incompletely resolved. Regarding university-industry cooperation, universities are 
unwilling to conduct R&D collaboration with biotech start-ups, and inversely biotech 
start-ups seek cooperative relationships with other firms over education institutes 
(Lynskey, 2006). Also, there are still limits and restrictions on star scientists’ businesses 
and interaction with the private sector in Japan despite the law permitting administrative 
autonomy of public research institutions being enforced, which allows national 
universities and government labs to become IAIs (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004).  
On the other hand, Korea has achieved rapid technological progress in various 
areas of biotechnology, including antibiotics, diagnostics and hepatitis B vaccines, at 
internationally competitive levels (Rhee, 2003; Cho et al., 2007). The Korean government 
established a number of biotechnology development programmes to promote technology 
transfer, joint R&D, spin-offs and entrepreneurial processes for the commercialisation of 
basic scientific results. The participants are privileged from a monetary perspective with a 
number of incentives, such as research funding, tax protection for intellectual resource 
trade, low interest loans for the construction of the R&D facilities and subsidies for 
human capital, among others (Chun, 2002; Lee, 2000). However, small numbers of 
biotech venture businesses have originated from private research institutes, and the 
chances of their survival are low due to the monopolistic strength of large firms, which is 
a problem facing Korea’s biotechnology innovation system (Kim and Ko, 1998). 
Compared with the Japanese innovation system of biotechnology, there are more serious 
problems awaiting solution in the Korean innovation system of biotechnology, which 
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hamper the generation of competitive Korean bio-products, and thereby delay the catch-
up with advanced countries. Those include: (i) the shortage of industrial manpower 
compared with researchers in the basic science, creating an imbalance of human 
resources; (ii) the immature financial market for long-term R&D investment and venture 
capital, (iii) the lack of university spin-offs; and (iv) the feeble scientific and information 
networks that cause inactive cooperation among state-university-industry and 
international partnership. The lower proportion of new start-ups spun off from 
universities and research institutions may be a result of the restriction and disallowance of 
individual researchers to use their research outcomes. Also, Korean universities are still 
focused on learning scientific knowledge, rather than fostering creative individuals, and 
thereby weaken the motivation to pursue biotechnology innovation. 
 
7.4 Innovation Systems of Information and Communication Technology 
and Wireless Telecommunication Industry in Korea and Japan 
Together with biotechnology, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
continues to grow as a future-oriented technology in nearly every country. The growth of 
ICT creates a new techno-economic paradigm that provides new opportunities for 
latecomers to rapidly catch up with or leapfrog forerunners (Perez and Soete, 1988; Lee et 
al., 2005). The evolution of ICT is referred to as the new economy revolution, which 
resulted in large institutional and policy reforms in all countries because the growth of 
ICT makes access to knowledge and information easier, with no bounds on time or place 
and multiple channels; in addition, the cycle of products and techniques became shorter 
(Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). ICT also allows an increase in the stock and flow of 
information and knowledge by stimulating cross-border cooperation and knowledge 
spillover through more and better information and communication (Lipsey et al., 1998; 
Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002; Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006). It provides electronic 
271 
 
communication, broadcasting, computing (e.g., data processing, software, multimedia) 
and communications network, which are important elements in improving the S&T 
infrastructure (Pilat and Lee, 2001; Corrocher et al., 2007).  
In the digital era, ICT is widely applied and used for the development of all 
technologies and industries since it is employed in every process for circulating 
information and transferring knowledge. ICT is utilised for socioeconomic and human 
development to improve income, education, health, security and other social sectors, 
while also being applied to various S&T fields to develop the latest technology and 
emerging industries (e.g., bioinformatics, environmental informatics, engineering 
informatics) (UNCATD, 2005). Recently, mobile telephony and the Internet have become 
core channels through which to promptly exchange information, acquire knowledge and 
facilitate cooperation by allowing efficient communication among stakeholders in the 
process of innovation. These channels also support business activities by reducing 
transaction costs and by increasing the speed of trade and the ease of market access 
(UNCTAD, 2007). These advantages induce changes in the institutional framework and 
policy for ICT adoption and diffusion (Colecchia, 2002). A liberal regulatory regime and 
a sense of rivalry are important sources for catch-up success in the areas of ICT, while 
strategic alliances and international partnerships (cooperative relationships) make a big 
contribution to the progress of biotechnology in many catch-up countries.  
Japan is one of the frontier countries, with Korea, in terms of mobile 
communications and wireless technologies. Japan has long focused on the development of 
ICT-related industries, inter alia, mobile communications and wireless technologies as a 
national objective. Because it is a top policy priority, the government has actively 
intervened in the telecommunications industry in all kinds of ways needed for catching up 
with technologies from the United States.  
The wireless network of FOMA (Freedom of Mobile Multimedia Access) was 
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first developed by the Japanese NTT DOCOMO and its 3G FOMA services was 
commercialized in 2001. A year later au (KDDI) and Softbank (the former J-Phone and 
Vodafone) launched 3G services commercially. Both NTT DOCOMO and Softbank 
provide 3G services using W-CDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access) 
technology, while au (KDDI) introduced CDMA 2000 1x technology for 3G networks 
(MIC, 2010). The different strategies of the three mobile phone operators - NTT 
DOCOMO, au (KDDI) and Softbank - make the Japanese telecommunications market 
highly competitive in the creation of new knowledge and technologies. By setting up a 
number of aid packages and funding programmes, the government also encourages R&D 
cooperation among various players engaged in ICT-related industries, including service 
operators and equipment and handset manufactures to meet changing market demands 
and harmonise IT systems according to the needs of subscribers (MIC, 2010). Such a 
government effort enabled Japan to strengthen its international competitiveness through 
differentiated products and services produced by a highly competitive domestic wireless 
telecommunications market.  
Meanwhile, Korea has overtaken Japan’s capabilities in wireless technologies 
and become a world leader in access to information via mobile and broadband networks, 
with the fastest speed of wireless/wired Internet in recent years, by successfully 
commercialising WiBro (Wireless Broadband) and 3G mobile (Fortune, 2011; Forge and 
Bohlin, 2008; Nam et al., 2008). By adopting the Qualcomm CDMA (Code Division 
Multiple Access) standard service., Korea became the first country to commercialise 3G 
mobile over a CDMA20001xEV-DO network with the highest speed of voice or data 
transmissions and various application services, including satellite services (Forge and 
Bohlin, 2008). With improvements in the quality of handsets, there has been an upsurge in 
mobile Internet users in Korea, with 46 million mobile wireless broadband subscribers 
and 95 percent penetration, compared to a wired line take-up of 34.4 lines per 100 
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inhabitants in 2010 (OECD database). With a close political-commercial link, the 
government supported chaebols in quickly undertaking businesses in the fields of new 
technologies, such as mobile communications and wireless technologies. The leading 
operators driving the world-class wireless technologies are KT (Korea telecom), SK 
(Sung Kyung) telecom and LG (Lucky-Goldstar) telecom, while Samsung Electronics and 
LG Electronics are major handset manufacturing firms for production of related 
equipment and handsets (Kushida, 2008).  
How have Korea and Japan managed to rapidly catch up with the ICT of 
advanced countries faster than in biotechnology, even though top policy priority has been 
placed on attaining both ICT and biotechnology development? Why do the ICT 
capabilities of Korea far surpass those of Japan in the creation of new technologies, 
especially wireless technologies, despite smaller investments and funding in Korea? To 
find these answers, this section discuses effective government policies and advantages of 
ICT innovation systems in Korea and Japan, with particular attention to mobile 
communications and wireless technologies. Since Korea’s competitiveness in mobile 
telecommunication industry has recently overtaken Japan’s in terms of production, sale, 
and export, I also critically analyse the contributions of key actors within the innovation 
system to the creation and diffusion of new wireless technologies in Korea after a review 
of literature on determinants of ICT innovation. 
 
7.4.1 Literature on Information and Communication Technology Innovation 
ICT is an emerging factor driving economic growth and social development in the recent 
knowledge-based society. The growth of ICT leads the emergence of a new economic 
business model that influences the speed of production, sales and foreign trade, as well as 
transforms innovation patterns from concentrated R&D to diversified R&D and network-
based innovation (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002; Hobday et al., 2004). As ICT evolves, 
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the access to knowledge and the cycle of change become easier and shorter, respectively, 
and hence stimulate the dynamics of knowledge flow, R&D cooperation and knowledge 
spillover across countries, industries and firms (Lipsey et al., 1998; UNCATD, 2005; 
Maurer and Scotchmer, 2006).  
A great deal of empirical evidence demonstrates the positive impact that ICT has 
on national income, firm performance, labour productivity or TFP and job creation 
(Bresnahan et al., 2001; Pilat and Lee, 2001; Colecchia, 2002; Parham, 2002; Basu and 
Fernald, 2007; Guerrier and Padoan, 2007). Meanwhile, several studies on innovation 
have addressed ICT-related goods/services (e.g., computer, phone, Internet) as crucial 
components of S&T infrastructure that influences national technology capabilities and 
innovation (Archibugi and Coco, 2005; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). ICT-related 
goods/services allow access to the latest information and business transactions using 
electronic methods (e.g., e-finance, m-banking) and communication among different 
players, including suppliers, buyers and customers, in a way that is easier, faster and more 
convenient (also see UNCTD, 2007). Therefore, ICT contributes to the increase of labour 
efficiency, firm productivity and innovation performance, as well as the creation of more 
jobs.    
ICT-related products/services encompass diversified mediums and tools for 
information and communication, such as radios, televisions, cameras, computers, 
telephones and the Internet. Recent mobile handsets cover all functions of the ICT by 
offering MP3 player, web browser, e-mail access, broadcasting service, digital camera, 
voice dialing and the synchronisation of information with computers (West and Mace, 
2010). The Internet-enabled mobile phone is an invaluable tool to share, acquire, master, 
diffuse and transfer the latest information and knowledge and to interact with various 
people by communicating over a network in a digital era (UNCTD, 2007). 
The Internet-enabled mobile phone, namely the smart phone, enables people to 
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communicate with one another from anywhere and to access various resources anytime; 
consequently, it enhances people’s lives and methods of work. With these advantages, 
there have been a number of attempts to identify important determinants of diffusion and 
penetration of mobile phones and wireless technologies (Minges, 1999; Banerjee and Ros, 
2004; Kim, 2005). As important factors influencing their penetration, the level of income 
(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2003), the degree of competitive broadband and mobile markets 
(Crandall et al., 2002; Rouvinen, 2006), socio-cultural attributes (Kamssu, 2005) and 
telecommunications industry structure, pricing schemes and network externalities 
(Minges, 1999; Iimi, 2005) are highlighted in much of the literature. Also, the adoption 
and development of advanced wireless technologies by providing high-speed Internet and 
various services, including video calling, global roaming and upgrade services, lead the 
increase in subscribers and the demand for mobile phone services (Kim, 2005).The next 
section critically analyses success factors of ICT progress in Korea and Japan.  
 
7.4.2 Rational Polices and Innovation Systems of Wireless Telecommunication 
Industry in Korea and Japan  
Telecommunications is an important component of national infrastructure, as well as an 
essential element for new growth to replace the main export items (e.g., steel and 
automobiles) in Korea and Japan due to a fall in value and competitiveness incurred 
through a rapid change of techniques. To analyse in what way the two countries achieved 
rapid catch-up in ICT and a world-class wireless telecommunication industry, the rational 
policies and successful institutional reforms are the focus of this section.  
 
Korea 
The Korean ICT catch-up strategy was properly managed after the privatisation of state-
owned telecommunications service carrier, namely Korea Telecom (KT). Starting from 
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the public announcement of the privatisation plan in 1987, KT became fully privatised by 
2002, which was protracted for 15 years (Choi, 1997; Yoon, 1999).  KT had the crucial 
role in building up national infrastructure for the information society as a major performer 
of ICT policies (Yoon, 1999). Until the mid-1990s, the Korean government directly 
determined the sale price of its shares in KT as well as controlled foreign investors and 
their investments in the domestic telecommunications industry for fear that local firms 
related to ICT would go bankrupt by competing with foreign firms with advanced 
technologies (Choi, 1997). The government had sold only 20 percent of its shares of KT 
by 1994 and still had its ownership and managerial power despite outside pressure, 
especially from the U.S. government and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Singh, 
2000, Jin 2006). 
Korea started to speed up KT privatisation after 1994 when the government 
formulated its policy towards ‘Segyehwa’ (globalisation in Korean) consistent with the 
global movement for privatisation, liberalisation and competition as an important political 
agenda. Under the Segyehwa policy, the government pushed privatisation of state-owned 
public firms including KT, as well as liberalisation of international trade and foreign 
ownership (McClelland et al., 1997; Jin, 2006). At the time, the telecommunications 
sector was liberalised by an increase in economic demand for Korean telecommunications 
market entry from national and transnational corporations because both foreign and 
domestic firms were interested in communication service as a lucrative business to 
increase their value. Also, regulations for foreign ownership in Korea’s 
telecommunications market were relaxed under outside pressure (Choi, 1997).  
The main motive for privatising the state-owned telecommunications enterprise is 
distinct from other countries. Many countries suffered from bad debt caused by the 
government’s monopoly, and consequently they formed the privatisation plan to improve 
managerial inefficiency and firm performance (Hills, 1998). However, KT had no 
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financial difficulties and enjoyed constant increases in revenues and net profits until it 
was fully privatised in 2002. The net profits of KT increased eight times from 1996 to 
2001 while annually raising revenue by more than 10 percent during the same period (KT, 
2001).The main driving forces for privatising KT and opening the Korean 
telecommunications market were the US government, the WTO the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Singh, 2000). 
The Segyehwa policy resulted in large reform of Korea’s telecommunications 
industry, changing from a monopoly-controlled industry with a national-based business to 
a competition-based industry with international-based business (Hills, 1998; Jin, 2006). 
To prevent a monopoly of KT in the telecommunications service market, the government 
transferred its ownership to the private sector; it facilitated chaebols (i.e., SK and LG) to 
expand their share of the telecommunications market to compete with a privatised KT by 
setting up a three-competition policy (Jin, 2006). KT had been the dominant 
telecommunications service operator, accounting for 97 percent of market share for local 
phones, 86 percent for long-distance phones and 64 percent for international phones 
before the privatisation was completed in 2002 (Jin, 2006). Also, the government set up a 
series of R&D programmes to build competitive telecommunications industry. The 
Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) was in charge of policy 
implementation and regulations for expansion of corporations in the telecommunications 
market in Korea.  
Table 7.10 presents Korea’s government initiatives and the specific targets for 
ICT growth over twenty years. Starting with ‘Cyber Korea 21 strategy’ (1999-2002), 
broadband networks and wireless technologies were largely funded by the government to 
help transform Korea into an ICT powerhouse with the highest Internet access rate in the 
world. In this regard, the government formulated the ‘Act on Closing the Digital Divide’ 
in 2001 so that broadband Internet service could become a universal service.  
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Table 7.10 Korea’s ICT Policies  
 
 Key ICT Strategy  Focus 
    
1987-1985 
 
Measures to Nurture IT Industry  Developing manufacturing techniques. 
1987-1996 National Basic Information System  Improving administration, defence, public 
security, finance and education. 
 
1995-2005 
 
Korea Information Infrastructure Initiative 
  
National information superhighway.  
 
1996-2000 
 
National framework Plan for 
Informatisation Promotion 
  
Ten priority areas annual action plans. 
 
1999-2002 
 
Cyber Korea 21 
  
A creative knowledge-based society. 
 
2002-2006 
 
E-Korea Vision 2006 
  
Maximising the ability of all citizens to use 
ICTs.  
 
2004-2007 
 
IT 839 Strategy 
  
Preparing for ubiquitous network society 
and improving competitiveness. 
 
Source: compiled by the data from Lee (2005) and Forge and Bohlin (2008).  
 
With the success of broadband penetration, the Korean government established 
'IT 839 Plan’ in 2004 with the ambitious goal of a ubiquitous network society. This was a 
comprehensive and systematic programme covering all ICT areas, including broadband 
services, infrastructure networks and digital devices (see Table 7.11). It was designed by 
the MIC for developing eight service sectors, three infrastructure sectors and nine 
technology sectors to attain the national goal of development of the domestic ICT 
industry with universal availability of broadband and the reinforcement of international 
competitiveness with next-generation wireless communications technology in the world 
telecommunications market (ETRI, 2008). Under the IT 839 Plan, wireless technologies 
were considered essential elements for a ubiquitous network society, while focusing on 
the progress of RFID (Radio-frequency identification) chips, embedded software and 4G 
mobile to increase global telecommunications market shares (Lee, 2005). The current ICT 
policy are intended to create advanced wireless technologies and fourth-generation ICTs 
at the global level, as well as to provide high-speed wired/wireless broadband Internet 
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services to all households by 2015 so that Korea stands as the worldwide ICT leader. 
 
Table 7.11 Key areas of IT 839, Korea  
 
8 Services 3 Infrastructures 9 Technologies 
   
WiBro Service; DMB Service; 
Home Networking; Telematics 
Service; RFID based; W-CDMA 
Service; Terrestrial Digital TV; 
VoIP. 
Broadband Convergence Network; 
Ubiquitous Sensor Network; Next 
Generation Internet Protocol 
(IPv6). 
Next Generation Mobile 
Communications; 
Digital TV; Home Networking; 
IT System on Chip; Next 
Generation PC; Embedded 
Software; Digital Contents; 
Telematics; Intelligent Service 
Robots. 
 
Source: compiled by the data from ETRI (2008). 
 
The widespread availability of broadband (the Internet) access has been the 
engine of Korean economic growth and technological catch-up in the present decade 
(OECD, 2004). By 2008, more than 94 percent of Korean households had broadband 
connections via computers and mobile phones, an increase of about 65 percent from 2000, 
while almost 100 percent of all Korean businesses used broadband to access the Internet 
through various modalities, including ADSL, VDSL, cable and fibre/LAN modes (OECD 
Database). The speed of Korean broadband - VDSL (Very high bit rate Digital Subscriber 
Line) – is the world’s fastest at 14 Mbps, seven times faster than the global average (1.9 
Mbps) (Fortune, 2011).  
With the fixed broadband, Korea developed WiBro, which is its own wireless 
broadband Internet technology, enabling mobile subscribers to download/upload data and 
browse the Internet at broadband data rates (Nam et al., 2008). As a result, Korea became 
the largest OECD country in terms of mobile wireless broadband penetration; 95 percent 
of subscribers used mobile Internet services in 2010 (OECD Database). The high 
percentage of Korean Internet access via mobile phone was attributable to the 
introduction of the advanced 3G technology network, namely CDMA1xEV-DO 
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(Evolution-Data Optimized), which offered voice and data transmissions at high speeds 
(up to 2.4M bit/sec) and supported a wide range of application services, including traffic 
information, m-banking, broadcasting, location services and stock prices in real time 
(Forge and Bohlin, 2008). CDMA1xEV-DO is the latest 3G wireless telecommunications 
technology to rapidly transmit large packet-sizes, with speed that is 16 times faster than 
the previous version of CDMA2000 (Qualcomm, 2009). Although Japan invented a 3G 
mobile network with NTT DOCOMO’s FOMA, 3G mobile service over the 
CDMA1xEV-DO network was first commercialised by Korean telecommunication 
operators (e.g., SKT), which enabled Korean to move ahead of its competitors, including 
Japan, in share of the global 3G mobile market (Forge and Bohlin, 2008). 
Korea also developed radio technologies to increase 3G network coverage. In 
Korea, 18,000 commercial WiFi hotspots had been installed by 2004, making up nearly 
one-third of the world’s total (49,577) (Kushida, 2008). The types of technologies used 
and produced in Korea include WiFi (IEEE 802.11x), WiMax (IEEE 802.16x), Mobile-Fi 
(IEEE 802.20), ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4), Bluetooth, (IEEE 802.15.1), Flash OFDM 
(IEEE 802.20) and UMTS3GPP W-CDMA, which are the frontier radio technologies that 
Korea holds (Kushida, 2008). These radio technologies have contributed to the 
improvement of 3G mobile broadband accesses and formed a foundation of the 
development of next-generation wireless technologies for 4G LTE.  
The operators driving the above wireless technologies are KT and two chaebols’ 
subsidiaries, SK Telecom and LG Telecom. Also, chaebols including Samsung, LG and 
Hyundai, are the leading manufacturing firms to produce the related chips and equipments 
(Kim et al., 2004). Wireless technologies have been regarded as invaluable export items, 
and hence Korea has attempted to elevate them to world-class status by forging alliances 
with foreign organisations. For example, Korean mobile operator SK telecom and 
American Internet service provider (ISP) EarthLink established the 3G/WiFi combo joint 
281 
 
venture in the United States to leverage their innovation in new wireless voice and data 
services (EarthLink, 2005). More Recently, SK telecom has made partnerships with 
Qualcomm and Nokia Siemens Networks to develop the core technology of ‘Enhanced 
Inter-Cell Interference Coordination’ for LTE-advanced (SKT, 2012).  
 
Japan 
Japan has a relatively long history focusing on the development of telecommunications 
industry as a national growth, starting with the establishment of Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT) and Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) in 1952 (MIC, 2001). However, 
Japanese ICT diffusion lagged behind Korea and the United States in Internet penetration 
and the number of broadband subscribers as a proportion of the population in 2000 (MIC, 
2006). This brought about the revision of existing ICT policies and the formulation of 
sequential development plans in Japan with the aim of fostering an advanced ICT network 
society by rapidly deploying high-speed networks at low prices to all part of the country 
(MIC, 2006). Table 7.12 summarises the evolution of ICT policies in Japan. 
The e-Japan strategy proposed the construction of a high-speed backbone 
network to expand broadband connections and penetrations. It resulted in the upsurge of 
broadband users, indicating that 35 million households had a constant connection to a 
digital subscriber line (DSL); 23 million households had cable TV and 17.7 million 
households had fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) connections by 2003 (Naito and Hasuman, 
2005). With such a successful outcome, attention turned towards the issue of ICT usage 
by developing the e-Japan Strategy II in 2003. Seven areas were selected for intensive 
usage promotion - health care, diet, lifestyle, financing for small businesses, knowledge, 
labour and administrative services (MIC, 2010). At the end of the year, the government 
drew up the u-Japan plan, focused on facilitating the development of ‘ubiquitous 
networks’ by integrating applications, hardware and wired/wireless networks. The u-
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Japan plan had a similar goal as the e-Japan II strategy that focused on balances ICT 
infrastructure with ICT usage, but it placed more emphasis on cooperation with other 
Asian countries for the next-generation technologies. Under the u-Japan plan, Japan 
worked on R&D projects with China and Korea to implement the next-generation IP 
standard IPv6 (MIC, 2010). Despite these efforts, Japan is still a laggard in fixed and 
mobile broadband penetrations compared with Korea (ITU Statistics). 
 
Table 7.12 Japan’s ICT Policies 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication’s IT Policies (2001-2004) 
 Development of broadband infrastructure and other 
advanced communication services. 
    
2001 e-Japan strategy  Establishment of high-speed backbone network, 
promotion of education and learning system, e-
commerce and e-government, and ensuring the security 
and reliability on advanced information and 
communication network.  
2003 e-Japan strategy II  Promotion of IT usage in 7 leading areas: health care, 
diet, lifestyle, financing for small business.  
2004 
 
e-Japan strategy II accelerated 
package 
 Acceleration of the e-Japan strategy II implementation, 
aiming at the most advanced IT nation in the world by 
2005.  
 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication’s u-Japan Policies (2005-
2010) 
 Realisation of autonomous and ubiquitous networked 
ICT society 
 
2005 IT policy package  Development of ubiquitous network (both wired and 
wireless networks), advanced usage of ICT to assist in 
resolving social issues and improvement of the 
environment for ICT usage in a safe and secure manner.  
2006 IT new reform strategy 
 
 Making all areas of Japan accessible to broadband by 
2010 and dissemination to the world.  
 
Source: Compiled by the data from MIC white papers (various years). 
 
However, Japan has entered to the world top country in terms of 3G (mobile 
broadband) penetrations (95%) in 2012, after leapfrogging Korea (85%) and the United 
States (64%), which is attributable to effective government policies and reforms for 
wireless telecommunication industry. NTT has played the pivotal role in upgrading ICT 
infrastructure and creating new wireless technologies. NTT was the first inventor to 
develop analogue wireless cellular service using the PDC format, which was a proprietary 
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format used only in Japan until global standards were adopted (Lallana, 2004). Also, the 
development of 4G LTE (the latest wireless data communication technology was first 
proposed by NTT DOCOMO under the name of Super 3G in 2004, which enable 
operators to upgrade the standard with faster transmission speed and higher capacity on 
the GSM/EDGE and UMTS/HSPA network technologies (NTT DOCOMO, 2012).  
Japan’s government started to privatise NTT and liberalise its 
telecommunications market for a fair competition in the early 1980s, which was almost 
twenty years earlier than in Korea, by formulating the ‘Telecommunications Business 
Law’, the ‘NTT Law’, and the ‘Background Law for the Telecommunications Law’ (MIC, 
2005; Kushida, 2005). After the completion of NTT privatisation in 1986, the government 
introduced a decentralisation policy to prevent monopolies, arranging cellular carriers’ 
business areas by dividing into nine districts and placing strict restriction on the entry of 
new in other zone; IDO provided service to the Tokyo and Tokai region under the name 
Tokyo Digital Phone (later to become part of Softbank), while DDI concentrated on the 
Western district, such as Osaka, under the name Tsuka Cellular (later consolidated into 
KDDI) (Kushida, 2002, p.61). 
Entering the 1990s, the government undertook a deregulation process with a 
relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions. Under the deregulation policy, the 
manufacture of handsets was liberalised, allowing service providers to purchase handsets 
from external sources. All handsets were manufactured by NTT before then (Kushida, 
2002). Also, there was widespread consolidation among cellular carriers. J-phone was 
established after merging Digital Phone and Digital Tsuka in 1999. IDO and KDD 
consolidated into KDDI in 2000, standardising its brand nationally as ‘au’ for CDMA 
service, and retaining Tsuka for PDC service (Abu, 2010; Kushida, 2005; Lallana, 2004). 
The cellular division of NTT was also spun out and created NTT DOCOMO, which was 
the largest market-capitalised corporation, accounting for more than 50 percent of the 
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market share in Japan (Abu, 2010). The main three cellular carriers, NTT DOCOMO, au 
(KDDI) and Softbank, have close ties with large consumer electronics companies 
producing cellular handsets; NEC provides equipments to all three services, but Sony 
offers handsets only for NTT DOCOMO and KDDI and Sanyo produces handsets solely 
for KDDI’s service (Kushida, 2002). In addition, the leading global handset 
manufacturers, Ericsson, Nokia and Motorola, could enter the Japanese handset market to 
work together with Japanese handset manufacturers, which enables them to rapidly catch 
up and upgrade innovation capabilities with sophisticated cellular equipment (Tee and 
Gawer, 2009; Abu, 2010). In 2008, total mobile cellular subscribers numbered 112.05 
million with 88 percent penetration, indicating the mobile phone market had reached 
realistic near-saturation stage, of which DOCOMO accounted for 51.2 percent market 
share. Two other carriers, au and Softbank, held 28.9 percent and 18.9 percent of market 
share, respectively (TCA and ITU databases). 
In the 2000s, there has been a large fluctuation in carriers of market share after 
when 3G services were launched in Japan. At the beginning (not actually 3G but 2.5G), 
au was the largest 3G service provider with 85.5 percent market share, but its market 
share had significantly diminished to 27.5 percent in 2010. Although DOCOMO held 
only 13.7 percent market share, their market share sharply increased to 48.4 percent in 
2010, the result of offering a number of innovative services to subscribers with handsets 
and pricing strategies (TCA database). Also, there was another 3G mobile services 
provider, namely EMOBILE. In 2007, EMOBILE entered into 3G mobile phone markets 
with only 60,200 subscribers, but expanded its subscribers to 3.2 million as of April 2011 
with attractive pricing, marketing and service offering (TCA database). DOCOMO, 
Softbank and EMOBILE used W-CDMA technology which was widely used in Europe, 
while only au (KDDI) introduced CDMA2000 standards invented by Qualcomm. The 
maximum download speeds of CDMA2000 and W-CDMA are 2.4 Mbps and 14.4 Mbps, 
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respectively (MIC, 2010). With SK telecom, which is also the major CDMA operator in 
Korea, au KDDI announced to change its standard to LTE and fully commerce LTE 
services by 2013 (SKT, 2012).  
Regarding wireless Internet on mobile phones, the four carriers introduced 
Internet protocol (IP) functions to mobile phone networks and competed with provide 
content such as web browsing and email services (Abu, 2010). DOCOMO provides 
Internet services through i-mode, au though EZweb, Softbank through Yahoo!Keitai and 
EMBILE through EMnet (Chen et al, 2007; MIC, 2010). With the invention of i-mode, 
DOCOMO holds the largest share in 3G networks and handsets. DOCOMO is superior in 
its competitive services in quality; it provides more sophisticated and user-oriented 
services, including video mail, high-speed web access, downloads (e.g., games) and 
multimedia facilities by allowing video, audio and graphic applications. Such innovative 
handset functions led subscribers to sign up for DOCOMO’s 3G FOMA services and 
thereby strengthen its market power (MIC, 2010).  
 
7.4.3 Strengths of Polices and Innovation Systems of Wireless Telecommunication 
Industry in Korea and Japan. 
Korea and Japan have maintained the leadership position in the penetration of mobile 
phone broadband and Smartphone users, with continued innovations in the improvement 
of mobile coverage and take-up and the creation of next-generation wireless 
communications technology for a new standard, such as 4G LTE (OECD, 2006; ITU 
Statistics). Several overlapping factors behind the rapid catch-up in wireless technology in 
Korea and Japan are discussed below. There are three major contributors to Korea’s and 
Japan’s innovation system for the development of ICTs and wireless telecommunication 
industry. The first is government. As an ICT catch-up strategy, both governments formed 
regulatory and competitive policies for orchestrating the telecommunications sectors and 
286 
 
ensuring fair competition by controlling monopolies.  
To equip the ground for the information society, the government in Korea and 
Japan established NTT in 1952 and KT in 1981. NTT and KT were state-owned 
organisations and had exclusive rights as local service providers until they were privatised. 
With the market allowing pressure from the US government, Japan started to undertake 
NTT privatisation in 1982, when American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) was 
entirely dissolved, and completed its privatisation in 1982 (MIC, 2005). NTT played the 
leading role in drawing up ICT growth policy and setting up technical standards, while 
controlling the market entry of equipment manufacturing firms. Large equipment 
manufacturers, such as Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi and Oki Electric, joined the NTT R&D 
programmes as contractors and partners (Kushida, 2002; 2005). Meanwhile, KT was 
gradually privatised over ten years under state control. KT started for privatisation in 
1993 by selling the shares owned by the government, and then was fully privatised by 
selling off all equity and ownership in 2002 under the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunication Services. KT played a key role in universal 
broadband service provision and advanced wireless technologies generation, such as 
WiBro, to increase high-speed Internet market penetration and boost the global 
competiveness of the Korean information technology (IT) market (Singh, 2000; MITI, 
2008). Despite almost twenty years later than Japan, Korea’s rapid catch-up with Japan in 
the field of ICT might be partly attributable to the gradual reform toward KT privatisation.  
After privatisation, the Japanese and Korean governments placed strict 
restrictions on the entry of NTT and KT into new ICT markets, such as the cellular mobile 
market, for fear of market monopolisation by them. Such a regulatory policy promoted 
the rapid growth of private service operators (e.g., Japan: au by KDDI and Softbank; 
Korea: SK telecom and LG telecom) and led keen competition among them to create new 
technologies and differentiated products. For a fair competition, the countries introduced 
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a standard price model with a low cell phone rate that stimulates telecom operators to set 
up attractive service packages with a competitive marketing campaign to survive in local 
wireless telecommunications markets (Lallana, 2004; Jin, 2006). This could produce a 
surge in mobile demand, mobile subscribers and mobile Internet users.  
Likewise, both the Korean and Japanese governments actively intervened in the 
telecommunications industry to expand ICT usage by making Internet access with high 
transmission speeds universally available, while facilitating active cooperation among 
service operators, cell phone makers and electronics companies (e.g., flat screens, certain 
chips) to create advanced wireless technologies (MIC, 2005; MITI, 2008). To upgrade 
their telecommunications industries, the government promotion followed a three step-
process. The governments promote new telecommunications projects, seed new network 
provision and then encourage the private sector to participate in the projects by setting up 
various incentives (Jin, 2006). The main public R&D institutes in Japan are the National 
Institute of ICT, the New Generation Network Research Centre, the Information Security 
Research Centre and the Applied Electromagnetic Research Centre. The Electronics 
Telecommunications Research Institute, National Communication Association and 
National IT Industry Promotion Agency are major official R&D organisations related to 
ICTs in Korea. They have played the pivotal role in formulating and implementing new 
ICT programmes supporting the private sector’s R&D and cooperation between service 
operators and handset manufactures to develop next-generation core technologies needed 
for the latest wireless communication standard, such as LTE (MITI; 2008; MEXT, 2008). 
Remarkably, the rapid catch-up of the Korean fibre optics industry is also the 
result of government efforts. As the catch-up strategy, the Korean government 
energetically pushed to build a fibre asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) backbone from 
the middle of 1990s onwards. The pilot project to test and connect the ATM network with 
a fibre optic backbone was first executed in all government offices, and then telecom 
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operators, including KT and Dacom (the former LG Dacom), were commissioned by the 
government in a ten-year plan to develop backbone fibre networks and operate them all 
over the country (MITI, 2008). It implies that the government initially undertook a risky 
projects that is costly and uncertainty and then encouraged private sector telecom 
operators to invest in the project after taking out the start-up risk. To attract investment 
from the private sector, the government offered funding for fibre optic research and low-
interest loans for building broadband infrastructure.  
Second, large consumer electronics firms, Japan’s MNEs and Korea’s chaebols, 
have played the leading role in the development of wireless telecommunication industry 
as ICT users and equipment manufacturers. Korea’s chaebols, SK and LG act as handset 
manufacturers as well as service providers. They have long participated in the Korean and 
Japanese telecommunications service markets as equipment manufacturers, starting from 
Time Division Exchange (TDX) Project, which is the electronic telephone exchanger 
entirely developed with their own domestic technologies. They joined the project for 
TDX invention under a government initiative because it required significant R&D and 
highly sophisticated techniques in the fields of electronics, semiconductors and computer 
software (Larson, 1994; 1995). The TDX became the foundation for upgrading their 
scientific technology capability to a higher level, and subsequently becoming world-class 
telecommunications equipment producers with strong competiveness in exports. Recently, 
the Korean chaebols, especially Samsung and LG, have leapfrogged and outperformed 
Japanese large manufacturers (e.g., Matsushita, Mitsubishi and Sony) and become the 
world leader as 4G handset manufacturers and inventors of core technologies for 
upgrading 4G LTE.  
Regarding cooperation between handset manufacturers and service operators, 
Korea has more effective collaborative relationships between them, whereas a superior to 
subordinate relationship exist in Japan. Since NTT DOCOMO has its own network 
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standard (the PDC standard invented by NTT), manufacturers (e.g., Sony) are required to 
obtain permission from the DOCOMO to sell the same handsets ordered by DOCOMO to 
other providers (Kushida, 2002), which might make Sony to be a laggard in the creation 
of new technologies in response to technical change as well as consumers’ need. Although 
Sony had the leadership in the creation of 2G and 2.5G mobile phones, this company has 
been crowded out of the world mobile phone market by Korean Samsung and LG in the 
recent of Smartphone area (ITU Statistics).  
Third, an educational institution is the key contributor to the improvement of 
ICT-related products and services, especially Korea. Korea’s information technology 
education system has focused on the spread of knowledge throughout the whole nation to 
produce well-qualified people so as to make Korea rich in human resources. This differs 
from Japan’s elite-based system (the Oxbridge model), which selects a small number of 
outstanding people by setting up strict valuation criteria and then intensively trains these 
individuals. In this sense, there have been many IT facilities across the whole extent of 
Korea and the widespread training of all the people in the country in IT skills, which is a 
feature distinct from other advanced countries, including Japan (Forge and Bohlin, 2008). 
There is no doubt that the financial crisis (1997-1999) was a turning point for Korea’s 
information society. The government established information technology training 
programmes for the jobless to resolve massive unemployment caused by a large-scale 
restructuring of chaebols and many companies’ bankruptcy during the crisis. The 
unemployed who completed an entire training programme could receive a certificate 
issued by the government in addition to chances for employment in the field of ICT 
(Forge and Bohlin, 2008). Also, the programme educates adults in IT skills by offering 
free IT classes so that they feel a sense of closeness with ICT goods, such as a computer, 
can access the Internet and can communicate with people over a network. It leads to an 
upsurge in users of broadband and mobile Internet, and by extension development of the 
290 
 
telecommunications industry due to increased demand for high-quality ICT goods and 
services in Korea (also see MITI, 2008). Hence, Korea’s education institutions have made 
a great contribution to the rapid catch-up with ICT in Japan.  
 
7.4.4 Summary and Discussion 
Korea and Japan have achieved rapid ICT catch-up with the frontier countries in the 
penetrations of fixed/mobile broadband and mobile phone users, which are attributable to 
effective government ICT policies and institutional reforms supporting continued 
innovation in the creation of new wireless technologies and rapidly deploying the 
technologies on a commercial scale. Figure 7.3 shows the world’s top ten countries in the 
ICT Development Index (IDI). The IDI is a comprehensive indicator that is useful in 
comparing the level of ICT capabilities among countries. It covers ICT infrastructure, use 
and skills, fixed telephone penetration, mobile cellular telephone penetration, 
international Internet bandwidth (bit/s) per Internet user, proportion of households with a 
computer, proportion of households with Internet access at home, Internet penetration, 
fixed broadband penetration, mobile broadband penetration, adult literacy rates and gross 
secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (ITU Statistics). According to the IDI, Korea has 
the third highest level of informatisation while Japan has the eighth highest ranking in the 
world, implying higher ICT capabilities, competitiveness and performance in Korea than 
in Japan. Among ICT infrastructure indicators, Korea is the world’s top in terms of both 
wired and wireless broadband penetrations (ITU Statistics). Korea’s success in the 
development of ICT infrastructure can be attributed to effective ICT policy and robust 
government initiatives toward an ICT-friendly environment. Remarkably,  
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Figure 7.3 Top 10 countries in the ICT Development Index (2007-2008) 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the data from ITU statistics 
 
Both Korea and Japan have successfully transformed its telecommunications 
industry into a highly competitive market by privatising the state-owned operators (NTT 
and KT) and stimulating the market entry of private service providers (au by KDDI, 
Softbank, SK telecom and LG telecom), while ensuring fair competition among service 
operators and ICT-related equipment suppliers (Kushida, 2002; Jin, 2006).The 
interventionist policy restricting incumbent operator dominance (Korea’s KT and Japan’s 
NTT DOCOMO) and a legal prohibition on its mobile license (e.g., an exclusive sales 
contract) have improved the supply side including cellular carriers, handset manufacturers 
and content providers in the creation of innovative technologies, which lead to upsurge in 
mobile network users and handset demand (Kim, 2009). The cellular carriers quickly 
migrated to new standard for wireless data communications technology, such as LTE 
(fourth-generation long-term evolution), while creating the next-generation of core 
wireless technologies to upgrade the network to win over users in the heavily saturated 
mobile phone market in Korea and Japan (NTT DOCOMO, 2012). Korea is the first 
county to commercialise LTE service that covers the entire county, and has become the 
world leader in terms of the penetration of LTE network users with 15 percent (Korean 
Times, 07-22-2012).  
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Korea’s handset manufacturers (e.g., Samsung and LG) have also overtaken 
Japan’s Sony (Sony Ericsson) in the world handset market share. Figure 7.4 shows 
Samsung has been ranked as the world top and Sony as 9th in the world mobile phone 
market share in 2012. Until the early 2000s, Sony had the world leadership with Nokia 
and Motorola as a handset vendor and it was forecast to grow continuously and conquer 
the world 3G mobile phone market (KIEP, 2012). At that time, Japan’s cellular phones 
were innovative in miniaturisation of size and sophistication (e.g., camera phone), while 
commencing the world first a mobile Internet service (i.e., i-mode) and picture messaging 
service. However, Sony has been suffered from Galápagos Syndrome, implying the 
phenomenon of a rapid decrease in international competitiveness by entering a new 
phases due to a product evolving in isolation from globalisation (KIEP, 2012). The 
insufficient strategy to improve brand value and the quality adapting to the changing in 
the environment could cause the huge drop in 3G/4G mobile phone market share of Sony.  
 
Figure 7.4 Global Market Shares of Handset Manufacturers (%), 2009-2012 
 
 
Source: Compiled by data from Gartner report (2012). 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2120015 
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Despite the market share of Symbian-based devices continued to decline against 
rival platforms led by Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS, Sony remains as the largest 
support for Symbian with Nokia (see Figure 7.5). Sony has used it as the key operating 
system (OS) over the past decade (Gartner, 2012). The failure of Symbian’s evolution 
caused by passive response to the rapid change of mobile Internet trends could not attract 
both software and hardware developers, including content providers, which also might be 
the main reason for the collapse of BlackBerry’s RIM. Nevertheless, Sony did not quickly 
abandon the support and belatedly dealt with this problem. Realising the magnitudes of 
the problem, recently Sony has started to transfer to Google’s Android OS for its Smart 
phone, together with another platform led by Microsoft (Financial Times, 10-15-2012).  
 
Figure 7.5 Global Market Shares of Smartphone Operating Systems (%), 2009-2012 
 
Source: Compiled by data from Gartner report (2012). 
http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2120015 
 
Meanwhile, Samsung produced a variety of Smartphone operated by its own OS 
of Bada and other platforms, including Android, Symbian, Bada and Windows mobile 
enabled Samsung in a transition period to quickly adapt to digital evolution (KIEP, 2012). 
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After many trials and errors, the focus on Android (OS for a high-priced Smartphone) and 
Bada (OS for a mid-priced Smartphone) has allowed Samsung to strengthen international 
competitiveness in 3G and 4G mobile phone market (Financial Times, 10-15-2012). 
Although the concentration on the production of new mobile phone to increase profits, 
while offering limited services, such as upgrade service (the previous version of OS), 
have been criticised by mobile phone users who purchased Samsung’s handset in the 
transition period (KIEP, 2012), Samsung has gained increasing recognition for 
technological sophistication and design, and become the world top in the global handset 
market share in 2012 (See Figure 7.4). “Samsung and Apple continued to dominate the 
smartphone market, together taking about half the market share, and widening the gap to 
other manufacturers. No other smartphone vendors had share close to 10 percent. In the 
race to be top smartphone manufacturer in 2012, Samsung has consistently increased its 
lead over Apple, and its open OS market share increased to one-and-a-half times that of 
Apple in the second quarter of 2012” (Garter, 08-14-2012).  
 
7.5 Conclusion 
I have undertaken case studies on innovation systems and policies of the biotechnology 
and wireless telecommunication industries in Korea and Japan. These two industries are 
the path-creating catch-up models, implying that latecomer firms explore their own path 
of technological development and innovation, but their catch-up speeds and performance 
differ: slow catching up of biotechnology and rapid catching up of wireless 
telecommunications.  
Many parallels exist between Japan’s and Korea’s innovation systems in 
biotechnology versus those of the frontier countries, such as the United States. First, the 
public sector, including nationally funded universities and government-sponsored 
laboratories, is the dominant player (over private universities and corporate research 
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institutes) in the generation and diffusion of scientific knowledge because the majority of 
star scientists work in public institutes under a restrictive system that limits their working 
with the private sector in both Korea and Japan (Park, 2004; Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004). 
Second, the immobility of resources related to biotechnology creates weak state-
academia-industry cooperation in these countries. The matter of a weak relationship 
among innovators in biotechnology innovation systems is more pertinent to Korea, with 
lower numbers of cooperative patenting and lower levels of joint R&D than Japan 
(Castells and Hall, 1994; Rhee, 2003). Third, private universities and biotechnology 
ventures make relatively lower contributions to the biotechnology innovation systems of 
Korea and Japan than public research institutes and large industrial firms. Regarding 
biotechnology R&D, the established firms receive the largest share of the total R&D 
spending over biotech ventures in both countries because of the low availability of 
venture capital, whereas biotech entrepreneurs or new biotech firms originated from 
university spin-offs have greatly contributed to development of the bio-industry in the 
United States (Bartholomew, 1997).  
However, the rapid technology catch-up of wireless telecommunication industries 
in Korea and Japan suggests that the wireless telecommunication industries are largely 
unaffected by the low capabilities of university R&D and spin-offs and weak state-
academia-industry cooperation, which are the delay factors affecting biotechnology catch-
up performance in these countries. Instead, the pursuit of a competitive R&D 
environment, in-house R&D and inter-firm linkages (rather than international partnership) 
and home-grown talents made a big contribution to the progress of wireless 
telecommunication and ICTs in Korea and Japan. Hence, this study suggests that the 
triple helix paradigm that emphasises the role of universities for balanced growth based 
on university-industry-government relationships might be an appropriate model for 
biotechnology industry environment, but inappropriate for wireless telecommunication 
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industry environment. Both countries have achieved huge catch-up success in wireless 
telecommunication industry despite the lack of university R&D capabilities, inactive 
cooperation between academia and industry, as well as a low level of international 
partnership.   
Korea’s ICT capabilities in the creation of new products and services have even 
overtaken Japan’s capabilities. This provides some lessons. First, the government has 
created a medium-term strategy for ICTs so that it can adjust its plan against the constant 
evolution of digital techniques, including broadband networks and digital devices. This 
differs from other OECD countries’ long-term ICT programmes. Also, Korean ICT 
programmes are pragmatic and systematic with clear policy targets. For example, the IT 
839 strategy targeted the collaborative development of three areas - ICT services, ICT 
goods and infrastructure networks. Concretely, eight service sectors, nine product sectors 
and three infrastructure sectors were intensively fostered as new strategic businesses with 
the aim of a ubiquitously networked Korea. Therefore, government intervention has 
enabled Korea to remain the worldwide leader in terms of wired/wireless broadband 
penetration with a super-highway information network. Second, the Korean government 
efficiently uses revenues gained from spectrum licenses and taxes on operators to reinvest 
in the field of ICTs by introducing spectrum auctions. Such a strategic government 
reinvestment from spectrum fees and taxes has contributed to the improvement of 
national telecommunications infrastructure and the creation of next-generation core 
technologies while boosting exports. Third, interventionist policy for fair and free 
competition without dominance by incumbents has spurred the rapid catch-up with 
mobile and wireless technologies of the United States and Japan. To create a highly 
competitive mobile market, the Korean government has annually reformed its 
telecommunications regulation policy and regularly inspected chaebols to restrict their 
excessive expansion and market share. This has increased IT venture firms (equipment 
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suppliers) and facilitated their cooperation with service operators in the creation of 
cutting-edge products and consequently led a surge in Smartphone demand and users in 
Korea. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of national technology capabilities 
and sectoral catch-up in Korea and Japan in relation to policy and institutional changes by 
focusing on regulation, finance system, national innovation system (NIS), sectoral 
innovation system (SIS) and intellectual property (IP) regime. On the basis of a review of 
relevant literatures, I developed a theoretical framework and a methodological framework 
to address four research questions, namely: (1) In what way do government regulation 
and policy affect technology catch-up and national technology capabilities? (2) In what 
way do key actors within NIS and contextual factors affect technology catch-up and 
national technology capabilities of Korea and Japan? (3) What determines the 
occurrence and speed of catch-up and the level of technology capabilities in Korea and 
Japan?(4) What are key contributing and delay factors affecting the catch-up success in 
biotechnology and wireless telecommunications industries in Korea and Japan? These 
questions leading to specific hypotheses and propositions are analysed by both a historical 
comparative analysis and a quantitative analysis. The findings relating to the four 
questions are discussed in terms of theoretical and empirical contributions, and policy 
implications. The limitations of this thesis and directions for further research are also 
discussed in the last section. 
 
8.1 Key Arguments and Findings 
This section summaries the main findings and arguments derived from theoretical and 
empirical analyses for the research questions of this thesis.  The first sub-section discusses 
the estimation results for policy and institutional effects on national technology 
capabilities across countries. The findings are the negative effect of liberal economic 
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system for domestic market entry and capital flow, but the positive effect of a low 
regulatory burden on international trade on national technology capabilities. In addition, I 
found that the size of government acts as a moderator of regulation and foreign trade 
effects on national technology capabilities. This indicates that small government size in 
conjunction with the liberalised domestic market and foreign trade facilities technology 
investment and creation. The second sub-section discusses specific institutional 
conditions for causal relationships between technology input and output in the context of 
Korea and Japan. The findings are more effective public R&D and more dependence on 
foreign technology transfer in the development of national technology capabilities in the 
Korean innovation system. The third sub-section discusses key determinants of 
technology catch-up occurrence, speed and performance. With a sectoral analysis of 
biotechnology and wireless telecommunications technology key delaying and 
contributing factors affecting technology catch-up performance have been identified.  
Using a comparative benchmark of Japanese firms, Korean firms show better 
performance in catch-up speed in industries that require more explicit knowledge, higher 
degree of embodied technology transfer, shorter product cycle, easier access to external 
knowledge and higher appropriability. More detailed discussions on these findings are 
provided in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
8.1.1 Government Policy and Regulation and Technology Capabilities 
The first research question leading to specific hypotheses on the impacts of government 
policy and regulation on national technology capabilities across countries was empirically 
tested. On the assumption that restrictions on market entry, transactions and foreign trade 
with larger size of government over the private sectors interrupt the dynamics of 
innovation activities, I examined three institutional and policy factors as determinants of 
national technology capabilities: (i) liberal (or controlled) systems of credit and labour 
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markets, and business; (ii) freedom (or restriction) on international trade; (iii) large (or 
small) size of government.  
First, I found that government regulation in credit, labour and product markets 
positively affects national technology capabilities. This was a surprising result, since I 
anticipated that government intervention in the marketplace could hinder the dynamics of 
innovative activities. A strict government regulation implies that prices and wages are 
determined by the government (not by competition), and that resource allocation, 
knowledge transfer and entrepreneurial process are controlled by the government (Allen 
et al., 2006; Fay et al., 2007). The possible reasons for a positive correlation between 
government regulation and national technology capabilities are as follows. Firstly, the 
sample of high-income and upper middle-income countries used in this empirical study 
could produce such an effect opposite to what was expected, since they have relatively 
free market systems, engaging in voluntary exchange and allocate resource to private 
parties by the market force, compared with low-income countries. In the contexts, 
excessive liberal systems with no government interference could yield myopic behaviours 
of market participants, seeking immediate profit and focusing on short-term creation and 
investment, since innovation inherently involves in high uncertainty. Secondly, free 
market entry without any strings attached could produce make excessive and unfair 
competitive environment, making a low chance of survival of new start-ups and S&M 
businesses. The blindly reliance on the principle of the market economy without any 
government interventions in market access could cause the monopolisation of established 
firms since the entry of new firms are incapable of competing with them due to 
difficulties for cutting in cost, attracting more clients and improving supply chain. Start-
ups and S&M businesses are key contributors to the development of technologies in the 
frontier countries. Thirdly, an excessive deregulation could create an air of anxiety about 
the flight of capital, illegal leakage of knowledge and surreptitious use without licensing 
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that discourage innovative and productive activities in technology investment and 
creation. Since the relatively well-off economies (high and upper middle income 
countries) have competent to generate own technologies with advanced indigenous 
capabilities, stricter regulation action may be needed so as to prevent the leakage of 
important knowledge incurred in an inordinate mobility of capital, as well as protect 
innovators against the illegal use of their intellectual properties. Particularly, the negative 
effect of deregulation in credit market on the growth was proved by Korean experiences.  
Korea’s highly liberalised credit market system made a sudden increase in foreign capital 
flights and bad loan, which are the fundamental cause of the 1997 of financial crisis. For 
such possible reasons, I argue that government regulations in domestic market positively 
affect the development of national technology capabilities in the contexts of high-income 
and upper middle-income economies.  
Second, I found that low regulatory barriers in international trade positively affect 
national technology capabilities, implying that the open-door policy leads to the 
expansion of R&D expenditures and patent productions. Growing global interdependence 
in the product and process of innovation under globalisation (Amable, 2003), a foreign 
trade policy plays an important role in the dynamics of innovation activities by facilitating 
FDI, technology trade, internationalisation of R&D and joint R&D (Gu, 1997; Rycroft, 
2002). Such the cross-border innovation activities directly affect the stock and flow of 
knowledge, while providing learning opportunities, spillovers and externalities in a highly 
cooperative R&D environment (Rycroft, 2002). Therefore, it suggests that free trade 
system opens a gate for acquiring, transferring and generating new knowledge, and hence 
contributes to the development of national technology capabilities.  
Third, I found that there is no correlation between a size of government and 
national technology capabilities in contrast to my anticipation that a large size of 
government (the preponderance of the public sector’s investment and output over those of 
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the private sector) negatively affects technological development. However, a size of 
government moderates these effects such that low regulatory burdens on market entry and 
foreign trade have positive effects on the national technology capabilities when 
government size is small. It suggests that SOE-oriented industrial structure (not private 
industrial firm- centred structure) impedes the flow of capital (credit, labour, and 
technique), entrepreneurial process and foreign trade, and the consequent inconducive to 
the development of national technology capabilities. Therefore, I argue that a small 
government size in the combination with the liberalised domestic market and foreign 
trade systems facilities more active technology investment and creation.  
These empirical findings confirm that national technology capabilities are 
influenced by government intervention in domestic markets and free trade policy, and 
their interactions with a small size of government. The empirical contributions and 
limitations are presented in section 8.2 and 8.3. 
 
8.1.2 Institutional Conditions for Technology Input and Output Relationships  
The second research question was addressed by examining causal relationships between 
technology investments and technology creations. This empirical investigation aimed at 
evaluating the contributiveness and the effectiveness of actors within the NIS and the 
contextual factors to the development of national technology capabilities in Korea and 
Japan.  Also, I estimated how much of the current technology output (or technology input) 
can be explained by past values of technology input (or technology output), and whether 
adding lagged values of technology output (or technology input) can improve the 
explanation, and the other way around in the contexts of Korea and Japan.  
First, I found that R&D investments cause the production of patents, whereas 
there is no the causal relationship between FDI and patent creation. It suggests that 
domestic R&D performers and financiers are key contributors in the development of 
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national technology capabilities, but MNEs or foreign institutions play a minor role in 
technology development in Korea and Japan. In comparison, Korea’s R&D activities 
causes patent activities from one year to five years later (for a period of 5 years), while 
the causal relationship appears three years to four years later (for a period of 2 years) in 
Japan. This implies more time-consuming for generating and commercialising new 
knowledge, as well as shorter life cycle of products, and thereby more high technology-
centred system in Japan than Korea.  
Second, I found that the causal relationship between private R&D and patent 
production is stronger than the causality between public R&D and patents in Korea and 
Japan. In detail, Korea’s patents are created from one year to three years (for a period of 3 
years) after undertaking R&D in both public and private sectors. Meanwhile, Japan’s 
public R&D causes patenting a year later and the casual relation disappears after that, 
while private R&D facilitates patenting activity four years and six years later. It suggests 
that the Japanese public sector is less effective and innovative in the creation of new 
knowledge and technology, compared with the Korean public sector. Also, patents 
produced over a longer time span (from four years to six years after private R&D) in 
Japan are attributable to a more high-tech industrial structure, compared with the case of 
Korea (from one year to three years after private R&D), since it demands longer-term 
R&D investment.  
Third, I found that patenting activity causes an increase in technology export in 
Korea, but there is no casual relationship between them in Japan. It confirms that Korea’s 
export-oriented policy focuses on R&D activities for market-induced applied research. 
Further, there is a stronger casual relationship between patent production and technology 
imports in Korea than Japan. It suggests that Korea has a higher level of dependence on 
technology import in the creation of knowledge. Korea’s patents are created one to three 
years after introducing foreign technologies while it takes six years to produce patents 
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with imported technologies in Japan. It suggests that Japan’s innovation relies on 
intangible knowledge and sophisticated techniques since it takes more time to master, 
absorb, transfer and codify. 
Overall, this empirical study revealed (i) a critical role of R&D (lack of FDI 
influence) in national technology creation in Korea and Japan; (ii)  stronger influence of 
private sector than public sector in Korea and Japan; (iii) less effective and innovative 
public sector in Japan compared to Korea; (iv) a high-tech oriented industrial structure of 
Japan and more time-consuming nature of Japanese patenting compared to Korea; (v) a 
higher level of  dependence on foreign technologies in Korea compared to Japan.  
 
8.1.3 Determinants and Patterns of Technology Catch-up  
The third research question led to investigate in which industrial sectors Korea caught up 
rapidly with productivity and technology of Japan. In the observation of the rapid catch-
up of Korean industries against the Japanese industries, important determinants of catch-
up in terms of occurrence, speed and performance are analysed to compare catch-up 
distinctive mechanisms between the countries and to identify significant factors that 
influence latecomer countries’ technology capabilities and innovation.  
First, I found that Korean firms rapidly caught up with technology and 
productivity of Japanese firms engaged in the industries characterised by shorter product 
cycle, easier access to external knowledge and higher appropriability. The industries 
relied on more explicit knowledge and embodied technology transfer over tacit 
knowledge also tended to rapidly catch up. It suggests that technology catch-up 
performances of latecomers are determined by knowledge and technology relating to the 
ease of codification, transfer and commercialisation of R&D outcomes, as well as the low 
complexity for learning.  
Second, I found that the speed and performance of catch-up in Chaebol-centred 
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(monopolistic market structure) and export-oriented industries (high degree of external 
discipline) were much faster and better than small and medium enterprises (SMEs) or 
venture businesses-centred and domestic demand-oriented industries in Korea. In sum, 
Korea’s industrial structure is characterised by the dominance of large established firms, 
namely chaebols, and the monopolistic nature of the market. Different industrial 
structures induce different models of technology catch-up, different growth strategies and 
sectoral specialisation in the latecomer countries. Compared with Taiwan’s innovation 
cluster model (SMEs-centred) that focus on cooperative R&D, international partnerships 
and sectoral specialisation in narrow areas, Korea’s Chaebols-centred catch-up model 
seeks independent R&D, inter-firm linkages and specialises in more board areas, like 
ICTs (Hobday, 2003; Kim and Lee, 2003). Regarding technology regime, the Korean 
model is correlated with high cumulativeness and low appropriability, while the 
Taiwanese SMEs enjoy low cumulativeness and high appropriabiltiy due to a high risk for 
knowledge leakage to large firms (MNEs) (Lee and Park, 2006). These findings suggest 
that knowledge regime, financial system and trade policy are important factors in 
facilitating technology catch-up process in the context of Korea. It provides the important 
implications for other catching-up economies.  
 
8.1.4 Sectoral Innovation Systems of Biotechnology and Wireless Telecommunication 
Industry 
The fourth research question was addressed by investigating specific policy and 
institutional changes in innovation systems of biotechnology and wireless 
telecommunication industries through a comparative historical analysis. The two 
industries in Korea and Japan are the path-creating catch-up models, indicating the 
latecomer firms explore their own paths of technological development and innovation. 
However, there were relatively pathetic returns on large scale government funding and 
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corporate R&D in biotechnology industry, compared to wireless telecommunication 
industry in Korea and Japan. In this sense, strengths of innovation system of wireless 
telecommunication industry and weaknesses of biotechnology innovation system were 
analysed to find key institutional and contextual factors contributing to and delaying the 
sectoral catch-up performances. 
The root of the problem that makes the countries to delay the leapfrogging for 
advanced countries’ biotechnology capabilities are as follows. First, biotechnology 
innovation in Korea and Japan was based on independent and in-house R&D, which is 
distinct from the network-based innovation system in the United State and other the Asian 
newly industrialised countries, such as Taiwan and Singapore. Compared with other 
newly-emerging high-tech fields, a cooperative relationship rather than a competing 
relation (e.g., ICTs case) is an important channel for catching up and developing 
biotechnology (Blumenthal et al., 1986; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1993; Lethrer and 
Asakawa, 2004).  
Despite absences of science base facilities and capabilities, the countries relied on 
inter-firm linkages rather than cooperative relationships with foreign organisations, which 
might delay the rapid catch-up with biotechnology of advanced countries. Second, the 
lack of commercial orientation of the academia, the lack of mobility of scientists, the low 
quality of entrepreneurships and university spin-offs impeded the catch-up process of 
biotechnology in the countries. The recent thesis of triple helix highlights the important 
role of university in biotechnology (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000; Leydesdorff, 2006; 
Marques et al., 2006). It is analytically different from the traditional NIS model (e.g., 
Statist and Laissez-Faire models) focusing on the central role of firms in technical 
innovation (Ludnvall, 1992) and the Triangle model focusing the decisive role of 
government in tradition (Inzelt, 2004). The success of biotechnology catch-up and 
innovation much depend upon R&D capabilities of universities. However, the countries’ 
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universities were inactive for spin-offs and joint-R&D, while concentrating on learning 
and mastering the extant knowledge over research (Westney 1993; Bartholomew, 1997; 
Oh, 2002). Further, low availability of venture capital and weak state-university-industry 
relationship were the hindrances of rapid catch-up of biotechnology in both Korea and 
Japan. Japan lagged behind even Korea in terms of the number of NBFs and venture 
capital investments in life sciences, while the weak university-industry relation was a 
more serious problem in Korea due to the lower level of R&D capability of universities. 
Some policy measures for improvement are suggested in section 8.2. 
Meanwhile, Korea and Japan have become the frontier countries with the United 
States in terms of mobile telecommunications and wireless technologies. How have they 
managed to rapidly catch up of the technologies at higher speed than biotechnology 
despite lack of university R&D capabilities and inactive government-academia-business 
cooperation? There are three major contributors to Korea’s and Japan’s innovation system 
of wireless telecommunication industry. The first is government. As information and 
communications technology (ICT) catch-up strategy, both governments formed both the 
regulatory and competitive policies for orchestrating telecommunications sectors and a 
fair competition by controlling monopolies. With close ties with private sectors, 
governments have made its telecommunications industry to be highly competitive by 
privatising the state-owned operators and stimulating private sectors to compete with the 
incumbent for next generation wireless technologies by offering several incentives.  Also, 
the governments actively intervened in telecommunications industry to expand usage of 
ICTs by making an universal available of Internet access with high transmission speeds, 
create advanced wireless technologies, and facilitate active cooperation among service 
operators, cell phone makers and electronics companies. The second is the large industrial 
firms. Japan’s MNEs and Korea’s Chaebols have greatly contributed to the rapid catch-up 
of ICT-related goods and services as a service supplier, and an equipment manufacturer. 
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The large consumer electronics companies have long participated in the Korean and 
Japanese telecommunications service markets as equipment manufacturers, starting from 
the TDX project. They joined the project for the TDX invention under the government 
initiative, because it was required a large R&D and highly sophisticated technique in the 
fields of electronics, semiconductors and computer software (Larson, 1994; 1995). The 
TDX became the foundation for upgrading their scientific technology capability to a 
higher level, and subsequent being the world-class telecommunications equipment 
producers with a strong competiveness in exports. Recently, the Korean Chaebols, 
especially Samsung and LG, have leapfrogged and outperform their Japanese 
manufactures - Matsushita, Mitsubishi and Sony, and become the world leader as a 
handset manufacturer and inventor of wireless technologies. The third is education 
institutions. Remarkably, the rational reform of education institutions has enabled Korea 
to overtake Japan’s innovation capabilities of ICTs, especially broadband and mobile 
technologies. Korea’s information technology (IT) education system has focused on the 
spread of knowledge among the whole nation to produce well-qualified people so as to 
make Korea to be rich in human resources, which is distinctive from Japan’s elite-based 
system. In this sense, there have been many IT facilities across the whole extent of Korea 
and the widespread training of all the people in the country in IT skills (Forge and Bohlin, 
2008). 
Therefore, the findings suggest that the rapid catch-up of wireless 
telecommunications industries in Korea and Japan cannot be explained in the triple helix 
paradigm that highlights the role of university, since the countries have low levels of 
university R&D capabilities and University-Industry collaborations. Despite such 
weaknesses make the slowing catch-up of biotechnology, the close ties between 
government and large industrial firms in their innovation systems help rapidly catch up 
and develop technology capabilities in wireless telecommunication industry, since 
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university plays relatively minor role.  
 
8.2 Main Contributions and Implications 
This thesis integrated NIS and late industrialiser perspectives to analyse the country-level 
and sector-level dynamics of innovation and their consequences on technology progress 
and competiveness. It contributes to the existing innovation literatures by providing a 
context-sensitive analysis of national technology capabilities and sectoral catch-up 
performances in Korea and Japan. The main theoretical and empirical contributions and 
policy implications are discussed in this section. 
 
8.2.1 Theoretical Contributions  
This thesis has developed a synthesised model by making up for theoretical shortcomings 
in institutional economics, the NIS and the late industrialisation. It provides a useful 
theoretical lens through which the primary rationale for the success of Korea and Japan in 
terms of national technology capabilities and sectoral catch-up performance could be 
analysed. The main theoretical contributions to the existing innovation studies are as 
follows.  
First, this thesis has compensated the weak points in new institutional economics 
that focuses on the role of social norms and legal rules that govern individual behaviour 
and structure social interactions in economic growth and competiveness (North, 1997; 
Aoki and Masahiko, 2001; Easterly, 2001). The theory does not look at the role of 
institutions in an angle of technical innovation, despite distinctive policy and institutional 
frameworks are key parts in producing various patterns of innovation and levels of 
technology capabilities across countries and industries within countries. I overcame such 
a blind spot the underlying of the new institutional theory by employing the theory of NIS. 
From the NIS perspective, NIS configurations and national institutional networks that 
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shape the country specific system of the stock and flow of knowledge as key sources of 
the variety in patterns of the product and process of innovation at various levels (Kogut, 
1991; Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1998). 
Second, this thesis has filled the gaps in NIS approach by introducing the late 
industrialiser perspective due to the limitation in applying into the contexts of Korea and 
Japan, where government and non-market actors play an active role in the development of 
technology capabilities. The principles and configurations of NIS were modelled on the 
systems of advanced countries, suggesting the build of strong professional networks and 
institutional links as the logical premises for the diffusion and the creation of new 
knowledge. Despite a weak State-University-Industry relationship, however, the countries 
have achieved the rapid technology catch-up and become world leaders in many high-tech 
fields. Also, NIS approach provides static descriptions of national institutional devices 
and mechanisms without proper regard to the special characteristics of sectoral, regional 
and international contexts, although technological change is often determined outside the 
system in the countries (Viotti, 2002). Therefore, this thesis extended the NIS perspective 
by employing the late industrialiser perspective, considering the country-specific 
structural, institutional and contextual environments.  
Third, this thesis has developed an integrated theoretical framework by expanding 
the scope of analysis in the NIS due to the difficulty in capturing the idiosyncratic nature 
of institutional and technological changes in Korea and Japan. It makes up for the 
insufficient part of the conventional business theory derived by the Western 
multinationals’ industrialisation, internationalisation and innovation processes, since the 
governmental implications and institutional embeddedness in Korea and Japan directly 
related to succeed industrial development, overseas expansions and innovation.  
Fourth, this thesis has contributed to the existing theoretical research on 
determinants of technology capabilities and innovation by addressing political, 
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institutional and contextual factors that produce different patterns of innovation and 
sectoral specialisation across countries. The existing management studies based on the 
resource-based view (RBV) have underlined the significance of the bundle of the firm’s 
unique resource and capabilities as key determinants of innovativeness and financial 
performance (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000). The RBV has provided the understanding of the cross-country and 
inter-firm differences by focusing on the choice of appropriate resources, but ignored the 
process of resource development and the contextual factors surrounding resource. The 
theoretical shortcomings in the RBV have been redeemed in the dynamic capability view 
(DCV), highlighting the specific capacity for resource development and renewal 
responding to the changing business environment (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 
1997; Winter, 2003). However, the DCV is not suitable to my theoretical framework as 
the main theoretical base, since it has no consideration for the specific institutional and 
sectoral conditions for the stock and flow of valuable resources despite the great influence 
on the development of technology capabilities and catch-up performances. Although the 
importance of national economic and institutional conditions has been emphasized by 
Michael E. Porter’s diamond model, this model has also failed to capture the idiosyncratic 
features and determinants of technology capabilities of Korea and Japan. Porter’s 
diamond model has paid no direct attention to non-market relations and international 
factors (e.g., FDI, internationalised R&D), and their impacts on technology capabilities, 
which are key contributing factors influencing technology catch-up performances due to 
the lack of R&D resources in Korea and Japan.  
Therefore, the integrated theoretical framework based on the NIS and late 
industrialiser perspectives have filled the gaps in the existing studies by focusing on 
institutional and contextual factors to some extent through the examination of the roles of 
government policy for domestic market and foreign trade, IPRs, finance system, 
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technology regime and sectoral contexts in technical innovation and catch-up. These 
investigations have been provided more balanced perspective for understanding under-
explored national, sectoral and international contexts in innovation studies, as well as 
overcoming the methodological limitations of existing innovation research in the contexts 
of East Asian latecomers, which have been mainly dominated by historical description 
and qualitative case analysis. Further, the case study of Korea and Japan has lay out a 
logical basis for the State-coordination against the neo-liberalism arguments by analysing 
the country-specific institutional and policy frameworks and their influences on national 
technology capabilities and sectoral technology catch-up performance in the context of 
Korea and Japan.   
 
8.2.2 Empirical Contributions 
My methodological framework contributes to empirical innovation studies. First, the 
institutional comparative analysis of this thesis, combined with a historical approach, has 
provided a contextual understanding of institutional change in industrial structure, finance 
system, NIS and SIS, and its influences on technology catch-up patterns and sectoral 
specialisations. Considering historical singularities and contextual dynamics of innovation, 
this approach, relying on a two-sided comparison, has enabled us to capture distinctive 
determinants and mechanisms for technology capabilities with a systematic and a 
contextualised comparison between the selected cases, namely Korea and Japan. It has 
provided an insightful interpretation between evidence and theory, as well as a fair degree 
of generalisability, since it is impossible for testing the validity of the existing theory and 
generating an adequate theory with a single case (Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000). The 
two-sided comparison has been based on firstly a positive comparison method because of 
similar institutional and contextual features of the countries, and then a negative 
comparison method to find their similarities and differences in patterns and determinants 
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of innovation. It has enabled us to conceptualise internal and external factors affecting 
national technology capabilities and sectoral catch-up performances by considering 
historical and institutional sequences over time.  
Second, this study contributes to the existing comparative studies. A number of 
macro studies have testified the same growth paths among countries which are grouped 
by institutional characteristics, such as finance systems (market-based vs. bank-based), 
legal origins (common law vs. civil law) and corporate governance systems (shareholder 
vs. stakeholder) etc. However, they have rarely examined distinctive mechanisms for 
technology capabilities and catch-up from an angle of innovation. Also, there have been 
no comparative studies focusing on the growth patterns by grouping the heterogeneity of 
countries into the state-led capitalist countries, such as Korea and Japan. Despite huge 
differences in cultural tradition and economic development level, the two different 
economies have shared many institutional features, including a close political-commercial 
link, the large firms-oriented industrial structure, the state-organised NIS and in-house 
R&D system. The comparative study between Korea and Japan which have the most 
similar characteristics in the world can overcome the risk of comparing apples with 
oranges. Due to the particularities of institutional settings in Korea and Japan, the widely-
used research method also have the limit in applying into the contexts of countries, which 
encounter the problems of validation of the findings of the research and generalisability. 
Therefore, this thesis sheds light on the comparative studies on NIS in which the 
principles and configurations are modelled on the systems of advanced countries, by 
examining the trajectory of state-business relationships and external heterogeneity in 
contextual homogeneity.   
Third, the empirical investigation using a wide range of sample (69 countries) has 
enabled us to generalise significant institutional and policy determinants of technology 
capabilities. The cross sectional research using such large numbers could alleviate the 
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problems of the case-biased findings and generalisability (Yin, 1994). The methodological 
issues in a cross-sectional estimation have been addressed by successfully controlling 
huge technology gaps, different levels of economic development, and various institutions 
by using relevant control and dummy variables. Also I have made up for the vulnerable 
point of the cross-sectional method that ignores an intrinsic importance of case and its 
contextual background conditions (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1994) by analysing these linkages in 
the particular cases. This macro-level analysis is a new attempt to empirically examine the 
effects government regulation and policy on technology capabilities across countries. 
Despite innovators are susceptible to regulatory burdens on credit, labour and business 
and foreign trade, government policy and regulation have been overlooked as 
determinants of national technology capabilities in the existing empirical innovation 
researches. Also, the empirical studies on political and institutional economics have 
addressed institutional and policy factors as important sources of economic growth, 
human welfare and entrepreneurship, although they directly affect innovation patterns and 
performances. Therefore, this empirical study has filled the gaps to the existing political 
economy and innovation studies.  
Fourth, the time-series data analysis using triple helix indicators within NIS and 
the contextual factors could remedy methodological shortcomings in the existing studies 
on NIS that have been dominated by a combination of descriptive and historical analyses. 
By testing the causal relationship of R&D expenditures by sectors within NIS with 
respect to the production of patents, this empirical analysis has enabled to capture 
singularities in specific institutional conditions for technology input-output relationship, 
drawing a profile of innovation patterns and sectoral specialisation in Korea and Japan. 
The validity issue has been addressed through longitudinal data collection approaches that 
could reduce the bias coming from a rapid change of the transition period in Korea and 
Japan. This empirical study has provided a new way of explaining the dynamics of 
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innovation in Korea and Japan by separately examining the causal relationship of each 
sector contributing to the NIS between technology investment and technology creation. 
Most innovation studies have looked the relationship through a correlation test under 
consideration of technology investment as a determinant of technology creation. Also, 
there have no existing empirical studies on the causality to examine the causal relations 
between technology input variables (i.e., R&D expenditure) and technology output 
variables (i.e., patents). The greater part of this area have focused on the causality of 
economic and financial variables, for instance, between financial development (e.g., stock 
market volatility and catpitalisation) and economic growth (e.g., GDP) (Arestis and 
Demetriades, 1997; Calderón and Liu, 2003), between FDI and economic growth (Hansen 
and Rand, 2006; Hsiao and Hsiao, 2006), between capital investment and economic 
growth (Vanhoudt, 1998; Elena and Gaetano, 2001) and between international trade (e.g., 
export and import ) and productivity (Awokuse, 2008; Harrison, 2007). Therefore, this 
empirical study contributes to the existing empirical studies by developing an alternative 
method that allows quantitatively analysing specific institutional conditions for the 
technology input–output relationships and the patterns of technological development.  
Finally, the comparative study on technology catch-up in latecomers has provided 
a comprehensive evaluation of technology catch-up models, which enables us to compare 
different mechanisms for sectroal technology catch-up of Korean firms with those of 
Japanese firms. This study has also extended the recent catch-up studies by suggesting 
that the occurrence and speed of catch-up and innovation largely depend on technology 
regime, market structure, and financial system and trade policy in the contexts of 
latecomer countries. The findings have significant relevance to innovation strategy and 
policy in other countries, particularly catching-up countries with indigenous technology 
capabilities. 
Therefore, this thesis have filled the methodological and theoretical gaps in prior 
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innovation researches, by using a theoretical integration of multiple innovation factors, a 
historical comparative research and an empirical investigation of social phenomena via 
statistical techniques. The findings of this thesis may be generalised to apply in other 
catching-up or emerging countries.  
 
8.2.3 Policy Implications  
I have concluded that the regulatory market system, liberalised system of trade and their 
interactions with small government size positively affect the national technology 
capabilities in high-income and upper middle-income countries in chapter 5. The first 
empirical findings for the negative impact of free market system on national technology 
capabilities implies that blind reliance on the principle of the market economy, meaning 
that prices, wages, business transactions and market entry are unconditionally determined 
by only competition without any government interferences, does not promote long-term 
value creation and innovative activities.  It suggests that a free market system can produce 
short-termism with concerns about a flight of capital and surreptitious use without 
licensing, while reducing the viability of new start-ups due to being incapable for 
competing with the established firms without government supports. Therefore, the 
government should set up stricter regulatory policy to promote productive and innovative 
activities in the contexts of high-income and upper middle-income countries, which have 
relatively free market systems to engage in voluntary exchange and allocate resource to 
private parties by the market force. Since the countries have competency to generate own 
technologies with advanced indigenous capabilities, the government intervention is 
required for preventing the monopolisation of large firms, the illegal use of their 
intellectual properties and the leakage of important knowledge. The second findings that a 
low regulatory burden on international trade influences national technology investment 
and creation imply that the open-door policy promotes the stock and flow of knowledge 
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by opening a gate for mastering, absorbing and transferring advanced technologies. Since 
liberalised system of trade facilitates active FDI, technology trade and R&D cooperation 
across the border, it suggests that the removal trade barrier is an essential condition for 
developing national technology capabilities. The third findings is that a size of 
government moderates these effects such that low regulatory burdens on credit, labour 
and business and foreign trade have positive effects on the national technology 
capabilities when government size is small. The large government size is indicative of 
heavier spending of public sectors (SOEs) over individuals and industrial firms, implying 
that resources are allocated by political choice and government decision-making, not by 
personal choice. Since the SOEs generally engage in protected industries with 
government funds, more concentrating on producing commodities for domestic market 
and supplying public wants over exporting, the combination of a small government size 
and liberal policy strengthens their effects on technology investment and creation. 
Therefore, it suggests that a low degree of government involvement is necessary for 
developing technology capabilities of countries with highly liberalised systems of 
domestic market and foreign trade.  
The case study of Korea and Japan supports the cross-country empirical findings, 
highlighting the positive effects of government interventionist policy and regulation on 
national technology capabilities in the contexts of relatively less globalised countries. 
Both Korea’s and Japan’s innovation environments are well-internationalised, but not 
less-globalised, indicating relatively low level of cross-border cooperation compared with 
other technologically advanced countries. Despite they invest and send their employers 
aboard to exploit new market and learn new knowledge (i.e., internationalisation), most 
R&D is performed within the countries. Also, key actors within NIS of Korea and Japan 
are not willing to export knowledge and engage in international collaboration in the fields 
where they are recognised as the world top. In this sense, effective government policies 
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and institutional reforms that are regarded as one of the key success factors of Korea’s 
and Japan’s rapid technology catch-up have provided new implications on policy issues. 
S&T policies in Korea and Japan have been repeatedly revised to address facing 
problems and suggest new direction of S&T development with clear objectives, 
instruments and policy prioritisation, which have been codified in strategy papers or white 
papers to inform the public and relevant stakeholders about current and future policies. 
With policy change, the government has carried out institutional reform to meet their 
S&T policy goals by establishing effective mechanism for collective risk-sharing by 
industry, government and their lenders. Such a risk-sharing partnership should be 
essential for the long-term R&D, especially in the take-off stage toward innovation-driven 
growth. The government funds for R&D and product development have been distributed 
in a highly competitive way, picking out priority areas through various means to allocate 
resources. The top priority policy has been placed on financing fast-growing industries in 
which income elasticity of demand and labour productivity have risen quickly as well as 
technological progress has been rapid, while flexibly adjusting  priority industries by 
phasing out declining industries in an orderly and timely fashion. Nevertheless, the 
priority areas are until now of different status. For instance, ICT and materials research 
have produced better innovation performance and can be regarded as the world top in 
both counties, whereas life science and biotechnology have been less progressed than 
expected despite longer period of investments.  
In what ways have the Korean and Japanese governments managed their weak 
innovation systems to leapfrog wireless telecommunications technologies? The research 
on wireless telecommunications in Korea and Japan has provided mainly two important 
lessons to other latecomer countries. First, the intervention of government and its close 
ties with the private sector are key success factors for upgrading telecommunications 
infrastructure and developing new wireless technologies in the countries. The Korean 
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government has made the medium term strategic plan for S&T development to flexibly 
adjust its plan against constantly evolving technology fields, which is different from other 
OECD countries’ long-term ICT programmes. The ICT-promotion policy is pragmatic and 
systematic with clear policy targets. For instance, the IT 839 strategy targeted the 
collaborative development of three areas - ICT services, ICT goods and infrastructure 
networks. The participants are privileged from the monetary burden with a number of 
incentives, such as research funding, tax detection for intellectual resource trade, low 
interest loans for the construction of the R&D facilities, subsidies for human capital and 
so on (Chun, 2002; Lee, 2000). Second, the interventionist policy for a fair and free 
competition without dominance by the incumbent has helped the rapid catch-up with high 
technologies of the United States and Europe. To make highly competitive domestic 
market, the Korean and Japanese governments have actively reformed their regulation 
policies and regularly inspected for Korean Chaebols and Japanese large firms (MNEs) to 
restrict their excessive expansions and market shares. Such great efforts allow the 
increased of venture firms (equipment suppliers) and facilitated R&D cooperation with 
among various players service operators in the creation of cutting edge products, and the 
consequent lead a surge of mobile-Internet demand and users in Korea and Japan.  
However, biotechnology in both Korea and Japan is the slowest catching-up 
industry in promising industries. The study of biotechnology in Chapter 7 has suggested 
important policy directions and implications. How should the government deal with the 
problems? First, both countries’ innovation systems of biotechnology are characterised by 
the in-house R&D and inter-firm cooperation make it especially hard to rapid catch up 
with biotechnology of advanced countries. Compared with wireless telecommunications, 
the cross-border cooperation is more important than competition, thereby more globalised 
network-based innovation systems of biotechnology should be required for the stock and 
flow of scientific knowledge in absence of science base facilities and capabilities. Second, 
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the lack of university’s R&D capacity, the large established firm-centered industrial 
structure and weak cooperation between academia and industry communities are the key 
delaying factors the slowing catch-up of biotechnology in Korea and Japan. The low 
availability of venture capital and the lack of commercial orientation of the academia are 
also the hindrances of biotechnology progress in both Korea and Japan. Japan has lagged 
behind even Korea in terms of the number of NBFs (new biotech firms) and venture 
capital investments in life sciences due to a heavy government regulation in mobility of 
scientists. The weak university-industry relation has been a more serious problem in 
Korea due to the feeble scientific and information networks and the lower level of R&D 
capability of universities that are still focusing on learning and mastering the extant 
knowledge. Therefore, the policymaker should devise effective policy measure to 
promote NBFs and university spin-offs, and cooperation between academia and industry 
communities. 
 
8.3 Limitations and Further Research  
The study has some limitations that direct future research. First, the present thesis has 
provided a strong relationship of institutional and policy factors with respect to 
technology capabilities, but could not include all possible institutional variables affecting 
innovative activities due to the lack of available data. The data of transition countries (low 
middle-income and low-income countries) has been excluded due to huge missing values 
in the cross-country empirical study.  With a larger sample, it should be controlled the 
different legal origins or varieties of capitalism for greater statistical significance in future 
study. Also, the use of the panel data with more longitudinal approaches should be 
required for looking all variables changes over time and generating detail information due 
to cross sectional nature of the study. Second, R&D and patent data have been divided by 
two sectors, public and private sectors due to data unavailability of university’s R&D in 
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the empirical study on the casual technology input-output relationships. Also, I have not 
considered of the cooperation among key actors within NIS, which directs future research. 
Third, this study has not considered organisational factors as determinants of technology 
capabilities. The cross-country differences in innovation patterns and performances can be 
caused by a complex interplay of the country-specific institutional factors and corporate 
governance factors: for instance market or equity-based ownership (i.e., dispersed 
shareholders: See Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1962; Porter, 1992) and relationship 
or bank-based ownership (i.e., corporate cross-holdings, bank-centered ownership: See 
Prowse, 1990; Sheard, 1994). There have been a number of studies on corporate 
ownership structure as determinants of innovation. Francis and Smith (1995) examine the 
relationship between firms’ ownership structure and innovation performance, and 
concluded that the firm with a highly concentrated management ownership or a 
significant equity block holder is more actively undertake innovation activities than the 
diffusely-held firm. However, the excessive firms’ ownership concentration and 
dominated insiders over outsiders have a harmful effect on firms’ performance due to 
arbitrary owner’s decisions, less liquidity in markets and fewer opportunities to negotiate 
the firm’s values (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer and Wolfenzon; 2002). However, there 
are a strong possibility to exist information asymmetry between owners and managers in 
diffusely held firm (Francis and Smith; 1995), implying that the separated management 
structure is likely to cause the conflict of opinion among them for performing innovation 
projects and allocating R&D resources.  However, there have been no existing studies to 
examine the effect of any type of corporate ownership and finance systems on 
technological capabilities across countries. The majority of existing empirical studies on 
innovation examine its correlation with the growth, such as firm performance, national 
income, productivity and competitiveness. Often, firms’ internal variables (i.e., 
concentrated ownership right) and finance market systems (i.e., market capitalisation) are 
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used for controlling the heterogeneity of samples, while linking them to innovation 
performance. Further, the existing empirical studies on corporate governance and finance 
system have not considered their relations with innovation performance at a macro level. 
It may be, because an empirical testing to verify these relationships at a macro-level may 
encounter difficulties in moderating huge technology gaps, the different level of economic 
development and various institutions across countries, because their distinct 
characteristics cause different statistical outcomes. Therefore, future research should be 
conducted to examine the relationship between corporate governance factors and 
technology capabilities with multi-levels of analysis (firm and national levels) and in an 
interdisciplinary research framework (strategy, management and political economic 
perspective). 
Despite these limitations, this study has made the contribution to the existing 
literature. Most research on innovation has neglected the study of an institutional context 
in spite of the widespread recognition that innovators are susceptible to contextual 
influences because of the unique characteristics of technical innovation - risky, costly, 
uncertainty and long-term investment. Also, the majority of political economists have 
addressed institutional and policy factors as important determinants of economic growth, 
human welfare and entrepreneurship in spite of the fact that innovative activities are 
affected by institutional framework that shapes competitive or cooperative research 
climates. Therefore, this study has filled the gaps to the existing political economy and 
innovation studies by demonstrating the effect of institutions on technology capabilities.  
 
8.4 Concluding Remarks  
This thesis has attempted to provide new insights in explaining the underlying dynamics 
of rapid technological catch-up and innovation in Korea and Japan. It has undertaken a 
comprehensive treatment of determinants of technology capabilities innovation in terms 
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of the effects of institutional, policy and contextual factors drawn from the NIS and late 
industrialiser perspectives. This thesis contributes to innovation literatures by considering 
institutional and international factors through the examination of the roles of government 
policy for domestic market and foreign trade, IPRs, finance system, and of technology 
regime and sectoral contexts in technical innovation and catch-up. These investigations 
have provided a more comprehensive and balanced perspective for understanding national, 
sectoral and international contexts of innovation, as well as overcoming some of 
methodological limitations of existing innovation research in the contexts of East Asian 
latecomers. Scholars and policy makers may gain useful lens and insights on national 
technology capabilities from this study and extend them in their pursuit of specific 
academic or policy interests particularly in the context of latecomer countries.  
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